WEAVING PEACE IN MINDANAO: Strong Advocacy through Collective Action

A collective impact case study on the Mindanao Peaceweavers network

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Acronyms

BBL — Bangsamoro Basic Law
BISDAK — Genuine Visayans for Peace
CDA — CDA Collaborative Learning Projects
CRS — Catholic Relief Services
GPPAC — Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict
GRP — Government of the Republic of the Philippines
IID — Initiatives for International Dialogue
MILF — Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MPPA — Mindanao Peoples’ Peace Agenda
MPW — Mindanao Peaceweavers
**Acknowledgments**

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Many thanks to all our colleagues at CDA and beyond who contributed to, reviewed, and brought this case study to life.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Mindanao Peaceweavers is a “network of networks” representing the broadest convergence of peace advocates in the southern Philippines. The purpose of this case study is to draw on MPW’s experience as a way to test and refine CDA’s provisional “Framework for Collective Impact in Peacebuilding.”\(^1\) Now 15 years old, MPW is structured around four secretariats (of which Initiatives for International Dialogue is the lead), eight convener networks, and three newer member organizations. MPW has cultivated a diverse body of advocates that is unified across the lines of identity-based conflict. They have earned the respect of conflicting parties and contributed to the recognition of civil society as a third party in peace processes, particularly the negotiations between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.

This case affirms the five conditions already proposed as essential in the provisional framework: collective and emergent understanding of the context; intention and action; learning and adaptation; communication and accountability; and support structure or backbone. Interestingly, shared context understanding and agenda for action — two great strengths captured in MPW’s Mindanao Peoples’ Peace Agenda — were not achieved primarily through the analytical processes emphasized in the provisional framework, but rather through iterative processes of dialogue and listening. Other success factors include a defining ethos of inclusivity and long-term mutual commitment, a self-sustaining form of flexible interdependence that keeps the network viable by drawing mainly on internal resources, and complementary skill sets including excellent dialogue facilitation and visionary approaches to advocacy.

MPW’s experience contributes multiple insights to the learning on collective impact:

1. **Moral imagination.** Many of MPW’s success factors are not technical, in the sense of being driven primarily by analysis, data, or procedures. Rather, many MPW successes arise from “soft factors,” such as attention to relationships, solidarity, cultural creativity, and even a sense of the transcendent. This might be referred to as “moral imagination,”\(^2\) drawing on Lederach’s concept of peacebuilding as an emergent, relational art of social change.

2. **Multitier networks.** As a network of networks, or a network composed of two and sometimes even three tiers, some of MPW’s successes and challenges manifest themselves in unique ways. This experience may hold significance for further learning on the distinctions between different types of collective impact efforts.

3. **Sustaining momentum and impact over time.** The provisional framework refers to the importance of sustainability, but it does not fully address the question of how a long-lived network can sustain momentum and impact over time. This is the biggest challenge facing MPW, and MPW’s learnings may be relevant to other mature networks.

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WEAVING PEACE IN MINDANAO: STRONG ADVOCACY THROUGH COLLECTIVE ACTION

Mindanao Peaceweavers (MPW) is a network representing the broadest convergence of peace advocates in the southern Philippines. MPW collaborated with CDA in early 2018 to pursue case study research on collective impact. The goal was to learn from MPW’s experience in ways that could field-test CDA’s “Framework for Collective Impact in Peacebuilding” and inform the further development of that framework. MPW has a 15-year track record of working as a network of networks in the Mindanao region, a particularly rich context for learning about the success factors and the challenges involved in pursuing collective impact.

I. Methodology and Limitations

On-site research was conducted between April 23 and May 1, 2018. This was a pivotal period for Mindanao, with the national Congress just weeks from the review of a new autonomy agreement between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP). Additionally, the president and Congress were moving toward federalist reform that would decentralize governance across the country. The hope and uncertainty of that moment formed the backdrop for all engagements with MPW members and stakeholders, even as it shaped their priorities and their views.

The research spanned three key urban areas in Mindanao, including Davao City, Zamboanga City, and Cotabato City (plus nearby Midsayap). This multicity approach was essential for ensuring breadth of perspective because the vast ethno-religious diversity of Mindanao displays clear geographic patterns, and location matters a great deal in shaping how Mindanaoans experience conflict and peace. These three cities also span the home offices of most MPW member organizations, making it possible to consult them in a face-to-face format.

The research team consulted a total of 35 participants, including nine in semi-structured key informant interviews and 26 in focus group discussion format. In consultations with MPW insiders, there was some fluidity between the two formats, because participants’ schedules shift

4 On-site research between April 23 and May 1 was led by Michelle Garred and assisted by Ayyi Gardiola. MPW participation was catalyzed by Myla Leguro (Catholic Relief Services - MPW lead convenor), led by Lyndee Prieto (Initiatives for International Dialogue – MPW lead secretariat), and guided by Gus Miclat (Initiatives for International Dialogue - MPW lead secretariat). Data use protocols were shared with participants in both email and verbal format. All participants gave verbal consent and did not avail themselves of the optional written data use agreement.
frequently, and group formats are culturally desirable. However, all consultations with external stakeholders were conducted in an individual format. The participants were approximately 35 percent female, with strong representation of Bangsamoro and Indigenous minorities. (See Annex A for participant list.)

The lines of inquiry explored the five elements of the provisional collective impact framework, plus related themes such as inclusivity, insider and outsider roles, and success factors and challenges. Consultations with external stakeholders were particularly geared toward eliciting perceptions of MPW’s advocacy influence over time. (See Annex B for guiding questions.) However, consultations with external stakeholders were limited to four because, despite MPW’s strong external relationships, the research fell at a busy time preceding congressional review of a peace process milestone, as well as local elections.

Review of MPW documents, a key form of triangulation of data, was limited due to availability constraints. Available documents included primarily MPW’s overviews and profiles, guiding principles, core values, and flagship “Mindanao Peoples’ Peace Agenda” (MPPA). In addition, the MPW website6 provided advocacy campaign updates covering most of MPW’s history. It is important to note that the research team did not visit national capital Manila, the center of power where MPW often seeks to influence the presidential administration and the congress. Face-to-face coverage of perspectives within Mindanao was considered the highest priority, while Manila perspectives were sought via phone and Skype.

6 Available at http://www.mindanaopeaceweavers.org.
II. Regional Context

Mindanao is the southernmost region of the Philippines, consisting not only of the large island called Mindanao but also the neighboring Sulu Archipelago. Mindanao is rich in agriculture and other commodities, and it is the area where the country’s Muslim minority is concentrated. This is also the region most affected by armed violence, in which economic and political conflicts have played out largely along the lines of ethno-religious identity for more than 50 years.

