Integrated
development and
peacebuilding
programming

Design, monitoring and evaluation

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Practice Products for the CCVRI

Improving Measurement in DFID Crime, Conflict & Violence Programming

This document is one of a series of Practice Products developed under the Conflict, Crime, and Violence Results Initiative (CCVRI). The full set of products is intended to support DFID country offices and their partners to develop better measures of programme results in difficult conflict and fragile environments.

DFID recognises the need to focus on the results of its work in developing countries. To this end, DFID strives to account better for our efforts on behalf of UK taxpayers, offering clarity regarding the value and impact of our work. The Results Initiative operates under the assumption that we will achieve our development objectives with our national partners more effectively if we generate—collectively—a clear picture of the progress being made.

Within DFID, the Conflict Humanitarian and Security Department has established a partnership with a consortium of leading organisations in the fields of conflict, security and justice to develop more effective approaches to the use of data in the design, implementation and evaluation of programmes that contribute to reducing conflict, crime and violence.

In addition to producing these Practice Products, the consortium has established a Help Desk function to provide direct and customized support to country offices as they endeavour to improve measurement of results in local contexts.

The Help Desk can be accessed by contacting helpdesk@smallarmssurvey.org.

The views expressed in this Practice Product are the sole opinions of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of all consortia partners. This Practice Product does not reflect an official DFID position.

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Title:
Integrated development and peacebuilding programming: Design, monitoring and evaluation

Purpose and intended use of this document:
The past decade has seen a growing recognition of the relationship between the goals of development, peacebuilding and state building and increased convergence of development and poverty reduction efforts with peacebuilding, state building and reconstruction interventions. Efforts to strengthen the links between peacebuilding, state building and development have important implications for the design and implementation of development assistance.

This document gives guidance on how to design, monitor and evaluate ‘integrated’ development and peacebuilding programming. A programme can be described as integrated when a peacebuilding focus is intentionally embedded in the design and objectives of interventions and strategies containing development objectives (or vice versa).

The document includes a discussion of ways to integrate development with peacebuilding and guidance on developing robust theories of change and indicators for integrated programming. It also provides guidance on how to apply the OECD DAC evaluation criteria in evaluating integrated programmes, as well as on choosing an evaluation approach when commissioning an evaluation.

Key questions this document addresses:
What is integrated programming? What is an integrated strategy?
What is the difference between integrated peacebuilding and development programming and conflict-sensitive programming?
How do I develop a good theory of change for linking development and peacebuilding?
How do I develop useful indicators for integrated programming?
What tensions between development and peacebuilding objectives exist, and how do I manage them?
Which evaluation criteria are useful, and how should they be applied in integrated programming?
What evaluation approaches are well-suited for integrated programming?

Key messages/essential “take aways”:
Integrated programming involves synergies and complementarities among peacebuilding and development goals and activities; it is not sufficient to bolt on peacebuilding activities to development programmes (or vice versa).

There are three kinds of integrated programming: intra-sectoral (development integrated as a mechanism for supporting peacebuilding goals), multi-sectoral (development interventions that also seek to influence drivers of conflict), and meta-integration (dual and linked peacebuilding and development objectives at the strategic level).
Integrated peacebuilding and development programming differs from conflict sensitive development programming in that the peacebuilding focus is intentional and embedded in the design and objectives of the programme that also seeks to address specific development issues.

Theories of change for integrated programmes need to show how assistance will support both peacebuilding and development outcomes, and how the peacebuilding and development objectives are linked/complementary.

Conflict analysis is critical for ensuring the relevance of integrated programming to peacebuilding needs and for clarifying the linkages between development and peacebuilding, as a basis for the development of a robust theory of change.

Integrated programmes requires indicators to measure progress both towards development objectives and peacebuilding objectives, and to analyse the relationship between the two.

It is useful to develop indicators using theories of change that integrate peacebuilding and development.

Potential tensions between peacebuilding and development objectives need to be identified, managed and reconciled during the programme design process and in the design of an evaluation process.

Some methodologies that are good for peacebuilding or development programming may not be good for integrated programming.

Evaluation of integrated programmes involves considering the internal coherence between the development and peacebuilding objectives, in addition to development and/or peacebuilding outcomes.

The DAC Evaluation criteria are applicable in evaluation of integrated programmes, but require additional lines of inquiry.

**Intended audience of this document (including assumed skill level):**

The primary audience of this document are DFID advisers and implementing partners in fragile and conflict-affected states who are planning and implementing strategies and programmes that seek to achieve development outcomes and contribute to peace, or who seek to use development assistance to contribute to peacebuilding and stabilisation. This document assumes basic knowledge of development or peacebuilding and of programme design, monitoring and evaluation.

