

FRAMEWORK FOR COLLECTIVE IMPACT IN PEACEBUILDING

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CDA COLLABORATIVE LEARNING PROJECTS

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Finally, we acknowledge the considerable work over many years by the team at FSG. As you will see, this Framework builds on their collective impact model, adapting it to the peacebuilding context. We are grateful for their pioneering work for collective impact.

Framework for Collective Impact in Peacebuilding: Revised version following case studies and consultation

We invite colleagues to use this framework to support groups that are attempting to achieve collective impacts in conflict contexts — before, during, or in the aftermath of violence. We assume that it will need adaptation to each setting and the needs of the consortium, network, or platform involved. We only ask that you let us know the results of the process.

CDA is also prepared to accompany and advise groups that are interested in organizing a collective impact process. If you would like more information, please contact CDA at cda@cdacollaborative.org.

Please send feedback and experiences to CDA at cda@cdacollaborative.org.

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I. INTRODUCTION¹

Why Collective Impact?

This framework aims to achieve a clear goal: greater impact from collective efforts toward peace. That is, even if peace practitioners improve the effectiveness of their individual programmatic actions, collectively they may not achieve significant impacts at a systemic level, which must involve changing the fundamental causes of conflict and the cycles of violence and injustice that sustain it. Hence the need for a framework for collective impact.

The underlying premise (theory of change) of collective impact is that increased coherent action and mutual support by multiple dedicated actors can create effective synergies to accelerate and sustain progress toward durable peace.

This is not to suggest that collective impact efforts are the only means for achieving durable peace. Certainly, we have seen, for many years, that many attempts to make progress do eventually succeed, even if they are sometimes chaotic, even disorganized. The idea is, rather, that progress can be more efficient, faster, and perhaps more sustained, if individuals and organizations dedicated to peace work together more self-consciously and deliberately. Despite the needed investment of organizational time and resources, the costs of continued conflict and violence are too high to depend on processes that creep slowly toward peace or stumble upon it accidentally. Harnessing the collective resources, energy, and imagination of multiple peace actors has the potential for gaining greater coherence and impact in the search for peace.

This Framework is intended for a broad audience, including a wide range of civil society organizations, government and intergovernmental entities, donors, and, potentially, the business community.² Collective impact efforts also represent a wide range of forms and structures; the most common include networks, consortia, coalitions, alliances, and platforms. CDA has conducted case studies of several collective impact efforts, some of them involving all types of groups, others composed of a narrower range.³ The Framework benefits from this wide experience and intends to support all groups that are interested in promoting peace.

A Framework, Not a Model

Models can be dangerous. If misused or misinterpreted, they can suggest that there is a formula or set series of steps that, if followed faithfully, will lead to predictable results. In the

1 This document refers to collective impact in “peacebuilding.” This term should be understood broadly to include conflict prevention, efforts to promote peace in the midst of war/violent conflict, and postwar consolidation of peace and the prevention of further cycles of violence. It is our assumption, also, that “upstream” conflict prevention efforts ultimately must address the same factors as atrocities prevention. However, the crisis intervention modes in relation to conflict and atrocities may look somewhat different.

2 CDA’s Business and Peace Project has concluded that, in most circumstances, the business community can only contribute directly to peace in collaboration with other actors. See “A Seat at the Table: Capacities and Limitations of Private Sector Peacebuilding” at www.cdacollaborative.org.

3 Three case studies and summaries of two new network initiatives are available on the CDA website: www.cdacollaborative.org.

peacebuilding and conflict prevention arena, this is a meaningless notion. Conflict contexts are extremely varied and dynamic, requiring constant renewal of analyses, ongoing learning, and adaptive management in response to changing conditions and feedback. The overall approach to effective peacebuilding should embody adaptive management in response to constantly updated and systemic analysis of the key drivers of conflict, as well as information about the effects of peace efforts. We suggest that the concept of a “framework” implies greater flexibility than a “model” — and have used that language in this paper, which is intended as the basis for field testing and refinement.

Origins and Development of the Framework

In developing this Framework for Collective Impact in Peacebuilding, we started with the Collective Impact model provided by FSG in a series of articles in the *Stanford Social Innovation Review*.⁴ In doing so, we recognized that the FSG approach benefits from many years of experience among networks dedicated to justice and peace in many dimensions, mostly within the United States context plus a few international examples. Nevertheless, the FSG model has certain limitations, and some experienced experts in coalition building and networking have offered critiques of the Collective Impact model.⁵ We have attempted to account for those critiques in offering this Framework.

As we shall see below, the FSG Collective Impact model needs significant modification to make it applicable to the peacebuilding context, as even the minimum criteria or preconditions for collective impact, as suggested by FSG, are rarely entirely met in conflict zones. For the initial draft of this Framework, we completed a literature review to identify other possible approaches to collective action and/or coordination that could complement (or contradict) the FSG framework.⁶ While the available research and commentaries were neither extensive nor deep, some useful ideas and cautions emerged — and these have been incorporated into the Framework.

As a key step in developing this Framework, we shared a preliminary draft with a range of colleagues and convened a one-day consultation in Washington, D.C., in July 2016 and incorporated the feedback into a subsequent draft that was used for further development. Subsequently, with support from a grant from Humanity United, CDA undertook field testing of the Framework through a series of three case studies regarding existing networks in the Philippines, Kenya, and a country dubbed “Boendoe” (anonymized due to risks to the network and its members). At the same time, CDA provided technical support and documented two efforts by Search for Common Ground in Sri Lanka and Nigeria to launch new collective impact networks. These case studies⁷ provided raw material for a consultation in October 2018, bringing together the case authors as well as representatives of the organizations involved and other interested colleagues. The helpful reflections of that group have been incorporated into this revised version of the Framework. While the Framework is complete for now, we fully expect to refine it through ongoing learning.

4 Hanleybrown, Fay, John Kania, and Mark Kramer, “Channeling Change: Making Collective Impact Work,” *Stanford Social Innovation Review*, January 2013. John Kania and Mark Kramer, “Collective Impact,” *Stanford Social Innovation Review*: 36–41, 2011. John Kania and Mark Kramer, “Embracing Emergence: How Collective Impact Addresses Complexity,” *Stanford Social Innovation Review*, January 2012.

5 See, for example, Tom Wolff, “Ten Places Where Collective Impact Gets It Wrong,” *Global Journal of Community Psychology Practice*, March 2016.