Historically, Islam was introduced to Mindanao in the 14th century by Arab traders. The groups that converted to Islam eventually became known collectively as the Bangsamoro, while the groups that did not convert are called Indigenous Peoples or Lumads. Four subsequent centuries of Spanish colonialism left Mindanao included, against the will of many locals, in a new and predominantly Christian geopolitical entity called the Philippines. A 20th-century period of U.S. colonial rule contributed to resettlement policies that moved northern Christian migrants into Mindanao, making them demographically, politically, and economically dominant over the local Bangsamoro and Indigenous Peoples, many of whom were pushed out of their ancestral lands.

Separatist armed conflict emerged in the 1960s via the Moro National Liberation Front (at around the same time a communist rebellion was beginning elsewhere in the Philippines). A 1996 autonomy agreement led to the establishment of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao, which has faltered in its implementation. Fighters dissatisfied with that agreement soon splintered off to form the MILF. The MILF and the GRP were involved in several “all-out wars” in the early 2000s, plus a series of episodic peace negotiations facilitated by Malaysia. At the time of writing in May 2018, those

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7 Bangsamoro means “Moro Nation.” The Spanish first introduced the term “Moro” with a pejorative implication, but Mindanaoan Muslims have made it their own.
negotiations were poised for a potential breakthrough, with a new autonomy agreement called the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) due for congressional review by June 2018. A hopeful government-in-waiting is preparing to assume power in the autonomous zone.

While the GRP-MILF peace process has dominated the news, it is not the only matter of importance. When one talks about “the Mindanao peace process,” critical thinkers may ask: Which peace process? The national communist rebellion, on the cusp of fresh negotiations with the GRP, is highly relevant in parts of Mindanao. Smaller armed Islamist groups have proliferated, more radical than the MILF, including Jemaah Islamiyah, Abu Sayyaf, Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters, and the Islamic State-affiliated Maute Group, which laid siege to Marawi City in 2017. U.S. military involvement continues in ways that many Mindanaoans find questionable, while China’s economic influence expands, and its maritime territorial disputes escalate. The president and Congress in Manila are moving toward federalist reform, a long-talked-about possibility that could empower Bangsamoro and Indigenous communities while also creating turbulence due to shifts in power and internal borders.
III. Overview of Mindanao Peaceweavers

MPW is known as a network of networks, the broadest convergence of peace advocates in Mindanao, including thousands of individuals within its extended reach. Its core aim is to promote civil society participation in the peace process and to demand peace and human security as a matter of policy for Mindanao. MPW’s advocacy approach is responsive to developments unfolding in the context, grounded in the participation and perspectives of local communities affected by conflict, and propelled by consensus-based action planning among network members. All activities are focused either on preparing civil society to engage in advocacy or on carrying out advocacy itself. Human relationships are central to all MPW processes, both internal and external, which is a reflection of Mindanaoan culture.

MPW’s specific objectives include the following:\(^8\)

1. to develop and institutionalize the participation of civil society in the Mindanao peace process;

2. to provide mechanisms and processes for consensus-building, sharing of information and expertise, and drawing unified actions among civil society groups on issues concerning peace and conflict in Mindanao;

3. to develop a critical mass of peace constituency that can engage and influence the actors in conflict; and

4. to evolve a common agenda for peace.

**Structure.** MPW is structured around four secretariats,\(^9\) eight member networks called “conveners”\(^10\) in light of their own broad reach and grassroots constituencies, and three newer incoming member organizations.\(^11\) Each member brings unique resources and expertise that benefit other members and MPW as a whole. Some members’ mandates do not focus directly on peace advocacy but rather on humanitarian, development, and legal assistance — so MPW makes it possible for those members to align with peace goals and have a strong advocacy voice.

All members contribute resources in some form, be it the dedication of time and energy, funding, and/or connections to influential people. Initiatives for International Dialogue (lead secretariat) and Catholic Relief Services (secretariat) frequently provide direct funding subsidies. The few external donors have included the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation, the Canadian International Development Agency (now Global Affairs Canada), and Cordaid. Key partners have included the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Manila.

**Founding.** MPW was conceived during a Peace in MindanaNOW Conference, in which concerned civil society leaders came together in Davao City in May 2003 to address the “all-out war” then under way between the GRP and MILF in Central Mindanao. Following the conference, the participating organizations began cease-fire advocacy. In 2004, MPW was

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9 Secretariats: Initiatives for International Dialogue (lead), Catholic Relief Services, Balay Mindanaw Foundation, and Saligan Mindanaw.
11 Newer members: Mindanao Peacebuilding Institute, Peacebuilders Community, and World Vision Philippines.
publicly launched by seven member networks that spanned the identity-based divides between Bangsamoro, Indigenous Peoples, and the descendants of Christian settlers (collectively called the “tri-people”). MPW’s cultural creativity was evident in the metaphor of weaving, a textile art that is central to many traditional cultures in Mindanao. An excerpt from the launch statement reads as follows:12

Watch the weavers go! The fabric is in the making as they tense up.
Backs ache, arms and hands strain, patience without end.
They mean to finish their work.

It is not quite gentle occupation — this weaving. It takes strength
to set up the loom, to pull the threads to fitting tension, engaging all —
the body and spirit, requiring total involvement,
producing wholeness and beauty...

And peace!

**Stages of action.** Beginning in 2003, “all-out war” was addressed through collective action to advocate cease-fire, provide spaces for direct engagement between IDPs and decision-makers, and pressure the GRP and MILF to go back to the negotiation table. After the cease-fire was achieved, 2004–7 brought engagement with MILF and GRP peace panels for progress updates, and promotion of civil society engagement in the unfolding peace process. There was also advocacy around GRP and U.S. militarization in the Sulu Archipelago, which was home to numerous armed Islamist groups including Abu Sayyaf.

In 2008, when the GRP-MILF peace process was sharply set back by the Supreme Court’s nullification of an agreement on ancestral domain,13 MPW redoubled its efforts to preserve the peace constituency, through empowering people displaced by violence to advocate their cause directly to the GRP and MILF, and through the “Duyog Mindanaw” road show, which developed public awareness. Most significantly, MPW began a two-year series of consultations to develop the MPPA, a flagship work that conveys a powerful shared understanding of the context and a 15-point agenda for action.

Post-MPPA plans included a future focus on three key areas: 1) the right to self-determination; 2) internal displacement; and 3) the Bangsamoro peace process. There were also continued efforts to develop the national peace constituency, and solidarity and advocacy campaigns in response to incidents in Sabah and Zamboanga City. However, due to developments in the context, the increasingly promising GRP-MILF peace process demanded much of MPW’s attention from the 2012 Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro onward, in order to advocate for the subsequent BBL autonomy agreement and shape its content.