**Key topics/tags:**

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Lines of inquiry
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Evaluation approaches
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Cross-references to other documents in the series:

Corlazzoli, V., and White, J. (2013) Practical Approaches to Theories of Change in Conflict, Security and Justice Programmes: Part II: Using Theories of Change in Monitoring and Evaluation (Search for Common Ground)
Small Arms Survey (2013) Tools for measurement, monitoring and evaluation: In-depth focus on surveys
Woodrow, P., (2013) Practical Approaches to Theories of Change in Conflict, Security & Justice Programmes: Part I: What they are, different types and how to develop and use them (CDA Collaborative Learning Projects)
**Table of Contents**

1 **Understanding integrated programming** ............................................................................................................. 1
   1.1 What is integrated peacebuilding and development programming and why do it? ........................................... 1
   1.2 Typology of integrated development and peacebuilding programming.............................................................. 1
   1.3 What is the difference between integrated development and peacebuilding programming and conflict sensitive development programming? ................................................................................................................. 5

2 **Designing ‘evaluable’ integrated programmes** ............................................................................................................ 6
   2.1 Theories of change in integrated programmes .................................................................................................. 6
   2.2 ‘Good enough’ conflict analysis for integrated programmes .............................................................................. 8
   2.3 Methodological and practical challenges in integrated programme design ......................................................... 10
   2.4 Identifying indicators for integrated programmes and country operational plans ............................................. 11

3 **Monitoring and evaluating integrated programming: key issues and challenges** ...................................................... 14
   3.1 Establishing attribution, impacts and wider effects ............................................................................................ 14
   3.3 Understanding linkages and assessing coherence ............................................................................................ 14
   3.4 The timing of evaluation processes ................................................................................................................. 15

4 **Practical guidance for measuring results: monitoring and evaluating integrated programming** .............................. 16
   4.1 Applying evaluation criteria and key lines of inquiry .......................................................................................... 16
   4.2 Evaluation designs and approaches .................................................................................................................... 16
   4.3 Fundamental reviews of integrated programmes .............................................................................................. 18
   4.4 Methods for gathering data .................................................................................................................................. 18
   5.5 Practical considerations ....................................................................................................................................... 20

5 **Case studies** ............................................................................................................................................................ 21
   5.1 Tumutu Agricultural Training Programme in Liberia (TATP) ............................................................................. 21
   5.2 The Rural Access Programme in Nepal (RAP) .................................................................................................. 24
   5.3 South Sudan multi-donor review ....................................................................................................................... 27

Annexes ........................................................................................................................................................................... 31

   Annex 1: OECD DAC Evaluation criteria as applied to development, peacebuilding, and integrated programming .......................................................................................................................................................... 32

   Annex 2: Comparative Overview of the relative utility of evaluation approaches for development, peacebuilding and integrated programmes ............................................................................................................ 36

   Annex 3: Resources exploring the relationship between poverty and conflict .......................................................... 39

   Annex 4: Tool for Monitoring and Evaluating Integrated Programmes using Theories of Change ....................... 41
List of tables and figures

Table 1: Differentiating peacebuilding, integrated programming and conflict sensitive development........................................................................................................5
Table 2: Theories of change in a joint livelihoods and peacebuilding project (multi-sectoral integration)..................................................................................................................7
Table 3: Identifying indicators to track changes relevant to the results chain (multi-sectoral integration)..............................................................................................................12
Table 4: Data gathering in relation to evaluation consideration for integrated programmes...........19
Table 5: Indicators and measurements used to assess change in Tumutu Agricultural Training Programme, Liberia ...............................................................................................................22
Table 6: Specific conflict factors relating to conflict prevention and peacebuilding categories (summarised).............................................................................................................28

Figure 1: Developing indicators using theories of change in an integrated economic development and peacebuilding programme ..............................................................................12
1 Understanding integrated programming

1.1 What is integrated peacebuilding and development programming and why do it?

The past decade has seen a growing recognition of the relationship between the goals of development, peacebuilding and state building and increased convergence of development and poverty reduction efforts with peacebuilding, state building and reconstruction interventions. This understanding is embedded within DFID’s peacebuilding and state building framework¹ and the New Deal on Fragile States² emerging from the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and State building.

"All interventions in all sectors in Fragile and Conflict Affected States should contribute to tackling conflict and fragility as a primary or secondary set of objectives”.


Efforts to strengthen the links between peacebuilding, statebuilding and development have important implications for the design and implementation of development assistance. They have resulted in a higher incidence of ‘integrated’ peacebuilding and development programmes, projects and strategies.

A programme can be described as integrated when a peacebuilding focus is intentionally embedded in the design and objectives of interventions and strategies containing development objectives (or vice versa). Integrated programmes will generally require partnership and coordination amongst a range of different actors bringing a variety of skills from across the different sectors.

1.2 Typology of integrated development and peacebuilding programming

Looking across the different ways and levels that peacebuilding and development have been integrated, it is possible to identify a broad typology - outlined below³. When monitoring and evaluating integrated programmes, it is useful to consider where they fit within this broad typology, since this will influence where the emphasis of the evaluation will lie.

Intra-sectoral integration: peacebuilding as the primary objective and development as a secondary objective

Programmes achieve intra-sectoral integration when they pursue predominantly a peacebuilding focus, and development activities and objectives are integrated as a mechanism for supporting peacebuilding goals. Intra-sectoral integration is most commonly undertaken by organisations with an exclusive mandate for peacebuilding, but also by multi-mandate organisations.

³This typology is drawn from Rogers, M., Chassy, A. & Barnat T. (2010) Integrating Peacebuilding into Humanitarian and Development Programming (Baltimore, MD: Catholic Relief Services).
Examples of Intra-sectoral integrated programming

*Media programming to promote reconciliation.* A television series produced by Search for Common Ground in Macedonia to promote inter-cultural understanding among children, with a view to transforming conflict. The programme focused on the daily lives of eight children from Macedonian, Roma, Turkish, and Albanian ethnic groups who live in the same neighbourhood, and sought to influence attitudes towards a culture of peace via portrayals of common social identities and models of coexistence.

