THEORIES AND INDICATORS OF CHANGE
CONCEPTS AND PRIMERS FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND MITIGATION

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THEORIES AND INDICATORS OF CHANGE IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND MITIGATION

CONCEPTS AND PRIMERS

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### Glossary of Abbreviations

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACU</td>
<td>Accelerating Contraceptive Use</td>
</tr>
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<td>ADR</td>
<td>Alternative Dispute Resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLTP</td>
<td>Burundi Leadership Training Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CALM</td>
<td>Conflict Abatement through Local Mitigation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDCS</td>
<td>Country Development Cooperation Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDR</td>
<td>Community-driven Reconstruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMG</td>
<td>Conflict Management Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMM</td>
<td>Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation</td>
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<tr>
<td>COP</td>
<td>Culture of Peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPCs</td>
<td>Community Peace Councils</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCHA</td>
<td>Bureau of Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELN</td>
<td>National Liberation Army (Colombia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGM</td>
<td>Female Genital Mutilation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAM</td>
<td>Free Aceh Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICR</td>
<td>International Conflict Resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Peoples</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPCRI</td>
<td>Israel–Palestine Center for Research and Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRs</td>
<td>Intermediate Results</td>
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<tr>
<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHS</td>
<td>Mutually Hurting Stalemate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td>Non-violent Peaceforce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRC</td>
<td>Norwegian Refugee Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>PJTT</td>
<td>Project on Justice in Times of Transition</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPP</td>
<td>Reflecting on Peace Practice Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOW</td>
<td>Scope of Work</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<td>THINC</td>
<td>Theories and Indicators of Change Initiative</td>
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Overview
I. Overview: Working with Theories of Change

The most important thing to know about theories of change is that they are intended to be helpful and practical. They are not an academic exercise to make your work more difficult, but instead a tool to improve the design, implementation and assessment of your programs.

This guide is to help you understand and use theories of change and to provide you with resources and information that you can draw upon in that process. It distills insights from development policy and practice, as well as from the analysis of researchers, to give you the most up-to-date material to construct theories of change for development programming.

This Guide will cover the following:

1. Theories of change and how they are relevant (Section 1.1).
2. Constructing theories of change (Section 1.2).
3. Additional resources on developing and using theories of change (Section 1.3).
4. How to use the Theories of Change Matrix and Primers in defining your programmatic theories of change (Section 2.1).
5. The Theories of Change (THINC) Matrix (Section 2.2).

1.1 Defining Theories of Change and Their Relevance

As a development practitioner, the programs you design are intended to improve the conditions (economic, political, social, environmental, etc.) in a given context. As such, they will hopefully change how institutions operate/are structured and the way people think or act such that these improvements take place and are sustained. As a practitioner, you draw upon your experience and that of others to create ways to catalyze or facilitate such changes. In doing so, you are making explicit, or sometimes implicit, assumptions about how the change will come about, i.e., which activities will function in which ways to create the desired outcome.

“A theory of change explains why we think certain actions will produce desired change in a given context.”¹ It is intended to make all of our implicit assumptions more explicit, in order to (1) clarify which drivers of violent conflict we are addressing; (2) state clearly what the intended outcome of programs will be; and (3) fully articulate how and why the program will address the drivers of conflict and achieve its intended outcomes.

In its simplest form, a theory of change is expressed in the following:

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¹ CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, Search for Common Ground and CARE International (Forthcoming) Practical Approaches to Theories of Change in Conflict, Justice and Security Programmes (Draft, June 2012), London: DFID (“DFID Theories of Change”).
“If we do X (action), then we will produce Y (change/shift towards peace, stability, security).”

or

“We believe that by doing X (action) successfully, Y will come about (movement towards a desired goal).”

Of course, not all situations call for such simple statements. A theory of change might be expressed as, “If we do X, Y and Z, it will lead to W,” or, “If we do X, it will lead to Y, which will lead to Z, which might possibly lead to W.”

It is important to extend the statement a bit further to clarify underlying assumptions by adding the rationale or logic—how and why the change will come about—in a “because” phrase. This then produces the following:

“If we do X…, then Y…, because Z….”

For instance, one theory of change for a post-war program aimed at promoting employment for ex-combatant youth might be as follows:

“If we provide employment for ex-combatant youth, then we will reduce the likelihood of inter-communal violence, because unemployed youths are the most likely to be recruited into fighting; many still hold weapons and remain connected to their command structures. If they find employment, they will disengage from their command structures and will be less recruitable because they will have more to lose.”

Box 1—Embedding theory of change in context
A theory of change cannot stand alone. It needs to be embedded and considered within a specific context. Efforts that contribute to a desired change in one context may have a different effect in another.

How does a theory of change relate to a conflict analysis? Conflict analysis and theories of change are related but distinct concepts used to inform conflict resolution interventions and their evaluation. Analysis that presents no avenues for change is not useful to development practitioners, while a theory of change not rooted in analysis is also unlikely to be effective.

Experience has shown that analysis of the conflict dynamics and context is an essential first step to any and all program design, monitoring and evaluation in conflict-affected and fragile environments. At USAID, a formal conflict assessment process often serves as the starting point for programming-oriented analysis, although frequently it is necessary to conduct additional analysis specific to the project or activity in question.

Conflict analysis and assessment set the stage for design, monitoring and evaluation of programs by identifying the factors or drivers that are most salient in affecting dynamics of peace, conflict and fragility. By changing these factors or their inter-relationships, it is logical to

2 Modified from “DFID Theories of Change,” op. cit. (note 1).
infer that conflict dynamics should change as a result. **This is the juncture where theory of change and conflict analysis meet.** The theory of change provides the bridge between analysis and programming, helping practitioners to make sure that the programs are relevant and appropriate to the conflict.

In short, based upon the findings of the conflict analysis, a theory of change can be identified by asking the question, “What needs to change in this particular context to generate more peace and less violent conflict?” The theory of change will be an “if…then” statement about how that change will happen. It will specify the type of change (e.g., knowledge, attitudes, skills, policies, etc.), the target of change (e.g., key individual, group, organization, process, etc.) and the pathway to change (e.g., logic of results), ensuring that the theory of change is causally linked to the conflict diagnosis.

**How can you use theories of change?**
There are several ways in which theories of change are useful in conflict and development programming, some of which have already been mentioned:

1. To make assumptions explicit about what change we expect to take place and how/why we expect this to happen.
2. To weed out unrealistic program ideas and clarify and refine ideas that are worthy of further consideration.⁴
3. To uncover gaps in our programming when we find that there are steps in the logic of our theories (see (1) above) that turn out to be either incorrect or missing entirely.
4. To make sure everyone involved in designing and implementing the program has the same understanding of why a program is structured as it is and how to implement it according to that structure.
5. To help communicate and be more transparent with beneficiaries and communities about our programs.
6. To provide a basis for assessing relevance, effectiveness and impact in monitoring and evaluation (M&E), and therefore to help identify reasons for success or failure.
7. To identify where adjustments or modifications in the program may be needed to achieve the desired outcome/result.
8. Based on (6), to contribute to knowledge about violence, peace and development.⁵

**Why is stating an explicit theory of change essential for effective monitoring and evaluation of conflict programs?**⁶
When analysis, theory of change and implementation come together effectively, the result should be a noticeable change in the conflict dynamics. Focusing on these outcomes—particularly in the context of evaluation—is critical for purposes of

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⁴ See CAF 2.0, p. 36.
⁵ See OECD DAC (2012) *Evaluating Peacebuilding Activities in Settings of Conflict and Fragility: Improving Learning for Results.* Paris: OECD DAC. This Guidance emphasizes that “[d]eveloping better founded, more clearly stated theories about how peacebuilding and statebuilding can be achieved and supported is a key message from this guidance for decision makers, managers, and programme staff.” Id. at 9 (Executive Summary).
⁶ Ibid.
accountability and learning. If a project does not appear to affect the overall conflict dynamics, however, there are four broadly plausible explanations:

1. **The underlying analysis was incorrect.** Perhaps the project did affect identified conflict factors, but these factors were not related to the overall conflict dynamics in the manner previously understood; for example, the project addressed the symptoms of conflict, instead of its sources.

2. **The theory of change was unfounded or invalid.** The expected changes did not take place because the project made incorrect assumptions about how change would occur in this context. Or perhaps the project did affect the targets of its change as intended, but the expected changes from this particular set of actions did not address drivers of conflict or had unintended negative consequences; for example, the project brought together leaders from opposing sides to pursue common goals unrelated to the peace process, and although relationships improved, attitudes about the "other" and about the peace process did not.

3. **The project was not implemented properly.** Perhaps the project did have a valid theory of change for affecting the conflict dynamics and the proposed actions would have yielded the desired outcomes, but the project did not go off as planned; for example, the project faced logistical challenges or malfeasance.

4. **The theory of change was valid but insufficient.** The project’s theory of change was valid and did affect the identified conflict factors, but it was insufficient to affect overall dynamics of peace and conflict. This, for example, could be due to the influence of other conflict factors that were not considered or addressed or to the absence of linkages with other programs.

Theories of change, it should be added, may also benefit project managers in terms of maintaining accountability. In some cases, expectations for peace and security programs exceed what is plausible or realistic. By rooting projects in realistic and logical analysis and theories of change, project managers can ensure that the project’s expectations are realistic and better respond to critiques, i.e., “Perhaps the project did not bring about an
end to the war, but there is credible evidence that it changed the dynamics in a positive way, based on the analysis and theory of change.” A well thought-out theory of change will help to identify and assess the nature of the contribution to the broader peace, rather than make inappropriate claims to have single-handedly created that peace.

1.2 STEPS IN CONSTRUCTING A THEORY OF CHANGE

The theory of change is best articulated at the beginning of a planning process and reviewed and checked throughout the program cycle. However, it is also possible to develop or amend a theory of change at a later stage. Conflict situations tend to be volatile and dynamic in nature. A project must sometimes shift its focus or strategy to remain relevant to the situation on the ground. Or a project team might discover that the theory of change was insufficient or inadequate as the team learns more about the situation and the program’s effects on it during implementation. In that case, it will be important to adopt a revised theory or theories of change as well. Unfortunately, this ideal is not always reflected in practice. Many efforts fail to develop theories of change at the beginning of the project cycle, if at all, and many others neglect the ongoing process of adaptation. However, it is never too late to develop a theory of change; it can be useful during all stages of the programming cycle.

Articulating the theory(ies) of change is a helpful way of generating good, logical frameworks. The logical or results framework establishes a hierarchy of objectives or results statements to show how a program believes change will come about. Essentially, a good and robust logical framework should represent “a theory about how intended change will occur.” Once the theory of change is developed, you can use it to identify what the project goal, purposes or intermediate results (IRs) and outputs for the logical framework are and what you think needs to happen to achieve them.

The theory(ies) of change, which may not be fully written into the results framework or logical framework, are important because they clarify what is behind the arrows or links between different levels of objectives. They explain how and why achieving lower level results will lead to the higher level objectives and to the Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) goal, and thus help program planners identify and test critical assumptions and expectations about how the program will work.8

Step 1: Conduct a conflict analysis

As with constructing any intervention, the first step is to conduct a conflict analysis to determine the significant drivers of violent conflict and sources of resilience in a given community, region or country. The conflict analysis should help focus attention for strategy and programming based on conflict drivers and mitigating factors, urgency, opportunity and your needs. The revised USAID Conflict Assessment Framework (CAF 2.0) provides a template for conducting a conflict analysis. However, it is also possible to draw upon

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assessments done by other groups, such as the International Crisis Group, the United Nations, other donors or practitioners or USAID’s own partners in the country concerned.

**Step 2: Identify the conflict/resilience drivers the program will address**

Once the significant causes of violent conflict and the sources of resilience are identified and prioritized in terms of their relative importance, the second step is for you to decide which of the priority conflict drivers you will try to address, and which sources of resilience you will incorporate and build upon. This may be a function of mandate, expertise, staffing capacity, alignment with country strategy or availability of funding.

**Step 3: Identify the program’s goals (the WHAT and the WHO)**

Once a priority program area has been chosen, you must again consult the conflict assessment data to determine what type of change is desirable in this context. Here is where it is important to decide: (a) what the preferred outcome will be, once the change process is completed; and (b) whether the change process needs to be targeting political leaders, institutions, civil society leaders and/or public opinion in general.

**Box 3—Tips on formulating robust goals**

Goals are often expressed in broad and vague terms such as “reconciliation,” “tolerance,” “empowerment” or in overly specific terms of activities. This can make it difficult to develop a good theory of change. Goals should be articulated concretely as **desired changes** in the key drivers of the situation—observable changes in behavior, interactions, institutional performance, intergroup relations, norms, etc. For example, goals that “women are raising issues of concern to them with local authorities, leading to changes in government policies” or that “women are consulted and included in the peace process” are more specific goals than “women are empowered to participate in the peace process.” Those goals would also be a good reformulation of activity-based goals, such as “1500 women will be trained in peacebuilding and advocacy.”

**Step 4: Develop the approach (the HOW)**

When you decide upon the outcome(s) and target audience for the change process, consider various approaches that could be employed to create the desired outcome. For example, if you identify that reducing hostility among youth is your goal (e.g., because youth interactions have been a significant trigger for conflict), you will want to consider a number of different approaches to achieving that goal, such as cross-group sports and drama, cooperation on issues of common concern, media programming, tolerance education in schools, joint rewriting of history textbooks, youth camps, etc. Based on the conflict analysis, you then choose the most appropriate approach to use to achieve the change.

**NOTE:** Individual projects are usually part of a continuum or chain of intended outcomes, which starts with current conditions and extends to the overall intention/vision of “Peace Writ
Project or program goals are incremental or intermediate outcomes along the way to this larger vision.

Here is where it might be especially helpful to consult the Theories and Indicators of Change (THINC) Matrix (see Section 2.2 of this document). The THINC Matrix can be a tool to help you brainstorm or focus. You may also want to review the Primers for other ideas about how to best achieve your goal. They provide an overview of various approaches, as identified in practice and through comparative and case study research, and the intended outcomes when using each one. This will give you a general idea or set of ideas that you should adapt to your context.

Figure 1: Continuum of Theories of Change

**Step 5: Articulate the theory(ies) of change**

Write up the completed “theory of change” to be employed, taking care to specify in detail what your assumptions are about how your approach will result in your expected outcome in this specific context. Referring to Figure 1, the “Project Logic,” should be spelled out clearly in order to articulate how the project activities will add up to the project’s goal or Intermediate Result (IR). The “Overall Theory of Change” should also

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9 “Peace Writ Large” is the term coined by the CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, in their study of peacebuilding activities. It refers to the ultimate goal of achieving sustainable peace in a community/ country/geographic region. The problem CDA found when it looked at most peacebuilding activities was that few of them had thought about how their programs would/could eventually lead to this ultimate goal. Anderson, M., and L. Olson (2003) *Confronting War: Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners*. Cambridge, MA: CDA Collaborative Learning Projects.
be articulated. This makes clear how achieving the goal or outcome of the program will ultimately lead to a Development Objective (DO) that is tied to an over-arching development or peacebuilding goal like the CDCS or "Peace Writ Large" and will address key drivers of conflict or resilience you have identified in the conflict analysis.

For example, suppose you are developing a program to treat children at school for trauma recovery and train them in skills for non-violent conflict resolution. The desired outcome of the program is less violence between children of differing religious groups in a local school. The overall theory of change might be articulated by considering how, if your program is successful, it will contribute to mitigating or transforming the drivers of conflict or strengthening sources of resilience you have identified in the conflict analysis. The programmatic theory of change (or program logic) might be constructed by developing a continuum of results (a hierarchy or sequence of changes sought through the program logic) by identifying all the activities and changes resulting from them, from outputs to outcomes and impacts; organizing them in a logical sequence; and identifying the theories of change associated with each one, as illustrated in Table 1.

Table 1: Hierarchy of Results in a Theory of Change Project Goal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hierarchy of Results in a Theory of Change Project Goal</th>
<th>Overall Theory of Change (How will the goal contribute to &quot;Peace Writ Large&quot;)?</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inter-religious violence at X number of schools in Y community is reduced.</td>
<td>If inter-religious violence at schools is reduced, then cooperation and coexistence among youth of different religions will increase, and they will be less susceptible to manipulation into inter-religious violence overall, because their new skills for resolving differences and controlling their emotions peacefully and their new relationships will make them less willing to fight.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Continuum of Results</th>
<th>Incremental Theories of Change</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Children use skills and knowledge to deal with differences at school without violence.</td>
<td>If children employ skills of non-violent conflict resolution to resolve differences at school, then inter-religious violence at schools will decrease.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children gain knowledge, awareness and skills from trainings to resolve differences non-violently.</td>
<td>If children are trained in non-violent methods of conflict resolution, they will resolve differences at school peacefully.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children will act out or act aggressively less frequently.</td>
<td>If children are able to control their emotions and feel less fearful, they will be able to master skills of non-violent conflict resolution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children are able to manage emotions and will feel less vulnerable at school.</td>
<td>If children in school X are given individual treatment for trauma recovery, they will begin to heal from the psychological wounds of war. This will allow them to control their emotions and to feel less vulnerable at school.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Put together as a narrative, the theory of change of this program might read as follows:

This program is based upon the premise that if children in this school are given individual treatment for trauma recovery, then they will develop increased ability to control their emotions and not act out against others, especially those who are different from them, because the activities will have helped them begin to heal from the psychological wounds of war and reduce their overall fear and sense of vulnerability at school. Under these conditions, if we introduce inter-group skills (negotiation, mediation, problem-solving) to children of different religious groups together, then they will be able to learn them and use them to resolve disputes at school, including those that may arise between religious groups. Reduction of violence in schools will contribute to reduction of inter-religious violence overall because youth are recruited by extremist groups who are significant perpetrators of inter-religious violence and because schools are a significant place for violence in this region. The children will be more likely to use the skills outside of school and will be less recruitable by such extremist groups.

Step 6: Assess the theory(ies) of change

When the complete theory has been developed in a hierarchy of results and/or narrative story, the team must assess whether there are: (a) gaps in the logic of how the steps in the process follow from each other; (b) assumptions that cannot be supported; or (c) steps in the chain that cannot be carried out for any reasons. If any of these make the desired outcome no longer feasible, the team must go back to Step 3 to begin the theory of change analysis with another possible target audience or approach. For instance, in the example above, you might test how realistic the assumption is that children will be able to use the new skills outside of school and whether the ability to resolve conflicts peacefully will be enough to lead them to resist recruitment to violence (i.e., are there other factors?). Similarly, the assumption that children are “acting out” only because of the trauma they experienced might also be tested.

A number of frameworks exist for assessing the theory of change. Table 2 below describes the qualities of a good theory of change and some practical tips for developing them in the context of a specific program.

Table 2: Qualities of a Good Theory of Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Qualities of a Good Theory of Change Criteria</th>
<th>Practical Notes</th>
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<tr>
<td>Clear conceptualization of impact and pathways to it: It makes explicit the intended changes from the effort. The “road map” to change is clear and understandable. For peacebuilding interventions, it makes a clear connection to key drivers of conflict or resilience.</td>
<td>State the theory or theories of change in the CDCS and/or project appraisal document, as well as project Scope of Work (SOW) as feasible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qualities of a Good Theory of Change Criteria</td>
<td>Practical Notes</td>
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<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coherence</strong>: It demonstrates logic and common sense and/or reflects research results. It shows how the effort will lead to the desired results without leaps or gaps.</td>
<td>Share your draft theory of change with colleagues, especially those with knowledge of or experience in the context in which the project will be implemented. Review scholarly literature or evaluations for evidence of plausibility. Contact DCHA/CMM or PPL/LER for additional guidance on learning and evidence. Be sure to share your evaluation reports with DCHA/CMM and PPL/LER to ensure continued learning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Plausibility</strong>: Beliefs and assumptions about how one change will influence another have been explored and articulated and there has been some challenge of “comfort zones” in thinking them through.</td>
<td>State assumptions in the results framework and in the project appraisal document. Consider undertaking a systems analysis or generating a systems map; see Systems Thinking in Conflict Assessment: Application and Concepts (2012) from CMM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grounded in context</strong>: It takes context as the starting point and reflects the reality of change processes in that setting.</td>
<td>Review any recent conflict assessments, DRG assessments, political economy analysis, gender analysis or related CDCS background information. DCHA/CMM can provide recommendations on sources for high-quality conflict analysis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Testable</strong>: It is specific enough to be tested for validity over time.</td>
<td>Ask, “What would show this theory is not right or this program is not working? What would falsify it?” Build this into the evaluation design and the project appraisal document. For guidance on evaluation design and management, contact DCHA/CMM or PPL/LER. Include processes for monitoring validity of theories of change in M&amp;E plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dynamic</strong>: Uncertainties, risks and knock-on effects are captured, including unintended negative and positive effects, and a process is in place for reviewing and revising the theory.</td>
<td>Document uncertainties and risks in the SOW; include scope for flexibility, such as a “crisis modifier.” Build a process for strategic theory review and revision into the SOW and/or annual work plan.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What happens when a theory of change needs to be evaluated against a larger objective (contribution to the larger societal peace) or against other theories of change, such as in the context of a country strategy (i.e., CDCS)? The CAF 2.0 suggests using the **RPP (Reflecting on Peace Practice) Matrix** as a way to identify gaps in the theory of change as well as potential linkages with other programs that can enhance the effectiveness of USAID programming.\(^{10}\) The RPP Matrix can help in assessing and strengthening both the coherence and plausibility of a theory of change in context. The RPP Matrix emerged from research by the Reflecting on Peace Practice Program (RPP) of CDA Collaborative Learning Projects. It summarizes the major findings of RPP, illustrating that effective peacebuilding efforts link change at the individual/personal level

\(^{10}\) CAF 2.0, Section 4.1.
(e.g., attitudes, skills, relationships) to change at the socio-political level. They also link change in “Key People” or mobilizers to change in “More People” or society at large.11

In brief, if a program works primarily at the individual/personal level—on attitudes, skills and relationships—and merely “hopes” that the outcomes at that level will lead to changes in the socio-political realm, then a review or revision of Steps 3 and 4 might be needed to fill in gaps or to identify linkages with other efforts that might strengthen the program’s effectiveness. Similarly, if a program working with “More People” does not link to “Key People” or mobilizers in some way (and vice versa), then a gap exists and should be addressed. A more detailed explanation of the RPP Matrix and how to use it to examine theories of change can be found in Annex 2.

**Step 7: Monitor and Evaluate Outcomes and Impacts**

Context matters! Not all theories of change will be effective or even possible to use under all circumstances. Often, changes in context, new understandings of the dynamics a program is trying to influence and changes in implementation realities can affect the relevance and validity of the theory of change in the context. Therefore, **MONITORING AND EVALUATING OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS IS CRUCIAL** so that assumptions are continuously examined and programs can be adjusted accordingly. You should regularly review whether the results at the lower levels are leading to the results at higher levels. The results hierarchy and underlying theories of change must be regularly revised to remain clear, coherent and relevant to the current context. It is also important to review the program’s activities and results with another evaluative method. This will help you assess the intended intervention and the results together.