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**Key contributions.** MPW’s contributions, as identified by research participants, are both horizontal and vertical in nature. The horizontal contributions center on the cultivation and nurturing of a body of advocates that is unified across identity groups. Creating space for meaningful dialogue on sensitive issues between Bangsamoro, Indigenous Peoples, and Settlers is considered a groundbreaking achievement that has transformed awareness, mind-sets and behaviors. The process is marked by deep listening, embrace of diverse cultural and religious practices, and tangible expressions of solidarity in times of crisis. People on the receiving end of MPW solidarity often describe it as profoundly impactful. This ongoing horizontal “weaving” has made it possible to develop and pursue MPPA as a basis for unified advocacy.

The advocacy gains are more vertical. MPW has earned the respect of conflicting parties, including the MILF and GRP, and contributed to the establishment of civil society as a third party in the peace process. External stakeholders acknowledge that the “amplifier effect” attained through MPW’s unified advocacy is very real, and minority members credit MPW with empowering them to express their policy views. MPW has raised awareness of the Mindanao peace process at the national level, and worked to keep that peace constituency alive in the aftermath of setbacks. Key advocacy “wins” include the 2003 cease-fire, the 2009 creation of a Civilian Protection Component within the peace process International Monitoring Team, and the congressional declaration of National Day of Healing on March 6, 2015.
IV. Conditions for Collective Impact

This section explores MPW experience in relation to the provisional “Framework for Collective Impact in Peacebuilding,” including the major conditions identified thus far as essential for achieving collective impact, as well as other key themes.

**Collective and emergent understanding of the context.** The MPPA embodies the shared contextual understanding of MPW members and constituents. It inspires a level of pride that could almost be described as transcendent. It was developed through a two-year (2009–10) iterative process that built trusting relationships and used face-to-face discussions to produce consensus. Personal growth and improved relationships were involved, as many process participants who did not think that they could see eye-to-eye began to discover common ground. In fact, the MPPA vision relies on several shared lenses for viewing the context: historical injustices, self-determination, and the residents of Mindanao as an interdependent tri-people. It is striking to note that this shared contextual understanding was not achieved primarily through conflict analysis exercises but rather through a structured process of dialogue and listening. (See Figure C.)

The centrality of the MPPA does not imply that MPW members agree on every detail of the context: “While unified on the broad agenda for peace, justice and the recognition of the right to self-determination of the peoples of Mindanao, MPW needed to identify areas of complementation, convergence, and consensus on specific issues for policy advocacy and campaigns.” Some contentious issues are approached by proposing principles for interpreting and responding to the context, and processes for doing so in a just and effective manner, rather than detailed policy positions. For example, the MPPA does not comment on what the specifics of an MILF-GRP peace agreement should entail. Rather, it argues for respect for the right to self-determination, development of a national peace framework, and participation of Mindanao’s tri-people in all negotiations. Internally, when dealing with contentious issues among members, MPW falls back on mutually agreed on and clearly articulated guiding principles of unity and engagement, which include factors such as non-violence, mutual respect, multiculturalism, inclusivity, spirituality, subsidiarity (local

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**Figure C: Development of the Peoples’ Agenda**

Network consultations were organized by the MPW conveners in their own geographic areas. They posed the following questions:

- How do you perceive the Mindanao situation?
- How do you understand the situation in your particular area?
- What do you think are the causes of the conflict?
- What has been done to resolve the conflict?
- What are the obstacles in resolving the conflict?
- What is your concept of peace and development?
- What should be done by the different players in order to resolve the conflict?

These questions might be found in any conflict analysis, yet the time devoted to them indicates something unique was happening. The tri-people came together not only to share their own views but also to listen to each other. Many views were changed as people identified areas of convergence.

As a next step, responses to the initial questions were summarized and presented at two area consultations for validation and sharpening. Following revisions, a draft MPPA was reviewed by MPW conveners and an advisory group representing the tri-people.

About three hundred network members contributed to developing the MPPA. The final draft was ratified at the MPW Peoples’ Peace Assembly in April 2010.

Source: MPPA, pp. 2–3.

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14 Woodrow 2017.
15 MPPA, pg. 1.
decision-making), and consensus-building. Importantly, this principle-focused foundation does allow the possibility of later issue-specific lobbying when the political moment is right, as MPW has done on recent occasions to influence the details of MILF-GRP negotiations as they unfold.

Additionally, within the past few years MPW has made use of some conflict analysis exercises to support its scenario planning. This takes place during face-to-face meetings (general assemblies) to inform action plans in response to a particular event in the context. The purpose is primarily tactical — different from the deeper sharing of worldviews through dialogue — yet members do consider it an important part of their current practice.

Collective intention and action. There is a strong consensus that the 15-point agenda included in the MPPA represents the network-wide strategy. Drawing on the MPPA, MPW’s organization of activities is centered on specific advocacy campaigns, emphasizing voluntary effort and consensus-based decision-making. When a particular campaign is agreed on, MPW member networks volunteer to contribute in ways that overlap with their own existing strategy and align with their level of available resources. Campaign leadership roles can rotate, depending on which member network is best equipped to lead on a particular action. When approving public advocacy statements, the MPW name is only used if all member networks are in agreement; otherwise the statement is signed only by the networks that agree.

Since the GRP and MILF are poised for a likely breakthrough in the peace process, it is clear that significant progress has been made in the context, and that MPW has contributed to this progress. However, MPW’s significant advocacy achievements are not systematically tracked. Achievement tracking has been seen as potentially helpful but not a priority. This is largely because MPW member engagement is long-term, with little felt need for “institutional memory,” and achievement records have rarely been required for fund-raising. On the other hand, a lack of tracking makes it difficult for MPW to objectively assess its effectiveness, and to communicate its successes to key stakeholders both inside and outside the network.

### Figure D: Action points of the Peoples’ Agenda

**Right to Self-Determination**
1. Recognize the right to self-determination of Bangsamoro and Lumads.
2. Strengthen customary laws and Indigenous governance.
3. Discuss the narratives of the Bangsamoro and Lumads in an effort to rediscover historical truth.

**Human Rights and Justice**
4. Stop excessive use of military force.
5. Correct historical and ongoing injustices.
6. Address land-grabbing through a community-based mechanism.

**Humanitarian Accountability**
7. Ensure civilian protection/assistance during armed conflict.
8. Address policy issues related to internally displaced persons.

**Good Governance**
10. Work to end corruption and impunity.

**Sustainable Development and Environment**
11. Ensure a more serious consideration of climate change.
12. Address economic issues including food security, plantation economy, etc.