6 See Marin O’Brien Belhoussein, “Developing a Model for Collective Impact for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding: Summary of Initial Findings,” CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, May 2016.

7 As noted, these are available on the CDA website: www.cdacollaborative.org.

Who Might Use This Framework?

A range of entities might use this Framework, including:

- An emerging coalition or network of local organizations wishing to increase the results of their peace efforts
- An international peacebuilding NGO, a private foundation, or a coalition/consortium intending to support local actors and organizations to undertake complementary actions and/or to supplement official peace processes
- A donor or group of donors wishing to increase the effectiveness of their grant making and/or the impacts of grant recipients
- A U.N. official, U.N. agency, or regional intergovernmental organization (e.g., a Special Representative of the Secretary General, a U.N. Resident Coordinator or a U.N. Peacebuilding Fund/Commission) wishing to (a) improve the impacts of the U.N. “family” itself, and/or (b) increase effectiveness of the international community as a whole, or regional initiatives in relation to a peace process or post-violence peacebuilding efforts
- A government peace commission or ministry tasked with consolidating peace or preventing future violent conflict

These entities face a common challenge: how to harness the energies and initiatives of multiple groups and individuals to achieve the shared goal of durable peace. While applications of the Framework by these different groups must differ in important respects, the fundamental tasks remain similar.

What This Document Covers and How to Use This Framework

This Framework is not a recipe for successful collective impact efforts in peacebuilding. Rather, it presents a series of questions and considerations that have been found to be helpful as groups have tried to achieve greater progress. Section II discusses a set of principles that must inform any collective impact effort in the peacebuilding realm. Section III presents five conditions for collective impact — adapted from the FSG model to fit the realities of conflict areas. Finally, Section IV presents a series of preliminary steps and key questions that need to be asked in preparation for a collective impact effort.

Because the Framework is not a step-by-step guide, we suggest that groups and individuals use it to prompt careful thinking about whether and how to build the trust and mutual understanding necessary for successful joint efforts.

II. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS

Fundamental Principles

Before presenting the full Framework for Collective Impact in Peacebuilding, we offer the following summary of key principles that should inform any effort to promote greater collaboration and cooperation among peace actors. These principles were emphasized by practitioners and academics during CDA's July 2016 and October 2018 consultations, and have been affirmed by CDA's own research and work with local and international peace practitioners over many years. These principles are embedded in the rest of the Framework and often noted explicitly in the text.

1. **Local actors and organizations** must drive and control collective impact efforts. The role of external organizations is to provide support and reflections from other experiences. Pay attention to **issues and perceptions regarding power, privilege, identity, and control**.
2. **Context is important — attempts to import programmatic approaches from other contexts without significant adaptation are likely to fail.** We can and should learn from efforts elsewhere, but always taking care to understand the local conditions and challenges.
3. **Trust and relationship building are core functions of collective impact initiatives.** Evidence from the case studies and efforts to launch new networks suggests that collective impact work depends on achieving at least some level of mutual trust. If mutual confidence is weak at the outset, it must be strengthened as an ongoing enterprise. At times, it may be necessary to engage participants *within* groups before bringing people together across societal divides — and this is likely to take time.
4. **Participatory conflict analysis** must include as many perspectives as practical. While we favor using **systems tools** and an **adaptive and learning approach** to programming (see the Underlying Assumptions below), there are less formal ways to perform analysis that may be appropriate in particular contexts. **Analysis and learning are iterative processes;** they can't be performed once and considered finished.
5. **The process of joint participatory analysis** represents an opportunity for building relationships and early testing of willingness of individuals and groups to participate in a collective impact effort.
6. **Learning processes** must be integrated into collective impact processes, not only to support continuous improvement in practice but also to respond constructively to positive and negative feedback. Flows of information, analyses, and responses are crucial activities across participating organizations and provide one basis for improved exchanges and relationships.

7. All organizations, and especially “outsiders,” must recognize their own **motivations and agendas** — and be as transparent as possible about them.
8. **Bottom-up processes** are more likely to achieve sustained successes than initiatives driven from the top or externally.
9. **Vertical and horizontal linkages** must be built into peacebuilding initiatives. One way to examine the viability of a collective impact effort is to assess the strength of horizontal linkages across organizations, sectors, geography, and areas of expertise, as well as vertical connections from grassroots communities to national and even international actors.
10. How **funding** is provided and how **accountability** is structured influence the ability to promote collective impact; accountability should generally be from network/consortium members to each other as well as to those most affected by war and violence. **Longer-term, sustained commitments** to key issues are important, reflecting a commitment to shared results, and despite funding challenges.
11. **Inclusivity** must be a consideration from the outset — balanced with the need to be able to act and achieve a “sufficient” group of organizations operating from a common agenda.
12. Collaborative efforts must be motivated by a sense of the importance of the issues, **durability and sustainability** — rather than “urgency,” which can lead to short-term and transitory efforts with no lasting effects on fundamental drivers of conflict. That said, certain trigger events can awaken a renewed sense of the need for change — and can reveal opportunities that can be seized quickly while building toward longer-term efforts. The challenge is to link short-, medium-, and long-term strategies.
13. **Incremental building of the collective action** is advised — with room for **reconfiguring** (adding and dropping organizations) over time and through different phases and an evolving agenda for action/activities.
14. The **incentives and disincentives for participating** in collective impact for peacebuilding must be considered. What factors encourage groups to engage with others — and which factors influence them to stay on the sidelines or pursue their separate pathway? Will the possible mutual gains outweigh the real costs in time and resources?
15. **Do No Harm principles apply.** As local and external practitioners consider a collective impact initiative, they should consider potential negative impacts and take mitigation measures.⁸

The Framework presented in the next sections includes guidance regarding the Five Conditions for Collective Impact (Section III) and Preliminary Considerations (initial assessment and a permissive environment, Section IV). The principles presented above are integrated throughout.

Two Underlying Assumptions

Two fundamental assumptions infuse the Framework for Collective Action in peacebuilding:

- a systemic understanding of conflict dynamics and systems change
- an adaptive management approach to program planning and implementation.

⁸ For more on Do No Harm, see “From Principle to Practice: A User’s Guide to Do No Harm”, by Marshall Wallace, on the CDA website.