*Integration of economic and psychosocial assistance.* The Tumtu Agricultural Training Programme (see case study, Section 5.1 below) provided agricultural training and livelihoods support and psychosocial counselling to ex-combatants who posed a risk to peace and security. The overall objective of this programme was to reduce armed violence.

*Community-driven reconstruction.* Some community-driven development programmes can be described as intra-sectoral when development activities are undertaken purely to support the primary programme objective of relationship building, trust and cooperation amongst populations. For example, in the wake of the Rwandan genocide, Oxfam GB supported a community-based development programme that helped organise inclusive community development councils, provided training in conflict resolution skills, and offered poverty reduction grants to each community. The aim was to reinforce decentralisation in Rwanda and to promote participatory decision making as a means of managing destructive conflict. The programme hoped in the long term that this would facilitate poverty reduction but aimed primarily to address drivers of conflict and promote coexistence.

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**Multi-sectoral integration: dual (and linked) peacebuilding and development objectives – programme level**

Multi-sectoral integration (also referred to as inter-sectoral integration) is most commonly undertaken and supported by organisations with broad mandates (e.g., donors, large development NGOs, national governments). It involves development interventions that seek to influence one or more drivers of conflict. The integration of peacebuilding objectives may take place once a programme is already underway in response to an evolving context. This was the case in the Nepal Rural Access Programme described in Section 5.2, below.

Fundamental here is that there are *synergies* and *complementarities among* the different sets of activities (the whole is greater than the sum of the parts). Multi-sectoral integrated programming should:

- Be intentional (specifying what will change in the conflict)
- Be relevant to the drivers of conflict
- Dedicate significant and adequate resources for both the development and peacebuilding dimensions.
- Anticipate and plan for synergies among the peacebuilding and development components.

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6 These components are adapted from Rogers, M., Chassy, A. & Bamat, T. *Op. Cit.* p. 13.
Examples of multi-sectoral integrated programming

A livelihoods program that seeks to build social cohesion and trust. A programme in Uganda sought to build peace in agro-pastoralist communities through activities designed to strengthen livelihoods and encourage cooperative interaction between groups with a history of violence, thus building an economic interest in peace. Activities included building small dams, joint farming on previously inaccessible land, joint rehabilitation of roads and markets. The programme also trained local leaders in conflict management, facilitated community dialogues and supported joint monitoring of violent incidents.  

An infrastructure programme that seeks to promote reconciliation. The Rural Access Programme in Nepal (RAP, Section 5.2 below) engaged in road-building in remote rural areas, with the goal of supporting livelihoods, and later adjusted the programme to provide labour opportunities for marginalized groups in conflict areas, in order to address social issues (such as discrimination against dalits) that were drivers of conflict, and thereby reduce recruitment into the insurgency.

A community-driven reconstruction programme that seeks to build social cohesion. A community-driven reconstruction programme in Liberia aimed to improve households’ material welfare, promote democratic values and reduce tensions by enhancing the cooperation across conflict lines. This would be accomplished through the introduction of the mechanisms of a democratically-elected community development council to manage a community-wide process for selecting projects and to manage and supervise the projects subsequently.

Support to the education sector that seeks to address social exclusion and promote social cohesion. In Sierra Leone, support was provided for reconstruction and expansion of education infrastructure, which had been damaged badly by the war, and had been limited in rural areas. Over time, the programme began to focus on improving teachers’ capacity in the most marginalized areas through Distance Education and engaged in curriculum reform, introducing human rights and citizenship education.

Simply bolting peacebuilding activities onto a development programme without considering how they complement development programming (and vice versa) does not constitute integrated programming. Thus, for example, a reconstruction or livelihoods programme that includes activities to promote inter-group contact (e.g., sports matches, cultural activities) would not be an integrated programme, although it may constitute good conflict-sensitive practice (see section 1.3 below).

Meta-integration: dual (and linked) peacebuilding and development objectives at a strategic level

Meta-integration relates to the integration of peacebuilding and development objectives at the level of the overall portfolio, country operational plan or sector plan or in relation to inter-donor coordination (e.g., joint country, sector plans) and donor-partner alignment (e.g., alignment with host country plans).

For example, at the DFID Operational Plan level, an integrated plan and results framework would outline how the country programme will contribute to statebuilding / peacebuilding as well as poverty reduction goals. DIFD’s approach to integration at this level revolves around the four objectives highlighted below.

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DFID’s integrated approach to building peaceful states and societies

1. Address the causes and effects of conflict and fragility and build conflict resolution mechanisms
2. Support inclusive political settlements and processes
3. Develop core state functions
4. Respond to public expectations

Source: DFID (2010) Building Peaceful States and Societies, A DFID Practice Paper

In most contexts DFID country plans are aligned with a host government’s own development framework (e.g., Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers) to support national ownership. Thus enabling and enhancing integrated programming involves supporting national frameworks to do the same. While most national plans and strategies have some articulation of peacebuilding objectives, most countries lack a more holistic, integrated and shared national vision that can guide national and international development efforts. DFID can encourage inclusive national planning processes that integrate peacebuilding. Unfortunately, this requires navigating the reluctance of governments to discuss sensitive issues relating to the root causes of instability. DFID can strengthen the conflict perspective in domestic poverty assessments and diagnostics and locally driven or shared donor/government contextual analysis.