Once you have articulated, tested and refined the theory of change, you can develop indicators to monitor your assumptions, outputs, outcomes and sustainability in comparison with expectations informed by the design of the program. By breaking down the statements’ “if” (input), “then” (outputs and outcomes) and “because” (assumptions and logic), the theory of change can help you identify good indicators for activities/outputs, the expected changes resulting from each of the activities and the assumptions underlying the theories.12

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Box 4—Using Theories of Change to Create Indicators in School Trauma Healing Program

In the trauma healing program for school children described in Step 5, an indicator that the project’s goal has been achieved could be the number of inter-religious conflict incidents at school/per month. Indicators could also be developed to assess whether the project is having the impact the theory of change anticipates—to reduce recruitment of school-age youth into armed groups. The project could measure the number of school-age youth associated with armed groups outside of school or the number of youth-perpetrated incidents of inter-religious violence. Finally, you can use the theory of change to develop indicators to monitor progress towards the goal and to monitor the assumptions underpinning the theory of change. For example, the theory of change assumes that if children are trained in conflict resolution skills, they will use the skills to resolve conflicts at school non-violently.

Several assumptions about the impact of training underpin this theory: 1) that training is a relevant and effective mechanism for knowledge and skill transfer; 2) that information and skills are understood and accepted as an alternative to violence. Indicators for these assumptions might be:

- % of participating youth who demonstrate knowledge and skill acquisition and comprehension in pre/post-test;
- % of surveyed youth who state they are confident in their ability to employ nonviolent conflict resolution techniques.

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THINC Matrix
2. Common Theories of Change in Conflict Management and Mitigation: Matrix and Primers

2.1 INTRODUCING THE THINC MATRIX AND PRIMERS
This section provides you with resources for developing your theories of change. It describes the most commonly used theories of change in conflict management and mitigation, and it supplies you with supporting information and references to understand the state-of-the-art research supporting (or raising questions about) each theory.

What is the THINC Matrix?
The Theories and Indicators of Change (THINC) Matrix summarizes and organizes the major theories of change in the practice of conflict management and mitigation, including conflict resolution. It was developed by DCHA/CMM and its partners based upon extensive literature review and consultation with experts and practitioners. The THINC Matrix is one way of organizing the many theories of change that have informed peacebuilding projects, programs and strategies.

The families and individual theories in the Matrix have been categorized based on their shared assumptions and qualities to provide a comprehensive but manageable list that is useful to program planners and managers. However, the list should not be considered exhaustive. Many initiatives have their own theory of change, multiple theories of change or combined aspects of different theories. And most initiatives in complex and fragile environments need and have more complex theories than simple “if…then…because” statements; for example, “if we do X, Y and Z, then this will lead to A, which will promote B and possibly lead to C, because…” What is important is to be able to articulate the thinking about how change happens. It need not fit into any of the above theories.

What are the THINC Primers?
The THINC Primers in Annex 1 provide program planners and managers with a detailed summary of the theories of change identified and critiqued through the THINC initiative and the three families into which they have been grouped. They are meant to provide a brief introduction to the current practice and research underpinning each theory and its family and to point the reader to resources that can be accessed in order to learn more about the strengths and weaknesses of each given theory.

They are organized according to the families of Theories of Change listed in the Theories of Change Matrix: Attitudes, Behaviors, and Institutions. Each primer includes:

1. An overview presenting the entire family and its core assumptions.
2. Summaries of each theory of change within the family describing each theory and its core change logic.

3. Overviews of debates and critiques concerning the validity and application of each theory, based on academic research and practitioner and policy experience.

4. Examples of programs that are grounded in each theory of change. The examples provided in the Primers are NOT meant to be endorsements for any particular theory, but rather illustrations of how various theories have been implemented. When data is available (e.g., through an evaluation) to indicate whether, or under what circumstances, a particular theory of change has been successful, that will be indicated. However, such data is not available for all theories of change.

5. Resources for practitioners additional material on the theories of change, their application and their validity in different contexts.

**Box 5—Steps in Constructing a Theory of Change**

1. Conduct a conflict analysis.
2. Identify the conflict/resilience drivers the program will address.
3. Identify the goals of the program.
4. Develop the approach.
5. Articulate the theory(ies) of change.
6. Assess the theory(ies) of change.
7. Monitor and evaluate outcomes and impacts.

**How can you use the THINC Matrix and Primers?**

The THINC Matrix and Primers are designed to be used at all stages of the program cycle: analysis, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. However, the Matrix and Primers will be most useful in the design, monitoring and evaluation phases, since these are the points when you first attempt to articulate a clear, coherent, and contextually-grounded theory of change, and later seek to assess progress against that theory. In other words, although potentially of use throughout the program cycle, the THINC Matrix and Primers can be particularly useful in informing steps #4, #5 and #6 in the sequence for constructing and using a theory of change outlined in Section 1.2 above and summarized in Box 5.

You can use the THINC Matrix and Primers to:

- **Generate new program ideas**—read through the materials to inform brainstorming about what theories and kinds of programs would be appropriate and effective in the particular context. (It should, however, only be a starting point—the ideas and the theories behind them need to be developed and thought through in context.)

- **Express ideas**—find language and information to help you express a difficult or new idea; i.e., articulate the theory of change underlying your program or infer a theory of change from a project already under way where the theory of change was not clearly expressed at the beginning.

- **Clarify and seek consensus on program logic**—identify, choose and develop consensus on what changes particular activities or approaches you may be pursuing will catalyze and why and how those changes may come about, especially when activities can fit into many different theories of change.
• **Refine and test ideas**—use the process of articulating the theory of change or the underlying research in the Primers to critically examine your idea and the assumptions underlying it in light of scholarship.

• **Compare ideas**—understand how different theories of change relate to one another and to the underlying changes they seek to make.

The Matrix gives a brief description of each theory, the target audience(s) for each and the basic assumptions that underlie the theory. This should give you a good idea of which ones may fit your program needs. There will most probably be a few choices, and the Primers will then be helpful in discerning whether and how a given theory may be valid or need to be adapted for a specific circumstance.

**How should you NOT use the THINC Matrix and Primers?**

The THINC Matrix is:

• **Not a stamp of approval**—While the theories presented in the Matrix are common in practice or research, their validity has not necessarily been proven or supported by evidence, nor are they necessarily endorsed by USAID or the authors of this report. The Primers do provide examples of how the theory has been used in practice and summarize the debates about when and under what circumstances various theories may be valid. However, research is constantly evolving, and you will need to test and monitor whether the theory of change underlying your program is appropriate and valid in the context where you are working.

• **Not a checklist or menu**—While the theories and information in the Matrix and Primers can help you brainstorm program ideas, they should not be used as a checklist or menu to pick from. The Matrix and Primers should not be a substitute for thinking through what theory or theories of change are appropriate for your program.

• **Not exhaustive**—Just because an idea or theory is not in the list does not mean it is not credible; analysis may lead you to develop a new theory, but it should exhibit all of the qualities of a good theory of change outlined in the first section and in particular Table 2.

• **Not static**—USAID anticipates updating this Matrix as new evidence emerges on the theories or as new policy and program guidelines are developed related to theories of change and project design/evaluation. Learning emerging from experience with and evaluations of the theories of change in your programs will add to the evidence that will be incorporated in the THINC Matrix.

• **Not the only aspect of effective project design**—Formulating a theory of change is essential to effective conflict mitigation and development, but there are many other important aspects related to management, logistics, contracting/grants, finances and personnel. Notably, projects and activities in conflict-affected and fragile environments need to adhere to principles of good engagement by ensuring activities
do no harm, are not discriminatory, are flexible to shifting circumstances, and so on.  

**How can you enhance and build on the THINC Matrix?**

The THINC Matrix represents an attempt to rationalize (and simplify) the field of conflict resolution and peacebuilding to facilitate better knowledge management by USAID and its partners. Building upon this knowledge management architecture through additional research, targeted information and sharing of results and ideas organized in terms of this framework will lead to better outcomes for everyone.

Practitioners can:

- Share information about appropriate indicators and evaluation techniques corresponding to specific theories or theory families;
- Share best practices and lessons learned by theory; and
- Provide guidance on legal or operational dimensions for different theories (for example, which types of actors are most appropriate to which activities implied within the theory(ies)).

Researchers can:

- Share research pertaining to theories or their underlying premises, leading over time to some theories on the Matrix being revised, supported or abandoned;
- Investigate how different theories are related to one another (such as when one theory is strongly implied within another); and
- Critically examine or expose acknowledged or unspoken assumptions within each theory.

USAID’s Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (DCHA/CMM) welcomes input on these or related efforts. Please send your feedback or supporting information to conflict@usaid.gov.

**Construction of the Theories and Indicators of Change (THINC) Matrix**

The THINC Matrix summarizes the major theories of change commonly informing non-coercive conflict resolution practice—although it does not purport to include all possible theories. The theories have been grouped into families, according to the type of change that is being sought. There are three such groupings, or families:

- theories that seek change in attitudes;
- theories that seek change in behaviors; and
- theories that seek change in institutions.

The Families are not mutually exclusive; it is often possible and desirable to combine more than one theory of change in a program; i.e., to target attitudes and behaviors, or behaviors and institutions or all three.

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Family #1—Attitudes

Theories in this family are structured to change attitudes of individuals and groups. There are various attitudes that are correlated with politically violent or peaceful behaviors, and the underlying premise of the theories in this family is that by changing such attitudes, violent behavior will be prevented or mitigated because the thoughts/feelings that lead to such behavior will be changed or mitigated. A further assumption is that this creates more stable constructive change in the society over the medium to long term because attitudes are more resilient than behaviors.

This Theory of Change Family encompasses a variety of theories about attitude change, including:

- **Intra-personal attitudes**—change within individuals concerning their experience of the conflict and their ability to change their own attitudes about the conflict. Theory 1.1 (Trauma Healing) focuses on such personal change.
- **Inter-group relationships and attitudes**—group-level change in attitudes about the “other” and changes in relationships between conflicting groups. Theories 1.2 (Social/Cultural Contact), 1.3 (Cooperation and Mutual Interest) and 1.4 (Problem Solving Dialogue) describe different theories for decreasing negative attitudes about the “other” and building cross-conflict relationships. They describe individual-level change that is hoped to lead to change in in-group attitudes, as individuals change due to encounters with the “other” and then, in turn, begin to change the norms of their group or of other individuals. This, in turn, creates other individual level change within the group.
- **Attitudes about the conflict**—Theory 1.5 (Attitudes about Conflict) focuses on attitude changes within individuals or groups about the conflict itself: its nature, its consequences and the value of peace.
- **Public opinion and social norms about the “other” and about the conflict**—cultural change, or changes in mass attitudes about the “other,” about peace and about values and norms such as tolerance, diversity, etc. Theories 1.6 (Mass Attitudes About Conflict) and 1.7 (Culture of Peace) focus on changing societal attitudes about ways of dealing with differences.

Theories of change can focus on promoting change in “key” people (“mobilizers”), whether officials or not, or on broadening change to reach “more” people in the citizenry and communities to enhance their willingness and capacity to support peace.

Family #2—Behaviors

Theories in this family share the assumption that behaviors can be changed directly, without requiring prior attitude change. The further assumption is that this creates change more quickly because it bypasses having to allow for the longer process of a shift in attitudes. Direct behavior change is accomplished by withholding or diminishing the resources “key actors” or mobilizers have to perpetrate violence (Theory 2.1), addressing security fears of “key actors” (Theory 2.2) or changing the incentives for

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15 See USAID, CAF 2.0, Section 3.1.
actors in the conflict, making the actions that lead to violence more costly and those that lead to non-violent problem-solving more appealing (Theory 2.3). Behavior change can also be facilitated through management of domestic political obstacles to peace (Theory 2.4) and through building of skills and capacities that actors lack to engage in more productive processes of peacemaking, peacebuilding and cooperation (Theory 2.5).

Programs developed based on these theories often also incorporate activities and processes that are designed to change attitudes or may follow on work that is focused on attitude change and relationship building. Many programs based on these theories also believe that attitude change is important and useful for influencing conflict-related decisions and behaviors of actors; attitude change may indeed be one step in a strategy to produce behavior change, or to reinforce or sustain changes in behavior. However, the theories in this family do not assume that attitude change will automatically produce behavior change. Rather, changing behavior and decisions requires additional effort and approaches.

**Family #3—Institutions**
This Theory of Change Family is fundamentally about structural change, as opposed to change at a group or individual level. Political and economic theory has long recognized that societies and groups have institutions, or rules, governing who has power and how that power may be used. The institutions of society are often themselves systems for resolving conflict, such as through the rule of law or social norms, but when they do not work as planned or when different sets of institutions clash, violence can escalate. The Institutions Theory of Change Family describes ways to change the capabilities and functioning of the institutions of a society, as well as how they are perceived by the public, in order to promote sustainable peace.

The core hypothesis for institutional theories of change is if institutions in a society are effective and legitimate, then they create options for addressing grievances peacefully rather than through violent means. As evoked in this hypothesis, there are two major underlying qualities of institutions that are believed to promote peacbuilding: effectiveness and legitimacy.

**Using Multiple Theories of Change to Address Conflict Issues**
Many theories of change are relevant and can be used, together or in the alternative, to address important issues that USAID supports, such as: dealing with the past, support for peace processes, reconciliation or people-to-people programming. Reconciliation, for example, can be pursued through trauma healing (Theory 1.1), any of the inter-group dialogue theories (Theories 1.2-1.4) and the institution-building theories (Family 3). Similarly, people-to-people programming can focus on social contact (Theory 1.2), problem-solving (Theory 1.4), psychological aspects of conflict (e.g., trauma, Theory 1.1), or skill building (Theory 2.5).
Example: Dealing with the past

Many of the theories of change that relate to attitudes can be used to address the past, often in multi-prong programs. The importance of creating mechanisms for dealing with the past is well documented, especially in situations where peace agreements do not address the key grievances of certain groups or negotiated commitments are not implemented in the post-conflict environment. In cases where one party defeats the other through force and when “groups remain intermixed after violence occurs, renewed violence is probably an even greater danger.” Programs for dealing with the past can be based on a number of different theories, which might be adapted for the particular context and goals of the activities, for example:

- **Trauma Healing** (Theory 1.1): If people address the trauma caused by their experience of violence, they will not have a desire for revenge, will be able to focus on the future and will have capacity to form relationships with former “enemies.” Sample activity: psychosocial counseling.

- **Inter-group Relationship-Building** (Theories 1.2-1.4): If people are able to engage in structured inter-group dialogue, their pain and suffering will be heard and acknowledged. As a result, they will be able to “acknowledge their own group’s harmful actions.” This exchange will allow them to feel closure and move on, breaking cycles of violence. Sample activity: dialogue workshops with community leaders and ex-combatants.

- **Public Opinion and Social Norms** (Theory 1.7): If traumatic events of the past are commemorated, memorialized and acknowledged on a broad, public level within a society, then the norms governing intergroup relations will be more tolerant and people in such societies will be encouraged and supported to coexist peacefully. Sample activities: collective rituals; community reconciliation ceremony; reconciliation-focused radio programs.

To create a holistic and comprehensive approach to programming that effectively helps communities deal with the past, many programs have elements of all three of these theories of change. For example, one program in Rwanda worked with a range of actors in society, from members of the population who were affected in deeply personal ways by the conflict, to national leaders who shape policies, practices and institutions. The program’s “interventions” have included training of the staff of NGOs that work with groups in the community; seminars/workshops with community leaders, journalists and national leaders (government ministers, heads of commissions, members of the supreme court and advisors to the President); and the development of nationally broadcast radio programs that, according to surveys conducted in the summer of 2005, reached 90% of the radio listening population.

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17 Ibid. p.887.
18 Ibid.
2.2 CMM THEORIES OF CHANGE (THINC) MATRIX

The Matrix is intended to be a summary of the major Theories of Change outlined in the Section above.

The Matrix provides:

1. The name of the theory (Column 1).
2. A concise statement of the theory of change (“If…then” statement) (Column 2).
3. An indication of the constituency engaged (Column 3). This may be “Key People” (groups who play a critical role in whether a conflict continues or not) or “More People” (groups and people in the broader population, such as communities, business people, religious leaders, women, youth, etc.) whose support and inclusion in the peacebuilding process is needed for peace to be achieved and sustained.
4. A brief description of the theory and the assumptions underlying it (Column 4).

You can use this Matrix as a quick reference as you are reflecting on your proposed approach, asking important questions such as “Is the theory appropriate for the goal?”; “Is the theory consistent with my underlying analysis?”; and “Is the logic sound?”
# Theories of Change Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theory of Change Family 1: Shifts in Attitudes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Theories in this family seek to influence the attitudes and psychological drivers and effects of mass mobilization by “key actors” in an armed conflict.</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theory</th>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Constituency Engaged</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Theory 1.1: Trauma Healing</td>
<td>If individuals who have been traumatized by violence are given opportunities and support, then their desire for revenge will be reduced.</td>
<td>“More People”</td>
<td>Theories of change related to psychosocial trauma healing emphasize processes that assist traumatized individuals to develop effective strategies for coping with the emotional, cognitive, behavioral and spiritual effects of trauma. They assume that the psychological impact of violence on victims, perpetrators and bystanders is a significant barrier to the re-establishment of relationships with former enemies.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Theory 1.2: Social/Cultural Contact</td>
<td>If groups from conflicting societies participate in joint activities, then this contact will lead to increased understanding of the “other” and will reduce inter-group conflict.</td>
<td>“More People”</td>
<td>This theory is based on the assumption that contact based on cultural, social and recreational activities will promote increased understanding. Programs may include peace camps for youth, cultural exchanges and inter-ethnic sports games. The theory is that hostility between groups is perpetuated by unfamiliarity and separation, and that inter-group contact can challenge negative stereotypes and generate more positive inter-group attitudes and relationships.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theory 1.3: Cooperation and Mutual Interest</td>
<td>If groups from similar sectors of conflicting societies work together on issues of mutual interest, then they will learn to cooperate and, through cooperation, develop increased trust and positive relations.</td>
<td>“More People”</td>
<td>This theory is based on the assumption that if contact among people across conflict lines occurs in activities based on mutual interests, understanding will increase, prejudice will be reduced and a safe space within the conflict for healthy relationships to develop will be created.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theory 1.4: Problem Solving and Dialogue</td>
<td>If people from both sides of a conflict engage in unofficial dialogue at the Track 2 and 3 levels, then these efforts will ultimately strengthen official negotiation processes.</td>
<td>“Key People” and “More People”</td>
<td>Unofficial, yet structured, interactions and sustained dialogue are expected to make possible a quality and depth of communication that is not possible in more official processes, and thereby generate new understandings of the conflict and the parties that facilitates resolution of conflict issues.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Theory of Change Statement</strong></td>
<td><strong>Constituency Engaged</strong></td>
<td><strong>Description</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Theory 1.5: Attitudes about Conflict</td>
<td>If perceptions of the costs of violence or benefits of peace are changed, then key decision makers or broader constituencies will withdraw support (and mobilization) for violence.</td>
<td>“Key People” and “More People”</td>
<td>This theory presumes that if individuals change their attitudes about the consequences of continuing conflict or the benefits of alternative means of addressing conflict, then they will pursue peaceful means of resolving or transforming conflict (e.g., peace agreements), and they will influence societal attitudes or mobilize in favor of peaceful resolution of the conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theory 1.6.: Mass Attitudes about Conflict</td>
<td>If enough people in society change their attitudes to favor peace, then they will prefer that “key actors” seek peaceful solutions to conflicts and will resist mobilization to violence.</td>
<td>“More People”</td>
<td>If “key actors” attitudes change but the general population does not believe in peace, it can be difficult for “key actors” to create and maintain peace. In some contexts, such attitude changes can prepare the sides to accept an official peace. In others, it can be the basis for the creation of social movements at the grassroots levels of society to call for an end to violence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theory 1.7: “Culture of Peace”</td>
<td>If societies focus resources on changing people’s attitudes to support peaceful resolution of conflicts, then a culture of peace will emerge that promotes coexistence.</td>
<td>“More People”</td>
<td>This theory focuses on fostering a cultural shift from violent (“culture of war”) to peaceful approaches (“culture of peace”) to handling conflict as a long-term process of transforming the attitudes and social norms that supported violent conflict in the past.</td>
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<td>Theory of Change Statement</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Theory of Change Family 2: Changes in Behavior</strong></td>
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<td>Theories in this family share the assumption that behaviors can be changed directly without requiring attitude change.</td>
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**Theory 2.1: Changing Elite Means**
If the means or resources that "key actors" have to pursue violence are reduced, then they will be less able to pursue violence and more amenable to negotiation and peaceful means of resolving conflict.

"Key People" This theory grows out of work by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler on the economic causes of war. They suggested that rebellions start not because of grievances, but because of the "greed" of leaders seeking greater access to financial resources. In other words, whether or not "greed" or economic motivation is a factor, government leaders and rebel groups cannot wage war without access to the means to do so.

**Theory 2.2: Resolving the Security Dilemma**
If a party's fears that the "other" is not committed to peace and will exploit it in the future are allayed, then it will not resort to force.

"Key People" This theory builds on research concerning the "security dilemma," which arises when one party, in an effort to increase its own security, and out of distrust of the other side, decreases the other side's sense of security, e.g., by resorting prematurely to the use of force. Confidence-building measures, peacekeeping and verification missions, monitoring mechanisms and some problem-solving dialogues all seek to provide confidence that will alter a party's decision to escalate conflict.

**Theory 2.3: Incentives for Peace**
If motivations or incentives for violence are changed so that violence seems more costly and non-violence more attractive, then people will pursue peace and reject violence.