**National Peace Policy**
13. Sustain a culture of peace and human rights in Mindanao.
14. Pursue a comprehensive national peace policy.

**Solidarity and Peoples’ Participation**
15. Continue to enhance this MPPA as a living document.

Source: MPPA
Collective learning and adaptation. Process-oriented reflection is a core part of MPW’s organizational culture, but it is not necessarily systematic. Participants note that lessons learned are informally identified during general assemblies, and then applied to immediate action planning. They suggest making the practice even more useful by explicitly documenting those learnings for ongoing use.

MPW frequently seeks input from member networks and their constituencies — more often focused on a particular advocacy campaign rather than on the internal functioning of the network itself. Input opportunities are seized when they present themselves rather than systematically planned. For example, the lead secretariat is treating this case study research as a key opportunity for internal consultation and feedback.

Continuous communication and accountability. The most complete form of communication happens during face-to-face general assemblies, which include a representative of each member network. However, general assemblies are on an irregular schedule due to funding constraints. (The geographic spread of Mindanao is vast. Member networks often fund their own travel, but there are still hosting costs that fall on the secretariat.) In between general assemblies, most communication flows from the secretariat outward to the members. However, many MPW campaigns are initiated by a call from a member to the secretariat, raising an issue and urging the network to act. Virtual consultation (particularly via email listserv) is used when decisions are required. It is difficult to simultaneously gather all busy member representatives in a virtual format, so this sometimes results in disjointed conversations that strain the consensus-based decision-making norm.

There is no formal accountability structure — and there is a sense that such a structure might not fit well in a relationship-centered culture. However, the member updates that feature prominently in each general assembly serve as a gentle, informal means of accountability. Some participants observed that not all member networks contribute equally, and that some may need to be respectfully reminded of their responsibilities to the network. It is also uncertain how the liaison representatives of member networks share MPW information updates within their own constituencies. Many participants feel this represents a weak point, because it can lead to disconnects within the second tier of the network.

Second-tier communication is important because Mindanaoan civil society is exceptionally active, and there is moderate confusion around who is doing what. This confusion arises where networks have members and activities that overlap, or where the same people appear in similar roles within multiple organizational spaces. Such confusion does not necessarily impede advocacy. Policy makers do pay attention when they hear civil society speaking loudly and with a consistent message, even if they later find it difficult to recall which civil society actor was in the lead. However, within MPW, people who work in the second (or sometimes even third) tier of the network may have an incomplete understanding of what MPW is doing, particularly if the representative that connects them to the broader network has struggled to pass the message. This sometimes contributes to indifference or dissatisfaction within the network’s second tier.

Support structure or backbone. Overall, MPW’s structure is described as somewhat loose and reliant on a system of personal relationships, which many participants consider appropriate for a network of networks. At the same time, there is some confusion among members about how many members MPW has, and some interest in an updated clarification of roles and responsibilities (perhaps in the form of simple by-laws).
As noted above, MPW has four secretariats, eight member networks called conveners in recognition of their broad constituencies, and three incoming member organizations. The role of IID as the lead secretariat includes convening gatherings (assemblies, consultations, or solidarity missions), spearheading collaborative development of gathering agendas and arranging for strong facilitation, facilitating consensus-building around fast-moving advocacy opportunities, drafting written statements and positions, and addressing issues of network funding. Recognition of the pivotal importance of the secretariats’ role, and of the pressure that the secretariats face, is widespread. Indeed, secretariat staff have fondly joked that the pursuit of consensus-based decision-making within such a lively and diverse network is something akin to “herding eels.” CRS as a secretariat has lent particularly active support and accompaniment to IID in its lead secretariat role.

Among the conveners, there is a lead convener intended to represent other conveners in decision-making when time is short. This role is currently shared by CRS and the Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society. The lead convener role was previously a rotating responsibility, but this changed when the role began to overlap with that of the secretariats (CRS). The designation of secretariats themselves has not yet changed or rotated, and there are no near-term plans to do so.

The possibility of extending membership to singular organizations (e.g., Mindanao Peace-building Institute) rather than networks is relatively new within MPW and represents a way to expand MPW’s reach. The current membership process requires multiple years, because it is based on prior development of trusting relationships, and membership decisions can only be confirmed in the presence of a conveners’ meeting or general assembly. Once confirmed, singular member organizations are unlikely to have the same decision-making rights as convener networks, because they are not deemed to represent the same type of constituency.

Withdrawal from membership is also possible. It has occurred when member networks ceased to exist, and on one occasion a member network temporarily “parked its membership” due to internal disagreement over a sensitive policy issue. However, the more likely scenario is that a member network with changing interests would simply become less active rather than disrupting relationships by formally withdrawing from membership. This could lead to a “free rider” issue in which a member benefits without contributing, but in practice this has not been a significant problem.

Other collective impact themes. In addition to the considerations described above, other supportive factors have included the link to the Southeast Asia branch of the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict via IID, its regional convener. The GPPAC-IID interface involves mutual influence and growth, which has helped expand the vision for the mid-level and third-party roles that civil society can play in a peace process. Such vision enables MPW at its best to form a bridge from the grass roots to the presidential and congressional decision-makers in the Manila center of power. In the words of one participant, this allows MPW to influence policy “like baking a bibingka cake,” by cooking it from below and above at the same time. GPPAC has also been the source of exchange visits from civil society activists in other countries, including Myanmar and Timor Leste, which created cross-learning opportunities for everyone involved.

Among the useful tools and mechanisms used by MPW, the standouts include consultation processes and solidarity missions. Both merit deeper research to share the detailed how-tos with other networks. The consultation processes, seen in their most expansive form during the development of the MPPA, rely on deep dialogue and listening. However, at a pragmatic level,
they also rely on excellent process planning and facilitation skills to guide the proceedings, as well as talented writers to capture the consensus in writing and iteratively edit it until all parties are satisfied. The solidarity missions in times of crisis contribute to strong horizontal bonding within the network, and subsequently become the basis for influential lobbying, because statements are informed by direct experience in the crisis-affected area.

Inclusivity across conflict lines bears repeated emphasis as MPW’s hallmark. The story of MPW is the story of the committed pursuit of shared understanding, growing unity, and advocacy collaboration between Mindanao’s Indigenous Peoples, Bangsamoro, and Settlers. The inclusivity theme is a thread that runs throughout this case study, and MPW may be a helpful model for other networks looking to develop an inclusive vision, composition, and practice. The tri-people composition of MPW, when combined with the strong sense of need arising from the context, also serves to reinforce an ethos of mutual responsibility and long-term commitment. MPW members would be unlikely to abandon the causes of Indigenous and Bangsamoro communities as long as there are significant conflicts and injustices to be addressed. However, at 15 years old, MPW is facing challenges in sustaining the perception of ongoing momentum and impact, as described in the “Difficulties and barriers” subsection below.