Promoting integration of peacebuilding and development objectives at a strategic level: A Liberia Example

In Liberia, the United Nations Mission (UNMIL) undertook an effort to integrate peacebuilding objectives within existing development policy frameworks. Conflict analysis workshops were organized with UNMIL and UN agencies, civil society, academia and government. Working groups were established to infuse peacebuilding into the interim Poverty Reduction Strategy (iPRS) and UNDAF. A dual-track process was followed involving (i) infusing ‘conflict sensitive’ concerns within development frameworks—in other words, ensuring that they recognise and address conflict factors; and (ii) developing an integrated set of programming priorities specifically to address conflict factors. Efforts were made to ensure continuity between the tracks, so that PRS goals were coherent with programming priorities for peacebuilding, developed through the government-UN committee managing the Peacebuilding Fund’s grant. The iPRS recognized officially the conflict factors and the need to address them, and included policy commitments to setting up and empowering conflict management structures.


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1.3 What is the difference between integrated development and peacebuilding programming and conflict sensitive development programming?

A key question likely to be raised by practitioners is: ‘how does integrated programming differ from conflict sensitive programming’? The answer is: they diverge in subtle but fundamental ways that have implications for how the programme is designed, monitored and evaluated.

Conflict sensitive development programming involves ensuring that the two-way interaction between a programme’s activities and the context are understood and factored into the programme cycle (design, monitoring and evaluation) of development programmes. The goal is to minimize the negative impacts and maximize the positive impacts of interventions on the conflict, within an organisation’s given priorities or mandate. A conflict sensitive development programme therefore seeks to avoid contributing to conflict and might, where possible, make a positive contribution to peace—for example, by designing a programme and targeting stakeholders ways that will help mitigate tensions or support connectors. It does not, however, explicitly seek to address drivers of conflict, as would be the case in a peacebuilding or integrated development and peacebuilding programme (see Table 1).

Table 1: Differentiating peacebuilding, integrated programming and conflict sensitive development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peacebuilding</th>
<th>Integrated development and peacebuilding</th>
<th>Conflict Sensitive development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peacebuilding aims to build and achieve peace by directly targeting key drivers of conflict.</td>
<td>A peacebuilding focus (and effort to address one or more drivers of conflict) is intentional and embedded in the design and objectives (goal and outcome and outputs) of a programme that also seeks to address specific development issues. There is a complementary interaction between the peacebuilding and development objectives.</td>
<td>Conflict sensitive development seeks to ensure that design, implementation and outcomes do not undermine peace or exacerbate conflict, and contribute to peace where possible (within the given priorities).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The difference between peacebuilding and conflict sensitive development is further explored in a separate guidance note in the CCVRI series, Monitoring and evaluating conflict sensitivity – methodological challenges and practical solutions.

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2 Designing ‘evaluable’ integrated programmes

Practitioners are often confronted with the challenge of evaluating integrated programmes that are missing some of the key components for evaluability—the extent to which an activity or a program can be evaluated in a reliable and credible fashion\textsuperscript{14}. The evaluability of a programme is usually assessed by considering the extent to which there is:

- Available data (e.g. through monitoring processes);
- The context is conducive and
- A robust programme design (i.e. a results chain logic, articulated theories of change)\textsuperscript{15}.

Constraints may relate to data collection in conflict contexts, but often relate to poor programme design. This section outlines some of the key areas for consideration when designing effective and evaluable integrated programmes.

2.1 Theories of change in integrated programmes

Well-evidenced theories of change which articulate a testable hypothesis about how change comes about are widely understood to be a critical component of robust programme design, monitoring and evaluation. Programme assumptions should be explicit within the results chain and supporting evidence for programme choices provided in the Business Case.

This section provides information on particular considerations in developing theories of change for integrated programming. Practical approaches to developing and using theories of change for peacebuilding programming are discussed in detail in other CCVRI guidance papers:

- \textit{Practical Approaches to Theories of Change in Conflict, Security & Justice Programmes: Part I: What they are, how to develop and use them} (P. Woodrow, CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, 2013)
- \textit{Practical Approaches to Theories of Change in Conflict, Security & Justice Programmes: Part II: Using Theories of Change in Monitoring and Evaluation} (V. Corlazzoli and J. White, Search for Common Ground, 2013).

For an integrated \textbf{Country Operational Plan} there should be an analytical explanation, reflected in the results framework, of how the portfolio of programmes and activities links to the overarching country level development and peacebuilding goals. This represents a rationale for the choices made among many options—essentially why the chosen set of efforts will lead to the desired results. For integrated programming in particular, this requires explicit attention to the assumed complementarity of peacebuilding and development interventions in reaching peace-related goals.

For integrated \textbf{sector plans (in the case of a Sector-Wide Approach)} or a sector programme/project the theory(ies) of change need to show how sector- or programme-specific efforts will support both development and peacebuilding objectives, and how these objectives are linked/complementary.


Integrated projects and programmes require theories of change that relate to both the peacebuilding and development components, and explicitly make the links between the two. Table 4 provides examples of the theories of change relating to an economic development and peacebuilding project.