"Key People" and "More People" This theory sees decision making as a matter of rational choice and focuses on changing behavior by changing the incentives facing decision makers, rather than the means at their disposal, by increasing negative incentives for violence or positive incentives for non-violence and cooperation. If people have the right incentives, motives or choices, so that they believe they are gaining more from non-violence than from war, then they will decide to end war and pursue peace.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Theory of Change Statement</th>
<th>Constituency Engaged</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Theory 2.4: Addressing Domestic Divisions</strong></td>
<td>If domestic political struggles within a party are addressed resolved or managed, then a party will have greater motivation and capacity to pursue peace.</td>
<td>“Key People” and “More People”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programs based on this theory seek to address domestic divisions that limit leaders’ ability to make decisions against continuing violence or to pursue peace. Intra-communal or “single community” programs that bring different factions within one side together for dialogue are an example.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Theory 2.5: Improving Skills and Processes</strong></td>
<td>If parties have skills and good processes for resolving conflicts, then they will be more successful in negotiating peace and dealing effectively with underlying causes of conflict.</td>
<td>“Key People”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The implicit assumption is that lack of capacity or inadequate process is a significant obstacle in negotiation, peacebuilding and consensus building. This theory suggests that if the parties have the proper skills and processes to handle the conflict differently, then agreements and cooperation are more likely.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Theory of Change Statement</td>
<td>Constituency Engaged</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Theory of Change Family 3: Institutions</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Theories in this family apply if you are working in a situation in which formal and informal institutions lack the capability to respond to the needs of the population and/or are considered to be unfair, abusive or corrupt.</td>
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</table>

| Theory 3.1: Statebuilding Theory of Change | If formal and informal institutions can efficiently and effectively respond to the needs of society, then people will rely on these institutions rather than resorting to violence. | This theory rests on the idea that members of society look to institutions, both formal and informal, to have sufficient capacity to efficiently and effectively provide goods and services to meet the range of needs in society (e.g., police, jobs). When these needs are not met, the likelihood of violence increases. The theory contends that people will be less likely to engage in destructive conflict against the government if it acts, and is seen to act, efficiently and effectively. |

| Theory 3.2: Liberal Peace Theory of Change | If institutions are democratic, then people will more likely feel included and able to address grievances non-violently, thereby promoting peace. | Under the Liberal Peace Theory of Change, the legitimacy of a state’s institutions is determined by their democratic nature. Only democratic processes and institutions allow the people of a society to express their will and exert control over those making decisions in governing institutions. Under such a structure, people will be less likely to either revolt against the government or address their grievances violently, thereby creating a more peaceful nation. |

<p>| Theory 3.3: Traditional Institutions Theory of Change | If institutions in a society are based on traditional structures (not externally-imposed structures), then people will feel more allegiance to those institutions, reducing the likelihood that they will use violence to change the institutions. | The premise of this theory is that institutions should be based on traditional norms, customs and models particular to that community or nation. Such institutions are familiar to and reflect the values of the people they govern. As such, people are more likely to feel ownership over them and to respect them as legitimate, and thus be less likely to resort to violent means to reject or replace such institutions. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theory of Change Statement</th>
<th>Constituency Engaged</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Theory 3.4: Ad-hoc or Transitional Institutions Theory of Change</td>
<td>If support is provided to temporary institutions that assist in the transition from a violent and/or insecure society to a peaceful society, then the likelihood of violence re-emerging in the future will be reduced.</td>
<td>Ad-hoc institutions provide a bridging function, which is both backwards and forwards looking. They are intended to help society deal with unresolved issues from the past in order to move forward. The principle is that by facing the negative experiences of the past, those issues will not act as impediments to future progress.</td>
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### 2.3 ADDITIONAL RESOURCES ON THEORIES OF CHANGE

Following are additional resources on developing and using theories of change in program development, monitoring and evaluation.

**General resources on theories of change**


Theoryofchange.org, a collaborative project of the **Aspen Institute** and **ActKnowledge**, offers a wide array of resources, tools, tips, and examples of theories of change.


**Tools and application guidance**


Annex I: Theories and Indicators of Change Primers

Primers:
Shifts in Attitude (Family 1)
1. Family 1: Shifts in Attitude

According to the USAID Conflict Assessment Framework, armed conflict can best be understood in terms of influential people or organizations, known as “key actors”, mobilizing larger numbers of people to engage in violence on the basis of some grievance. Theories in this family seek to influence the attitudes and psychological drivers and effects of conflict and peace. These include stereotypes, prejudice, cognitive biases, internalized oppression/privilege, trauma, feelings of victimization, anger, guilt, fear and mistrust, as well as “enemy images” that can emerge from the psychological effects of conflict, constituting continuing obstacles to transformation. Programs might seek to influence the attitudes of the key conflict actors themselves or shift the underlying culture, relationships or understandings of grievance that make people susceptible to recruitment to violence. Although focused on attitudes, feelings or values, many of these theories ultimately seek to change parties’ behavior, for example, to unblock negotiations, promote cross-conflict cooperation, induce communities to constrain more extreme people or reduce discriminatory practices. The assumption is that changing attitudes will lead people to change behavior.

The Shifts in Attitude “Theory of Change” Family is organized by type of attitude change:

- **Intra-personal attitudes**—Theory 1.1 (Trauma Healing) addresses the psychological effects of conflicts within individuals. The hypothesis is that if people undergo internal transformation in relation to their feelings or perceptions of the experience of conflict, the psychological changes will allow them to respond more constructively to conflict. Intra-personal attitude change often (though not always) happens interactively and in the context of relationships. There is, thus, a great degree of overlap between intra-personal and inter-group attitude change addressed in Theories 1.2-1.4.

- **Inter-group relationships and attitudes**—group-level change in attitudes about the “other” and changes in relationships between conflicting groups. The core assumption underlying this sub-family is that positive interaction between belligerent groups will improve attitudes about the “other,” making it more likely that groups will support and be able to engage in peaceful resolution of conflict. Theories 1.2 (Social/Cultural Contact), 1.3 (Cooperation and Mutual Interest) and 1.4 (Problem Solving Dialogue) describe different approaches to decreasing negative attitudes about the “other” and building cross-conflict relationships in order to transform conflict.

- **Attitudes about the conflict**—Theory 1.5 (Attitudes About Conflict) focuses on individual or group-level change in attitude or perception about the conflict. The assumption underlying this theory is that if people undergo changes in their

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perceptions about the conflict, its consequences and its value, these psychological changes will lead them to pursue more constructive means for resolving the conflict.

- *Public opinion and social norms*—cultural change, or changes in mass attitudes about the “other,” about peace and about values and norms, such as tolerance, diversity, etc. Theories 1.6 (Mass Attitudes about Conflict) and 1.7 (Culture of Peace) focus on changing societal attitudes about the specific conflict or about ways of dealing with difference.

Within each theory, the focus can be on promoting change in “key” people (“mobilizers”), whether officials or not, or on broadening change to reach “more” people in the citizenry and communities to enhance their willingness and capacity to support peace.

The distinctions between the theories in this family can be subtle. The same activities may be conducted based on very different theories of change or a program might “miss the mark”—i.e., be irrelevant—because it has not been clear what attitudes need to change and how and why. For this reason, it is important to understand which theories a specific program is using in a specific context in order to:

- Ensure that the program is relevant to the conflict—i.e., that it is clear about what attitudes need to change and why, or even whether attitude change is a problem at all, in relation to the conflict analysis;
- Develop appropriate objectives and indicators for monitoring and evaluating the program;
- Ensure that the staff implementing the program are working together and not at cross-purposes;
- Identify appropriate follow-on activities and support that will enhance and build on the program’s initial results.

### Box 6—“Missing the Mark” because of lack of clarity about whether attitude change is the problem

“Conflict resolution concepts don’t work in Lebanon—it’s not about two people not liking each other, you need a political solution. Aid money for preventing violence is promoting a false reality.”

— Lebanese NGO director, commenting on the proliferation of bridge-building conflict resolution activities in his country

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21 See CAF 2.0, Section 3.1.
For example, a “people-to-people” program might conduct activities that bring women from different groups together for a dialogue in which participants tell the stories of their experience in the conflict. It may seek to catalyze self-awareness and heal trauma caused by a war through the interaction and exchange with the other, on the theory that this will lead women to engage in their own recovery and lead them to develop societal and structural responses that address the use of violence against women as a weapon of war (Theory 1.1). However, it may also be designed to help to build trust and break down negative perceptions of the “other” (Theory 1.2). Understanding whether the primary theory of change is related to self-awareness and trauma healing or to relationship-building would be important for the design of objectives and selection of indicators. If the primary objective and theory of change relates to trauma healing, the program team might monitor indicators related to symptoms of trauma, such as depression, anxiety, social isolation, etc., and determine the activities they undertake later on to prevent violence against women. If the theory of change is based on relationship building, indicators might measure stereotypes of the “other,” relationships among participants, cooperative activities or levels of trust.

Box 7—Effects of Not Explicitly Identifying Theories of Change, Cyprus

An evaluation of bi-communal people-to-people conflict resolution training and trainer of trainers programming in Cyprus supported by USAID observed that the primary goal of the intervention at its inception was personal change and reconciliation. As Cypriot trainers became more active, the goal evolved to one effecting social change through creating a critical mass of people committed to bi-communal harmony. However, there was a difference of opinion about how to bring this change about. Some believed that catalyzing the kind of cathartic personal change they had experienced would be sufficient, while others believed that joint projects and greater mono-communal education work was needed. The evaluator commented that these different theories of change created tension between Greek and Turkish Cypriot trainers and affected the impact of the program: “It is also notable that there appears to be a difference in philosophy between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot bi-communal leaders about how to influence social change. It is important to emphasize that each community’s philosophy is a valid one and that both of these philosophies are effective ways to initiate social change. However, because these approaches differ, there has been a lack of understanding among people of each community about why the others act as they do.”


1.1 Theory 1.1: Trauma Healing

Theory of change: If individuals who have been traumatized by violence are given opportunities and support to express and heal their pain, then their fear, grief and desire for revenge will be reduced and unresolved trauma will not fuel future violence.

Theories of change related to psychosocial trauma healing emphasize processes that assist traumatized individuals to develop effective strategies for coping with the emotional, cognitive, behavioral and spiritual effects of trauma. They are grounded in the
assumption that the psychological impact of violence on victims, perpetrators and bystanders is a significant barrier to the re-establishment of social cohesion and of relationships with former enemies. In terms of the CAF categories of conflict drivers, trauma sustains feelings of grievance and weakens or counteracts the resilience of aspects of society that support non-violent conflict resolution.

Therefore, individuals, groups and entire societies must have mechanisms to engage both survivors and perpetrators in exploring their experiences of and roles in traumatic events from the past. The assumption is that if traumatized individuals have safe opportunities and adequate support to confront their painful past, then their grief, fear and desire for revenge will be reduced and unresolved trauma will not fuel future violence. Furthermore, they will become more resistant to violence and empowered to actively and peacefully engage in shaping their own and their community’s future.

This theory posits that it is important to engage in what happened rather than avoid past experiences of trauma. This act of expression and exploration will allow people to feel closure and become more open to the other group, breaking cycles of violence. As prominent genocide scholar Ervin Staub comments, “Trauma creates insecurity, mistrust and disconnection from people which is why dealing with the past is often considered a necessary step in reconciliation processes aimed at building a more positive orientation towards the self and other.”

The majority of current interventions designed to address war trauma focus on individual and small group post-traumatic stress therapy. These include psychosocial programs, individual counseling, training of local communities in psychosocial support skills and self-help support groups (such as “victim” or “survivor” groups), among others. Interventions that create safe space as a way to support the trauma healing process often allow participants: to feel supported to share stories of victimization in order to process emotions, particularly anger; to reduce the negative emotional force of painful memories; and to reconnect with and gain trust in people. In addition, many programs also try to work at the group level to deal with collective trauma that creates significant shifts in group consciousness and identity. As Staub notes, “[a]fter group violence, healing will ideally be a group process.” Large group approaches to healing include testimonials and commemorations; socio-drama and drama therapy; collective rituals and symbolic acts of mourning; and radio and mass media.

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25 See CAF 2.0, Section 3.1.2.


Debates and Critiques

Western bias

There has been criticism of the way in which psychosocial programs have been set up in post-conflict societies. The critiques have focused on the ways in which international agencies have shaped the local agenda and imposed Western conceptions of trauma and methods for dealing with it, including using labels like “trauma” and “post-traumatic stress disorder,” without regard to local culture and approaches and existing notions of self which influence people’s suffering.\(^{31}\)

Entrenching victimhood and trauma

Some international efforts have also been criticized for giving rise to hierarchies of “victimhood” and an attendant competition over “who suffered more.” In addition, when individual trauma healing is being sought, there is always the risk of vicarious traumatization, which is the negative effect on the helper that can arise from working with survivors of trauma. In particular, if trauma workers are themselves survivors of conflict, the possibility of vicarious trauma increases.\(^{32}\) For large group interventions including testimonials and commemoration, it is important to balance a focus on pain and suffering with hope and possibilities for a better future, in order to avoid perpetuating the wounds and making the past into a “chosen trauma” that feeds continued conflict.\(^{33}\) For example, the historical/psychological focus in Serbia on its military defeat at the hands of the Turks in 1389 in Kosovo seemed to reaffirm and deepen historic Serbian feelings of victimization and a sense of the world as dangerous and hostile.\(^{34}\)

Failure to make connections to socio-political change

Theories of change focused solely on changing attitudes of individuals have been also challenged to show how they can “add up” to macro-level change. The Reflecting on Peace Practice (RPP) Program has found that measurable impacts on conflict were only achieved when programs that focused on change in individual values and behaviors were consciously linked to follow-on efforts or other programs that focused on socio-political change.\(^{35}\) In other words, even when trauma healing programs have profound transformative effects on participants, it cannot be assumed that they will add up to

“Healing strengthens the self, moderates the perception of the world as dangerous, and makes it more likely that positive changes in the other group are perceived.”


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macro-level change in attitudes and feelings or lead to changes in behavior. Psychosocial programs working with individual victims may need to be aware of and become involved in broader processes to re-establish a socio-political context supportive of healing and reconciliation, such as working for the discovery of truth. Follow-on efforts to translate these individual changes into changes at the socio-political level, such as social norms and beliefs or community action and advocacy, are needed.

An illustrative example of how follow-on efforts might lead to socio-political change is provided in Figure 2, mapping a trauma healing effort on the RPP Matrix. Trauma healing would generally be found in the upper left hand quadrant of the RPP Matrix: work that is done at the individual-personal level (seeking to affect attitudes, emotions and perceptions), mostly with “More People” rather than key decision makers. For example, a program working with

CONSTITUENCY ENGAGED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>More people</th>
<th>Key people</th>
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LEVEL OF CHANGE

- Institutions, social norms, collective action, public opinion, culture
- Mobilization of women to advocate for combatant accountability
- Negotiation of rules of behavior with leaders of armed groups

INDIVIDUAL-PERSONAL CHANGE

- Trauma healing

SOCIO-POLITICAL CHANGE

Figure 2: Mapping Trauma Healing Effort

37 For further explanation of the RPP Matrix, see Annex 2. See also USAID, Conflict Assessment Framework 2.0, Section 4.1.
victims of rape may have profound effects on individual participants, but without further effort, may have little impact on use and treatment of gender-based violence in a conflict zone. If the effort joins up with another program advocating for accountability of combatants for these crimes, the effects may begin to have a broader impact—insofar as women who have experienced trauma are now taking initiative to deal with gender-based violence, and the effects may extend beyond the program participants to collective action in the socio-political realm. If, in turn, this initiative succeeds in negotiating rules of behavior with the leaders of armed groups, then by influencing “Key People”, they may succeed in reducing the gender-based violence in the region.

Examples
The following are several examples of programs utilizing this theory of change. They are not intended to be endorsements of any of these approaches as exemplary of the theory, nor do they represent the only or best examples of application of the theory. Except in cases where programs have been evaluated, there is no evidence of the validity or success of the theory or lack of validity in the particular context. The examples are provided for illustrative purposes only.

Trauma healing as part of reconciliation in Rwanda
The Healing through Connection and Understanding Program in Rwanda trained 35 individuals (both Tutsi and Hutu) working for local organizations in trauma healing and developed radio programs to educate the public about the origins and prevention of violence and about healing through stories. The program was based on the theory that reconciliation requires changing attitudes of people, changing words and actions (behaviors) of “Key People” who can influence constituents and institutions and changing societal institutions. The training and radio programs concentrated on discussion and sharing in a number of areas considered by the program team to be key to healing trauma, based on existing research and evidence:

- Understanding that the psychological, somatic and behavioral changes they experienced are normal consequences of extreme events. “Providing people with a framework for recovery offers hope, a fundamental aspect of healing.”
- “Understanding what leads to violence can shape the emotional orientation of and practices by members of the community, including leaders. It can also promote healing.”
- Sharing painful experiences in an empathetic context, focusing small group engagement with their experiences of the genocide through writing (where possible), drawing or thinking about one’s painful experiences during the genocide, followed by sharing these experiences in small groups, with group members responding empathically to each other’s stories. A “central process…is reconnecting with and gaining new trust in people.”

The program team focused on the psychological, but in working with high level leaders, the ministry of education, the media and communities, the team tried to influence socio-political issues of justice, creating a shared collective memory, and institutionalizing different approaches to dealing with conflict and cross-ethnic cooperation.

**Empatija, Zenica, Bosnia**

The project established a women’s center in Zenica, a town with 35,000 IDPs, to assist victims of wartime rape, although the center’s ambit quickly expanded to include other traumatized groups. The goals of the center were to help IDP women move out of a passive, helpless position and to identify survivors of severe war trauma to provide them with support. For displaced women, the project emphasized preparing them for return to their homes in towns dominated by other ethnic groups. The project targeted up to 40% local women in addition to displaced women. An evaluation noted that the project helped women “cope with their emotional and social problems” arising from their war experiences and living conditions at the time. They benefited from mutual support, strengthened social networks and growing trust, due to the fact that women from all three ethnic groups in Bosnia were present in the groups.42

1.2 Theory 1.2: Social/Cultural Contact

*Theory of change:* If groups from conflicting societies participate together in activities that promote social and cultural engagement and exchange, then this contact will lead to increased understanding of the “other” and will reduce inter-group conflict, hostility and tension.

This theory is based on the assumption that contact based on cultural, social and recreational activities will promote increased understanding. Programs grounded in this theory of change may include peace camps for youth, cultural exchanges and celebrations for communities, inter-ethnic sports games and other recreational activities. Positive interaction is believed to humanize the other side. If the parties have positive interactions, ignorance, fear and stereotypes will be reduced, and trust, empathy and cooperation will increase. Many “people-to-people” programs43 are based on this group of theories of change. As USAID’s People-to-People Peacebuilding programming guide notes:

*Reasoning that strong, positive relationships will mitigate against the forces of dehumanization, stereotyping, and distancing that facilitate violence, this intervention brings representatives of conflicting groups together to interact purposefully in a safe, co-equal space to forge trust and empathy. The hope is that stronger relationships can benefit each stage and track of the peace processes, from enabling elite negotiators to reach a strong commitment to*

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43 For further practical guidance and lessons learned from USAID support for inter-group relationship building programming see USAID/DCHA/CMM (2011) People-to-People Peacebuilding: A Program Guide, Washington, D.C., USAID.
(re)weaving the social fabric at the grassroots level in support of long-lasting peace.\textsuperscript{44}

This theory builds on the contact hypothesis that inter-group contact among individuals will lead to mutual understanding and reduced inter-group prejudice.\textsuperscript{45} The expectation often is that as these contacts and the attitudes and relationships that emerge from them are scaled up, cross-ethnic bonds of trust, cooperation and solidarity will be formed and will counterbalance the divisive force of “bonding” social capital (i.e., the social networks, values, norms, and connections that keep homogenous groups cohesive and hostile to each other).\textsuperscript{46} “Because they build bridges and manage tensions, inter-ethnic networks are agents of peace, but if communities are organized only along intra-ethnic lines and the inter-connections with other communities are very weak or even nonexistent, then ethnic violence is quite likely.”\textsuperscript{47} The idea is that hostility between groups is perpetuated by unfamiliarity and separation, and that, under the right conditions, inter-group contact can challenge negative stereotypes and generate more positive inter-group attitudes and relationships.

Social/cultural contact programs create opportunities for interaction based largely on common, experiential activities, often circumventing key conflict issues, and help people to relate on a human level. They are generally implemented at the community level or with the public at large (“More People”). They promote everyday types of inter-group engagement that allow people to become aware of common values and identities (thus shift their own perception of their identity) and refrain from engaging in hostile behavior.

There is evidence that these programs do promote positive interactions, empathy and increased understanding.\textsuperscript{48} A major meta-analysis investigating the results of 515 studies on contact theory conducted in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century showed that overwhelmingly, greater contact is routinely associated with less prejudice.\textsuperscript{49} Not only do attitudes toward immediate participants often become more favorable, but attitudes toward the entire “other” group do as well.\textsuperscript{50} However, the results of these studies should be viewed with

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid. p. 5.
\textsuperscript{47} Varshney, A. (2001) “Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society: India and Beyond.” World Politics, Vol. 53 (3), 362–398. Varshney studied six cities—three categorized as riot-prone and three as peaceful—to identify the communal mechanisms of violence and peace. He found that “pre-existing local networks of civil engagement between the two [Muslim and Hindu] communities stand out as the single most important explanation for the differences between peace and violence” (p. 374).
some caution, as little work has been done to identify the effects of contact in highly charged conflict or post-conflict settings.

Gordon Allport, the originator of the contact hypothesis on which this theory is based, had identified four optimal conditions under which contact would lead to a reduction in prejudice:

1. equality of status of the groups;
2. support of relevant authorities;
3. acquaintance potential, or opportunities for group members to get to know each other as friends, apart from their social roles or group identities;
4. a (shared) superordinate goal toward which both groups can work.\(^{51}\)

Later studies have found that Allport’s conditions are not essential for inter-group contact to reduce inter-group prejudice, showing that cases without these conditions still showed that contact reduced prejudice.

A note on intra-personal change (internal change) and inter-group processes:

Changes in intra-personal and inter-group attitudes are not mutually exclusive and are often facilitated together (in a single program) or sequentially (in different phases of a program or different programs). Indeed, the same activities may lead to both kinds of change.

Intra-personal or individual level attitude change is often an essential element of programming that relies on inter-group relationship-based theories of change. Intra-personal change happens interactively and in relationships with others. It can come about by experiencing cognitive dissonance between positive interactions with the "other" and one’s own negative attitudes and stereotypes about them.\(^{52}\) Contact work is essentially about personal change and the expectation that personal level change translates to group level change.

At the same time, inter-group relationship change would be difficult to achieve or to sustain or deepen without shifts in individual-level feelings, attitudes and perceptions and re-examination of social identity. If people cooperate and have positive emotional experiences across conflict lines, they are less likely to see the other group as monolithic (and bad).\(^{54}\) They can also discover values (e.g., peace, justice, ethics) and identities (professional, gender,


educational, etc.) they share with the “other.” This can influence the development of common cross-cutting identities that unite groups (e.g., “we are all women, teachers, businesspeople, farmers, democrats, etc.”) and subsequently reduce inter-group prejudice and hostility.

**Debates and Critiques**
The debates and critiques about the contact hypothesis can be grouped into several categories:

1. Critiques of the contact hypothesis.
2. Debates about the sustainability of “people-to-people” and inter-group relationship building programs.
3. Debates about impact and relevance.

**Critiques of contact hypothesis**
The contact hypothesis is one of the most-researched theories of change related to conflict and prejudice reduction. The debates among academics and practitioners about the conditions under which the hypothesis is valid are long-standing and continue today.

**Doing harm?**
Some scholars have provided evidence that, under some conditions, more contact can result in increased prejudice, including:

- **When contact is involuntary.** These are typically situations in which participants feel threatened and the contact has not been undertaken freely (e.g., contact at a checkpoint).55
- **When there is a large power difference between the identity groups in conflict.** In situations of protracted conflict, even when interventions are designed to ensure equal status between the parties (e.g., through equal number of participants, choice of venue, facilitation to ensure equal voice, etc.), the reality of power imbalances between parties can exacerbate conflictive relationships. Groups often differ in their motivation to reduce the intensity of the conflict. If the design of the intervention unwittingly prioritizes the goals of the higher-power group, the dynamics of the conflict can be perpetuated despite intentions to create equal status.56 People-to-people efforts, for example, have been criticized in some contexts in particular for inadvertently supporting the higher-power agenda. One study of the cumulative effects of peacebuilding efforts, for example, observed that people-to-people efforts failed in part because participants from the higher-power side “came thinking that all the political problems were solved and so they came to ‘make a friend’,” while the other lower-power group, knowing their own current realities, “came to convince

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56 Rouhana, N., and S. Korper (1996) “Dealing with the Dilemmas Posed by Power Asymmetry in Intergroup Conflict.” *Negotiation Journal*, Vol. 12, No. 4, 353–366, p. 364. Rouhana notes that tension can be exacerbated if members of the higher power group show ambivalence in connecting a reduction in the conflict to a change in their privileged status, while the lower power group believes that a change in the power relationship has to come before a lowering of the conflict intensity. *Ibid.* p. 357.
[them] to make concessions. The gap between expectations and reality was huge and disappointing to many.57

- **When contact is seen as appeasement.** Contact can increase the disadvantaged identity group’s awareness of its relative deprivation, spurring them to protest for change.59 Even when the disadvantaged group becomes less prejudiced because of contact, some critiques of inter-group contact theory suggest that in some situations, “reducing prejudice of the less powerful will deter their willingness to initiate the conflict necessary for social progress.”60

Given these possibilities, ongoing analysis of the conflict and relationship dynamics is necessary for the successful design and ongoing adjustment of interventions based on these theories.