Each of these could be the subject of considerable elaboration and identification of specific tools and methods, but we are simply restating them here to note that they inform the rest of the Framework.⁹

A systemic understanding of conflict dynamics and systems change

There are many methods and processes for performing conflict analysis — as a preliminary step in programming and as an ongoing process of deepening the understanding of conflict dynamics and tracking constant changes in the conflict system. CDA has found that conflict analysis must push beyond traditional frameworks and tools for information gathering to add a systems thinking dimension. In other words, rather than treating conflicts as a series of disconnected factors, it is important to understand how those factors — and associated actors — interact dynamically to generate tensions and violence. Therefore, CDA has developed systems thinking tools for mapping of conflict.¹⁰ Conflict mapping and analysis is necessary but not sufficient; tools for identifying points of leverage and ways to induce positive change in conflict systems (ideally building on positive dynamics that exist in the system) are also needed. Thus, we suggest use of a range of tools for ensuring that analysis is translated into robust and operational strategies.

Despite this commitment to systems thinking, we recognize that many people and organizations take a more informal or less academic approach to conflict analysis, using, for example, various forms of dialogue and arts-based methods to explore conflict dynamics. Those who live in a conflict context often understand it intuitively, not necessarily analytically. We recognize the validity of multiple approaches to understanding conflict but would argue that, regardless of the method used to generate information, finding some way to understand how the different elements interact is an important step. Systems thinking tools are useful for the “sense-making” process: taking disparate, even contradictory information from multiple sources and showing how the elements work together to perpetuate war and violence.

Durable peace usually requires fundamental changes in structures of power, privilege, authority, inclusion/exclusion, inequality, and injustice in the economic, social, and political realms. Those structures represent resilient systems that resist transformation. In order to achieve significant progress toward peace with justice, an understanding of systems, coupled with systemic approaches to change, is needed. A thorough understanding of the challenges represented by systems of war, injustice, and oppression is a crucial requisite for a collective impact effort.

An adaptive management approach to program planning and implementation¹¹

Colleagues engaged in the development and humanitarian relief arenas are increasingly trying to move away from rigid programming regimes (such as results-based management or log frames). The need for flexible and adaptive action is even more pronounced for peacebuilding, where there are no “proven” methods for change, and the objects of change (conflict dynamics) are in constant flux. Adaptive management requires frequently updated conflict analysis, a regular flow of information/feedback regarding the effects and results of program activities,

⁹ See websites in Bibliography for access to tools and methods.

¹⁰ Systems thinking approaches to conflict analysis are explained and practical tools presented in several publications. CDA's publication *Adding Up to Peace* takes a systems approach and includes a chapter on systems-based conflict analysis. In addition, the CDA website includes step-by-step guidance on systems analysis: “Designing Strategic Initiatives to Impact Conflict Systems: Systems Approaches to Peacebuilding. A Resource Manual.” See also Robert Ricigliano, *Making Peace Last*, and David Peter Stroh, *Systems Thinking for Social Change*. See Bibliography for full citations.

¹¹ There are many existing resources regarding adaptive management approaches. See, for example, the website Design Monitoring and Evaluation for Peace at www.dmeformpeace.org.

and program management structures that are designed to respond flexibly to conflict analyses and feedback regarding short-term outcomes and longer-term results.

In the context of collective impact efforts, when several groups are working toward common objectives, obtaining information about what is working and what is not and tracking the results of actions taken become crucially important. We will return to this issue in Section III in the discussion of one of the conditions for collective impact: collective learning and adaptive management.

III. THE FIVE CONDITIONS FOR COLLECTIVE IMPACT

FSG put forward five basic conditions that must be met to achieve collective impact:¹²

1. Common Agenda
2. Shared Measurement
3. Mutually Reinforcing Activities
4. Continuous Communication
5. Backbone Support

As noted, the FSG model needs significant adjustment to make it applicable in the context of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. We suggest the following reframing of the five conditions:

1. Collective and Emergent Understanding
2. Collective Intention and Action
3. Collective Learning and Adaptive Management
4. Continuous Communication and Accountability
5. Sufficient Support Structures (“Backbone Support”)

The text below presents each of the five conditions (in our revised framing), identifies a series of more specific dimensions involved, suggests potential activities for advancing those dimensions, recognizes potential constraints and challenges, and offers some ideas for mitigating those challenges.

An important overarching comment is needed: *There can be no generic formula for addressing these conditions; the approach, methods, and processes must be adapted to the specific context.* (See Principle No. 2 in Section II.) What might work in one setting might seriously backfire in another. Therefore, while the overall categories and subtopics will be important in almost all settings, exactly how to accomplish them will vary considerably. Also, as noted in the first principle at the beginning of this Framework, local people and organizations must drive the process — including whether and how to address these conditions.

Note that the term “collective” can have several meanings and connotations, which then imply different degrees of mutuality. Some groups achieve a truly “shared” understanding of the conflict (they see it the same way) and go on to develop joint goals and closely coordinated

¹² See cited FSG articles; full listings in Bibliography.

activities. Other groups recognize that they see things somewhat differently (though not necessarily in opposition) and have different yet “aligned” objectives that are appropriate to their mandates/positions and are compatible and mutually supportive.

Note that the five conditions and their many specific subcategories and action steps might appear a bit overwhelming and full of complex detail. Practitioners should *pay attention to the main five conditions* and consider the other detailed subcategories and actions as elements to think about or as prompts to specific action as and when needed. Recognize, also, that all of these things do not have to be accomplished at once; they take place over a considerable period of time.

1. Collective and Emergent Understanding

A. Nurture (sufficient) trust and continuous improvement in relationships among members.

Collective efforts rely on trust. Therefore, assess the degree to which participating groups have confidence in each other, at the start and as the group evolves. Undertake activities that build mutual understanding, noting that, over time, positive experiences will help improve trust. *Important note: This element is not a one-time concern; the levels of trust and mutual confidence among members of the consortium/network must be monitored and improved continuously for the duration of the collective effort. Why is trust an important element? Much of the success of a joint effort depends on how well groups communicate, give feedback, engage in difficult conversations, and are able to respond flexibly to emerging conditions.*

Constraints & Challenges	Potential Mitigating Action(s)
Hostilities and tensions may be based on long-term experiences of abuse, injustice, exploitation, inequality, or competition for resources.	Take small steps; allow for reflection and reassessment. Engage in limited, achievable actions to build positive experiences. Work with groups in tension separately from the full group.

B. Conduct conflict and stakeholder analyses. Perform joint conflict analysis and conflict mapping and/or share existing analyses that identify key drivers of conflict. See comments and suggestions regarding conflict analysis in Section IV, under Initial Assessment No. 3, including the importance of incorporating multiple perspectives and the possibility of using systems thinking tools. Under the right circumstance, conflict analysis, coupled with stakeholder mapping, can serve as an initial joint activity to build relationships, improve mutual understanding, and create a common product. Note that conflict analysis is not a one-off activity; regular updating is required. Update joint analysis regularly, as a routine element of group activities.