Table 2: Theories of change in a joint livelihoods and peacebuilding project (multi-sectoral integration)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall Outcome</th>
<th>Results Chain</th>
<th>Output to Outcome theory of Change linking enhanced stability to livelihoods interventions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enhanced livelihoods and increased stability</td>
<td>If we reduce scarcity of resources and improve relationships and economic interdependence between conflicting groups, then violence will decrease because the drivers of violence will be mitigated and people will have skills, relationships and incentives to resolve conflict peacefully.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 1</td>
<td>Strengthened economic relationships between conflicting groups</td>
<td>If we build economic relationships between conflicting groups, then people will refrain from or resist violence, because they will perceive tangible, concrete benefits from cooperation and will place a higher value on cooperation than conflict with adversaries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 2</td>
<td>Livelihoods opportunities for populations at risk of conflict</td>
<td>If we strengthen livelihoods for high-risk populations, then groups will be less likely to resort to violent competition as a way to access limited economic resources because the grounds for competition will decrease.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output 3</td>
<td>Strengthened local mechanisms for conflict mitigation and resolution. (e.g., skills of leaders in conflict management, joint monitoring of violent incidents, community problem-solving)</td>
<td>If we strengthen local conflict management mechanisms and provide people with the needed tools and skills, then relationships will improve and disputes will be resolved peacefully.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


There is an emerging body of evidence that explores the causal relationships between poverty and conflict highlighting the potential contribution of interventions across a variety of sectors to peacebuilding outcomes. A number of donors have synthesized this evidence into guidance notes and policy briefs. A list of these is provided in Annex 3. These provide a useful point of reference to inform programming choices and the appraisal case when developing a programme’s Business Case. However, each conflict context is unique, and theories of change cannot be simply transposed from one context to another; a conflict analysis is critical to understanding which theories of change are most relevant to supporting peace in a particular context.

Failure to carry out a conflict analysis in the design phase can lead to unfounded assumptions, inaccurate theories of change and programmes that fail to address the most important issues. The following case study of an integrated Community Driven Reconstruction Project in Liberia demonstrates the risks of design failure due to inadequate conflict analysis and resulting faulty theory of change.
Testing Assumptions in Liberia

International Rescue Committee’s Community Driven Reconstruction project sought to increase social cohesion within villages in Liberia, on the assumption that this had been destroyed by many years of civil war. The logic of one of their project’s interventions – providing funding for committees to spend on community projects – is illustrated by the simplified results chain below. The results chain shows the project assumed their interventions would lead to increased cohesion, improved attitudes to governance, and improved participation of minority groups.

However, although the intervention did increase levels of cohesion, democratic attitudes and social acceptance, the baseline discovered that these were high within treatment and control communities alike before the start of the project. This challenged the underlying assumption of the project that years of civil war had significantly reduced the social cohesion within village. The evaluation found that the really important divisions existed between communities rather than within them, and that community development projects undertaken jointly by villages would have been more relevant. This finding underscores the importance of testing important assumptions prior to and during implementation and reflecting this learning in project interventions, in order to ensure that they have their desired effects.


2.2 ‘Good enough’ conflict analysis for integrated programmes

Conflict analysis is critical for ensuring the relevance of an integrated programme to peacebuilding needs and for clarifying the linkages between development and peacebuilding to inform the theory of change. For integrated programmes, conflict analysis is required in addition to other assessments that are conducted to inform the broader development priorities (e.g. livelihoods or governance assessment). This can place an additional burden on staff. In order to reduce this burden, it can be helpful to embed conflict analysis within other assessment processes (at the intervention level or, in the case of governance assessments, at the country level).

Country Operational Plan level

Strategic level conflict analysis can help identify suitable areas of integrated programming. New DFID guidance has recently been developed for conflict analysis, the Joint Assessment of Conflict and Security (JACS). The JACS outlines different approaches to analysis, for example whether and when to undertake
‘light touch’ versus in-depth analysis. Internal ‘light touch’ approaches that focus less on new research and more on drawing together existing knowledge may be sufficient where substantial research has already been undertaken. Similarly, other relevant analytical processes, such as a country governance assessment (CGA)\textsuperscript{16}, can provide relevant information for designing integrated programming.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incorporating conflict into governance analysis: Nepal and Pakistan Country Governance Analyses (DFID)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A recent Nepal Country Governance Analysis (2012) explored conflict dynamics and the underlying factors that are shaping Nepal’s ability to achieve a sustainable political settlement and long-term peace. This was done by exploring key conflict dynamics throughout the report and synthesizing these findings in a ‘conflict overview’. A key finding of the conflict overview was that, for all its emphasis on consensus, Nepal’s constitution-making process has not strengthened the ‘collaborative capacity’ and trust of political leaders. Continued elite bargaining may contribute to a vicious cycle of brinkmanship, frustration, protest, and, potentially, further conflict. The Pakistan Country Governance Analysis (2010) was conducted as a governance and conflict analysis. Conflict dynamics were considered throughout the analysis. The analysis focused on understanding how conflict was related to forces that were competing to govern the state in accordance with their own interests and beliefs. The power struggle between these groups, which included the military, religious leaders, and elites, was causing tensions and had the potential to lead to further escalations and violence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source: Practitioner interview</td>
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The JACS also gives guidance on joined up cross-HMG analysis processes. Joint analytic processes are particularly valuable when supporting a cross-disciplinary integrated approach, by bringing together different expertise from across the sectors to be integrated.