With regard to insider and outsider roles, MPW has always been strongly and unequivocally locally led. There is no power struggle between local and international actors within MPW, nor is this a prominent issue within Mindanao’s strong and vibrant civil society. Within MPW there are a few international organizations involved as secretariats and members — and even a few foreign individuals in prominent roles — yet the network is always perceived as Mindanaoan. When international actors make a long-term commitment to Mindanao, align with the worldview represented in the MPPA, and submit to Mindanaoan leadership, then they are openly accepted — perhaps even to the point that they are no longer regarded as foreign.

What might be more sensitive is the participation of member networks from Filipino regions outside Mindanao (in light of the historical implications of settler migration from the north). Yet MPW’s members include two networks from other regions. Their roles are distinct and valued, because they focus on developing the peace constituency at the national level. Mindanao Solidarity Network represents Mindanaoan concerns to policy makers and the public in Manila, while BISDAK aims to help Visayan citizens (in the central Philippines) understand more of the situation in Mindanao and the need for a publicly supported political settlement. However, in 2015, when it became necessary to further expand public support, MPW did not add new members from outside the region but rather partnered with new organizations on a nationwide campaign. (Figure E illustrates collective impact themes in action.)
Difficulties and barriers. Every network faces tough times, and MPW is no exception. The context produces discouragements, because peacebuilding in Mindanao has often resembled a dance of “three steps forward, two steps back.” Militant groups have abducted individual MPW members on more than one occasion, which is traumatic for the network itself, and often prompts a visit and active assistance by an MPW delegation. Each unexpected setback in the peace process also comes as a blow, particularly the major disruptions experienced in 2008 and 2015.

MPW shines in addressing violent setbacks through its solidarity missions. An MPW delegation visits, negotiating access if necessary to arrive at the site of the crises, gathers all relevant groups, and listens deeply to the stories of the affected people. MPW’s convening power can draw influential constituencies into the solidarity mission teams. For example, a centennial commemoration of the 1906 Bud Dajo Massacre in Jolo (Sulu Archipelago) involved a num-

**Figure E: Campaign Spotlight — Mamasapano and All Out Peace**

At the dawn of 2015, the GRP-MILF peace process was moving forward nicely, and a Bangsamoro Basic Law stipulating autonomy details had been submitted for congressional review. MPW was supporting the process through public seminars and Moro-Indigenous dialogue on sensitive aspects of the policy. However, on Jan. 25 the prevailing calm was broken by a major clash in Mamasapano Municipality. Operations were botched during police pursuit of a Malaysian militant, resulting in violence that cost more than 60 lives (44 police and 18 or more fighters from MILF and Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters). Congress postponed BBL review, and public opinion began to sour, following a pattern of anti-Moro backlash in the wake of setbacks.

A few days after the massacre, one of the Bangsamoro member networks within MPW called the lead secretariat to ask MPW to “step up” to help mitigate damage by reframing the public narrative, lest the derailment of the peace process become permanent. The lead secretariats began to act. In Mamasapano, MPW could not make its usual immediate solidarity visit, because multiple investigations were ongoing at the site. However, IID collaborated with Oxfam on a woman-led listening mission to Mamasapano.

MPW lead secretariats consulted conveners via email and decided to hold a stakeholders’ conference. This three-day conference went beyond the usual MPW membership to include other key people positioned to mobilize unprecedented civil society support in the Luzon and Visayas regions. The conference began with addresses from key players including MILF and GRP lead negotiators, so that their perspectives could inform subsequent scenario analysis and action planning. Conference participants planned a multi-month campaign in which participating organizations would develop their own city-level activities in alignment with a shared template, and national events would culminate in Manila. The new All Out Peace campaign had seven conveners, with MPW taking the lead within Mindanao.

In Manila, All Out Peace organized a “people’s congress” to ritually pass the BBL. It also countered the government’s mourning for fallen police by calling for a day of mourning for every life lost. Following intense lobbying, the National Day of Healing towards Justice and Unity was congressionally approved for March 6, 2015. Simultaneous ceremonies in multiple cities used culturally rich symbolism, such as a strike of the agung (traditional instrument) for every life lost. Strong media coverage further spread the message across the country. After the Mamasapano-related events, All Out Peace shifted into ongoing support for the BBL, and remained quite active until the shock of the Marawi siege in 2017. External observers credit this campaign with helping to keep the peace constituency alive in the wake of Mamasapano, making it possible for Congress to once again revisit the BBL by June 2018.
ber of foreigners, including some from the U.S., whose military had been implicated in severe atrocities. Local participants remember it as a defining moment for MPW, and as “the first time we heard the Americans say they were sorry.” Following the listening process, the MPW delegation reflects together, taking time to process their own strong emotions if needed. Then they set out to influence the contending parties, usually through a written statement and action proposals combined with a collective lobbying plan using the connections that MPW member networks have to influencers and decision-makers.

The context also produces fault lines that can threaten unity. While MPW has made ground-breaking progress in overcoming exclusion and forging unity of purpose among the tri-people, there are a few flash-point issues that even MPW finds it challenging to navigate. These are typically policy dilemmas that appear to require prioritizing the interests of one identity group above another. For example, every negotiation around (re)establishing an autonomous region for the Bangsamoro raises difficult questions about where the boundaries of that region will fall in relation to non-Moro communities, and what will be the rights afforded to Indigenous or Christian settler communities that are within the new Bangsamoro entity.

These were the questions that derailed the near-signing of the 2008 Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain, and also sparked a rift within MPW when member Mindanao Peoples’ Caucus became dissatisfied with the response of network partners. The tension is high once again given the upcoming congressional review of the BBL agreement by June 2018. Within MPW, the recent emphasis has been on bringing the GRP-MILF peace process to fruition, so some Indigenous members feel that their rights are being deprioritized. Some are quite willing to support MPW’s big-picture policy stances on the BBL while pursuing Indigenous-specific issues on a parallel track. However, other Indigenous members feel a relational strain, and they wish to see MPW take a stronger stance on current Indigenous rights issues. Even so, they continue to “appreciate the space” that MPW uniquely provides for being heard throughout the peace process, including periodic facilitation of two-way dialogue between Bangsamoro and Indigenous Peoples.

Over the past two years, the Rodrigo Duterte presidency has also become a source of fault lines within civil society. Duterte’s history as mayor of Davao is raising the city’s national-level profile. The president’s emphasis on pushing the GRP-MILF peace process to completion is enthusiastically celebrated by some peace advocates, even as extensions of martial law in Mindanao and a heavy-handed “war on drugs” provoke deep and growing concern. Civil society organizations feel pressure to decide which direction to throw their weight — and any decision they make may give the appearance of favoring one identity group over another. Within MPW, some members envision this becoming the toughest test of unity in their 15-year history.