**Critiques of effectiveness and sustainability**

**Sustainability of attitude change**

Although there is evidence of attitude change and increased empathy for the “other” for up to one year after significant contact,61 there is little evidence of their long-term effects, especially when participants return to communities that are coming from situations of ongoing or protracted conflict and that remain unchanged.

Inter-group relationship building efforts often operate in environments in which the political space for contact is very limited. Participants often return to unsupportive or hostile communities and feel isolated; sharing their new perspectives can be dangerous

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and difficult to sustain. Strong socialization institutions, such as families, schools, religious organizations or professional organizations, often counteract the effects of inter-group contact. While remote locations create a neutral environment that encourages positive contact and development of positive attitudes and relationships, it is not necessarily a realistic one.

If not reinforced by substantial follow-up and ongoing support, and in some cases intra-group work to create a more hospitable climate for inter-group cooperation, attitude change and relationships can quickly dissipate as people fall back into old habits or succumb to social pressure.

Form over substance

Cooperation and joint work may not necessarily lead to or be indicative of any improvements. As a farmer participating in a multi-ethnic agricultural coop project in Kosovo stated, “Being a member of the coop does not mean I have to work with Serbs, they are only on the board.” There is a danger that cooperation will remain pro forma—with no accompanying attitude change.

Debates about broader impact

Finally, inter-group theories of change have been challenged to show how they create “Peace Writ Large.” Participants are usually self-selecting, so groups attract those that are generally open-minded and may not engage people who have strongly negative views or are reticent to participate for other reasons. Contact may thus have limited reach with those who hold more negative perceptions and attitudes—at least not without significant pre-contact and post-contact work. Moreover, when successful, programs based on inter-group relationship-building theories lead to changes in the upper quadrants of the RPP Matrix—the individual/personal realm (see figure #3). They often have profound impacts on participants’ attitudes, relationships and even behavior. Many programs also assume or hope that the attitude and relationship changes participants

Box 10—Counterbalancing forces to intergroup relationship building

Social cohesion initiatives are often overwhelmed by strong socialization institutions, such as families, schools, religious organizations, etc. that preach messages of hostility and portray the "other" as an enemy. These can erode or prevent gains made through programs based on the contact hypothesis. In Somalia, for example, clan-based structures, ranging from relatively “harmless” self-help groups to reinforced social to clan mobilization movements that operated websites demonizing rival clans, reinforced cleavages and undermined efforts for national unity.

63 Paffenholz, T. (2010) Civil Society & Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, p. 396. Paffenholz finds that social cohesion (intergroup relationship-building) initiatives have been largely ineffective, due to their scattered, fragmented and short-term nature and the counter-influence of powerful socialization institutions relevant to participants’ lives.
64 Ibid.
experience will lead them to take action, too, at the socio-political level. However, as Anderson and Olson note in relation to dialogue programs:

Some of these impacts are felt to be significant by individuals. But by themselves, these impacts on individuals do not affect the factors driving conflict. Experience shows that individuals may continue to talk across conflicts lines, in times of calm or crisis, without any discernible impact on a conflict.67

The profound transformations in attitudes, perceptions, relationships, skills and trust of participating individuals are significant for the broader peace only if they are translated into action at the sociopolitical level—the public, political or institutional sphere of activity. Programs often fail to integrate follow-up activities and support to create the necessary linkages between the individual-personal change they catalyze and action and change at the socio-political level. They remain at the “individual-personal” level, with a hope that people will take action to promote socio-political change. Yet without additional activities or linkages to other efforts, the programs based on these theories, even when they involve large numbers of people, are usually insufficient to create socio-political change and thus have limited (if any) impact on “Peace Writ Large.”68

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68 Ibid. See also USAID/DCHA/CMM (2011) People-to-People Programming: A Program Guide.
**Examples**

The following are examples of programs that promote social/cultural contact. As with the other examples in this guide, except when evaluations have been conducted, the examples are not presented as “success stories,” but as illustrative approaches based on the theory of change.

**Peace education in Sri Lanka**

In 1999, university teachers in Sri Lanka started a peace camp program for young adults from Sinhalese, Tamil, and Muslim communities, funded by the Norwegian Government, as part of a larger peace education strategy. The four-day program included lectures, peace workshops, creative activities, a cultural show and tours of multi-ethnic villages. Participants and non-participants were assessed for changes in attitudes, particularly empathy, and behaviors directly after the program and a year later. Differences in attitudes and behaviors were present during both assessments, confirming the hypothesis that participants would have greater empathy for members of the other ethnicity than non-participants and that participants would donate more money to help poor children of the other ethnicity than non-participants.69

**Youth contact in Kosovo**

In order to “relax relations” between Serbs and Albanians in two neighboring villages, a small group of youth met on a regular basis (about once a month) and came together for social and sport activities. Participants included Serb youth Internally Displaced Peoples (IDPs) from the formerly multi-ethnic village who had fled to the neighboring mono-ethnic Serb village following the 1999–2000 war and ensuing violence against Serbs in Kosovo. These youth were already connected in part by the fact that the leaders of the groups from both sides worked for Gjilan/Gnjilane municipality; many also knew each other and had played together as children. The youth dialogue organized several activities: a joint outing to see a movie, a joint sports tournament in the US KFOR base, joint trainings in conflict resolution and participation in a Kosovo-wide “peace project” in Brezovica, among others. These events, according to participants, helped reduce tensions and change their views of each other.

**Coexistence in Bosnia**

In Bosnia, UNHCR launched the Imagine Coexistence Initiative through a local partner, who provided grants and support to local-level projects promoting coexistence. In one pilot community, after six months of groundwork, during which the local partner provided training and support to local people who seemed willing to engage in inter-ethnic activities, a multi-ethnic café was opened, and children in each community were invited to engage in joint arts and sports activities. The hope was that these activities would reduce friction in areas in Bosnia where return was already occurring and to encourage returns of refugees and IDPs to other areas by demonstrating the viability of inter-ethnic coexistence at the community level.

1.3 Theory 1.3: Cooperation and Mutual Interest

Theory of change: If groups from similar sectors of conflicting societies work together on issues of mutual interest, then they will learn to cooperate, and cross-cutting networks will be created across the divide. This, in turn, will lead to increased trust and positive attitudes and relations, and participants will ultimately prefer and be able to resolve conflicts peacefully.

Like Theory 1.2, this theory is grounded in the “contact hypothesis,” but differs with respect to the kind of interaction required to improve attitudes and relationships. This theory is based on the assumption that if contact among people across conflict lines occurs in activities based on mutual interests, then understanding will increase, prejudice will be reduced and a “safe space within the conflict for healthy relationships to develop”\textsuperscript{70} will be created. The “positive change in attitude occurs from repeated engagement and increased cooperation around the safe purpose.”\textsuperscript{71}

The kinds of joint projects or activities can vary widely. One category of programming seeks economic interdependence and concrete benefits of support for peace and cooperation. Projects based on this approach include livelihoods projects offering mutual benefit (e.g., a project providing greenhouses to beneficiaries in two communities, an agricultural cooperative designed to bring groups in neighboring communities together to share equipment), and business grants to promote cross-ethnic business linkages. The idea of these programs is to provide economic benefits for both communities: by implementing projects that offer tangible results, community-wide cooperation can be enhanced,\textsuperscript{72} making it “bad business to harm your neighbor,” as one agency’s staff has noted.\textsuperscript{73}

A second related category of joint projects programming seeks to build trust and change attitudes and relations through the act of cooperation. Cooperation can build confidence among conflicting groups in the value and feasibility of working together across conflict lines and provide a basis for eventual development of relationships to help mitigate flash points and address root causes.\textsuperscript{74} Projects typical of this approach include cross-ethnic bakery supply or handicrafts projects for women, youth internet cafes servicing multi-ethnic youth, a joint environmental clean-up project, multi-ethnic youth magazines, multi-ethnic NGOs and multi-ethnic community centers. Community-driven reconstruction (CDR) programs, such as Afghanistan’s National Solidarity Program, are also an example. These programs aim to promote social cohesion and greater trust and cooperation by engaging local communities in the design and management of development projects, often by giving them direct control over project

\textsuperscript{70} USAID (2011) People-to-People Peacebuilding: A Program Guide, p. 20.
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{73} Chigas, D., et al. (2007) \textit{Has Peacebuilding Made a Difference in Kosovo?}, Cambridge, MA and Prishtine/Pristina, Kosovo: CDA Collaborative Learning Projects and CARE.
\textsuperscript{74} USAID (2011) People-to-People Peacebuilding: A Program Guide, p. 20.
decisions and funds. The belief is that by coming together in democratic decision making forums (e.g., community development councils) and solving development problems jointly, participants will have positive experiences that will lead to greater trust and cooperation. They will also not support escalation of conflict and will be more willing and able to solve other problems non-violently.

**Debates and Critiques**

Debates and critiques of this theory are similar to those of Theory 1.2 (Social/Cultural Contact). Moreover, while there is evidence that cooperative activities do help improve relationships, there is also evidence that the relationships and attitudes developed in cooperative activities do not “spill over” into other domains of inter-group relations, especially in relation to attitudes about the conflict and relationships among people affiliated with different political parties. There is also evidence that general economic interactions do not improve relationships and trust but do so when they are focused on underlying economic causes of conflict, and that “[t]rust-building measures may need to be implemented alongside or prior to economic development interventions in order to develop the relationships necessary for business partnerships and trade.” Consequently, as one agency has noted, because “[d]ifferent types of economic activities lead to different outcomes in different contexts,” “implementing agencies need to better understand the variety of peacebuilding outcomes produced by diverse economic interventions. Moreover, a more nuanced approach must be adopted in order to design tailored economic activities to target specific drivers of conflict.”

**Examples**

Following are illustrative examples of the theory of change. As the examples show, there are various approaches to implementing the Cooperation and Mutual Interest Theory. Program managers will need to choose the appropriate approach or activity-level theory of change for the particular context they are working in. In the absence of evidence from research or evaluation, they are not presented as “success stories,” but as examples of the application of this theory of change.

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80 Id., p. 18.
Peres Centre for Peace

The Peres Centre for Peace is a stand-alone, ongoing project to promote cooperation by Israelis and Palestinians on issues of mutual interest, including joint business ventures and environmental projects. In 2009, they started Streams that Cross Borders, a program that engaged environmental NGOs and professionals from both sides to identify streams that flowed in both Israeli and Palestinian land and the groups worked in cooperation to prepare plans for stream rehabilitation, dealing with waste water and other water safety issues. The groups did a public education campaign and advocated for changes in wastewater policies.  

Building Bridges to Peace in Uganda

Mercy Corps’ Building Bridges to Peace project in Uganda applies the cooperation and mutual interest theory of change, engaging communities in joint livelihoods projects that build mutual economic interest and promote reconciliation in northern Karamoja. Activities included training community leaders in dispute resolution, participatory conflict mapping, dialogue and trust building to prepare communities for joint livelihoods projects and participatory design and implementation of joint livelihoods interventions.

One of the theories of change underlying the project was that if economic relationships are built across lines of division, then stability will increase, because people will perceive tangible, concrete economic benefits from cooperation and will place a higher value on cooperation than on conflict with former adversaries. An evaluation of the program found that resource sharing between conflicting communities had increased, and that the quality of relationships (trust and perceptions of the “other”) had improved. While this was attributed in part to the multi-faceted nature of the intervention (which included dialogues as well), and partly to the presence of the Ugandan People’s Defense Force working for disarmament and the rule of law, the economic cooperation was seen to have played a positive role.

CDR in Liberia

In 2006, IRC launched a CDR project in Lofa County, Liberia. The project had four main components: (1) grouping of villages into equally sized “communities,” of 2000-3000 people, based on geographical proximity and pre-existing ties; (2) sensitization of communities to the project; (3) election of community development councils (CDCs) with representatives chosen from all voting-age residents of the villages; and (4) empowerment of CDCs to oversee a community-wide process of selecting and overseeing a quick impact project followed by a larger development project. One (of several) hypotheses of the project was that it would improve social cohesion, specifically that the process would generate greater acceptance of displaced persons and ex-combatants in the communities, and that it would result in reduced tensions between groups and would enhance the community’s ability to act collectively. An evaluation

using randomized intervention found that areas that received the CDR program generally fared better in social cohesion than non-treatment areas. While tensions were not reduced, they were less likely to escalate, and slightly more likely to accept (and not discriminate against) marginalized groups.84

1.4 Theory 1.4: Problem Solving and Dialogue

Theory of change: If people from both sides of a conflict engage in unofficial, structured and sustained dialogue at the Track 2 and 3 levels, then these efforts will complement and strengthen all stages of official negotiation processes by providing support in the form of new ideas and solutions as well as relationships that develop over the long term across the conflict divide.

“Interactive Conflict Resolution” and problem solving processes go beyond contact alone and bring members of opposing groups together in structured workshops, usually facilitated by a third party, in a safe, neutral environment to generate substantive options and frame potential future relations.85 These processes are often conducted at the “Track 2” level, involving informal interaction with influential unofficial actors from civil society, business or religious communities and local leaders and politicians who are considered to be experts in the area or issue being discussed. “Track 2” processes generally seek to supplement official diplomacy by working with mid- and grassroots levels of society, often involving a variety of dialogue strategies.86 The interactions are expected to enable a quality and depth of communication that is not possible in more official processes, and thereby generate new understandings of the conflict and the parties that facilitate resolution of conflict issues. Problem solving and dialogue processes generally have involved influential, non-officials, Track 1 participants, as well as grassroots organizations.87

Used most notably and for the longest duration—over 20 years—with Israelis and Palestinians, problem solving workshops bring together politically influential people from both sides of the conflict under conditions of equality for direct communication about

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86 Search for Common Ground. “Commonly Used Terms.” Available at http://www.sfcg.org/resources/resources_terms.html. “Track I” diplomacy refers to direct government-to-government interaction on the official level. Typical Track 1 activities include traditional diplomacy, official negotiations and the use of international organizations. The participants are involved as representatives of their respective states and reflect the official positions of their governments during discussions. “Track 3” efforts are essentially “people-to-people” work with communities to transform relationships and to promote peace and social change. Track 3 activities often involve training, advocacy, empowerment, local peace committees, community mediation, community development and dialogue. Ibid. See also Chigas, D. (2013, forthcoming) “The Role and Effectiveness of Non-Governmental Third Parties in Peacebuilding.” In Fritz, J. (Ed.) Moving Toward a Just Peace: The Mediation Continuum. New York: Springer.
the conflict in a confidential, non-adversarial setting. The workshops are meant to provide a space for exploration of the perspectives, needs, fears and experiences of each side and “to generate new ideas for solutions to the conflict that satisfy the fundamental needs of both sides, particularly their needs for identity, security, justice, and recognition.” From these exchanges, participants will come up with new ideas, insights and solutions to the conflict to bring into the political conversation. When conducted with influential, but unofficial, members of the conflicting groups, they are meant to complement and strengthen official Track 1 negotiation processes.

At the grassroots level, people-to-people peacebuilding programs based on this theory, bring together people for dialogue on conflict issues. Participants can be from the grassroots, middle levels and sectors of society; youth and women; and from civil society leadership. The goals of this kind of contact may be limited to developing new perceptions of the "other" and of conflict issues. They can also extend to developing ways that civil society and community actors can contribute to resolving conflict issues or agreed ideas for inclusion in the negotiation processes themselves.

Examples
The following are several examples of programs utilizing the problem solving and dialogue theory of change. They are not intended to be endorsements or critiques of the theory, nor do they represent the only or best examples of application of the theory. When evaluation data is available to indicate whether and how a particular approach has been successful, this is indicated. Except in those cases, however, there is no evidence of the validity or success of the approach or the theory or lack of validity in the particular context. The examples are provided for illustrative purposes only.

Israel–Palestine Center for Research and Information
The Israel–Palestine Center for Research and Information (IPCRI) conducts workshops of varying length with a range of participants from both sides, including youth, women, teachers, business and civil society leaders, to have dialogue about the conflict, work together on projects and work on joint solutions. The IPCRI maintains two “Track 2” working groups, the Strategic Thinking and Analysis Team and the Economic Working Group. As one of IPCRI’s co-directors has commented, “[T]he non-official peace process was always and is still very important. It creates space for 'thinking out of the box,' narrows options, keeps discussions going and relations alive when the official process is ruptured. “Track 2” and grassroots peace work is important but it is critical to have leaders involved in making progress on the final settlement.” Within these “Track 2” initiatives, IPCRI prepares policy papers and talking points on final status

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89 Ibid.
90 For an overview of the different approaches to problem-solving interventions, see Chigas, D. (2007) “Capacities and Limits of NGOs as Conflict Managers.”
negotiations issues (water, Jerusalem, security, etc.) to inform and advise the negotiation teams from both sides of the conflict.\textsuperscript{91}

\textit{Sri Lanka “One Text” initiative}

In Sri Lanka, the “One-Text” initiative brought together politicians, representatives of peace secretariats and civil society representatives for dialogue to enable stakeholders to develop common ground among their opposing positions through problem-solving interventions and information sharing.\textsuperscript{92} The US Mission funded researchers and technicians to help parties at all levels of society to clarify areas of broad agreement and issues requiring further negotiation. It also supported People’s Fora in 21 districts to facilitate community participation in the consultation process.\textsuperscript{93} The One-Text process was designed as a mechanism and safe collaborative working space for stakeholders to explore common ground and ways to raise and deal with critical issues constructively, without having to take “formal” positions. Second tier leadership could explore major issues and offer multiple options to top leadership for consideration. The intention was that once the parties reached consensus on issues, such agreements and recommendations could then be offered to the top leadership, the Peace Secretariats and the Norwegian facilitators. One of One-Text’s achievements in the overall peace process was the facilitation and support of the establishment of a Peace Secretariat for Muslims in 2005.

\textit{Inter-Tajik Dialogue}

Former U.S. diplomat Harold Saunders developed a “public peace process” in Tajikistan to “engage representative citizens from the conflicting parties in designing steps to be taken in the political arena to change perceptions and stereotypes, to create a sense that peace may be possible, and to involve more and more of their compatriots.”\textsuperscript{94} The Inter-Tajik Dialogue begun in 1993 had a dual agenda: to discuss specific problems and to increase understanding of the dynamics in the relationships that cause problems (and improve them).\textsuperscript{95} The group met multiple times, passing through phases: a first meeting, in which the participants “were absorbed with unloading their feelings about the origins and conduct of the civil war;”\textsuperscript{96} joint analysis of the problem through dialogue and design of ways of changing the relationship; building of scenarios of steps that could be taken in


\textsuperscript{96} Id. at 45.
the political arena to change the relationships; and acting together. This process resulted in at least eighteen joint memoranda.

Until the beginning of the UN–sponsored official negotiations, the Inter-Tajik Dialogue was one of the few existing channels of communication between the opposition and the government. The participants shared their ideas with the negotiators and international actors, as well as with the population at large in a number of public events inside and outside Tajikistan. Some participants became involved in the official negotiations and, thus, were able to transmit the ideas developed in the dialogue to their teams directly. Following the peace agreement in 1997, the Inter-Tajik Dialogue made recommendations for implementing the details of the agreement and introducing the necessary changes to the constitution and legislative processes, among others.

1.5 Theory 1.5: Attitudes about Conflict

Theory of change: If perceptions of the costs and consequences of violence or the benefits of peaceful means of addressing interests are changed, then people will withdraw support (and mobilization) for violence.

The aim of interventions using this theory is to alter the way people view the benefits and costs of violence—either by changing their perceptions of the benefits or need for violence or the existence of peaceful means for addressing grievances. There is an assumption that if actors prefer a peaceful resolution of conflict, then their more positive rhetoric and discourse could help to shift society's attitudes towards a preference for peaceful resolution of conflict (cascading theory).

People’s attitudes about the conflict perpetuate conflict escalation in a number of ways:

- Through “entrapment,” where, having sunk resources into a given course of action, key parties escalate their commitment to the strategy in order to justify what has already been expended in money, honor or blood. Morton Deutsch describes US involvement in Vietnam as a case of entrapment: “The most direct statement of the reason for our continued involvement is the fact that we are involved: our continued involvement justifies our past involvement….We have over and over again acted on the tempting assumption that with just a little more investment we would prevent the whole thing from going down the drain.”

- Through changes in attitudes and psychology caused by conflict itself, leading parties to become psychologically committed to a course of action that common sense would reject. Conflict and the tactics used to pursue it cause psychological and structural changes in parties that reinforce conflict escalation by reinforcing decisions to pursue violence or enhancing psychological commitment to the goals,

98 Ibid.
strategies and tactics "key actors" are pursuing. Even if the strategies and tactics are not succeeding, "key actors" may not see an alternative way of dealing with the conflict or may fear losing face or admitting defeat if they "reverse" strategy.

• Because one side perceives the other side to be resistant and fears that initiating a de-escalation might communicate weakness or otherwise be risky.

Experience suggests that changes in these attitudes can be facilitated in a number of ways, such as (these are not exhaustive): reframing of the conflict to be more amenable to peaceful resolution; reframing the conflict to include the future costs of conflict that may previously have been discounted (extending the shadow of the future); or testing people’s views and values about the costs of continuing violence and the likely benefits of an alternative strategy that could achieve long-term goals for later generations.

This theory often is followed with “Key People” or actors who “are individuals or groups that have (or could soon have) the means and motivation to mobilize larger groups or resources to carry out organized violence or engage in political action.” Theories of change that focus on changing the attitudes of “Key People” presume that if they change their attitudes about the costs of continuing conflict or the benefits of alternative means of addressing conflict, then they will pursue peaceful means of resolving or transforming conflict, and they will influence societal attitudes in favor of peaceful resolution of the conflict. However, some mono-communal (“single community”) work with broader constituencies can also work to shift people’s perceptions of the conflict so that they support or advocate for more peaceful means of dealing with conflict.

Debates and Critiques

Some people have questioned whether the personal transformations experienced by people, which are significant in many cases, do in fact lead to the expected changes in behaviors and actions. The RPP project found that programming that focuses on or achieves change at the individual/personal level in attitudes, feelings or perceptions—even if such individuals are political or opinion leaders—but is never connected to or translated into action at the socio-political level has little effect on peace. As Anderson and Olson note:

Some of these impacts are felt to be significant by individuals. But by themselves, these impacts on individuals do not affect the factors driving conflict.” Linkages would entail additional follow-up work or collaboration with others to build on these attitude changes in order to take action in the public or political domain.