Constraints & Challenges	Potential Mitigating Action(s)
The basic framing of the conflict is itself often contested. Not all stakeholders are able/willing to engage in joint analysis. Some analyses are not shared. Are all perspectives represented in the analysis? Who “owns” the analysis?	Start out working only with publicly available documents. Gather information from contesting parties separately, then combine. Ask a third party to perform an amalgamation of analyses, based on information gathered from all perspectives.

C. Assess degree of progress on key conflict issues. In addition to conflict analysis, assess the degree of progress (or lack thereof) in key areas of change needed. Consider using CDA’s “Peace Progress Factor Tree” tool.¹³ CDA’s Criteria of Effectiveness/Building Blocks for Peace might also provide a useful macro-level reference to test progress in relevant areas.¹⁴ Assessing progress is the flip side of analyzing conflict and can help to identify important factors that need attention. Even if significant progress is made in one area (say, security), lack of forward motion on other factors (say, exclusion/marginalization) may impede overall advances toward sustainable peace.

Constraints & Challenges	Potential Mitigating Action(s)
Differing perceptions of progress and differing assessments of what is most important to address, based on interests and experience.	Engage in dialogue about progress made and priorities for action as a fundamental exercise in building a coalition/network. Focus on a shared future vision, rather than negative conditions or past abuses.

D. Identify who is doing what among peacebuilders. Based on the key drivers and areas of progress or lack thereof (see Nos. 1B and 1C), identify which organizations are working on which issues and where. Are there significant *gaps* in the number and/or scale of efforts for change? Analyze the success or failure of previous change efforts. This type of analysis can provide important information to inform the focus of collective efforts.

Constraints & Challenges	Potential Mitigating Action(s)
Some activities are, by necessity, confidential or off the record. The number of peace actors is often large, making it hard to gain a full picture of all efforts. There likely are contending interpretations of the success/failure of previous efforts.	Map at least the most significant efforts, taking care to note locally driven efforts that may be less visible. Develop more complete information over time.

2. Collective Intention and Action

A. Develop a common agenda, including the level/scope of action. Identify a shared long-term vision and a series of achievable intermediate goals or building blocks. Some groups may be able to agree only to a series of more limited short-term joint activities, at least at first. The longer-term vision, goals, and a broader scope of action may develop over time. As noted under No. 3 below, groups may determine some way to get started — and then assess and adjust, based on feedback, repeatedly.

¹³ *Adding Up to Peace*, Chapter 2.

¹⁴ See “Reflecting on Peace Practice (RPP) Basics. A Resource Manual.”

Constraints & Challenges	Potential Mitigating Action(s)
<p>The contrasting visions for the future may be central to the conflict. Underlying issues regarding inclusion/exclusion, grievances, models of power holding, and equity/justice may impede a shared vision, even among peace proponents. Although a shared vision may be achieved, designation of building blocks or intermediate steps may be difficult.</p>	<p>Agree to principles driving a vision first, then how those would apply in the context. Determine incremental steps toward the vision, rather than major leaps. Break issues down into doable parts. Plan “backward” from a significant achievement to how we got there. Work with those who are willing to join a collective effort toward identified ends.</p>

B. Develop the core strategy. Adopt a common overall approach, strategy, and theories of change. Within an identified vision and goals, develop a strategy for achieving intermediate goals and an accompanying theory of change (the pathway from planned activities to desired changes).¹⁵ Again, this may emerge over time, with experience, feedback, increased trust, and adaptation — and the process is rarely as rational and systematic as implied here. Plan for feedback and revision of plans. (See No. 3 below.)

Constraints & Challenges	Potential Mitigating Action(s)
<p>The system will push back or resist change efforts. Powerful groups may oppose changes that affect their privileges or control.</p>	<p>Address system pushback in planning. Ensure that “harm” is not done. Adopt an adaptive management approach to respond to progress, failures, and unexpected events. (See No. 3B below.)</p>

C. Determine priority areas for action and required scale of change. Use the various forms of analysis in Nos. 1B, 1C, and 1D (and/or repeat analysis exercises) to identify priority areas for action, especially issues or groups that have been neglected or where progress has been slow. Consider the scale of changes needed to address key drivers of conflict, including transformation of economic, social, and political structures.

Constraints & Challenges	Potential Mitigating Action(s)
<p>Organizations are often attached to their favorite approaches and/or to particular constituencies. The needed scale of efforts can be a stretch for organizations accustomed to modest programs.</p>	<p>Engage in exercises that free up imagination and innovation. Work with donors to provide resources for scaling up.</p>

D. Agree to a division of labor and mutually reinforcing activities. Use analytical information and group dialogue to identify who is best placed to do tasks, based on experience, capacities, mandates, skills, access, etc. Explore potential linkages and synergies across efforts, ensuring that participating groups are doing what they are best suited to do and that the various activities complement each other toward shared goals. While some groups might undertake new activities, much of the effort will be focused on aligning existing efforts more fully.

¹⁵ Resources on Theories of Change can be found in the “Reflecting on Peace Practice” manual and on the DMEforPeace website.

Constraints & Challenges	Potential Mitigating Action(s)
<p>Agencies may compete now or previously. It may be hard to openly discuss capacities. Some may be attached to dubious theories of change (favorite methods).</p>	<p>Emphasize mutual learning, based on evidence (and common measures). Continue to build relationships that permit frank exchanges.</p>

E. Coordinate a plan of action. Build on the tasks and roles assigned in the previous point to develop a more detailed plan of action. Who will do what, by when, with what resources?

Constraints & Challenges	Potential Mitigating Action(s)
<p>Organizations may resist perceived centralized control or erosion of independence.</p>	<p>The core purpose of coalition and goal of collective impact require coordination and adjustment to achieve a common agenda. The likelihood that organizations may be asked to shift their priorities or take on new tasks should be discussed up front.</p>

F. Develop common measures. One form of crucial feedback is obtained through tracking agreed measures. The participating groups can (although sometimes with considerable difficulty) identify shared measures, based on the action plan and theories of change, that can be tracked through ongoing monitoring. It is helpful, then, to develop a baseline, to make it possible to measure changes from starting conditions. Participants can identify the changes they expect from collective activities over a specified period of time — and then how to measure them. In addition, provision should be made for tracking *unexpected effects*, both surprisingly positive results as well as unintended negative consequences. (See Do No Harm principle in Section II, No. 15.) The shared measures serve as signposts indicating progress (or delays) toward shared goals, and allow for reassessment of strategies, goals, and activities in the spirit of adaptive management.