This test comes at a moment when MPW is also facing the challenge of sustaining ongoing momentum and impact over time. There is a strong perception among many of the participants that continued effectiveness will depend on visibly reinvigorating the network. It is not easy to pinpoint the root cause of this unease, and there is no obvious sign of decreased passion or effort. However, it is possible to discern a number of contributing factors.

First, many MPW members point back to the 2011 MPPA as not only their basis for joint action but also the peak of MPW’s momentum. The MPPA was, metaphorically speaking, a mountaintop experience. Of course, the challenge of such triumphs is that once a network has reached a mountaintop, it is difficult to continue going upward. Further, in recalling the early days of MPW, prior to the MPPA, many stakeholders mistakenly credit MPW for a highly
successful civilian monitoring program called Bantay Ceasefire (Ceasefire Watch). IID (MPW’s lead secretariat) helped to create Bantay Ceasefire, and several MPW member networks were central to its implementation. However, MPW as a network was never responsible for Bantay Ceasefire — and it is arguably possible that this misunderstanding contributes to a perception of MPW’s decline. From that somewhat inaccurate perspective, MPW is credited with two consecutive mountaintop triumphs — Bantay Ceasefire, followed by MPPA — so whatever comes next may appear less significant in comparison.

Second, MPW’s recent focus on the GRP-MILF peace process is on the hopeful verge of success, but it is also a subject of varying enthusiasm within the network. In addition to the Indigenous rights tensions described above, the BBL is focused on the MILF territory in Central Mindanao. It is therefore perceived as a lower priority by some MPW members based elsewhere in the region, and sometimes even as a delicate problem by MPW members based in the Western Mindanao zones dominated by competing Islamist groups. Thus, a multiyear focus on the BBL may be interpreted as a slow decline by MPW members who are less focused on that issue.

MPW’s recent BBL advocacy has required not only statements of support but also a deeper dive into the details of policy formation, as the country has debated at length on BBL content. The progress toward a settlement has counterintuitively made it increasingly difficult to sustain MPW network unity. In 2003, the urgent need was for a GRP-MILF cease-fire, so it was relatively easy for member networks to agree that the shooting must stop. Now the need is to shape the particulars of the BBL, including some potentially divisive aspects, which make it a less likely rallying point for MPW’s diverse membership. There are potential learnings here to inform the selection of future advocacy priorities, and a sense that the time is coming to revisit the MPPA.

Many MPW members are eager to pick up some parts of the existing 15-point agenda that have not yet been the focus of network action. MPW as a network has made progress on the right to self-determination, excessive military force, internally displaced persons, and the national peace policy — however with a much greater focus on the Bangsamoro than on other conflicts. (With reference to the MPPA summary shown in Figure C, those are points 1 through 5, 8 and 9, and 13 and 14.) Some MPW member networks have worked to address civilian protection (point 7) and local governance and land reform (parts of 10 and 12). None of the MPW members has done significant work on land-grabbing or climate change (6 and 11, respectively). A few members have expressed interest in updating the MPPA, but most simply emphasize a desire to revisit it together to determine which elements will be prioritized in MPW’s next phase.

In pragmatic terms, a lack of funds threatens to delay that reprioritization. Funds are required for face-to-face general assemblies, which are MPW’s way of updating shared contextual understanding and formulating joint action plans. In the absence of face-to-face gatherings, the lead secretariat must either cobble together a decision via email — which can strain the consensus approach that MPW so deeply values — or else forgo action. Finally, it is clear that external observers see MPW as consisting of the same leadership team over the past 15 years. While they deeply respect that team, they also feel the network needs a cadre of “second lin- ers,” a new generation of emergent leadership, to ensure its vitality for the future.
V. Summary of Success Factors and Challenges

This section draws on the analysis above to identify the key success factors and challenges that are most pivotal in shaping MPW’s effectiveness and highlights their significance for ongoing learning about the conditions for achieving collective impact. It also raises the question of how success and challenge factors might be experienced in unique ways in a multitier network.

Key success factors

1. **Engagement and commitment.** The level of engagement and commitment within Mindanaoan civil society is unusually high, and people working on peace tend to be steadfast for that cause. This unique cultural context has provided fertile ground for MPW to grow, and MPW in turn has raised the standard for what civil society in Mindanao can aspire to. There are high levels of commitment within MPW, which are best understood as a broad commitment to the cause of peace for the tri-people rather than merely as a narrow commitment to a network.

2. **Self-sustaining interdependence.** MPW is largely powered by internal capacities and funds, with frequent external collaboration but no external dependencies. It has evolved in an organic, fluid way in response to the context rather than pursuing highly structured long-term plans. MPW also depends on internal complementarity, in which all MPW members contribute something unique, and the collaboration between IID as lead secretariat and CRS as a strong accompanier is a case in point. IID brings progressive vision for the role of civil society and corresponding advocacy skills, while CRS brings formidable skills in planning and facilitation of horizontal processes within the network. Such internal interdependence has made MPW flexible and resilient, able to operate under circumstances that might cause more formalized networks to collapse.

3. **Moral imagination.** MPW’s experience is saturated with a hard-to-define something that is not present in the provisional Framework for Collective Impact in Peacebuilding,”16 and is therefore significant for further learning. Many of MPW’s success factors are not primarily technical, in that they do not emphasize the analytical and data-driven activities foregrounded in the provisional framework. Rather, much of MPW’s success stems from “soft factors.” These include MPW’s focus on relationships, listening, solidarity, and tri-people vision, all infused with a sense of the transcendent. Such factors might collectively be called “moral imagination,”17 drawing on Lederach’s concept of peacebuilding as a creative, emergent, relational art of social change.

While the MPW experience firmly upholds the five collective impact conditions identified in the provisional framework, it also demonstrates that the types of activities employed to achieve those conditions may vary more widely than anticipated according to the cultural context. It even suggests that there are limits to what a technical approach alone can accomplish, and that a complementary emphasis on moral imagination can enable a network to boost its effectiveness.

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16 Woodrow 2017.
17 Lederach 2005.
Key challenges

1. **Contextual strains on network unity.** Civil society peacebuilders are not immune to the very social tensions that they are trying to heal. While MPW has made groundbreaking progress in overcoming exclusion and forging unity of purpose among the tri-people, there are a few flash-point issues that even MPW finds it challenging to navigate. These include Moro-Indigenous tensions over minority rights and ancestral domain within autonomous zones, and polarization of views around the current national presidency. Both sources of strain are particularly strong in 2018.