**Sector / programme/ project level**

‘Good enough’ analysis involves understanding how the conflict drivers and/or peacebuilding capacities play out in relation to a particular sector or area of intervention in particular and informs the theories of change. This involves gathering evidence on the possible linkages between the sector or area of intervention and conflict/peacebuilding processes. For instance, this might include research on the linkages between education provision and drivers of conflict, or on the role of community based reconstruction in supporting reintegration or social cohesion.

Sector conflict analysis to inform a review of an education Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp)

During the 1996 - 2006 war in Nepal, donors continued to support the education sector through a Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp), which allowed them to coordinate their activities and present common views to the government. Wishing to align the SWAp to changes arising from the conflict, in 2006 they conducted a conflict analysis that drew together the development and conflict-related issues, analyzed how they interacted, and informed an integrated education and peacebuilding SWAp.

Drawing on conflict analyses already conducted by DFID and others, the review focused on understanding the extent of social, economic and political exclusion in relation to the education sector. It found that:

- Marginalized groups involved in the war were being further disadvantaged by having to bear costs of education that should have been covered by government budgets, leading in some cases to added discrimination against children from such groups, if they could not pay;
- Ethnic minorities among such groups were also disadvantaged because education was not available in their non-Nepali ‘mother tongue’;
- Schools were unable to challenge poor discipline among teachers and lack of teachers in remote areas, because of the political power of teacher unions and their resistance to redeployment; and
- The spread of private schools using English as the language of instruction gave children from richer families huge advantages in the job market.

The review recognised that, although all these issues were related to factors causing conflict, there was a need for sequencing in addressing them. The first two became focuses of attention while the last two had to be marked for attention later. Accordingly, the SWAp group increased monitoring of marginalized groups and worked on the issue of language policy in the education system.


Conflict analysis can be integrated into other assessment processes at this level, as at the country operational plan level. For example, conflict analysis has been integrated into a rapid livelihoods assessment in Ethiopia through identification of the elements of the livelihoods framework in which to integrate assessment of conflict: assets, vulnerability, context, policies, institutions and processes.

2.3 Methodological and practical challenges in integrated programme design

There are often inherent tensions between objectives that need to be understood, managed and reconciled through the design process. There are also practical challenges that must be addressed.

Trade-offs between peacebuilding and development objectives. Whilst poverty reduction imperatives often point towards targeting the poorest and most vulnerable in society, successfully addressing

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18 This approach is contested, even for development objectives, as the poorest and most vulnerable are rarely in a position to generate wider development.
conflict may require targeting a different set of actors: those who promote or engage in violence. In Burundi, a conflict analysis revealed a pattern of university students being manipulated into igniting street violence. With training and support they were able to resist manipulation. However, donors whose mandate is poverty reduction may react negatively to a programme that targets the (relatively) rich\textsuperscript{19}.

These tensions were present in the Tumutu Agricultural Training Programme in Liberia (See case study, section 5.1, below), which aimed to rehabilitate and reintegrate ex-combatants. The programme provided intensive training and capital support to a relatively small group of ex-fighters, as these individuals had the highest propensity to violence. A less intensive approach extending less intensive support the broader community would have had a greater contribution to broader poverty reduction, but would have been less effective in reintegration\textsuperscript{20}. In this instance of intra-sectoral integration, the programme prioritised peacebuilding objectives over the broader development objectives.

**Institutional, cultural and theoretical barriers exist which inhibit integration.** Development and peacebuilding professionals, even when working within the same government department, tend to approach things differently, use different terminologies and are often unfamiliar with the dominant theories of change and paradigms related to each discipline\textsuperscript{21}.

Bridging these divides is not helped by the fact that within development agencies peacebuilding is often perceived as a distinct set of activities (e.g., relevant to security sector reform or mediation) to be led and managed by specialist units (in the case of DFID, by Conflict Advisers), as opposed to an integrated component of development. Integrated programming requires a reorientation in approach that avoids the framing, ‘How can we incorporate peacebuilding alongside our existing development work?’ Rather, we should ask, ‘How should we be organised to support peacebuilding and development simultaneously?’ This requires extensive programme and managerial staff to work closely across disciplines and to develop new knowledge and work in unfamiliar territory.

**Dominant discourse and pressures within development agencies around the results agenda.** In an environment of austerity, and in order to justify dedication of tax funds to aid budgets, staff are under considerable pressure to demonstrate results and value for money in relation to aid expenditures. For reasons discussed further below, the results of peacebuilding activities are hard to measure and evidence, and results may not become apparent for some time. Furthermore, peacebuilding can in some instances be more focused on process than outcomes. These pressures and can discourage staff from developing innovative and more risky programming that integrates peacebuilding.

### 2.4 Identifying indicators for integrated programmes and country operational plans

Integrated programmes require indicators to measure progress both towards development objectives and the peacebuilding objectives, and to analyse the relationship between the two. The relative emphasis on peacebuilding and development indicators will depend on the type of integration—that is, whether there is equal weighting or an emphasis either on peacebuilding or on development objectives. If theories of change have been identified that describe the relationship between the development and


peacebuilding activities and expected outcomes, these can be used to develop indicators by focusing on the expected changes. Figure 1 illustrates how indicators can be developed from the different elements of a theory of change that integrates both development and peacebuilding.