Constraints & Challenges	Potential Mitigating Action(s)
<p>Organizations/practitioners may find it difficult to agree to common measures, even if they have identified shared goals/objectives.</p>	<p>Donor requirements may provide incentives for shared measures. Broader processes, such as the U.N. Sustainable Development Goals may offer some useful measures.</p>
<p>Participants may disagree about what is important to track. Issues of security and access in conflict zones may impede accurate data collection.</p>	<p>Use local organizations for data collection. Build local capacities for survey research and feedback. Utilize crowdsourcing and other emerging technologies.</p>

3. Collective Learning and Adaptive Management

A. Collect feedback regularly and analyze data. Engage the network members in joint analysis of information gathered from shared measures (No. 2F above) and other forms of feedback, both formal and informal. Elicit perceptions and opinions from a full range of stakeholders and program participants. Consider the implication of the feedback for current and future plans.

Constraints & Challenges	Potential Mitigating Action(s)
Participants may disagree about expected changes — and how to interpret data.	Ensure that there is agreement about how feedback is collected and encourage full participation in discussing the implications. Consider additional information gathering activities to clarify points of disagreement.

B. Engage in adaptive management; adjust actions based on feedback. Use monitoring data, evaluation results and feedback to discuss needed adjustments in program approaches, activities, and theories of change.

Constraints & Challenges	Potential Mitigating Action(s)
Some organizations and/or donors may be committed to specific strategies, actions, or outputs, making it difficult to change activities.	Gain prior commitment from participating organizations and their donors for an adaptive management approach, with clear accountability mechanisms built in.

C. Evaluate regularly. Ongoing monitoring and feedback mechanisms (No. 3A above) are helpful for continuous program adjustments, whereas periodic evaluation provides an opportunity for deeper consideration of program successes and areas needing strengthening. Periodically gather additional information and feedback, using a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods, revealing both expected and unexpected changes.¹⁶

Constraints & Challenges	Potential Mitigating Action(s)
Time constraints. Distrust or lack of willingness to discuss “failures” as well as successes. Possibly, lack of budget for evaluation processes.	Build learning processes into programming and budgets. Ensure that evaluation processes are transparent, participatory, and agreed in advance.

D. Engage in ongoing processes of collaborative learning. Organize processes of mutual reflection/learning to inform further implementation and to capture lessons to inform efforts and plans going forward. Use monitoring, evaluation, and updated conflict analysis information to support reflection. Encourage regular sharing of experiences and stories that provide a more qualitative and human perspective. What is working and what is not? What obstacles have been encountered? How is the conflict system “pushing back” or resisting change efforts? What alternative approaches should we consider? How well are we working together? How can we improve?

¹⁶ The DMEforPeace website (www.dmeforpeace.org) provides considerable resources regarding the evaluation of peacebuilding programs.

Constraints & Challenges	Potential Mitigating Action(s)
Time constraints. Distrust or lack of willingness to discuss “failures” as well as successes.	Schedule reflection processes well in advance. Include some form of reflection process in every meeting of the network/consortium, building a culture of mutual learning.

4. Continuous Communication and Accountability

A. Set transparent mechanisms for ongoing internal communication and decision-making.

Determine at the beginning of the collective impact initiative how decisions will be made by and for the group. Ensure that all data collection processes are transparent, and that information is available to all participating organizations (including initial and updated conflict analyses, monitoring and evaluation data, and any other feedback received). Make sure that all members know about meetings and other activities.

Constraints & Challenges	Potential Mitigating Action(s)
Depends on the capacity of the network to collect and share information — and the role assigned to the “backbone organization.”	Discuss how information will be collected, analyzed, and shared in the early stages of building the collectivity. Determine how members will be notified of meetings. Build informal sharing into each meeting.

B. Ensure mutual accountability. Accountability has multiple dimensions, including accountability of the members to each other, accountability to the larger society (those suffering from war/violence/tension), and, at times, donors. Within a collective impact effort (network, consortium, platform, coalition), the primary accountability is among the members to each other. Are people doing what they said they would do, following through on commitments made? Accountability to the broader communities involves constant monitoring of the effects of the collective impact initiatives. Are they having the intended effects, or have unintended negative effects occurred? Donors should be informed of the primacy of these two dimensions of accountability, which may require adjustments in expectations, program activities, or timing.

Constraints & Challenges	Potential Mitigating Action(s)
Participants may resist mutual accountability, preferring independence. Some may question accuracy of data, especially if it contradicts their favored methodologies or approaches. Some donors may refuse to change deliverables or methods.	Address mutual accountability from the beginning: meaning, process, decision-making, use of data. Encourage an experimental attitude, testing theories of change together. Avoid blame. Educate donors and make them part of the adaptive management process.

C. Set mechanisms for ongoing external communications and public advocacy. Identify important external stakeholders and constituencies (publics), the information they need, and how it will be provided. Determine who can speak for the network/consortium and what

decision-making or approval processes are required. If the group is going to take a public stand on issues, how will those positions be formed, decided, and communicated?

Constraints & Challenges	Potential Mitigating Action(s)
In conflict settings, even gathering information can pose risks, which may limit transparency. Multi-organizational groups may find it cumbersome to make decisions quickly when needed.	Ensure trust is maintained within the network, regardless of external constraints. Consider possible streamlined ways to make decisions in urgent situations.

D. Address the roles — and potential tensions — between those with more and less power and between “insiders” and “outsiders.” Depending on the makeup of the collective impact group, there are potential issues of power, funding, and access to decision-makers that need to be handled carefully. Even groups that are made up entirely of local entities can experience these tensions, especially if civil society, government, and the business community are all involved. When international NGOs and donors (both governmental and private) are added to the mix, an additional source of potential tension arises.¹⁷ Experience shows that the determination of who is an outsider or insider varies considerably. An international NGO who has been working for many decades in a place may be seen as a close ally and friend, not an outsider. People from a capital city may be seen as outsiders, even if they are of the same nationality and speak the same language as local people.

Constraints & Challenges	Potential Mitigating Action(s)
How to benefit from inclusive networks, including the resources represented by external/international groups, without overwhelming local groups and initiatives.	Use transparent processes for information sharing and decision-making. Engage in frank dialogue about appropriate roles for insiders and outsiders, ensure that outsiders support insider initiatives.