102 USAID, Conflict Assessment Framework 2.0, Section 3.1.4.
For initiatives that focus on key influential people, RPP also found that initiatives that focus on “key actors,” such as decision makers and others whose actions significantly affect the conflict without including or reaching out to “More People” at other levels, can quickly become stuck or unsustainable. For example, in the Conflict Management Group (CMG)–Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) Georgia–South Ossetia Dialogue project described below, although participants had made considerable progress in developing common thinking about a political resolution, the process reached an impasse as leaders claimed that public opinion on both sides was “not ready” for their new attitudes and steps they were prepared to take.105

Examples
The following are several examples of programs utilizing this theory of change. They are not intended to be endorsements or critiques of any of these approaches, nor do they represent the only or best examples of application of the theory. When evaluation data is available to indicate whether and how a particular approach has been successful, this is indicated. Except in those cases, however, there is no evidence of the validity or success of the approach or the theory or lack of validity in the particular context. The examples are provided for illustrative purposes only.

Georgia–South Ossetia dialogue
The Georgia–South Ossetia Dialogue Project, implemented between 1995 and 2000 by CMG in cooperation with the Norwegian Refugee Council, brought members of the negotiating teams of the parties, their advisors and other influential people together for a series of facilitated joint brainstorming meetings. One theory of change that informed the project (among several, which also included theories 1.3 and 1.5) was that if the parties were able to understand each other’s interests, needs and fears and options that could deal with issues of common concern, they would shift their understanding of the conflict and pursue a more “win-win” approach in the negotiation process. Indeed, the official mediators observed that the attitude and behavior of the parties did change in the negotiations and that the “shift to using frameworks to structure discussion… reinforced the idea that there might be win-win outcomes to some discussions.”106

Invoking the shadow of the future at Camp David
During President Jimmy Carter’s mediation of the Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt, the talks came to an impasse. On Day 13 of the negotiations, when all appeared lost, Carter personally delivered autographed pictures of himself to Begin and Sadat, inscribed to each of their grandchildren. “I wish I could put in there ‘when your grandfather and I brought about peace,’” Carter said. Begin was touched. Carter relates,


“[Begin’s] lips trembled, and tears welled up in his eyes. He told me a little about each child, and especially about the one who seemed to be his favorite. We were both emotional as we talked quietly for a few minutes about grandchildren and about war.” Soon thereafter, Begin returned to the negotiating table.107

1.6 Theory 1.6. Mass Attitudes About Conflict

**Theory of change:** If enough people in the society change their attitudes to favor peaceful solutions to conflict, then they will prefer that “key actors” seek peaceful solutions to conflicts and will resist mobilization to adopt violence.

This theory focuses on the perceptions of the general population about the conflict. If "key actor" attitudes change but the general population does not believe in peace, then it can be difficult for “key actors” to create and maintain peace. In some contexts, such change in public attitudes can prepare the sides to accept an official level peace. In others, it can be the basis for the creation of social movements at the grassroots levels of society to call for an end to violence.108

This theory overlaps with theories 1.3 and 1.4 in that they are based on similar assumptions: that “empowering ordinary people and community leaders to rid themselves of violence and its effects by cooperatively meeting their basic needs, transforming their relationships and building better ways of managing conflict at the community level—all involving civic negotiation . . . creates a more favorable environment for top-level leaders to come to a peace agreement and reduces their ability to maintain violence.”109 Public support can help open space for negotiations by providing essential support to pro-negotiation forces by constraining or counteracting the influence of rejectionists or actors that are seeking to provoke violence or by setting in motion dynamics that result in greater accountability from combatant parties in the implementation of peace agreements.

However, with inter-group relationship building, there are questions about how to scale up the small group level changes catalyzed by that work to the level of mass attitudes.110 This theory, therefore, concerns efforts and approaches to change attitudes of large numbers of people directly. The essential strategy is to increase the numbers of people at the grassroots level who support the processes for ending violence or building justice and peace. As Louise Diamond, one of the originators of the concept of “multi-track diplomacy,”111 has noted:

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111 “Track 2” diplomacy is a term coined initially by former diplomat Joseph Montville to describe unofficial, informal interactions between members of adversarial groups with the goals of developing strategies and influencing public opinion in ways that might help resolve conflict. The idea and methods were developed to complement official peace
The forces of war have an existing infrastructure that enables them to mobilize and actualize their aims....The forces of peace have little of this....Much more needs to be done to create both a human and institutional infrastructure for peace-building, in order to concretize these methods in social, political and economic systems that can both stand on their own and work together towards a shared goal.112

In this theory, public attitudes and norms about the conflict and about conflict resolution in general are seen to be part of this “infrastructure” that needs to change. Increasingly, the media and public advocacy have been used to promote large-scale change in public attitudes. Programs use media to offer more balanced, reliable and in-depth accounts of events, emphasize positive community relations and bridge gaps between communities by building empathy and a sense of interdependence.

**Debates and Critiques**

Research has suggested that most socialization activities, i.e., activities to change attitudes, occur outside the ambit of the main socialization institutions and are fragmented, scattered and often short term.113 The most important socialization institutions (such as families, schools, relatives, security institutions, cultural associations, etc.) exert tremendous influence over how people learn democratic and conflict behavior and thus are important and relevant for peacebuilding.114 In many cases, these socialization institutions reinforce existing divides, often fostering radicalization.

For example, there is particular concern about the media’s role in such processes. Yet it is not clear how much influence it may exert on public attitudes relative to others. One study in Rwanda found that reconciliation-oriented radio programming did not substantially change listeners’ personal beliefs about intergroup violence, but did influence their perceptions of social norms related to conflict.115 It suggested that normative pressure (applied through the media and other sources) could play a role in influencing behavior.116 Others have underlined the strength of negative media, which can overwhelm the positive role of peace-oriented media efforts. Most projects, it has been noted, focus on the production of content that is favorable to the peaceful transformation of conflict. However, if little is done to regulate negative media or propaganda, this can minimize or eliminate the effects of positive media projects. Similarly, if projects are isolated or fragmented, they are likely to have little influence on public attitudes. As a Bosnian NGO director has noted in relation to media efforts there:

efforts and contribute in areas where official processes proved to be inadequate. Diamond and John McDonald (1996) later refined the concept to describe nine “tracks” needed for sustainable peacebuilding, only one of which involves decision makers.


114 Ibid.


116 Ibid.
During the spring and summer of 1996, the main international powers that were behind the Dayton peace agreement decided to set up an alternative system to the national television stations which was going to be different, much better, more democratic and cover the entire country. This was supposed to erase the negative influence of the national television stations. This is how OBN and radio FERN came into being. This is an excellent idea. What was wrong was that this was the single effort. One isolated project never had a chance to combat the influence of powerful national stations.\footnote{Udovicic, Z. (2003), quoted in Bratic, V. and L. Schirch (2007) “Why and When to Use the Media for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding,” Issue Paper No. 6, Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, The Hague: GPPAC, p. 20.}


They have also emphasized that peacebuilding media programs must be incorporated into broader conflict transformation strategies and activities in order to maximize their effectiveness.\footnote{Ibid.} As with inter-group relationships theories, the assumption of this theory—that attitude change, even when it is achieved, will lead automatically to behavioral change—has been challenged. Without follow-up activities or linkages to programs conducting activities on the socio-political level, these theories will not be sufficient to have an impact on “Peace Writ Large.” Thus, for example, in a children’s television program that aimed to break down negative inter-ethnic stereotypes and promote coexistence and cooperation, an evaluation revealed that:

…the television show became a part of children's everyday life, was watched and discussed by the family as a whole, and had very positive impacts on children's views of themselves and others, overcoming stereotypes, and learning to live together. However, children did not appear to translate their new knowledge into changes of behavior towards children from other ethnic groups. The evaluators concluded that the reason Nashe Maalo did not cause concrete changes in behavior and action in children was because of deeply engrained group think and cultural stereotypes and because the program was not followed up by sufficient outreach and similar programs that targeted other members of the community.\footnote{Blum, A., and M. Kawano-Chiu (2012) Proof of Concept: Learning from Nine Examples of Peacebuilding Evaluation, Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, p. 22. For the full evaluation of Search for Common Ground’s program, see Brusset, E. and R. Otto (2004) Evaluation of Nashe Maalo: Design, Implementation and Outcomes: Social Transformation Through Media, Ohain, Belgium: Channel Research. Available at http://www.sfcg.org/sfcg/evaluations/macedonia.html.}
Examples

Following are examples of programs that have tried directly to influence mass attitudes about conflict. As the examples show, there are a variety of approaches—though many involve the use of mass media. These examples are not presented as the only approaches to implementing this theory of change, nor necessarily as “success stories,” except where evaluation or research has indicated that the approaches were effective in the contexts in which they were implemented.

Arusha Peace Accords, Burundi

Studio Ijambo radio, created by Search for Common Ground, covered the Arusha peace process, while the United Nations led a number of awareness-raising activities through local NGOs and the Catholic and Episcopal churches developed sensitization programs on tolerance, justice and dialogue. These activities reinforced public support for the Arusha process, which had strongly been opposed by a segment of society opposed to dialogue with “genocidal groups.”

Nepal local radio

In one community, a radio program supported by Search for Common Ground covered conflict issues and the weaknesses of the local peace committee; this “attracted people as well as concerned stakeholders’ attention” to make a peace committee functional. Another radio program convened and broadcast a dialogue “not only on dealing with the immediate conflict but also the root cause of it.” The theory was that holding and broadcasting a dialogue between conflicting parties that analyzed causes of conflict and identified common agendas would lead to parties to reach a mutually satisfactory resolution and broader public understanding and support for it.

Cyprus public education and advocacy for 2004 Annan Plan

The Annan Plan was openly discussed among the Turkish Cypriot community in 2003–2004. The plan itself was translated into Greek and Turkish and distributed widely by civil society actors. Discussions in the broadcast and print media gave a comprehensive picture of the plan for all Turkish Cypriots to judge adequately for themselves the merit of the proposal. As one Turkish Cypriot commented, “It was discussed publicly, on TV, everywhere; everybody knew what it was about.” The theory of change was that if the ideas in the plan were widely disseminated, explained and discussed in public fora, the population would understand the benefits and become less fearful of a settlement and would support a resolution. Many Turkish Cypriots credit this transparency and open public debate to the achievement of a “yes” vote in the referendum on the Plan in the Turkish Cypriot community in 2004.

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1.7 Theory 1.7: “Culture of Peace”

Theory of change: If war-torn societies focus cultural, media and educational resources on changing people’s attitudes and social norms to support peaceful resolution of conflicts, then, over time, a culture of peace will emerge that promotes coexistence and resists mobilization of violence.

This theory focuses on fostering a cultural shift from violent (“culture of war”) to peaceful approaches (“culture of peace”). It often involves addressing conflict dynamics in a long-term process of transforming the attitudes and social norms that supported violent conflict in the past.

A 1998 UN General Assembly resolution defined culture of peace as “a set of values, attitudes, modes of behavior and ways of life that reject violence and prevent conflict by tackling their root causes to solve problems through dialogue and negotiation among individuals, groups and nations.” It proposed eight bases for a culture of peace:

1. Education (and especially education for the peaceful resolution of conflict);
2. Sustainable development (viewed as involving the eradication of poverty, reduction of inequalities and environmental sustainability);
3. Human rights;
4. Gender equality;
5. Democratic participation;
6. Understanding, tolerance and solidarity (among peoples, vulnerable groups and migrants within the nation and among nations);
7. Participatory communication and the free flow of information; and
8. International peace and security (including disarmament and various positive initiatives).

The Preamble of the UNESCO Constitution states that “since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defenses of peace must be constructed.” If the eight bases for a culture of peace are promoted, societies will be able to achieve a “positive peace.” It is assumed that these general values embedded in a culture of peace will lead people—“key actors” and the general public—to deal with their specific conflict more peacefully and to work to lay the foundations for a just society.

Creating a culture of peace is a long-term process that aims to change public attitudes and values through creating change at the individual level over time and will eventually add up to changes in social norms. When these methods are used over time, and people can see positive models of addressing differences, they will gain confidence that they will...
achieve more by using peaceful methods. This in turn supports gradual changes in behavioral, cognitive and emotional processes. If this shift occurs in enough individuals and “key actors” over time, it can lead to a normative shift in favor of the value of diversity and a preference for resolving conflict at the macro-level.

Education in “anti-racism, conflict resolution, multi-culturalism, cross-cultural training, and the cultivation of a generally peaceful outlook”\(^{128}\) is used frequently to promote a culture of peace. Other programming approaches include:

- Socialization processes that stress tolerance and peaceful resolution of conflicts;
- Programming against domestic violence and gender-based violence;
- Development of common history texts and teaching;
- Establishment of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in communities, courts, etc.;
- Cultural peacebuilding activities, such as peace festivals celebrating local culture, peace songs and music videos celebrating peace and participatory theater reframing conflict and engaging people in values of a culture of peace; and
- Television and radio programming promoting values of tolerance, respect for diversity, human rights, etc.

**Debates and Critiques**

The debates and concerns regarding Theory 1.6 (“Mass Attitudes About Conflict”) are equally relevant to “culture of peace” theories of change. In addition, the concept of a culture of peace has not received systematic academic attention, and the coherence of the concept itself has been questioned.\(^{129}\) It has also been criticized as being based on liberal ideology and, as a result, potentially problematic to some audiences.

While there have been some attempts to measure “peacefulness” of nations,\(^{130}\) it is not clear whether and how a “culture of peace” can be measured. This is in part because it is not clear how the bases for a culture of peace are interlinked (or merely constitute a list of elements required to establish a culture of peace) and how they are weighted in relation to other factors determining “peacefulness.” Some have suggested that the fact that a number of nations are “peaceful” on all dimensions of the Global Peace Index and others, while less liberal nations are assessed as more “violent,” suggests that the measures may have a cultural bias.\(^{131}\)

**Examples**

The examples below are meant to illustrate how this theory has been used or applied. They are not meant to be endorsements (or criticisms) of any particular theory or approach to implementing the theory, nor exhaustive of the variety or approaches to


\(^{131}\) de Rivera, J. (2004) “Assessing the Basis for a Culture of Peace in Contemporary Societies.”
implementing the theory. They merely describe different kinds of programs practitioners have undertaken based on the theory. When evaluation data is available to indicate whether and how a particular approach has been successful, this is indicated—however, in many cases, no such data exists.

**Conflict Abatement through Local Mitigation (CALM) program, Nigeria**

A USAID-supported initiative aimed to prevent and reduce conflict by strengthening the capacity of Nigerian society to address the factors responsible for violent conflicts in several states in Nigeria. Among other things, the CALM program provided training in conflict management and mitigation, as well as economic skills for youth, engaged youth through basketball for peace and established peace clubs and community youth associations in peace zones that were created. Awareness of peace was disseminated through the public media and public education. The program did not have an explicit theory of change; nonetheless, evaluators concluded that the peace clubs and education initiatives could change values and approaches to dealing with conflict and could lead to personal peace transformation.132

**Culture of Peace Training in Mindanao**

Culture of Peace (COP) trainings were developed in 1996–1997 in a collaboration among Catholic Relief Services, the Mindanao Support and Communications Center for Agrarian Reform and Rural Development, the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process and the UN Children’s Fund. They are aimed at changing the way people think about their own history, culture and patterns of interacting with others. A person’s negative biases are challenged through modules that include everything from historical analysis from various perspectives to relief management, trauma healing and forums for talking about conflict. COP is designed to transform people’s outlook and sense of complicity with conflict.133

**Peace Media in Macedonia**

A television series produced by Search for Common Ground in Macedonia, *Nashe Maalo*, or “Our Neighborhood,” aimed at promoting inter-cultural understanding among children with a view to transform conflict. The program ran from October 1999 to December 2004. It focused on the daily lives of eight children from Macedonian, Roma, Turkish and Albanian ethnic groups, who lived in the same neighborhood. The theory of change was: “If shifts in consciousness and ‘value-identities’ can be influenced via portrayals of salient social identities on a wide-scale through television programming, then mass attitudes will shift toward building a culture of peace.”134

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1.8 Resources for Family 1: Attitude Change

General resources

Resources on intra-personal attitudes, identity and social identity


Health and Human Rights Info, http://www.hhri.org/thematic/ , offers resources on a number of themes related to approaches to dealing with psychosocial effects of conflict.


**Resources on inter-group relationship building for peace**


**Resources on attitudes about conflict and reframing**


Resources on public opinion and social norm change needed for peace


Primers:
Changes in Behavior (Family 2)
2. Theory of Change Family 2: Changes in Behavior

Theories in this family share the assumption that behaviors can be changed directly, without requiring prior attitude change. The further assumption is that this creates change more quickly because it bypasses having to allow for the longer process of a shift in attitudes. Programs developed based on these theories often also incorporate activities and processes that are designed to change attitudes or may follow on work that is focused on attitude change and relationship building. Yet while many programs based on these theories also believe that attitude change is important and useful for influencing conflict-related decisions and behaviors of actors, they do not assume that attitude change will necessarily lead to behavior change. Rather changing behavior and decisions requires additional effort and approaches.

2.1 Theory 2.1: Changing Elite Means

**Theory of change:** If the means or resources “key actors” have to pursue violence are reduced, then they will be less able to pursue violence and more amenable to negotiation and peaceful means of resolving conflict.

This theory of change in part grows out of work by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler on the economic causes of war. They suggested that rebellions start not because of grievances, but because of the “greed” of leaders seeking greater access to financial resources. While the “greed and grievance” theory, and the data and analysis on which it is based has been questioned, subsequent research (including Collier’s own) has suggested that whether or not “greed” or economic motivation is a factor, government leaders and rebel groups cannot wage war without access to the means to do so.

Means include human capital, weapons and ammunition, access to money, food, shelter, safe havens and other resources necessary to pursue war. These means can come from a variety of sources and methods, including: control of natural resources (e.g., oil, timber, “conflict diamonds,” and agricultural products, such as cashew nuts and bananas), Diaspora remittances, voluntary and involuntary transfers (looting or extortion), contraband and drug trade, and, in the case of states, government revenues and security institutions.

Interventions aiming at affecting parties’ means or resources to pursue armed conflict assume that by curtailing the financial, human or other resources needed to wage the

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136 Collier, P., A. Hoeffler and D. Rohner (2008) Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War, available at http://users.ox.ac.uk/~econpco/research/conflict.htm. Collier has noted that the “[f]actors that are important for the financial and militarily feasibility of rebellion but are unimportant for motivation decisively increase the risk of civil war. Ibid.

137 “Lootable” natural resources (e.g., diamonds) have been associated more with non-separatist conflicts, while “unlootable” resources (e.g., oil) have been linked more to separatist conflicts. Ballentine, K., and H. Nitzschke (Eds.) (2005) Profiting from Peace: Managing the Resource Dimensions of Civil War.
conflict, one or both parties will be more amenable to a ceasefire and non-violent alternatives for achieving goals or addressing grievances. In essence, these interventions seek to worsen one or both parties’ “best alternative” to a negotiated agreement, making it less feasible to pursue violence, and thereby more likely that they will choose peace.

This theory is related to Theory 1.2 (“key actor” attitudes) and Theories 2.2 and 2.3 in that all reflect approaches to changing “key actors” decisions about pursuing violence. They differ in the way they try to change decisions. Theory 1.2 addresses social-psychological dimensions of the decision to pursue violence. Theory 2.2 addresses the impacts of fears and uncertainties on parties’ decisions, and Theory 2.3 seeks to change incentives and rewards. This theory, by contrast, focuses on limiting the actual feasibility of waging armed conflict.

Programs developed based on the elite means theory include:

- Targeted commodity and financial sanctions;
- “Naming and shaming” of sanctions busters;
- Cutting off access to commodity markets for resource-rich countries in conflict;
- Limiting access to Diaspora funding;
- Interdiction regimes against organized crime, money laundering, drug trafficking and terrorist financing;
- Aid conditionality on regimes and their neighbors who may be supporting conflict;
- Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs (disarmament and demobilization that seek to remove weapons and disband command structures to constrain access to weapons and provide alternative livelihoods for ex-combatants and their dependents to reduce the availability of willing fighters);
- Conflict-sensitive business practices and corporate social responsibility regimes;
- Arms control advocacy and negotiations; and
- Support for conscientious objection and/or resistance to military service.

**Debates and Critiques**

Some analysts caution that eliminating the resources for war does not resolve conflict; as long as the structural factors of underdevelopment, state weakness and horizontal inequalities remain, then international control and interdiction regimes aimed at curtailing the parties’ capacities to conduct war will continue to treat the symptoms rather than the causes of conflict. When conflicts are motivated by a mix of political, security, ethnic and economic factors, curtailing resource flows to combatants may weaken their capacity but not their resolve to continue fighting.

Moreover, efforts to curtail elite means for war can have negative side effects. Sanctions have negative distributive consequences. Even when targeted, they often hurt exporters

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and benefit producers of import substitutes, increase opportunities for corruption\textsuperscript{140} and lead to the development of “new illicit activities and networks and means to evade regulation.”\textsuperscript{141} War economics also often develop so they become a critical source of survival for the civilian population. It is difficult to devise policies that target elite means without damaging those forced to participate in war economics to sustain their livelihoods.

When determining the most appropriate interventions, it is important to differentiate the type of conflict (rebellion, government-led violence, inter-state, or intra-state), the nature of the war economy and the other stakeholders involved in providing the means for pursuit of conflict (e.g., companies, neighboring country elites, transnational criminal networks, civilian populations) in the given context. The validity and appropriateness of this theory of change will depend to a large extent on these factors, as will the choice of specific approach.

**Examples**

The examples below are meant to illustrate how this theory has been used or applied. They are not meant to be endorsements (or criticisms) of any approach to implementing the theory, nor exhaustive of the variety or approaches. They merely describe different kinds of programs practitioners have undertaken based on the theory. When evaluation data is available to indicate whether and how a particular approach has been successful, this is indicated—however, in many cases, no such data exists.

**Tumutu agricultural training program, Liberia**

This program provided intensive agricultural training and social reintegration—Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR)—to combatants relocated from “hot spots” in Liberia. The theory of change was that the removal, retraining and relocation of ex-combatants involved in illegal natural resource exploitation from priority hot spots would improve regional and national security because it would reduce combatants’ vulnerability to criminal activity and to being recruited into illicit military activities.\textsuperscript{142} In other words it would deprive armed groups in Liberia of human resources to pursue war by providing economic (as well as social) incentives to refrain from violence.

**Post-conflict reforms (PCR) in Afghanistan**

USAID has supported the containment of over 12,500 serviceable or repairable heavy weapons from within communities to secure storage sites and to reassure and build confidence amongst the public that still remembers and fears their destructive power. The heavy weapons are taken to regional containment sites where they are deactivated


by removing the breech blocks, machine guns and fuel pumps and guarded by the MoD to prevent their misuse.¹⁴³

2.2 Theory 2.2: Resolving the Security Dilemma

Theory of change: If a party’s fears are allayed that the “other” is not committed to peace and will exploit it in the future, then it will not resort to force.