**Figure 1: Developing indicators using theories of change in an integrated economic development and peacebuilding programme**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Results Chain</th>
<th>Output to Outcome theory of Change linking enhanced stability to livelihoods interventions</th>
<th>Possible Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overall Outcome</strong></td>
<td><em>Enhanced livelihoods and increased stability</em></td>
<td>% change in number of places considered safe. Number of violent intergroup incidents, disaggregated by type of dispute Level of household assets</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Output 1** | Strengthened economic relationships between conflicting groups  
Increased economic interests in peace. | If we build economic and social relationships across conflict lines, then people will perceive tangible, concrete benefits from co-operation/believe they will incur economic losses from conflict, and will place a higher value on co-operation than conflict with adversaries  
Number of women who leave their products to be sold in villages where there is a history of mistrust  
% of survey respondents reporting an economic benefit from interacting with an opposing group  
Perceived economic cost of conflict of community members (high, |


Table 3 incorporates this theory of change into its wider results chain (see table 2, section 2.1) and develops sample indicators for other outputs and the outcome of this integrated peacebuilding and livelihoods programme.

**Table 3: Identifying indicators to track changes relevant to the results chain (multi-sectoral integration)**
Developing indicators can be found accompanying CCVRI guidance papers and DFID guidance: across the lines of division. There also need to be indicators for conflict sensitivity. Further guidance on developing indicators can be found accompanying CCVRI guidance papers and DFID guidance:

- **Measuring the Measurable: Solutions to Measurement Challenges in Conflict and Fragile Environments** (Corlazzoli, V., and White, J., Search for Common Ground, 2013)
- **Monitoring and evaluating conflict sensitivity – Methodological challenges and practical solutions** (Goldwyn, R., CARE International & Chigas, D., CDA, 2013)
3 Monitoring and evaluating integrated programming: key issues and challenges

The previous section examined the development of robust and ‘evaluable’ integrated programmes. The remaining sections focus on the methodological challenges, experiences and process of monitoring and evaluation integrated programmes.

3.1 Establishing attribution, impacts and wider effects

Several of the significant challenges to demonstrating attribution in peacebuilding programming are heightened in the context of integrated programming. First, the establishment of counterfactuals through experimental or quasi-experimental designs, considered to be the ‘gold standard’ for attribution, is difficult and often inappropriate in conflict contexts. This is because:

• It is difficult to ‘control’ the key elements of a control group, as both the context and the intervention are constantly changing.
• It is difficult to isolate the intervention; conflict is influenced by multiple factors, and the intervention is likely to play a small role, although it could be a contributory one.
• Experimental and quasi-experimental designs raise conflict sensitivity concerns; where causes of conflict or tensions involve lack of access to resources or discrimination, making a control group aware of its relative deprivation (lack of resource inputs) may result in violent mobilisation, particularly if the lines of division in the conflict overlap with the selection criteria for targeting. These issues were present in the Tumutu Agricultural Training Programme in Liberia (see section 5.1, Case study of Tumutu Agricultural Training Programme in Liberia).
• Disentangling more simple (linear) dimensions and more complex (non-linear) dimensions of programmes and their effects in complex contexts makes linear attribution neither meaningful nor accurate; the greater number of links to be proven in a context of multiple actors, multiple perspectives on what works and multiple drivers of conflict increases the challenge of attribution.22

These challenges have led many practitioners to limit their claims in relation to peacebuilding to contribution rather than attribution23.

3.3 Understanding linkages and assessing coherence

Linkages between peacebuilding and development objectives are often poorly articulated. The logic underpinning how development activities will contribute to peacebuilding (the theory of change) is often absent, unclear or poorly evidenced in integrated programmes. The linkages are not adequately reflected in the results chain, conflict analysis is not undertaken, and indicators to measure changes are

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absent, leading to a lack of monitoring data. Indicators often also do not measure the connections between development and peacebuilding outcomes—i.e., the relationship between the ‘ifs’ and the ‘thens’. This creates difficulties when examining the effectiveness of the integration. In Sudan, for example, donors had not articulated or evidenced a full theory of change around how the development activities would support peacebuilding; programming was based on an implicit, untested theory of how development would create a ‘peace dividend’. The theory of change needed to be re-constructed by the evaluators, who then were able to test it. The theory was then disproved through the evaluation. (See Case study of South Sudan multi-donor review, Section 5.3)

Evaluating integrated programmes involves considering the internal coherence between the development and peacebuilding objectives. This requires assessing the synergies between the objectives and how they have been managed (either at the intervention level or within the overall country programme). In a DFID-supported programme that planned to bring roads to more rural areas in Nepal, for example, poor coherence between the peacebuilding and development objectives and their lack of relevance to the peace and conflict context undermined the programme’s effectiveness. (See case study on South Sudan multi-donor review, Section 5.3). Evaluating coherence also necessitates assessing the quality of coordination between the different actors across both the development and peacebuilding fields.

3.4 The timing of evaluation processes

Different time horizons in development and peacebuilding programming. The time horizons to measure results in relation to development and peacebuilding components of a combined programme may be significantly different. For example, whilst an increase in school enrolment of a marginalized group may provide some initial evidence of progress towards development goals after just one or two years, the influence of improved access to education on perceptions of marginalisation and prospects for peacebuilding may take considerably longer. This can affect the timing of a combined evaluation focused on results.