5.Sufficient Support Structures (“Backbone” Support)

A. Assess organizational capacity of all network members. Each member organization of a coalition or network will have to provide some staff or volunteer time and effort to ensure the viability of the collective effort. Realistically, what can be expected of members, in terms of budget support? What can each member contribute?

Constraints & Challenges	Potential Mitigating Action(s)
Network/consortium members likely represent a wide range, in terms of staff size, budget, expertise, access to influential/powerful people, etc. — as well as reputational strength.	Ensure that size and resources do not translate into control or dominance of the collective effort, through skillful facilitation and transparent processes.

¹⁷ See *Adding Up to Peace*, Chapter 4.

B. Identify one or more organizations to provide a “secretariat” function. The “backbone” organization provides basic administration, organizes meetings (logistics, agenda), ensures ongoing communications, and follows up on commitments made. It may also provide a mobilization and facilitation role, especially in the early stages of formation. These functions are negotiated; there is no fixed model. In some cases, these roles are shared across several organizations or rotated among members over time. Collective impact efforts that lack this function or have only weak coordination tend to be less effective.

Constraints & Challenges	Potential Mitigating Action(s)
Resistance to perceived central control. Competition among members for leadership role and/or associated funding. Perceptions of bias or a hidden agenda.	Explore multiple options for the backbone function: single organization, several organizations, a coordination group. Keep structures light/non-bureaucratic, and flexible. Allow for change during different periods of activity and over time.

C. Review how well the backbone function is working. Is the backbone organization able to sustain necessary activities? Are members satisfied? Has the backbone organization remained relatively independent and avoided competing with members for funding? Is there a need to change arrangements as new phases of activity are undertaken?

Constraints & Challenges	Potential Mitigating Action(s)
Assessment of a member organization can be sensitive, even if people recognize that some form of regular performance review is needed.	Build in regular feedback mechanisms for the backbone organization — don’t leave it for a larger, more elaborate process. Secure the services of an external consultant to undertake a confidential process, with facilitated discussion of findings.

IV. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS: GETTING READY

Warning: The Process Can Be Messy

The previous section presents five important conditions that need to be met, in one way or another, to achieve collective impacts in peacebuilding. How those conditions are met will vary considerably, depending on the conflict context, the nature of the participating organizations, and how the collectivity was formed. This section provides a series of actions, explorations, and analyses that can be done to get ready to launch a collective impact effort. In reality, most initiatives happen more organically and less formally, with fits and starts. Thus, the process can be messy, and is rarely neat, tidy, and systematic. Nevertheless, the considerations and preparatory activities outlined here can help to ensure that people are ready to undertake a joint initiative. And, the elements can be applied after the fact to networks or alliances that are already operating, as a way to test viability or to identify potential problems.

Before engaging fully in a collective impact initiative, it is important to assess the situation through an initial assessment process and consideration of whether there are enough positive conditions present to allow the possibility of success. Following these preliminary assessments, those initiating or proposing a collective effort must make a “go/no go” decision about whether to proceed to create, variously, a network, consortium, coalition, alliance, or platform, and which groups/entities should be engaged, among community-based organizations, non-governmental organizations, international NGOs, the business community, government entities at various levels, international and regional organizations.

Initial Assessment and Strategy Development

Before engaging fully in the process of collective impact among multiple organizations (secular and religious civil society groups, government entities, businesses, bi- and multi-lateral agencies), several preliminary actions are needed in order to ensure that a collaborative effort is even possible — and that it is well conceived, targeted, and resourced. These are outlined below and include (1) initial stakeholder mapping to identify the potential range of stakeholders that could be involved, (2) preliminary convening of a sufficient network, (3) performance of a preliminary conflict analysis, (4) initial decision regarding the appropriate level of collective action (local, national), and (5) preliminary determination of the intended focus and scope of collective impact. At this stage, all of the actions and products are provisional, because they will evolve and change over time, as the process unfolds and as participants engage and take ownership.

1. Initial stakeholder mapping

Preliminary exploration includes identification of the important stakeholders involved, both those actively promoting peace and those who are engaged in ongoing violence or are otherwise direct parties to the conflict. Stakeholder or actor mapping identifies the parties to the conflict and their interests, demands, sources of power, and so forth. A complementary mapping would analyze the key groups and individuals working for peace: who is doing what, where, and addressing which issues at what level.

Stakeholder mapping permits preliminary determination of the range of possible partners in collective efforts, including existing networks or coalitions and their strengths and weaknesses.

2. Identification or convening of a “sufficient” network or coalition of interested groups

It is not necessary to include every possible group in a network; the question is what constitutes a *sufficient* collectivity to make the initiative effective. That determination can only be made in the context and based on the existing levels of trust or hostility, the previous history of joint efforts, and a shared sense of the urgency of working together. In some situations, moving forward with a narrower group that has clear shared goals may be more important than wide inclusivity. In other cases, the priority may be on moving slowly to bring as many groups into the effort as possible, devoting considerable time to reducing distrust and building mutual understanding before launching joint activities.¹⁸

Although the composition of the group(s) is likely to change over time through evolving processes, it is necessary to work with a network that has adequate reach, both vertical (local to state/province to national and international) and horizontal (across sectors, constituencies, perspectives, and geographic locations) to enable consideration of the questions involved in these initial stages. Subsequent discussions may result in narrowing or expanding of the network, depending partly on the chosen focus (topic, problem, issue, geographic area). From the beginning, it will also be necessary to address issues of power and decision-making, to guarantee that, to the extent possible, local actors control the process, and external actors and funders do not determine the agenda.

3. Preliminary conflict analysis¹⁹

Along with a stakeholder mapping, a preliminary conflict analysis could be performed by those considering the organization of a collaborative effort, to inform their own thinking. Or, if there is enough trust, it may be possible to bring groups together to perform a joint analysis, remembering to include as many perspectives as possible (see Principle No. 3 in Section II above). This represents an opportunity for people to get to know one another, to explore the possibilities of developing a common agenda, and to produce something tangible as a first step.

The FSG framework calls for development of a shared understanding of the problem at hand — and this is addressed in Section III as an important component of the FSG condition for a “common agenda.” Even before launching a new collective initiative, it will be important to understand the conflict context. In most conflict settings, local and international groups have performed conflict analyses, and some are willing to share those or have posted them online. If few such analyses are available or are deemed out-of-date or inadequate, a preliminary anal-

¹⁸ See CDA’s documentation of the attempt to build a local network in Sri Lanka cited in Bibliography.