2. **Funding.** While it has traditionally required only modest amounts of mainly internal funding to run MPW — which brings key advantages as explained above — it is also true that the shortage of funds impedes the network’s functioning. Funding shortfalls delay or prevent the face-to-face general assemblies that nurture a shared understanding of the context and drive joint planning and action. The question of how to ensure a modest amount of sustainable funding, without risking boom-and-bust cycles or incurring donor obligations that skew the network’s original identity and purpose, is a critical issue for the future.

3. **Sustaining momentum and impact over time.** The provisional framework for collective impact refers to the importance of sustainability. However, it does not fully address the question of how a long-lived network can sustain momentum and impact over time. This is the biggest challenge facing MPW. To the extent that there is a slowdown or decline in MPW, some of it is perceptual in nature — yet perceptions can become realities, particularly if they discourage members or external stakeholders from investing in the future of the network. Recapturing momentum through highly visible actions and successes is another critical issue for the future.

4. **Multitier networks.** Because MPW is a network of networks, or a network composed of two and sometimes even three tiers, some of its successes and challenges manifest in unique ways. This experience may hold significance for further learning on the distinctions between different types of collective impact efforts. For example, one factor critical to MPW’s success has been that it established itself as a fundamentally different type of entity — and therefore not a competitor — to any of its member networks.

At the same time, to address the challenges of the future, there are some incentives and pressures to institutionalize. Some MPW members recommend tighter organizational structures, expanded secretariat capacity, grant funding, and service program implementation as ways to increase MPW’s momentum. Those are certainly viable options, yet they risk pulling MPW away from its uniqueness as a network of networks and pushing it toward becoming indistinguishable from any other network — thus competing with its members. For that reason, other MPW members favor keeping MPW informal, flexible, and self-sustaining, maximizing the factors that fueled its early success.

There are particular challenges involved in managing a multitier network, such as the question of whether all network members must themselves be networks, or whether there could also be a place within the network for singular organizations. The latter option might expand MPW’s reach in dynamic ways, even as it risks compromising MPW’s uniqueness. Further, there is the dilemma of how to maximize communication about MPW activities within the second tier of the network while avoiding the overextension of the lead secretariats’ roles and capacities.
VI. Future Considerations for Mindanao Peaceweavers

The following considerations may be useful as MPW develops strategy for its next phase of peace advocacy influence at a pivotal time in Mindanao’s history.

1. **Gather MPW members to assess the emergent context** in light of pivotal developments including BBL approval (or failure), and a shift to federalism. Revisit the MPPA to renew shared understanding of context as MPW enters a new phase. Reprioritize future action together in a way that includes but also goes beyond the Bangsamoro peace process and attends to the contextual rifts that challenge network unity. (This aims to renew Collective and Emergent Understanding of the Context, plus Collective Intention and Action.)

2. **Secure enough funding** and secretariat capacity to carry out MPW’s basic operating requirements. This includes convening members for general assemblies at planned intervals, and also on an as-needed basis in the event of urgent developments, in order to reinforce consensus-based decision-making and minimize communication gaps. When considering additional funding beyond those basic requirements, weigh carefully the benefits and risks of institutionalization as a network of networks and the importance of preserving the nature and identity of MPW as an authentically Mindanaoan network. (This aims to strengthen Collective Intention and Action.)

3. **Add youth networks to MPW membership** to reinvigorate network momentum. This may involve adding more than one network, to ensure balance among different types of constituencies. It will likely require speeding up the membership process, disrupting some long-established relational patterns to extend inclusion to new types of members, and considering new means of communication via social media. Future youth members could benefit from intentional mentoring and accompaniment as they take on key roles and responsibilities within MPW. (This aims to help sustain momentum and impact over time.)

4. **Track advocacy wins and achievements** as a means to assess effectiveness, factor this tracking into rhythms of learning and adaptation, and communicate wins to external and internal stakeholders, including the second tier of the network. If time permits, this effort could be further strengthened through identification and tracking of a broader range of success indicators across the network. (This aims to strengthen Collective Intention and Action plus Collective Learning and Adaptive Management while reinvigorating perceptions of momentum and impact over time.)
Annex A: Participants in Interviews and Focus Group Discussions

### Key Informant Interviews

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<tr>
<td>April 23 Davao City</td>
<td>(1) Lyndee Prieto</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>IID (Pilipinas Program) / MPW secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 23 Davao City</td>
<td>(2) Agusto Miclat</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>IID executive director / MPW secretary general</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 23 Skype to Manila</td>
<td>(3) Ryan Mark Sullivan</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>External. Former executive director, Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 24 Davao City</td>
<td>(4) Pastor Daniel Pan-</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Peacebuilders Community executive director / MPW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 26 Cotabato City</td>
<td>(5) Rexall Q. Kaalim</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Nonviolent Peace Force / Bantay Ceasefire, former IID / MPC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 26 Phone to Manila</td>
<td>(6) Prof. Miriam Coronel Ferrer</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>External. Government of the Philippines Peace Panel chair / academe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 26 Cotabato City</td>
<td>(7) Mahdie C. Amella</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>MAPAD executive director / MPC – MPW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 30 Skype</td>
<td>(8) Mags Maglana</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>External. IID / MPW consultant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 30 FB Messenger call</td>
<td>(9) Philip Anghag</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>External. GIZ – COSERAM, former MPAC / former MPW co-secretariat</td>
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### Focus Group Discussions