This theory builds on research about the “security dilemma,” which arises when one party, in an effort to increase its security, or because it distrusts the “other,” acts in ways that decrease the other party’s sense of security. These security fears may drive a party to resort prematurely to the use of force and create self-perpetuating vicious cycles of escalation, even if neither side wants war, and even if their goals are fundamentally compatible. One party might distrust the other’s commitment to uphold an agreement in the future and fear that the other side might renege and exploit it at some future date (e.g., by using a ceasefire or negotiations to rearm).¹⁴⁴ In this case, the party may prefer to absorb the high cost of war and avoid exploitation in the future.

When the security dilemma is an issue, efforts to change parties’ decisions about escalating conflict include:

- Confidence-building measures (CBM): “The basic purpose of a CBM is to give the other side reason to believe that you will do what you say you will do. This is a basic prerequisite for compromise.”¹⁴⁵ By providing an opportunity to test intentions, cooperation and commitments on a smaller scale or on less critical issues, and by ensuring sufficient knowledge about opposing military forces, CBMs help to reduce the risk of decisions to engage in peace processes and provide information on intentions and risks of future exploitation.¹⁴⁶

- Peacekeeping missions, military or civilian: Peacekeeping missions also are intended to provide both a disincentive for groups to renege on agreements or to take up arms, to enhance parties’ confidence in the implementability of any arrangements and to reduce security fears. Increasingly, civilian monitoring and peacekeeping activities are being undertaken to provide a deterrent to armed conflict or to provide information (e.g., on human rights violations, early warning) to external actors to take action to deter parties from using violence.

- Human rights, ceasefire and other monitoring mechanisms.

Programs aiming at changing key actor/"Key People" attitudes (see Theory 2) or using problem-solving dialogue with “Key People” (see Theory 5) frequently also can be seen as ultimately trying to help parties resolve the security dilemma by analyzing the conflict, building trust and mutual understanding of interests and intentions and reducing fear. These, however, can be difficult to scale up in order to have the desired confidence-building impact.

Debates and Critiques
While confidence-building measures, peacekeeping and other monitoring mechanisms have been considered important for promoting trust (or substituting for the parties' lack of trust) and for ensuring parties' adherence to commitments they have made, they can at times provide disincentives for parties to address the real (and hard) issues in conflict. They can become a way of avoiding dealing with hard issues—in effect, postponing negotiations—or can make the conflict comfortable enough that motivation to move to resolution is reduced. Confidence-building measures can also become politicized, and undermine, rather than build an improved climate for resolution.

Examples
Civilian peacekeeping: Non-violent Peaceforce
Belgium-based NGO, Non-violent Peaceforce (NP), implements a model of unarmed civilian peacekeeping. NP provides support to communities threatened by violence “in contexts where armed intervention would be counterproductive, unsuitable or an overreaction.” NP support includes a proactive presence and protective accompaniment for civilians as well as work with local groups to foster dialogue among parties in the

Box 11—Limitations of civil society-based confidence-building programs
“For many years, CBMs intended to build trust between Armenians and Azerbaijanis over their conflict around Nagorno-Karabakh were built around meetings in Tbilisi, usually involving Georgians, undertaking initiatives of relevance to all three societies and therefore ignoring the issues specific to the conflict around Nagorno-Karabakh. These CBMs seldom went beyond the individual meeting because the initiatives agreed on focused on safe issues that did not challenge participants to demonstrate their willingness to deliver when it counted to the other side.”
Behrendt, M. (2011) 
Civil Society and Confidence Building

Box 12—Limitations of Peacekeeping in Conflict Management
“One issue that became particularly apparent in Cyprus is that the presence of peacekeepers can create a stable status quo—a relatively comfortable stalemate—that encourages belligerents to become disinterested in conflict resolution processes because they are not immediately threatened by violent conflict. In Cyprus, as elsewhere, traditional peacekeeping without effective conflict resolution has tended to preserve the status quo.”147

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conflict. The theory of change is that “the presence of external actors provides enough of a deterrent to forestall the outbreak of violence.”

2.3 Theory 2.3: Changing Incentives for Violence

Theory of Change: If motivations or incentives for violence are changed so that violence is perceived as more costly and non-violence more attractive, then “key actors” will pursue peace and cease mobilizing for violence.

This theory of change is based on the belief that parties will choose to pursue a negotiated peace or to behave in a peaceful manner when non-violence is more attractive than violence. This theory sees decision making as a matter of rational choice, and focuses on changing behavior by changing the choices facing decision makers. If people have the right incentives, motives or choices, they will decide to end war and pursue peace.

Researchers and practitioners differ about what motivates decision makers, and therefore, what incentives will succeed in affecting their choices. Two broad approaches for affecting decision makers’ choices are outlined below: increasing negative incentives for violence and increasing positive incentives for peace. When designing a program based on this theory, a deep analysis of the context, including a political economy analysis, will be useful in deciding which approach is most appropriate and realistic.

Negative Incentives—creating a “hurting” stalemate

If a party believes that further escalation is not possible or will produce unacceptable costs, or that cooptation or marginalization of the other side is not possible, they may be “pushed” to make decisions that favor peace. (A “pull factor,” or way out, is also needed: a sense that an agreed solution is possible and that the other party shares that sense and is willing to work on a mutual solution.)

Interventions that are based on this approach seek to affect the choices of decision makers by creating conditions for “ripeness,” either by increasing the costs of

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149 A mutually hurting stalemate (MHS) provides an incentive to seek peaceful resolution because at that point the parties no longer see violence as advantageous. Zartman notes that the MHS is usually associated with an impending, past or recently avoided catastrophe that provides a deadline or a lesson that pain will increase unless something is done now. See Zartman, I. W. (2006) “Timing and Ripeness.” In A. Kupfer Schneider and C. Honeyman (Eds.) The Negotiator's Fieldbook, Washington, D.C.: American Bar Association Section of Dispute Resolution, pp. 143–152. The conclusion of the Oslo Accords in 1994 provides an example: the fall of the Soviet Union and the defeat of Iraq in the Gulf War, coupled with the rise of Hamas, provided some urgency to both parties for the conclusion of an agreement. See Lundberg, K. (1996) The Oslo Channel: Getting to the Negotiating Table, Cambridge, MA: J. F. Kennedy School of Government Case Program.
151 “Ripeness” is used to describe the situation in which there is a mutually stalemate, a potential “way out,” and a process and leadership to achieve a peace. See Zartman, I. W. (2006) “Timing and Ripeness.” Dean Pruitt (2005) has expanded the theory of “ripeness” to focus on the “readiness” of each of the parties for resolution; the “readiness” theory focuses on the motivations of each party to end the conflict and adds third-party pressure as a negative factor in generating motivation to move to resolution. “Optimism” that the parties will be able to find a mutually acceptable
continuing conflict for the parties or by providing positive incentives and rewards for peaceful behavior. Sanctions, aid conditionality, non-violent action and civil society advocacy are common approaches to increasing pressure on decision makers. Sanctions aim to affect parties’ decisions by increasing the pain of the stalemate. Aid conditionality is also designed to shape incentives of decision makers to refrain from escalating conflict by increasing the costs of non-cooperation. As James Boyce has noted:

The crux of the peacebuilding challenge lies in the fact that not all parties to the peace accord are committed unequivocally to the consolidation of peace; if they were, peacebuilding would be an easy task. By altering the incentives faced by the parties, peace conditionality can strengthen the momentum of the peace process.152

Especially if donors take a strong and united stance, aid conditionality can supply political muscle to a peace process, making non-cooperation more painful.

In a similar way, non-violent action, defined as a “civilian-based method used to wage conflict through social, psychological, economic and political means without the threat or use of violence,”153 seeks to bring pressure to bear on those wielding power to take desired decisions or to end oppression. Activities include lobbying, media campaigns, social marketing and other efforts to influence the public agenda, whether in relation to protection of civilians, promotion of human rights, policy, and action on underlying causes of conflict, or negotiation or implementation of peace agreements. Paffenholz found that while the effectiveness of this approach varied according to the forms and types of advocacy and its timing advocacy was one of the most effective functions of civil society in peacebuilding, especially when mass mobilization or collective action was successful during windows of opportunity in peace processes.154 The “people power” movement in the Philippines and the people’s movement in Nepal in 2006 are examples of mass mobilization against oppressive governments.

Positive Incentives and Rewards for Peace

On the side of positive incentives, some programs focus on creating the “mutually enticing opportunity” or way out.155 Some “Track 2” problem-solving workshops and dialogues (see Theory 1.5) aim to develop new understandings and ideas that could form the basis for a “way out.” Programs supporting the sharing of experiences and exchanges among countries or conflict areas also often hope to provide new insights, information or ideas that can help parties see possibilities for resolution and cooperation. Still others provide support and advice for processes that are believed will

agreement is the pull factor; it takes account of the possibility that optimism might exist before the shape of a solution is apparent, based on the development of some mutual trust, identification of common interests, etc.


create opportunities to develop common ground and create conditions for “ripeness” for resolution.

Positive economic incentives (promises of aid and resources) and rewards for cooperation are frequently used as an approach to affect the calculus of actors at all levels of society about committing to peace. The theory is that “the offer of ‘economic peace dividends’ may co-opt belligerents into ceasefires or more formal peace processes.”\footnote{Ballentine, K., and H. Nitzschke (2003) “Beyond Greed and Grievance: Policy Lessons from Studies in the Political Economy of Armed Conflict.” pp. 1, 16.} This can be because they experience tangible economic benefits of peace that counter the economic benefits of war for some, or because they reduce competition for scarce economic resources and therefore reduce the motivation to resort to violence.\footnote{Collier argues that it is important that “the end of warfare brings a rapid gain in income.” Collier, P. (1995) “Civil war and the economies of the peace dividend.” In The Centre for the Study of African Economies Working Paper Series, Paper 26, p 3.}

Programs may include efforts to ensure livelihoods for combatants and other key stakeholders, many community-driven reconstruction programs, programs that provide greater business opportunities or other financial incentives for individuals and groups; they aim to make peace and seem more attractive than continuing conflict by demonstrating that peace brings benefits. Without this peace dividend, people may feel skeptical about the value of the peace process, and even that they were better off during the war, as they could provide for themselves through looting, stealing or violence. In addition, in theory, when the violence ends, the state should be able to free up the resources required for war and channel them instead to enhanced social services. It is also quite likely that in a developing or middle-income country, external aid will be readily available. If citizens see this type of economic wealth available in their nation but do not see it translated into services for them, they are likely to lose faith in the sincerity of the state institutions. Such perceptions of corruption may lead to a return to violence. On the other hand, if citizens see the government using newfound resources for the benefit of all, they will likely have more confidence in and allegiance to these institutions.

Debates and Critiques

There are overarching, general critiques of the incentive-based theory of change and debates about the specific versions of it. An overarching caution relates to the main underlying assumption that all decisions regarding conflict and peace are the result of rational cost-benefit analysis. While acknowledging the value of this perspective, many critics note that a number of other factors complicate rational decision making and would need to be taken into account in designing programs based on this theory of change, such as the influence of social relations, internal struggles, group dynamics and psychological biases, mistrust or emotions.\footnote{See, e.g., Cramer, C. (2002) “Homo Economicus Goes to War: Methodological Individualism, Rational Choice and the Political Economy of War.” World Development, 30(11), 1845–1864; Arrow, K., R. Mookin and A. Tversky (Eds.) (1993) Barriers to Conflict Resolution, Cambridge, MA: PON Books; and Bazerman, M., and M. Neale (1992) “Nonrational Escalation of Commitment in Negotiation.” European Management Journal, 10(2), 163–168.} These factors, including their effect on
what constitutes a “cost” and a “benefit” to the parties, need also be analyzed and identified in context in order to develop an effective program design that affects “key actors’” decisions.

Moreover, strategies to provide incentives have been criticized for overestimating the incentives aid can provide. Programs need to consider the overall impact of aid, as “[a]id alone usually has limited capacities to determine the dynamics of violent conflict: external aid (which volume is on the decline) is often weak when weighed against the range of pressures and interests emanating from international, national, regional and local actors, both public and private.”159 Some have suggested that negative incentives might increase resistance, rather than reduce it, if not linked to positive incentives or “carrots.”160 Others have noted that the influence of aid conditionalities on key actor decisions depends on a range of contextual conditions, such as:

- lack of availability of resources from other sources;
- importance and sensitivity of decisions that parties are being asked to make (the less important, the more influential);
- potential impact of aid withdrawal or rewards of aid on the political interests of the main protagonists; or
- possibilities for resisting change through lack of implementation of decisions afterwards.161

This same caveat has been noted with respect to the use of positive economic incentives or rewards for peaceful or cooperative behavior: efforts to “buy peace” rarely succeed because aid is seldom a pre- eminent factor in the transition from violent conflict to peace.162

Moreover, research undertaken by some NGOs has suggested that at least in circumstances where there is no overt violence, there is little connection between increased general economic interaction (e.g., market interactions) and stronger livelihoods supported by programs and peace or stability.163 If the programs address the economic causes of conflict (e.g., sharing resources where there is resource

competition) or develop much deeper economic cooperation (e.g., through associations), they may provide incentives for resisting or not participating in violence.164

While communities often do perceive economic benefits for peace,165 “peace dividends” provided as rewards for peace also have a mixed record. In South Sudan, for example, the dominant theory of changed identified by a multi-donor evaluation in 2010 seemed to be that “that development is not only a reward for peace (the CPA) but that failure to deliver a ‘peace dividend’ could lead to conflict…but the causal link between delivering services and abating violence is not found in Southern Sudan, despite this being the dominant paradigm that informs the aid operations.”166 This suggests that analysis of the particular drivers of conflict at national and local level, as well as analysis of the political economy of the transition from war to peace, must inform the choice of approach, including whether and how economic programming might provide incentives for peace.

**Examples**

The examples below are meant to illustrate how this theory has been used or applied. They are not meant to be endorsements (or criticisms) of any particular theory or approach to implementing the theory, nor exhaustive of the variety or approaches to implementing the theory. They merely describe different kinds of programs practitioners have undertaken based on the theory. When evaluation data is available to indicate

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whether and how a particular approach has been successful, this is indicated—however, in many cases, no such data exists.

**Affecting reality and perceptions of negotiation alternatives in Bosnia**

During the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in mid-1995, the Serbian army was strong relative to the Croatian and Bosnian armed forces. At the time, Serbia was not responsive to calls for negotiations. The US decided to provide military training to the Croatian and Bosnian armies and not to enforce the arms embargo against them. This helped the Bosnians and Croats make significant military advances during the second half of 1995 that contributed to a change in Milosevic’s perception of the likelihood of victory and an eventual decision to negotiate an agreement.

**Civil society advocacy and pressure on government: Liberia civil society public statement**

A transitional justice working group, made up of key international and local NGOs working on issues of accountability and reconciliation, accompanied the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) process critically from the beginning, and a group of 36 civil society organizations published a statement in July 2009 in strong support of the report and urging government to take action. The theory of change was that if civil society kept the issues raised by the TRC report on the public agenda and engaged broader constituencies in discussions on them, then the government would feel pressure to support and implement the recommendations.167

**Providing positive incentives for sustaining peace**

The Maluku Economic Recovery Program II, implemented in Maluku, Indonesia by Mercy Corps began in 2000 with support from New Zealand Aid. It aimed to strengthen local capacity to address the key causes of conflict through economic development projects and peacebuilding activities that brought divided communities together. The program used a community mobilization approach to economic development that was implemented by a team that included both Muslims and Christians. Activities included supporting community-based livelihood groups, providing technical assistance to strengthen livelihoods, and supporting peaceful dispute resolution. The program was based on three theories of change, of which one stated: “By strengthening livelihoods in conflict-affected communities, stability will increase because community members recognize that their economic welfare benefits from peace.”168

**Mo Ibrahim Foundation: Rewards for peace**

The Mo Ibrahim Foundation developed the Ibrahim Prize to recognize a democratically elected former African Executive Head of State or Government who has served his/her term in office within the limits set by the country’s constitution and has left office in the last three years. The prize is US $5 million over 10 years and US $200,000 annually for life thereafter. It is designed to provide an incentive and motivation for leaders to lead

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with integrity while in office and to leave office peacefully when the term is over by providing them with financial security and a prestigious award. It is the largest annually awarded prize in the world.169

2.4 Theory 2.4: Addressing domestic divisions

**Theory of change:** If domestic political struggles within a party are addressed, resolved or managed, then a party will have greater motivation and capacity to pursue peace.

Some programs focus on addressing domestic political struggles that limit leaders’ ability to make decisions against violence and in favor of addressing the underlying grievances and issues driving conflict, and increasingly, international capital linkages. Political division, “spoiler” groups170 and internal political or electoral dynamics influence the policies and strategies toward the conflict. Programs based on this theory seek to limit the influence of “spoiler” groups or overcome internal divisions in order to be able to take decisions for peace.

Intra-communal or “single community” programs may bring parties within a side across conflict lines for dialogue about significant issues. Others, such as support for the establishment of the Kosovo Protection Corps, which allowed for the demobilization of the Kosovo Liberation Army after the 1999 conflict in Kosovo, seek to integrate potential “spoilers” or groups that might be opposed to or be hurt by a peace process, so as to induce them to cooperate and participate in the peace process.

**Debates and Critiques**

While the influence of domestic divisions on parties’ willingness and ability to pursue peaceful means of dealing with conflict is widely recognized, there are debates about the approaches and strategies for addressing them. Questions have been raised about whether “single identity” or intra-community work might reinforce entrenched attitudes, stereotypes and prejudices.171 Others have suggested that in some circumstances, bridging internal divisions may result in a reduced “win set”—i.e., reduced possibilities for cooperation and agreement with the other side.172 In other circumstances, pursuit of inter-group strategies and agreements may be the most effective way to address domestic opposition to peace, as it can strengthen a peace

169 For more information about the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, please see http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org.
170 See Stedman, S. (1997) “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” *International Security*, 22(2), 5–53. Stedman defines three kinds of spoilers—limited, greedy and total—and argues that different approaches are needed to deal with each. Limited spoilers could be engaged if grievances are addressed, while greedy spoilers, who also might be engaged in the peace process, are more opportunistic and may need to be addressed with a combination of inducements/incentives and disincentives. Total spoilers would need to be marginalized, as their core interest lies in thwarting a peace process.
agenda or allies.\textsuperscript{173} Similarly, in some cases, excluding more extreme parties from the peace process can be effective—as the 2000 Arusha Accords in Burundi did in proceeding without the participation of the CNDD-FDD, one of the main armed groups in the country. In others, engagement of the “hard to reach” is critical for the achievement of sustainable peace. In Northern Ireland, for example, engagement of political prisoners was considered by many to be vital for the success of the peace process there.\textsuperscript{174} The particular approaches and theories for addressing internal divisions must be contextually-grounded.

\textbf{Examples}

The examples below are meant to illustrate how this theory has been used or applied. They are not meant to be endorsements (or criticisms) of any particular theory or approach to implementing the theory, nor exhaustive of the variety or approaches to implementing the theory. They merely describe different kinds of programs practitioners have undertaken based on the theory. When evaluation data is available to indicate whether and how a particular approach has been successful, this is indicated—however, in many cases, no such data exists.

\textit{Interpeace in Israel and Palestine}

Since late 2004, Interpeace, a Geneva-based NGO, has been promoting the development of geo-strategic visions for peaceful coexistence in sectors of Israeli society that up until now have been marginalized from the public debate on the resolution of the Arab–Israeli conflict: the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel, the Settler community, the traditional religious population and the heterogeneous “silent majority” that constitutes the core. The theory of change is that if these sectors are helped to develop their own visions for a peaceful future, then convergence on basic principles for co-existence will emerge and allow for the development of proposals that will eventually allow the peoples of the region to co-exist in peace. In Palestine, the program provides a neutral platform for Palestinians to develop a common vision for the future that reflects a consensus across a wide range of opinions. The program believes that if the intra-Palestinian split is settled, it will be possible to develop a coherent vision for the future of Palestine shaped by all Palestinians and unifying the efforts for ending the occupation.

\textit{Peace and Reconciliation Group, Single Identity Project}

The Peace and Reconciliation Group in Northern Ireland has worked with groups of loyalist (Protestant) men with a view to developing reconciliation and community work in their areas. The program provided training focused on issues of self identity and community identity, as well as examination of the identity of the other side, perceptions, stereotypes and respect for diversity. The training was followed by an intensive residential program that included visits to historically significant sites. The theory of change of the program was that if the group can gain knowledge and understanding of its

\textsuperscript{173} Ibid.

own cultural heritage and that of other groups, people will become more tolerant and accepting of cultural diversity.\footnote{Peace and Reconciliation Group, Single Identity Project, http://www.peaceprg.co.uk/p03.html (accessed 23 February 2013).}

2.5 Theory 2.5: Improving Skills and Processes

Theory of change:

*If the parties have skills and good processes for resolving conflicts, then they will be more successful in negotiating peace and dealing effectively and constructively with underlying causes of conflict.*

The implicit assumption in this theory is that lack of capacity/skills or inadequate process is a significant reason for the lack of success in negotiation, peacebuilding and consensus building to resolve drivers of conflict and fragility. This theory suggests that if the parties have the proper skills and processes to handle the conflict differently, then agreements and cooperation are more likely. Moving from a more “distributive,” or zero-sum and confrontational, mode of interaction to one that is more “integrative” and tries to reconcile the underlying interests and needs of the various stakeholders, is considered to lead to more productive interactions that result in more sustainable agreements.\footnote{Lax, D.A., and J. K. Sebenius (2006) *3-D Negotiation: Powerful Tools to Change the Game in your Most Important Deals*, Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press; Fisher, R., Ury, W. L., and Patton, B. M. (1991) *Getting to YES: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In* (2nd ed.), New York: Penguin Books; Hopmann, P.T. (1995) “Two Paradigms of Negotiation: Bargaining and Problem Solving,” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 542(1) 24–47 (November).}

Programs to provide capacity building to actors at various levels of society are often based on this theory. This may include training in negotiation, problem-solving, communication, life skills, as well as training or exchanges to expand and deepen knowledge of a particular subject matter or area critical to shifting the conflict (e.g., electoral systems, land policy, natural resources management, etc.). Support to mediation or other third-party processes also seeks to provide space, expertise, mechanisms and better processes for parties to overcome obstacles to negotiation and cooperation.

**Debates and Critiques**

Critiques of this theory focus on the limitations of capacity building and improved processes. Analysts caution that even when skills, processes, and capacities exist, the willingness and ability to use the skills are affected by incentives, by opportunities and by institutional context and culture (rewards and punishments) for using them. In other words, even if skills and capacities need attention, the determinants of actors’ behavior may be unrelated to capacities. Moreover, the assumption that the skills and knowledge gained at the individual level in the trainings will lead automatically to changes in behavior and action at the socio-political level has been challenged. Most capacity building work promotes change at the individual-personal level, while hoping that people will use the newly gained skills, knowledge and capacities will lead actors to take action.
at the socio-political level.177 Yet “[w]hile significant to individuals, these do not, by themselves, affect conflict more generally.”178 Training, and capacity building more generally, must be used as one tool in a larger strategy that links work that has effects at the individual/personal level to the socio-political level.