¹⁹ See comments in Section II above regarding principles and processes related to conflict analysis.

ysis engaging multiple local stakeholders will be necessary. Involving a wide range of actors from the beginning can help build local ownership of the process, build relationships, and test willingness to participate.

4. Decision regarding the level of collective action

CDA's own research has explored the connections between local or community level work on “peace writ little” and efforts at the larger societal or “Peace Writ Large” level,²⁰ which could be subnational (province, state), national, or involve international and regional dynamics.²¹ Collective impacts can be understood at any of these levels, although the stakeholders involved and the objectives would be different at the different levels.

Coalitions or networks dedicated to promoting peace could involve a range of levels, including any of the following or combinations of them:

- Local-level coalitions/networks
- National-level coalition/networks
- Networks or coordination efforts among international donors
- An international donor and its grantees
- Government peace efforts/commissions (with or without international support)

Quite apart from the conflicting parties themselves, any of these categories could involve civil society organizations; community-based organizations; national or international NGOs; local/international businesses; local, state/provincial, or national governments; regional intergovernmental organizations; U.N. agencies/officials; and bilateral/multilateral donors.

Each of these levels represents a different degree of difficulty involved in promoting collective impacts. Work with an entirely local group of organizations, even with support from international partners and donors, could be relatively straightforward, compared with efforts to organize a national-level coalition among peacebuilding groups. However, even local-level efforts can be fraught, as illustrated by CDA's Sri Lanka case, in which the levels of distrust and hostility even at a neighborhood level were so intense that iterative planning and repeated go/no go decision-making was necessary from the outset.²² Efforts among multiple bilateral donors, while involving a relatively small number of entities, would be complicated by their varied program priorities, bureaucratic and decision-making processes, and predetermined funding mandates from parliaments or the equivalent.

5. Preliminary determination of focus and scope

In addition to the level and range of stakeholders or partners involved, a preliminary question concerns the scope of the core issue(s) to be addressed. (Note: This must be preliminary, as the process of group formation and determination of focus/scope will evolve over time.)

20 For further discussion of the linkages between local level “peace writ little” efforts and “Peace Writ Large” initiatives aimed at changing conflict dynamics at the level of an entire conflict zone, see “From Little to Large: When Does Peacebuilding Add Up?,” *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development*, 2015.

21 See *Confronting War* (2003) and *Adding Up to Peace* (2018), both available on the CDA website.

22 Full citation of the Sri Lanka case can be found in Bibliography.

In our experience working with groups of organizations in the field, the most effective joint efforts focus on a relatively discrete and time-bound issue — although such endeavors are best embedded in a broader and longer-term strategy toward a clear shared vision and concrete goals. Combined work on “peace” or some other lofty long-term goal usually fails due to vagueness and lack of clear outcomes. At the other extreme, efforts focused on a narrow set of activities rarely result in any systemic impact. Therefore, collective impact initiatives must identify achievable objectives that represent significant contributions or stepping-stones toward Peace Writ Large, but not so ambitious as to be unrealistic or too long term.

In terms of the time frame, in several places (Kenya, Ghana, Burundi, Guinea-Bissau) we have seen successful short-term collective efforts dedicated to achieving a nonviolent election, in which organizations joined in a coalition, secured joint short-term funding, outlined a series of joint activities, assigned specific activities to different organizations, and even divided up territory to ensure geographic coverage of the country. Examples of longer-term efforts exist, but their successes have been less clear.²³ The challenge, therefore, is to undertake a series of shorter-term efforts (one to three years) that are each an integral element of a longer-term vision and sustained strategy.

Permissive Environment for Collective Impact: Leadership, Funding, and Sense of Importance

FSG posits three important *preconditions* that should be established before launching a collective impact effort — which we have renamed as a “permissive environment.” In FSG’s terminology, the preconditions include “an influential champion; adequate financial resources; and a sense of urgency for change.”²⁴ We have recast these as “leadership; adequate financial resources; and sense of the importance of sustained change.” These elements represent real challenges for peacebuilding activities.

Leadership

In most situations of war and conflict, there is either no single outstanding champion for peace or there are multiple competing champions. Overt leadership for peace is more likely to appear during a “*peacemaking*” phase — efforts to end violence and reach some form of settlement. In these circumstances, leadership can be provided to either build bridges between contending groups or to help articulate an emerging consensus among groups participating in various forms of dialogue or negotiation.

In CDA’s research,²⁵ we have seen examples where an international/regional power or group has taken initiative (such as in Burundi, Guatemala, and the Solomon Islands) or a prominent individual (such as Mandela in the Burundi case) has performed a key leadership role. But we have also seen situations where such leaders ultimately fail, for a range of reasons. The Oslo Accords process (regarding Israel-Palestine) is an example where initial success was undermined by conditions on the ground.²⁶

²³ Marin O’Brien Belhoussein’s review (op. cit.) provides quick summaries of ten selected examples of relatively successful coordination.

²⁴ FSG, “Channeling Change,” p.3.

²⁵ See *Adding Up to Peace*, especially Chapter 5.

²⁶ For an assessment of efforts to achieve peace in Israel and Palestine, see Yossi Mekelberg and Greg Shapland, “Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking: What Can We Learn from Previous Efforts?,” Chatham House, 2018.

In some situations, the U.N. mounts a major *peacekeeping* and *peacebuilding* operation, as in Liberia, Kosovo, East Timor, and Haiti. However, even when the U.N. is playing a central role, to the point of essentially running the country (Kosovo, Liberia, East Timor), its ability to generate a common agenda, even among its own agencies, is limited. Bureaucratic instruments (including the U.N. Development Assistance Framework, Integrated Strategic Framework, Poverty Reduction Strategy, Peacebuilding Fund/Commission, etc.) provide the basis for building a common agenda, but those opportunities are often squandered.

It may prove useful to identify different forms of leadership needed to deal with different substantive areas or to address specific key factors of conflict, rather than looking for one champion to handle the full complex array of issues. From a systems thinking perspective, we can also consider the notion that “systems change best when systems change themselves.” That is, effective systems change often involves reinforcing existing positive trends and leadership from within the system — or at least someone who can activate people or forces in the system to initiate and sustain change. This is consistent with the first and seventh principles laid out in Section II of this Framework that call for locally led efforts for peace and appropriate roles for outsiders.