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<tr>
<td>FGD #1 April 24 Davao City</td>
<td>(1) Radzini Oledan</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>IID consultant — Transitional Justice Study (co-wrote MPPA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) Octavio A. Dinampo</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Council member — Mindanao Peoples’ Caucus / MPW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3) Candido O. Aparece</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Mindanao Peoples’ Caucus / MPW</td>
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<tr>
<td>FGD #2 April 24 Davao City</td>
<td>(4) Frederick Goddard</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Mindanao Peacebuilding Institute / MPW</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5) Dolly Corro</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Catholic Relief Services / MPW secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6) Sami M. Buat</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>NCWF XI / Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society / MPW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGD#3 April 25 Cotabato City</td>
<td>(7) Bobet Dimaukorn</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Forum ZFD / AGONG Network / MPW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(8) Sammy Maulana</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>CBCS / MPW</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(9) Jehan A. Usop</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>MAPAD / MPW</td>
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<tr>
<td>FGD#4 April 25 Cotabato City</td>
<td>(10) Ma. Carmen L. Batnaytan</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Former IID / current NP / MPW</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(11) Alim Bandara</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Timuway Justice Governance / IP leader of Teduray / KL-MPPM / MPW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGD#5 April 26</td>
<td>(12) Prof. Rodelio Ambangan</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Mindanao Peoples’ Peace Movement chair / MPW co-convener</td>
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<tr>
<td>Midsayap</td>
<td>(13) Bae Magdalena S. Herbilla</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Mindanao Peoples’ Peace Movement vice chair, IP leader / MPW</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(14) Renante C. Parium</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Mindanao Peoples’ Peace Movement / Sama tribe / MPW</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(15) Habbas Camendan</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Mindanao Peoples’ Peace Movement Moro leader / MPW</td>
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<tr>
<td>FGD#6 April 27</td>
<td>(16) Grace J. Rebollos</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>ZABIDA – PAZ / MPW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zamboanga City</td>
<td>(17) Fr. Angel Calvo</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Peace Advocates Zamboanga / Interfaith Solidarity for Peace / ZABIDA / former MPW lead convener</td>
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<tr>
<td>FGD#7 April 27</td>
<td>(18) Al Rashid T. Jama</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Interfaith Solidarity for Peace / ZC – IPCL / GCCPBAI / IPO / MPW</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zamboanga City</td>
<td>(19) Dr. Salihmatal H. Lagbas</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Interfaith Solidarity for Peace / Golden Crescent / MPW</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(20) Prof. Ali T Yacub</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Interfaith Solidarity for Peace / Golden Crescent / MPW</td>
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<td>FGD#8 April 28</td>
<td>(21) Jocelyn S. Zabala</td>
<td>Female</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zamboanga City</td>
<td>(22) Vandrael Birowa</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>ZABIDA / ISP / MPW</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(23) Edmund Gambahali</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Bikotan New Life Initiative / MPW</td>
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<tr>
<td>FGD#9 April 30</td>
<td>(24) Boi Era Espana</td>
<td>Female</td>
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<tr>
<td>Davao City</td>
<td>(25) Antonio E. Apat</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Agong Peace Network / MPW co-convenor</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(26) Atty. Francesca Sarenas</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>SALIGAN / MPW secretariat</td>
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Annex B: Sample Guide Questions for Interviews and Focus Group Discussions

Interview or FGD Questions

1. Warm-up. Can you tell us about your role or relationship with MPW?

2. Big picture — Part 1. What do you consider MPW’s biggest impact for peace thus far? Why was that particular effort so successful?

3. Big picture — Part 2 (for external stakeholders). In what ways have you observed MPW influencing policy, or influencing the thinking of policy makers?

4. Joint & emerging understanding of the conflict. There are so many members networks and organizations involved with MPW! How does MPW develop a shared understanding of the Mindanao context, and its unique dynamics and needs, among all these people?
   • Optional follow-up: How was MPW originally conceived, and what was the motivation for collective action?
   • Optional: Was there a joint conflict analysis conducted at the outset? If yes, is this an ongoing progress? How often is the analysis revisited? Who participates in it?

5. Collective intention and action (including but not limited to MPPA) — Part 1. What is the network-wide strategy of MPW? What is MPW’s agenda (and desired outcomes)? How was/is that strategy/agenda developed?
   • Optional: Have you been involved in the process of developing MPW strategy or agenda? Can you tell us a bit about that experience?
   • Optional: What progress toward the peacebuilding agenda (outcomes) has been made to date?
   • Optional: How does MPW measure or track its progress toward the peacebuilding agenda (outcomes)?

6. Collective intention and action — Part 2. What are the contributing activities of individual member networks or organizations? How are decisions made regarding who does what? How does MPW ensure that activities are mutually reinforcing, and there are not overlaps or gaps?
   • Optional: Can you tell us more about the contribution of your own network/organization toward MPW goals? (Descriptions and details.)
   • Optional: How do individual member networks (organizations) ensure the MPW strategy is in line with their own organizational strategies?

7. Collective learning and adaptation. How does MPW identify lessons learned? How does it adapt its actions based on what it is learning?
   • Optional: Does MPW, or member networks/organizations, seek regular feedback from each other? From “beneficiaries” or affected communities?
   • Optional: How does MPW collectively reflect on how things are going, both programmatically and relationally?
   • Optional: In addition to formal learning practices, are there any informal learning practices within MPW that you think are helpful?
8. **Continuous communication and accountability.** What types of communication system(s) exist within MPW to ensure flow of information? Do member networks and organizations hold each other accountable for fulfilling their commitments? If so, how?
   - Optional: What types of communications do you receive from MPW? What types do you send?
   - Optional: Can you tell us about one experience of significant success in communication within MPW? One experience of significant difficulty in communication within MPW?
   - Optional: How does MPW share information and accountability with beneficiaries or affected communities?
   - Optional: How does MPW share information and accountability with its donors? How do donor relations impact the overall work of MPW?

9. **Support structure or backbone.** What are the mechanics of how MPW is set up? Which aspect of MPW structure have you found most helpful in progressing toward the peacebuilding agenda? Which aspect of the structure is occasionally problematic or challenging?
   - Optional: How are the secretariats identified? What are the characteristics that make a network/organization successful as an MPW secretariat?
   - Optional: How does the structure help or hinder fund-raising efforts?
   - Optional: What kind of vertical and horizontal linkages exist within MPW?

10. **Insider/outsider relationships.** Are there any outsiders (non-Filipinos) involved in MPW? If yes, what are their roles, and how do they differ from the roles of insiders? What are the keys to success in making insider/outsider relationships healthy and useful for MPW?
    - Optional: Are there any circumstances in which Filipinos from Luzon or Visayas are considered outsiders? If yes, how do the role questions above apply to this reality?

11. **Inclusivity.** What does inclusivity (sociopolitical, membership) mean to MPW? In what ways has MPW sought to be inclusive?
    - Optional: What scope exists for new members to join and existing ones to phase out?
    - Note: This question not “required” because inclusivity is highly likely to arise in other questions.

12. **Difficult times.** What was the most difficult time that MPW has encountered so far in its history? What made it so challenging? How did MPW try to overcome those challenges?
    - Optional: What types of problems or obstacles does MPW routinely encounter?

13. **Sustainability.** What keeps the member organizations of MPW engaged and committed over time?
    - Optional: What (when) has been the highest point of your (your organization’s) level of motivation to engage with MPW? Why? What has been the lowest point, and why?

14. **Other success factors.** What other factors do you consider important to the successful setup and operation of MPW?
    - Optional: Are there any specific tools or mechanisms that have proven to be useful for the success of MPW’s goal?

15. **Future.** Looking ahead to potential context changes such as the upcoming congressional review of BBL, and national charter change, do you have any ideas or suggestions about how MPW can continue to be effective in the future?