Similar observations have been made about mediation processes; while third-party assistance is often necessary to overcome inter-group dynamics that create barriers to peace, it is not sufficient alone to bring about agreements. Many factors influence the outcomes of mediation, including contextual factors such as the systemic features of the conflict, the nature of the conflict itself, its “ripeness” and the internal dynamics within the parties.179 Some suggest that mediation and negotiation might be counterproductive in the absence of ripe conditions.180

Examples
The examples below are meant to illustrate how this theory has been used or applied. They are not meant to be endorsements (or criticisms) of any particular theory or approach to implementing the theory, nor exhaustive of the variety or approaches to implementing the theory. They merely describe different kinds of programs practitioners have undertaken based on the theory. When evaluation data is available to indicate whether and how a particular approach has been successful, this is indicated—however, in many cases, no such data exists.

Burundi Leadership Training Program
The Woodrow Wilson Center for International Studies’ Burundi Leadership Training Program (BLTP) used training to stimulate dialogue and build skills to support implementation of the peace agreements in Burundi. Begun in 2002 to aid the transition to peace following the Arusha and later the Pretoria Accords, BLTP conducted a series of intensive six-day training workshops in interest-based negotiation, leadership skills, communication, mediation, conflict analysis, strategic planning and organizational change for close to one hundred political, military and civil society leaders. The workshops were designed to “build a cohesive, sustainable network of leaders who could work together across all ethnic and political divides in order to advance Burundi’s reconstruction.”181 Follow-up workshops specifically for key security sector actors led to significant breakthroughs in negotiations related to the integration of the Burundian army.

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177 Programs that work to increase institutional capacity by, for example, providing equipment, uniforms, and other material needed for people in government agencies to perform their duties, also can be limited by failure to link the effects at the institutional level (increasing capacity) to work at the individual/personal level to affect the attitudes and skills of those using the equipment as well as their actions.
Casamance, Senegal

In Senegal, the USAID-supported program on “Support to the Casamance Peace Process” aimed to increase the capacity of the government, the Mouvement des Forces Democratiques de la Casamance (MFDC) and civil society actors to reach and implement a peace agreement. The program provided training and technical support in a range of topics, from conflict transformation and negotiation to participatory management of peace processes, and created structures, processes and systems for managing the peace process effectively.182

Sharing experiences and creating new hope: PJTT

The Project on Justice in Times of Transition (PJTT) believes that humans share a basic psychological response to conflict, violence and repression that allows people from disparate countries to connect and see the possibility of peaceful change. Applying this shared experience methodology, PJTT has worked closely with individuals who understand the complicated political and psychological dynamics at play and from their own experiences can provide guidance and intellectual support to those facing similar problems. In Colombia, PJTT brought key international figures from Northern Ireland, the Philippines and Central America (who themselves have made a transition from fighter to politician) with members of National Liberation Army (ELN) and the Colombian government to consider how to negotiate a ceasefire and to think about what kind of transformations to prepare for—both as individuals and as a guerrilla movement transitioning into a legitimate political party.

2.5 Resources for Family 2: Changes in Behavior

Resources on changing elite means


Resources on changing choices about violence


Resources on improving skills and processes


Primers:
Institutions (Family 3)
3. **Theory of Change Family 3: Institutions**

This section will be particularly useful if you are working in a situation in which formal and informal institutions lack the capability to respond to the needs of the population and/or are considered to be unfair, abusive or corrupt.

Violence often occurs in response to a perception that the very structures and rules of a society are incapable of responding to the needs of its members in a fair manner. Unmet needs, in combination with exclusion from these structures, can cause members of society to resort to violent means, as they attempt to change the existing rules, structures and power dynamics. The Institutions Theory of Change Family describes ways to shift the capabilities and functioning of the institutions of a society, as well as how they are perceived by the public, in order to promote sustainable peace. This Theory of Change Family is fundamentally about *structural* change, as opposed to change at a group or individual level.

So what are institutions? Institutions are defined as “the formal and informal rules and practices governing human interactions, such as social norms, laws, organizations, and other mechanisms for shaping human behavior.”\(^{183}\) Often when we think of institutions, we have formal institutions in mind, such as government bodies, courts or security organizations. However, institutions can be either formal or informal.\(^{184}\) Formal institutions are “rules and procedures which are created, communicated and enforced through channels widely accepted as official.”\(^{185}\) Informal institutions, on the other hand, are “socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels.”\(^{186}\) They are not defined by laws or regulations, and include community networks, civil society, family systems, informal economic activity, customs, traditions and other codes of conduct. “Although formal rules may change overnight as the result of political or judicial decisions, informal constraints embodied in customs, traditions, and codes of conduct are much more impervious to deliberate policies.”\(^{187}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formal</th>
<th>Informal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political</strong></td>
<td>Laws, rules and constitutions that govern how political power is sought, won and distributed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic</strong></td>
<td>Laws, rules and regulations governing market economies.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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\(^{183}\) USAID (2012) CAF 2.0.


\(^{186}\) Ibid. (citing Helmke and Levitsky, 2006:5).

The core hypothesis for institutional theories of change is if institutions in a society are effective and legitimate, then they create options for addressing grievances peacefully rather than through violent means. As evoked in this hypothesis, there are two major underlying qualities of institutions that are believed to promote peacebuilding: effectiveness and legitimacy.

Effectiveness is the capability of the government and other institutions to work with society to assure the provision of order and quality goods and services. Many peacebuilding and development programs are fundamentally based around building government capacity, which in turn, should lead to increased effectiveness through enhanced capability. Which capabilities to focus on depend on the context, resources and capacities that are present at any given time. However, there are a number of governance capabilities frameworks that might provide guidance for reference (for example, see Box 18).

The link between effectiveness and peacebuilding is as follows: If formal and informal institutions can efficiently provide goods and services in response to needs of society and provide processes for resolving differences of interest between members of society, then people will more likely (a) feel that their basic needs are being met, and (b) use established non-violent forums for dispute resolution. In turn, this minimizes the risk that they will resort to violent means to meet their needs and settle their disputes. If you are working in a situation in which formal and informal institutions lack the capability to respond to people’s needs, you will likely undertake a program focusing on the effectiveness aspect of the theory of change.

### Box 14—Seven key governance capabilities

1. Operate political systems which provide opportunities for all the people, including the poor and disadvantaged, to influence government policy and practice;
2. Provide macroeconomic stability and promote the growth necessary to reduce poverty;
3. Implement pro-poor policy and raise, allocate and account for public resources accordingly;
4. Guarantee the equitable and universal provision of effective basic services;
5. Ensure personal safety and security with access to justice for all;
6. Manage national security arrangements accountably and resolve differences between communities before they develop into violent conflicts;
7. Develop honest and accountable government that can combat corruption.


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188 This definition is based on the definition used in USAID Fragile States, but has been slightly modified.
Legitimacy is the perception by members of society that the government and other institutions are exercising power in ways that are reasonably fair, even-handed and in the interests of the nation as a whole. It is, in other words, “the publics’ recognition of a states right to rule.”\(^{189}\) It also refers to the perception that the institution is organized in a manner that reflects the culture and values of the society. The link between legitimacy and peacebuilding is as follows: If members of society perceive their institutions as legitimate, then they will be more likely to participate in and trust those institutions, thereby increasing the likelihood that people will use institutional mechanisms, rather than violence, to resolve conflict. If you are working in a situation in which formal and informal institutions are seen to be unfair, corrupt, abusive, not reflective of local culture and/or non-transparent, you will likely undertake a program focusing on the legitimacy aspect of the theory of change.

Both effectiveness and legitimacy undergird all four of the institutional theories of change: Statebuilding Theory; Liberal Peace Theory; Traditional Institutions Theory; and Ad-hoc or Transitional Institutions Theory. Nonetheless, some of the theories of change are generally more associated with one of these principles than the other. The Statebuilding and Ad-hoc or Transitional Institutions Theories of Change tend to focus predominantly on effectiveness, as they concentrate on the delivery of services and responsiveness to citizens’ needs. Liberal Peace Theory and Traditional Institutions Theory tend to focus predominantly on legitimacy, as they concentrate on the types of institutions that contribute to a peaceful society. Despite the overall categorization of these theories, the manner in which principles of effectiveness and legitimacy will be operationalized under each theory will largely depend on the context and conflict analysis.

The following sections will explain each of the theories of change, their relationship to peacebuilding and the aspects of effectiveness and legitimacy that these theories evoke. Each of these theories of change can be applied to various institutional sectors: political, economic, security, justice, social services and media. As such, the theories are not disaggregated by sector. However, programming will vary based upon the targeted sector. These variances will be elucidated through examples of each theory of change in practice.

3.1 Theory 3.1: Statebuilding Theory of Change

Theory of change:

*If formal and informal institutions have the capacity to efficiently and effectively provide goods and services in response to the needs of society, then members of society will rely on these institutions rather than resorting to violence to provide for their needs.*

Statebuilding is “an endogenous process to enhance capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state driven by state-society relations.”190 The core operating principle of the Statebuilding Theory of Change is that effective, legitimate and robust state institutions are necessary for sustainable peace. Weak institutions do not have the capability to respond to the needs of citizens, properly manage and implement national resources or negotiate political processes to address competing demands. Because of these institutional inabilities, citizens’ grievances remain unaddressed. Additionally, poor economic governance can lead to competition over resources, which are often used to finance armed groups.191 The theory also contends that people will be less likely to engage in destructive conflict against the government if it acts, and is seen to act, efficiently and effectively. “A vicious cycle ensues in which the institutional fabric that supports societal agreement on basic rules of conduct in all spheres is weakened and torn, leading to further decay and conflict.”192

Interventions based on the Statebuilding Theory of Change are designed to prevent or reverse this vicious cycle of institutional weakness. Traditional approaches to statebuilding focused on technical capacity building—in other words, improving the effectiveness of the institutions. Such capacity building measures may focus on the rule of law, transparency, inclusiveness, efficient internal management, infrastructure and/or professional skill enhancement.

A key component of the Statebuilding Theory of Change is the issue of legitimacy, i.e., “the endorsement of the state by citizens.”193 The relationship between effectiveness and legitimacy is crucial, as one factor reinforces the other. Therefore, successful Statebuilding requires investment in both areas (see Box).

“People’s perceptions of legitimacy reside at the core of their willingness to engage with the state, to accept its “right to rule.” Legitimacy strengthens capacity because the state can rely mainly on non-coercive authority...Capacity is likely to improve legitimacy and further stimulate collective action that effectively aggregates and channels citizen demands and expectations. In this way, capacity and legitimacy are mutually reinforcing...”194

Building the “capacity of institutions that serve key social and economic sectors, such as those providing healthcare, education and financial services, will reduce stress and vulnerability, especially among poorer populations.”195 Moreover, strong institutions will allow the state to maintain control over its territory and build societal resilience. Resilience means the state is capable of navigating the expectations of its citizens,

managing economic and political processes and providing services to the population based upon state revenues. Because societies are constantly in flux and face new political challenges, a state’s resilience is vital for its ability to maintain a stable peace.

The Statebuilding Theory of Change focuses on enhancing the capacity of state institutions to respond to the needs of the citizens. However, the Statebuilding Theory of Change does not offer guidance on what types of state institutions should exist—merely that those in existence should be effective. The Liberal Peace Theory of Change and Traditional Institutions Theory of Change focus on this second component, i.e., the type of institutions that should be put into place. We turn to those theories next.

**Debates and Critiques**

One challenge to the Statebuilding Theory of Change is that institution-building is not a technical problem with knowable solutions that can be implemented by experts. Rather, institutions are embedded in a political culture, requiring malleability and localized, idiosyncratic solutions. Institutions are not monolithic and cannot be reduced to a simple capacity assessment exercise, as we might be able to do for groups or individuals. Engaging in statebuilding in a manner that presumes cookie-cutter technical solutions not only risks failure, but also may exacerbate conflict by affecting local power dynamics or creating unfulfilled expectations. Accordingly, the capacity-building approach has generally yielded disappointing results in both the medium and the long term.

The Statebuilding Theory of Change also operates on the assumption that increasing the capacity of institutions within a state’s borders will allow for political development. However, this does not grapple with the state’s place in the regional or international system. It may be the case that poorer and conflict-ridden nations remain that way because of their political and economic interactions with richer nations. If this is the case, then peacebuilding would require a reformulation of the relationship between rich states and poor states, rather than a concentrated effort to reform institutions within conflict-prone states.

**Examples**

**South Sudan – Statebuilding and Gender**

The World Bank and UN supported what would become the Government of South Sudan to build state institutions in the lead-up to the 9 July 2011 declaration of independence. This declaration led to the Republic of South Sudan becoming Africa’s fifty-fourth state, ending decades of conflict, and initiating a major statebuilding effort.
May 2011, one of four legal centers established to help women access information about their rights, including for cases of domestic violence and sexual assault, opened in the state of Western Equatoria. The Ministry of Gender, with funding from the World Bank, disseminated grants to 109 women who started small businesses in all ten states. Also, in 2011, the government launched a women’s vocational training institute in Aluakluak Payam (district), Yirol West County of Lakes state, the first of its kind in South Sudan.

3.2 Theory 3.2: Liberal Peace Theory of Change

*Theory of change:*

If a nation’s institutions are democratic, then people will be more likely to feel included and able to address their grievances non-violently, thereby promoting peace.

Under the Liberal Peace Theory of Change, the legitimacy of a state’s institutions is determined by their democratic nature. Only democratic processes and institutions allow the people of a society to express their will and exert control over those making decisions in governing institutions. Such democratic accountability provides a check on the ability of elites to take advantage of their power. Instead, all members of society—regardless of wealth or status—play a role in the nation’s decision-making process.

Because democracy is based on principles of inclusiveness, pluralism and compromise, it will establish norms of behavior for resolving conflict. If inclusive formal and informal institutions in society are equitably shaped by, respond to and serve all populations in the society through participatory decision-making, then inter-group cooperation, early problem solving around grievances and resilience will increase. Moreover, “inclusion, participation and accountability make it more likely that citizens will trust the state in times of crisis rather than fearing it and seeking alternative means of authority, protection, or support.” If a nation’s institutions are democratic, then people will be (a) more likely to feel included in the national decision-making process, and (b) more likely to address their grievances through non-violent mechanisms built into the institutional system. As a result, people will be less likely to either revolt against the government or address their grievances violently, thereby creating a more peaceful nation.

There are three major components of the Liberal Peace Theory of Change: 1) market liberalization, 2) democratic government, and 3) robust civil society.

Market liberalization allows private citizens and companies to freely engage in economic activity. The role of the government is to “assure sound macroeconomic policy, maintain the rule of law and enforcement of property rights, develop a market-

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201 Ali, N. M., Gender and Statebuilding in South Sudan, United States Institute for Peace, Washington, D.C., 2011
supporting regulatory framework and promote private sector investment.” A key objective for the international community is ensuring the government’s basic fiscal and monetary management capacity is intact in order to discharge this role effectively. Outside of this role, however, market forces should remain in the private sector. Market liberalization is important on two fronts. First, liberalized markets help generate investment and economic production, which facilitates economic growth for the nation as a whole. From the development community’s perspective, growth is often cited as the most effective way to lift people out of poverty. This national economic growth, in turn, allows the government to provide more national services to its citizens, such that everyone’s standard of living is raised. Secondly, liberalized markets provide opportunities for employment and entrepreneurship. With these opportunities for social mobility, citizens can engage in productive activities that make them feel like valuable members of society and that allow them to generate the resources they need to provide for their needs. This enhanced societal and individual standard of living reduces citizens’ desire to resort to violence.

The second major component is a democratic government. Democratic governments are elected by the populace and follow standards of transparency, accountability, fairness, inclusiveness and accessibility. Democratic processes allow all citizens—regardless of region or group affiliation—to participate in the decisions made in the society. As such, there is enhanced group ownership over the direction of the nation. Additionally, because democratic institutions allow citizens to remove those in power who do not exercise their will, members of society have an institutionalized way in which to evoke change, rather than resorting to violence.

The third component of the Liberal Peace Theory is a robust civil society. Civil society is “the arena of voluntary, uncoerced collective actions around shared interests, purposes and values.” It is the aggregate of entities, such as non-profit organizations, interest groups and other social or political networks, that forms part of society but that is separate from the government. Civil society plays an important role in monitoring state institutions, calling for accountability for any transgressions, advocating for the needs of particular groups, cultivating a culture of peace and providing facilitation among polarized groups.207

The successful culmination of these three components produces a society with broad-based legitimacy. The diversity of interests is effectively managed, including through the protection of vulnerable groups. People have the freedom to pursue social mobility within the system, with the guarantee that others will not infringe upon the rights and

205 Note that the international aid community has been often criticized in its democracy work for overly focusing on the process of elections (and the logistics and effective handling of election day itself) rather than these broader and deeper issues associated with democracy overall.
protections afforded them under the institutional framework. Similarly, people maintain control over those in power and the capability to hold them accountable for transgressions. Societies built on this inclusiveness, mobility and accountability are perceived to be legitimate and, accordingly, are more peaceful.

**Debates and Critiques**

While fully formed democratic societies have been shown to be more peaceful, nascent democracies in states with weak institutions are more likely to be unstable and engage in war. Transitioning into a democratic system requires political competition in which different groups vie for power. In the long term, beneficial and stable results can be achieved by promoting competition, when moderated by strong, rule-based state institutions. In the short term, however, such competition can exacerbate existing tensions between groups and/or create identity-based party politics, thereby furthering or reigniting violence. Moreover, institutional weakness of transitional states leaves democratic institutions vulnerable to manipulation. As such, some argue that it is important to first build the capacity of institutions before focusing on elections and other measures to liberalize the institutions.

Additionally, some argue that the ideals of democracy are Western ideals that are not easily translated to non-Western societies. To impose democratic structures is a form of political and cultural imperialism that denies the dignity of the people of the recipient society. Thus, this form of political imperialism wages yet a new type of violence on those who have already been victimized by war and violent conflict.

**Examples**

Activities typically undertaken in this area include: election monitoring; political party support; democracy trainings; empowerment trainings for female candidates; support to encourage privatization of markets; facilitation of foreign direct investment; constitution reform; etc.

**NDI in Guatemala**

NDI works to increase the political participation of women and indigenous people in Guatemala and has collaborated with political parties to design and carry out recruitment plans focusing on women and indigenous people. The 11 September 2011 general elections in Guatemala were a breakthrough for women's participation in the electoral process. Official figures issued by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal showed that of the 7.3 million citizens registered to vote, more than half, 3.7 million, were women. This is the first time in Guatemala’s democratic history where women made up more than 50 percent of the voter register.

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3.3 Theory 3.3: Traditional Institutions Theory of Change

**Theory of change**: If institutions in a society are based on traditional structures, rather than based upon externally-imposed structures, then people will feel more ownership over and allegiance to those institutions, thereby reducing the likelihood that they will resort to violent means to change the institutions.

The Traditional Institutions Theory of Change offers a different perspective of what makes institutions legitimate. Rather than being democratic, which is seen by some as a Western system inappropriate for export to other nations, legitimate institutions are endogenous to the society at hand. In other words, institutions are based on traditional norms, customs and models particular to that community or nation. Such institutions are familiar to, and reflect the values of, the people they govern. As such, people are more likely to feel ownership over them and to respect them as legitimate.

Traditional institutions may include (but are not limited to) local customs, patriarchal networks, clan structures, chiefdoms and local dispute systems. According to the Traditional Institutions Theory of Change, displacing these institutions with an external system, such as democracy, is detrimental to stable peace. Two particular problems are raised in relation to the idea of “imposing” a governance structure onto a nation that has no history with the system being introduced by external actors. First, imposing external institutions likely will not be effective, as societies will inherently try to infuse such systems with incompatible local traditions and structures. Second, even where the imposition of external institutions is relatively successful, the disruption of traditionally followed rules and customs destroys a way of life cultivated over many centuries, thereby reducing cultural dignity, pride and heritage.

If, on the other hand, it is argued, the process for reforming institutions reflects the values, traditions and perceptions of the society, and the reformed institutions reflect the historical power structures, then the process and resulting institutions should be perceived as legitimate. Once perceived as legitimate, these institutions can be more effective at mitigating grievances.

There are three models of institutional structure under the Traditional Institutions Theory of Change. The first model is that traditional institutions dominate over centralized state institutions, leaving the state weak and ineffectual. The second model is that traditional institutions dominate at one level of society (such as the community or local level), whereas centralized state institutions dominate at another level (such as the regional or national level). Alternatively, the traditional and state institutions may split governance based upon issues (such as family relations and foreign policy), rather than by regional level. The third model is that traditional institutions are subsumed into state institutions. Traditions and customary law may be written into the formalized state legal system and/or traditional leaders may be incorporated into governance structures.

**Debates and Critiques**

Simply because an institution has been in place for a long time and is deemed “traditional” does not make it effective. Using traditional institutions may reinforce pre-
existing power structures that marginalize important sectors of the population. At times, the traditional institution’s principles may be at odds with the donor principles (e.g. attitudes towards gender issues, sexual orientation, marginalized communities, etc). Finding a balance between local cultural customs and modern day concepts of human rights and representative government can be particularly challenging. This tension is manifested in the debate over “Harmful Traditional Practices,”210 in which certain organizations and individuals, typically from the West, criticize cultural practices such as Female Genital Mutilation (FGM), early marriage, son preference and infanticide.

Examples

DFID support to HIV/AIDS prevention in Yemen

Progressio, a charity sponsored by DFID, is providing focused training to imams and khutbas (those designated to give Friday sermons) in Yemen to discuss HIV/AIDS from a religious perspective and to examine religious leaders’ roles in reducing stigma and discrimination. Independent evaluations have found this approach to be effective, stating, for example, that “Part of Progressio’s added value in this field has been an understanding of how to work with faith leaders who can combat stigmatism and thus encourage “More People” to come forward for testing and treatment…”211

USAID’s Accelerating Contraceptive Use in Afghanistan

Under the USAID-funded Accelerating Contraceptive Use (ACU) project, contraceptive prevalence more than doubled in three rural districts in one year. Religious leaders reviewed and approved each ACU intervention, educated the community and advocated culturally acceptable contraceptive use on national television. The ACU model is now being scaled up nationwide. A training manual for religious leaders is being developed to integrate information on birth spacing and contraceptive use.

3.4 Theory 3.4: Ad-hoc or Transitional Institutions Theory

Theory of Change:

If support is provided to temporary institutions that assist in the transition from a violent and/or insecure society to a peaceful society, then the likelihood of violence re-emerging in the future will be reduced.

Ad-hoc institutions provide a bridging function, which is both backwards and forwards looking. They are intended to help society deal with unresolved issues from the past in order to move forward. The principle is that by facing the negative experiences of the past, those issues will not act as impediments to future progress. The efforts of such institutions will lay the groundwork for future peacebuilding work and avert a relapse into violence.


211 Evaluation of the Progressio—DFID Programme Partnership Agreement, Final Report, IOD-PARC, United Kingdom, 2010
A number of transitional institutions provide these functions, most notably transitional justice institutions. Traditionally, transitional justice referred to the process, conducted during a period of transition from violent conflict to peace, of addressing human rights violations committed by individuals in the past. It covers activities such as the creation of tribunals and truth commissions, commissions of historical inquiry, fact-finding processes, reconciliation activities and the provision of reparations. Other forms of transitional institutions include Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs, transitional governments (e.g. Governments of National Unity), Security Sector Reform (SSR) structures and national programs, such as the Gacaca process in Rwanda.