In some circumstances, it may be effective to undertake more narrowly focused campaigns with specific objectives to be achieved within relatively short time frames, such as a non-violent election. However, such limited efforts should be conceived as building on each other within a longer-term strategy. In these cases, an influential leader could inspire groups to join a campaign and articulate how the relatively narrow goals would fit within a larger vision and strategy for Peace Writ Large.

Leadership can come from several sources. First, there are those individuals and/or groups who initiate a collective impact effort. They may serve as initial conveners, bringing groups together to explore the possibilities and facilitating early exchanges. They may also complete some or all of the initial assessment processes outlined in this section. In some circumstances, we have seen donors play an effective role by encouraging their grantees to develop a shared set of goals and a common strategy — without dictating what the goals/strategy should be. Second, a crucial form of leadership will be provided by a “backbone organization” that continues to organize meetings, ensure communication, etc. (See Section III, No. 5, for more on this function.)

Adequate Financial Resources

In conflict prevention or in postwar *peacebuilding* efforts, a wide array of issues needs to be dealt with over time²⁷ and through the various phases of conflict prevention, *peacemaking*, *peacekeeping*, and *peacebuilding*.²⁸ Together, they represent an ambitious agenda for change. Unfortunately, even if donors (and governments) agree on the issues, obtaining long-term commitment of funding for fundamental change processes is difficult. Thus, this requirement represents a challenge for funding peace activities at all phases, especially for prevention.

During violent conflict and in the run-up to a peace accord, most funding is channeled to *humanitarian* assistance, with only small amounts provided for building support for peace. There tends to be a burst of funding for a wide range of activities during the immediate post-violence phase of “peace consolidation.” But this funding tends to be relatively short term (generally

²⁷ See *Adding Up to Peace*, Chapter 2, for discussion of the “factor tree” model, which identifies a range of issues, each of which must be addressed to some degree in attaining sustainable peace.

²⁸ These are the common terms used by the U.N., explained at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/terminology>.

up to three years), is rarely sustained for the long term, and usually fails to address key drivers of conflict.

FSG points out that, once under way, a collective impact effort “can last a decade or more. ... Collective impact is a marathon, not a sprint. There is no shortcut in the long-term process of social change.”²⁹ In order to address the fundamental problems that generated violent conflict in the first place, long-term commitment is needed, and is seldom available. Therefore, funding must be sufficient in *amount* to get the work done and sustained, to address issues over ten or more years. This suggests that part of the collective impact process will be to generate self-financing efforts that are not permanently dependent on external funding, combined with advocacy efforts to persuade donors to make longer-term commitments.

Sense of the Importance of Sustained Change

As noted immediately above, in peace efforts, there is usually a sense of urgency to stop violence through cease-fires and development of a peace settlement (peacemaking). This sense of urgency often continues through a brief period of “peace consolidation” and the early stages of peacebuilding. However, typically, once the situation has reached a degree of stability, the international community feels that its work is done, attention is diverted to another crisis, and funding dries up. The peace commitment must be sustained beyond short-term urgency and oriented toward sustained efforts for durable change, in the context of preventing further rounds of violent conflict.

There is a short window of opportunity — of about three years immediately following the signing of a peace accord — when weariness with war and widespread acknowledgment of serious problems can create momentum for change. At the same time, there is often a strong push for “normalcy,” a sense that conditions have returned to a tolerable state, and that the government is fully in charge of the situation, which typically results in active discounting of key conflict drivers.

Peacebuilding actors can focus energy, not so much on urgent action but rather on long-term commitment to addressing the fundamental causes of conflict. These cannot be confronted with speed or demands for immediate results. “Urgency with patience” is needed, as the issues to be addressed are usually deeply embedded in political culture, social norms, and economic systems. Preventing a new cycle of violence must be a priority, as gains in justice and equity are often wiped out during periods of violent suppression.

The commitment to change in a post-violence period is attenuated by the desire by governments to assert control and project the image of a return to normal life. Unfortunately, in many settings “normal” conditions include inequitable distribution of resources, neglect of large portions of the population, marginalization/exclusion, favoritism, corruption, and elite struggles for power, among other things. “Business as usual” implies ignoring the factors that resulted in warfare in the first place. A challenge for peacebuilders is to promote an acknowledgment of such key drivers of conflict, and to engage in longer-term prevention and development programming that addresses them.

²⁹ FSG, “Channeling Change,” p. 4.

Making a “Go/No Go” Decision

After exploring each of the five areas of Initial Assessment above, as well as the elements of a Permissive Environment, those initiating a collective impact effort must decide whether to dedicate focused energy, time, and resources to an effort toward collective impact. The elements of the decision to go ahead, to delay, or to seek a different path revolve around the questions embedded in the elements already discussed above. To summarize, these include the following:

1. Do we understand the various parties to the conflict, as well as groups and individuals working for peace?
2. Is there sufficient interest in developing a shared understanding of the conflict and articulating and pursuing joint goals within a larger vision?
3. Is there enough trust, mutual understanding, and shared values to allow groups to work together successfully?
4. Does an initial conflict analysis suggest that this is the right time for undertaking a collective effort for peace?
5. Is there a preliminary sense of which issues should be addressed, and at which level? Do participating organizations have good links, both with other potential partners at a similar level and with those at a “higher” or “lower” level?
6. Is there evidence of (emerging) leadership for change among local people and organizations?
7. Are there sources of funding for a collective impact effort, or mechanisms for sustaining the effort in the longer term?
8. Is there a shared sense of the importance of achieving real change in the situation?

It is not necessary to answer all of these questions affirmatively before launching a collective impact process. Clarity on some issues will only emerge over time. However, if there is real doubt on a significant number of these questions, it may be important to reassess the strategy. Also, a network or coalition may need to revisit these questions periodically, and even consider the possibility of disbanding the group.

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Useful Websites

CDA Collaborative Learning Projects: www.cdacollaborative.org. Resources on Do No Harm/conflict sensitivity, peacebuilding effectiveness, feedback and learning systems, and responsible business practices.

Collective Impact Forum (FSG site): www.collectiveimpactforum.org. This site offers those practicing collective impact in many different arenas the tools, resources, and advice they need. Individuals come together to share experience and knowledge to accelerate the effectiveness and adoption of collective impact. Sponsored/hosted by FSG.

Design Monitoring and Evaluation for Peace: www.dmeforpeace.org. Resources on peacebuilding evaluation, adaptive management, and much more.