DDR is often the first step in the transition from war to peace. It is a process that contributes to security and stability by removing ex-combatants from active combat structures, disarming and demobilizing them from military structures and supporting efforts to socially and economically promote integration into society as civilians.

Security Sector Reform refers to efforts intended to strengthen the overall security system of a country, often during a period of transition. Often the concept is applied to the security sector in the broadest sense, and not just the police and military. Therefore, SSR seeks to improve capacity, effectiveness and efficiency of core security actors, justice and law enforcement, oversight bodies and civil society.212

**Debates and Critiques**

Some question the ability/appropriateness of outside actors to intervene in issues that are so strongly rooted in local culture, history and societal norms. They argue that the drive for truth-seeking and retribution may be fueled by external goals, rather than a genuine priority, identified locally. Others say that if all the solutions existed locally, then the issues would have been resolved on their own, and in many cases they clearly have ongoing, serious issues to address in relation to past violence. Those who work on supporting transitional institutions often recognize the necessity to balance local and national views against international or regional perspectives.

Another critique is the charge that transitional justice mechanisms may support a “victor’s justice” result. At the end of a violent or traumatic past, the uneven power relationship that may be in place is potentially solidified, in part, by the very support intended to facilitate a transition to a peaceful society.

However, one of the key benefits of the international tribunal approach is the creation of valuable “case law,” which establishes precedent for future proceedings. Yet these

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“Transitional justice refers to the set of judicial and non-judicial measures that have been implemented by different countries in order to redress the legacies of massive human rights abuses. These measures include criminal prosecutions, truth commissions, reparations programs, and various kinds of institutional reforms.”

International Center for Transitional Justice
processes have been quite slow (for example, it took 50 years after the Nuremberg trials before the first person was ever convicted of genocide in the Rwanda tribunals), as well as very expensive. DDR and SSR programs can rank among the most costly of engagements by the international community. However, in recent years, the capacity of the international community to engage in such transitional institutions appears to be increasing in terms of capability and resources.

**Examples**

*The Special Court for Sierra Leone*

The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) was set up jointly by the Government of Sierra Leone and the United Nations. It is mandated to try those who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of human rights in Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996. The court was unique when it was established in 2002. Unlike the war crimes tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, which are entirely run by the UN with an international staff, it was set up jointly by the UN and the Sierra Leone government with a mix of local and international prosecutors and judges. Twenty-one individuals have been indicted for war crimes and/or crimes against humanity. In 2012, former Liberian President Charles Taylor became the first African former head of state to be convicted for war crimes.

*The Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP)*

From 2002 to 2009, the World Bank administered the MDRP, which supported demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants in the greater Great Lakes region in Central Africa. The strategy was to contribute to the overall security environment and to regional peacebuilding and stabilization processes in the greater Great Lakes region, thus laying the groundwork for sustainable development. The program demobilized approximately 300,000 ex-combatants from seven countries, and with 13 international donors, at a cost of $500 million USD, is the largest and most complex DDR program to date.
Table 4: Examples of Programming by Sector for Each Institutional Theory of Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutional Sector</th>
<th>State-building</th>
<th>Liberal Peace</th>
<th>Traditional Institutions</th>
<th>Peace Dividend</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Constitutional support; local governance strengthening; capacity building of public officials; anti-corruption campaigns; legislative strengthening</td>
<td>Creation, reform, or capacity building of independent election management body; election monitoring and observation; political party strengthening</td>
<td>Support to local chieftoms or local rulers; governance reform to reflect local traditions and structures</td>
<td>Capacity building for efficient mobilization of resources; budget support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Tax or land tenure reform; anti-corruption campaigns</td>
<td>Increasing transparency of government procurement; equitable and participatory economic development; implementation of free market policies</td>
<td>Strengthening informal markets</td>
<td>Public employment projects; public infrastructure support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Security sector reform; support to prison systems; human rights training of police</td>
<td>Civil–military relations projects; human rights training of police</td>
<td>Community policing</td>
<td>Support for security sector reform and for any DDR or ex-combatant programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>Capacity building of judicial institutions; facilitated dialogue; mediation</td>
<td>Access to justice reforms; legal reforms to protect human rights; human rights advocacy</td>
<td>Support to traditional dispute resolution mechanisms and alternative dispute resolution; facilitated dialogue</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Services</td>
<td>Support to reforms to improve access to social services; improving health care delivery; expansion of educational access and quality</td>
<td>Social service delivery to vulnerable groups, including IDPs, refugees, vulnerable youth, etc.; capacity building of health and education ministries and local institutions</td>
<td>Support to local educational institutions; support to traditional health providers, doulas, and midwives; community health workers</td>
<td>Increased access to roads, education, health services, and employment opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>Professional capacity building of journalists and media organizations; journalism ethics training</td>
<td>“New media” initiatives to increase the plurality of viewpoints in the public arena</td>
<td>Support to minority voices in the media; diversity training; traditional performance art</td>
<td>Media coverage of services delivered and progress made after peace agreement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.5 Resources for Family 3: Institutions


Annex 2: Assessing Program Strategies and Theories of Change Using the RPP Matrix
Assessing Program Strategies and Theories of Change Using the RPP Matrix

Assessing contribution to “Peace Writ Large” is difficult, as most peacebuilding programs are discrete efforts aimed at affecting one (often small) piece of the puzzle, and no one project can do everything. Outcomes are also difficult to assess. As one practitioner noted, “Peace requires that many people work at many levels in different ways, and, with all this work, you cannot tell who is responsible for what.” Moreover, when the goal of “just and sustainable peace” is so grand, and progress toward it is immeasurable in its multitude of small steps, then anything can qualify as peace practice. In the face of this complexity, practitioners often say, “I have to assume that, over time, all of our different activities will add up.”

During the first phase of RPP, the evidence from the case studies and consultations was sobering. Although many people do, indeed, work at many levels and conduct good programs at each level, these programs do not automatically “add up” to peace!

During its early phase and during its current phase, RPP has worked with many, varied peace agencies that are implementing a wide variety of peacebuilding approaches and activities. In the earlier phase, RPP struggled with the question of how to compare and assess all of the many contrasting strategies for impacting "Peace Writ Large." Through much discussion and analysis, the project discovered that the varied peace activities could be compared through the use of a relatively simple tool, the RPP Matrix.

The RPP Matrix: A Tool for Comparing Strategies for Affecting “Peace Writ Large”

The RPP Matrix is a four-cell matrix (see Figure 4) that permits analysis of program strategies in several dimensions, by looking at the different approaches of peace work, who is being engaged and what type of change is being sought.

Whom to engage

As shown in Table 7, RPP analysis of peacebuilding efforts found that all activities are based essentially on one of two approaches related to who needs to be engaged for peace.

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Table 5: “More People” vs “Key People” Approaches

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“MORE PEOPLE” APPROACHES</th>
<th>“KEY PEOPLE” APPROACHES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aim to engage increasing numbers of people in actions to promote peace. Practitioners who take this approach believe that peace can be built if many people become active in the process, i.e., if “the people” are broadly involved. This may involve mobilization of larger constituencies or expanding the numbers of people committed to peace.</td>
<td>Focus on involving particular people, or groups of people, critical to the continuation or resolution of conflict, due to their power and influence. “Key People” strategies assume that, without the involvement of these individuals/groups, progress cannot be made toward resolving the conflict. Who is “key” depends on the context: they may be political leaders, warlords or others necessary to a peace agreement. They may be people with broad constituencies. Or they may be key because they are involved in war making (e.g., unemployed young men).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Level of change

As shown in Table 8, RPP also found that all programs work for two basic levels of change: the Individual/Personal change and/or Socio-Political change.

Table 6: Individual/Personal and/or Socio-Political Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDIVIDUAL/PERSONAL CHANGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Programs that work at the individual/personal level seek to change the attitudes, values, skills, perceptions, relationships or circumstances of individuals, based on the underlying assumption that peace is possible only if the hearts, minds and behavior of individuals are changed. Most dialogue and training programs operate at this level, working with groups of individuals to affect their skills, attitudes, perceptions, ideas and relationships with other individuals.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOCIO-POLITICAL CHANGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Programs that concentrate at the socio-political level are based on the belief that peace requires changes in socio-political structures and processes, often supporting the creation or reform of institutions that address grievances that fuel conflict, or promoting non-violent modes for handling conflict. Change at this level includes alterations in government policies, legislation, policies, economic structures, ceasefire agreements, constitutions, etc. But it also incorporates changes in social norms, group behavior, and inter-group relationships.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The two basic programming approaches in terms of constituency engaged and the two levels of change promoted can be combined in a four-cell matrix as shown in Figure 4 below. RPP found that all of the activities included in the range of RPP case studies and consultations could be located on this four-cell matrix. Some programs engage in activities in more than one cell, or work in the boundaries between cells. Many programs start in one quadrant, but eventually move to or have impacts in others. However, many effective programs operate within only one cell.
For example, dialogue work with key leaders of two warring political factions would most likely be found in the upper right quadrant, since the desired changes are in the Individual/Personal realm (attitudes, perceptions, inter-personal relationships) and engage people who are key to peace. Trauma healing programs offered to the general population would be found in the upper left quadrant, since they promote individual healing among the broad population. A program that mobilized citizens’ groups to exert influence on important issues would be a “More People” strategy in the Socio-Political realm, the lower left quadrant. On the other hand, efforts to achieve a negotiated agreement among political leaders would be found in the lower right quadrant. Of course, these are just illustrative examples—other peacebuilding program approaches can also be mapped onto the matrix.

**RPP Findings Based on the Matrix**

Since 2002, RPP has been working with the matrix in the field in many places in the world to help program designers and implementers to examine their program strategies. Through that direct work with practitioners, and through analysis of the original RPP case evidence, we have derived several key learnings regarding program effectiveness.
Does it all “add up?” The importance of linkages

RPP found that work that stays within any one quadrant of the matrix is *not enough* to build momentum for significant change. Any individual program aiming to contribute to peace will have more impact if its effects transfer to other quadrants of the matrix. Two associated lessons emerged from the case studies and discussion concerning two kinds of linkages that were found to be particularly important for programs to have impact on “Peace Writ Large”.

**Individual/Personal → Socio-Political**

First, RPP found that programming that focuses on change at the Individual/Personal level, but that never links or translates into action at the Socio-Political level, has *no discernible effect on peace*. Peacebuilding efforts that focus on building relationships and trust across conflict lines, increasing tolerance and increasing hope that peace is possible, often produce dramatic transformations in attitudes, perceptions and trust. But evidence shows that impacts for the broader peace are more significant if these personal transformations are translated into actions at the Socio-Political level.

What does moving from the Individual/Personal to the Socio-Political look like? It involves moving, for example, from changes in attitudes, beliefs, perceptions and interpersonal or small group relationships to social action, activities in the public domain or efforts to affect something that is collective (whether institutions, public opinion, etc.). When participants in programs adopt new attitudes, form relationships, develop joint activities, undertake trade, do business with each other, form an NGO together, etc., they are operating at the Individual/Personal level. But as individual or small group attitudes, relationships or behavioral change expand and become community or group attitudes, behaviors or social norms, they reach the Socio-Political level. This could include changes in public opinion, mobilization of large groups to advocate for change in relation to key drivers of conflict, changes in inter-group relations, etc.

Does work at the Socio-Political level likewise need to link with the Individual/Personal level? Evidence suggests that sometimes, but not always, work is necessary at the

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**Box 15—Effective Individual/Personal–Socio-Political Linkage**

In Cyprus, international agencies conducted intensive conflict resolution training for local activists from both sides of the conflict. These participants formed a permanent working group of trainers and initiated a series of peacebuilding projects aimed at recruiting more participants into bi-communal activities. This spread into a wide-ranging bi-communal movement on the island. In response to a serious incidence of violence that threatened to escalate the conflict, the UN planned to cancel a planned bi-communal fair. The group pressed the UN not to cancel the event and publicized the event. Four thousand people showed up, and it became a public demonstration of support for the faltering peace process.

Individual/Personal level to ensure that Socio-Political changes are sustained and internalized in the behavior of individuals. The linkage needed from the Socio-Political to the Individual/Personal to impact “Peace Writ Large” is less strong.
RPP has also found that at the Socio-Political level, approaches that concentrate on “More People” but do nothing to link to or affect “Key People,” as well as strategies that focus on “Key People” but do not include or affect “More People,” do not “add up” to effective peace work. Activities to engage “More People” must link, strategically to activities to engage “Key People,” and “Key People” activities must link strategically to activities to engage “More People” if they are to be effective in moving toward “Peace Writ Large.”

Box 16—Insufficient Linkage between Individual/Personal and Socio-Political

A program convened dialogue sessions amongst actors representing every sector of society (and across conflicting groups) to analyze the conflict and develop policy recommendations to deal with the causes. The program led to very significant effects on participants’ relationships, attitudes and communication. These effects had not yet, however, been extended to the community at large, through community-owned dispute resolution mechanisms and new initiatives by the community on peace and conflict resolution. A new phase of the program was needed to help make these linkages and advocate for government adoption of the policy recommendations.

“More People” $\leftrightarrow$ “Key People”

The arrows in Figure 5 reflect the findings about the importance of transferring impacts among the quadrants. Wherever an organization’s particular project is located on this matrix (in terms of work targets and levels), it needs to plan mechanisms for

Box 17—Effectiveness Undermined by Lack of Linkage between “Key’”/”More People”

An agency organized a high-level dialogue in the Caucasus among people on the negotiating teams and in influential policy positions in government, academia and business. This resulted in improved communication and relationships in the negotiations and the implementation of some ideas to de-escalate the conflict and facilitate refugee return. However, after several years, while some convergence had been achieved in the dialogue on political resolution, participants claimed they were blocked by public opinion (and a regional power). They urged the program to shift the focus of its work with media to affect “More People.”

Box 18—Effective Linkage between Key and More People Strategies

The Citizens’ Constitutional Forum in Fiji developed and advocated broad-based recommendations for constitutional reform to address entrenched inequalities between ethnic groups in the country. Many of their ideas were taken up by the government. Realizing that the reforms needed public acceptance to be durable, they linked with other activists to conduct a public education campaign around the country to publicize the new constitutional provisions through a series of workshops, campaigns, and sales of T-shirts and posters. The work focused on Key People but provided a link back to “More People.”

The arrows in Figure 5 reflect the findings about the importance of transferring impacts among the quadrants. Wherever an organization’s particular project is located on this matrix (in terms of work targets and levels), it needs to plan mechanisms for
transferring project effects or extending efforts into other quadrants. Who else needs to be affected and at what level, in order to produce significant change?

![Figure 5: Creating Linkages among Quadrants](image)

These insights do not suggest that a single agency must necessarily conduct programs in all quadrants of the matrix simultaneously. An agency’s program may evolve, over time, to move from one quadrant to another. Most programs do not and cannot do everything at once. In many cases, programs can remain in one cell and develop opportunities for cooperation and/or coordination of efforts with other agencies working in different areas in order to magnify impacts. How these connections are best made will, of course, vary from context to context.

**Which people? “Key People,” governments and the “hard to reach”**

RPP found that most peace agencies work with people who are comparatively easy to reach, such as children, women, schools, churches and health workers, because they are, in some way, deemed non-political or because they are often ready to collaborate. As a beginning point, this makes sense, because initiating peace activities in a tense conflict arena is difficult.

Yet, RPP found that few agencies move beyond these groups to forces that are perpetuating or benefiting from the conflict, or who oppose peace efforts, e.g., militia
fighters, economic elites, governments and diasporas outside the conflict zone. In addition, in many cases, NGOs emphasize working with civil society, so that few peace agencies make direct connections to official governmental actors and functions. These groups are the “hard to reach.”

RPP’s experience affirmed the importance of working with these “hard to reach” people and groups—especially government and other combatants—because involving them (or dealing with them in a way that ensures that their actions do not undermine peace) is often critical to securing peace and to building or maintaining the systems that sustain it.

**Illustrative example: Ex-combatant youth program**

This section illustrates application of the RPP Matrix to a specific case example, as a preliminary step to engaging training participants in application to their own situation or program. The example concerns a program aimed at reintegration of ex-combatant youth into a traditional rural community. In this situation, the ex-combatant youth are considered “Key People” because they represent a threat to security, as most of them are unemployed, are viewed with suspicion and even fear by many members of the community and are considered to still hold weapons and to maintain connections to their old command structures.

The overall program goal is indicated at the top of the table below. The columns in Table 9 show a series of activities in the left column and associated changes in the right column. The table indicates “proposed/completed” activities and “actual/expected” changes, as the tool can be used either to plan programs or to examine programs underway or completed.

**Table 7: Matrix Application to an Ex-Combatant Youth Program**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposed/Completed Program Activities</th>
<th>Actual/Expected Changes, due to Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Outreach and “listening” efforts to ex-combatant youths and others to find out what young people are concerned about.</td>
<td>Obtain agreement to participate, achieve initial engagement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Joint skills training: communications skills, community problem analysis, leadership skills.</td>
<td>Heightened awareness of multiple perspectives, greater understanding of problems facing the community, better participant relationships.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Organization of youth groups: Engage training workshop participants in youth action groups focused on addressing community issues, as well as enjoyable activities (sports, drama, etc.).</td>
<td>Specific and ongoing mechanism for bringing youth attention to issues people hold in common in the community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4a Outreach to elders, women leaders, etc.: Invite community leaders to participate with youth in community problem solving.</td>
<td>Concrete evidence that leaders are concerned about young people and willing to devote time/energy to thinking with them about issues.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Program Goal: Contribute to community security by improving the reintegration of ex-combatant youth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposed/Completed Program Activities</th>
<th>Actual/Expected Changes, due to Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4b Problem-solving session: Facilitate meetings to identify problems and engage in joint analysis and development of possible solutions/actions.</td>
<td>Joint ownership of an action plan for addressing specific community problems, with primary responsibility resting on youth for action. Youth deepen their sense of responsibility to/for the community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Project Implementation: Youth action groups undertake projects to implement solutions/actions developed in the problem-solving sessions.</td>
<td>Concrete improvements in community life as a result of projects. Ex-combatant youth fully engaged and better integrated into the community. Possibly, some youth will gain skills that will help employment prospects.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6 illustrates how this project might be charted on the RPP Matrix. The items in boxes are activities, and the resulting changes are in circles. The overall goal is also indicated.
Figure 6: Youth Program Charted on the RPP Matrix

The map of activities and incremental changes of a program on the RPP Matrix can be used as a basis for reflecting on its theory of change. Questions could include:

1. Will the activities outlined above actually lead to the goal? Is anything missing? Why and how? What assumptions is the program making about how the activities and changes they are designed to produce will lead to the goal? Are they good and grounded in the context?

2. What linkages is the program making? What linkages are just “hopes”? How can those be strengthened?

3. Are there useful linkages that can be made in the program from the individual/personal to the socio-political levels or between “More” and “Key People” efforts? Alternatively, are there other organizations or programs with which the program can link?

4. What kinds of obstacles might the project encounter? Who/what might get in the way?
Annex 3: Acknowledgements
This document is the result of a three-year process to identify and catalogue theories of change in conflict and peacebuilding programming that have been developed in academic literature and the work of scholars and practitioners. Theories of change already had begun to be used to guide design, monitoring and evaluation of programming, in order to enhance rigor in program design and enable the development of indicators for monitoring and evaluation tailored to expected results. USAID’s Theories and Indicators of Change (THINC) initiative was designed to develop a more comprehensive, yet relatively parsimonious, menu of theories of change in the conflict field that would further enhance the effectiveness of USAID’s peace and conflict programming by enabling comparison and learning about theories across programs and contexts.

THINC has taken place in three distinct phases. During the first phase, the USAID Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (DCHA/CMM) worked internally to identify and catalogue existing theories of change employed by scholars and peace practitioners. This process culminated in the production of a Theories of Change Matrix—a catalogue of the most notable theories organized into groups, or “families.” This Matrix has undergone several revisions and has been vetted extensively by variety of scholars and practitioners.

During the second phase of THINC, CMM partnered with the Academy for Educational Development (AED) and George Mason University’s Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution (ICAR) to develop the catalogue of theories further and solicit feedback on the theories. In total, over 64 academics and practitioners were consulted, and several drafts were developed and vetted.

Finally, in the third phase, a group of scholar-practitioners based at The Fletcher School of Tufts University drew on the past two phases of work and their additional research and analysis to produce the current document, which represents a culmination of the THINC initiative to date. A large number of individuals and organizations have been involved in the THINC initiative. At USAID, the technical working group has included Tjip Walker, Kirby Reiling, Cybèle Cochran, Jessica Morrison, Joseph Hewitt and Carrie Gruenloh. USAID would like to express its appreciation to Eileen Babbitt, Diana Chigas and Robert Wilkinson, the principal authors of this report, as well as to thank Susan Allen Nan, Salamah Magnuson, Mark Rogers, Kristin Farthing and Peter Bauman, for their significant input on past phases of the THINC initiative.

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consultant), Meredith Blair (Humanity United), Diana Chigas (CDA Collaborative Learning Projects), Cybele Cochran (USAID), Tamra Pearson d'Estree (University of Denver), Olivia Stokes Dreir (Karuna Center for Peacebuilding), Judith Dunbar (USAID), Joshua Fisher (George Mason University), Ronald Fisher (American University), Mari Fitzduff (Brandeis), Su Flickinger (independent consultant), Melanie Greenberg (Cypress Foundation), Susan Hackley (Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School), Jerome Helfft (Search for Common Ground), David Hunsicker (USAID), Cynthia Irmer (U.S. Department of State), Isabella Jean (CDA Collaborative Learning Projects), Karina Korostelina (George Mason University), Mary Jo Larson (Columbia University), Alan Lessik (American Friends Service Committee), Carlisle Levine (CARE), Neil Levine (USAID), Michael Lund (Management Systems International), Terrence Lyons (George Mason University), Salamah Magnuson (independent consultant), Arthur Martirosyan (Bridgeway Group), Elizabeth McClintock (Tufts University), Sharon Morris (Mercy Corps), Jessica Morrison (USAID), Mary Mulvihill (Academy for Educational Development), Susan Allen Nan (George Mason University), Reina Neufeldt (American University), Nick Oatley (Search for Common Ground), Heidi Ober (CARE), Carrie O’Neil (Institute for Inclusive Security), Katherine Osborne-Valdez (USAID), Tamar Palandjian (George Mason University), Kirby Reiling (USAID), Rob Ricigliano (University of Wisconsin), Mark Rogers (independent consultant), Stefan Rummel-Shapiro (UN Peacebuilding Support Office), Anne Salinas (Academy for Educational Development), Ethan Schecter (CDA Collaborative Learning Projects), Mara Schoeny (George Mason University), Ilana Shapiro (Alliance for Conflict Transformation), Claire Sneed (U.S. Department of State), Andrea Strimling (Tufts University), Andrew Sweet (USAID), Noel Twagiramungu (Tufts University), Jenny Vaughn (Mercy Corps), Tjip Walker (USAID), Marshall Wallace (CDA Collaborative Learning Projects), Leah Werchick (USAID), Robert Wilkinson (Tufts University), Tizeta Wodajo (USAID), Peter Woodrow (CDA Collaborative Learning Projects), Saira Yamin (George Mason University), Craig Zelizer (Georgetown University).