Integrated programmes require on-going monitoring and formative evaluations in order to adapt to evolving context. All peacebuilding interventions require regular opportunities for review and reflection in order to remain relevant to the context. This is particularly the case with complex and often experimental integrated interventions containing multiple objectives, where innovation and uncertainty may be more pronounced. On-going monitoring and formative evaluations are required to consider the continuing validity of the theory of change, and to ensure the intervention adapts to the evolving context, lessons are learned, progress towards peacebuilding outcomes understood and corrections are made to the theory of change. This has implications for the overall cost of monitoring and evaluation.
4 Practical guidance for measuring results: monitoring and evaluating integrated programming

This section focuses on approaches to addressing these challenges and undertaking monitoring and evaluation of integrated programmes. Other CCVRI guidance provides best practices in monitoring and evaluation, and specific guidance on evaluating peacebuilding programming. Thus this guidance focuses on issues specific to integrated programmes. These are:

- Ensuring the both the peacebuilding and development dimensions of integrated programming are adequately captured in the monitoring and evaluation process;
- Paying attention to the linkages between the peacebuilding and development objectives within the monitoring and evaluation process.

4.1 Applying evaluation criteria and key lines of inquiry

Many evaluation designs include questions in order to assess the programme’s performance against the OECD DAC Criteria for Evaluation. The OECD DAC criteria are largely the same for development, peacebuilding and humanitarian assistance. However, their meaning and the nature of the inquiry suggested to determine whether a programme or portfolio meets the criteria are different. In addition, there are further considerations for integrated development and peacebuilding programming. When developing a term of reference for evaluation of integrated programmes, staff will need to consider those issues pertinent to development, peacebuilding as well as the additional questions for integrated programming.

A tool for examining the OECD DAC criteria as they relate to peacebuilding and development as well as specific considerations for integrated programmes is provided in Annex 1. It outlines key lines of inquiry used for each criteria for development programming, for peacebuilding programming, and additional lines of inquiry for integrated development and peacebuilding programming.

4.2 Evaluation designs and approaches

There is no single evaluation approach that is suitable for integrated programmes. The process will need to draw from different methods and tools and adapt them for the purpose in hand. The choice of method will depend in part on the questions that are being asked (key lines of inquiry) and the purpose of the evaluation (e.g. accountability, learning). Where accountability is a key objective then an approach should be chosen that can provide a case for attribution (or contribution) that is as plausible as possible. In all cases mixed methods approaches drawing on both qualitative and quantitative data as well as participatory approaches are likely to be appropriate.

Some approaches are better suited to peacebuilding and others to development, highlighting a possible challenge for evaluating integrated programming. For Intra-sectoral programmes it may be best to draw predominantly off tools best suited to peacebuilding. For multi-sectoral programmes, both the

development and peacebuilding dimensions will need to be captured in a more balanced way and may necessitate an approach that blends different methods. A comparative overview of evaluation designs and their utility in relation to evaluating development, peacebuilding and integrated programmes is contained in Annex 2.

**Theory-based approaches** are practically essential to assessing integration by examining the causal linkages in the results chain and the validity of assumptions linking development and peacebuilding outcomes. Taking the example of the livelihoods programme described earlier (see table 2, Section 2.1), focusing on output 2, a theory-based approach would assess the strength of the evidence supporting the assumptions in the theory of change around the linkages between livelihoods, competition for resources and conflict and consider whether these still hold true.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Results Chain</th>
<th>Output to Outcome theory of Change linking enhanced stability to livelihoods interventions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Output 2</td>
<td>Livelihoods opportunities for populations at risk of conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>If we strengthen livelihoods for high risk populations then groups will be less likely to resort to violent competition as a way to access limited economic resources, because the grounds for competition will decrease.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key questions and data gathering exercises would revolve around whether the activities have changed perceptions and competition over resources, and other supporting evidence about whether this has influenced changes in the conflict context. Importantly, by moving from the ‘whether’ to the ‘why’ question, theory-based approaches can be useful for informing policy learning, as they can inform the evidence base for linking conflict and peacebuilding interventions.

Theory-based approaches are also useful in navigating common weaknesses in the design of integrated programmes, such as an absent or poorly evidenced theory of change linking development and peacebuilding outcomes. In the multi-donor evaluation of assistance to South Sudan (see section 5.3, South Sudan multi-donor review case study), the evaluators reconstructed the dominant theory of change linking development assistance to peacebuilding. This revealed there was an assumption amongst development agendas that development contributes to conflict prevention and peacebuilding through a ‘peace dividend’ that would incentivise populations not to revert to violence. The evaluators were able to test the validity of this hypothesis by comparing maps of conflict outbreaks since the comprehensive peace with maps showing the spread of development services. They concluded that violence did not emanate from a lack of services but from other factors.

**Contribution Analysis** methods can create more certainty about the claims relating to the contribution of development programming to peacebuilding. They can also illuminate the integrated programme’s contribution in relation to the broader context of change and relationship with other interventions (*coherence*), as well as a ‘project-centric’ bias an evaluation may have.

Approaches that move beyond the more linear cause and effect designs, such as **Outcome Mapping** (OM), may be particularly helpful for assessing the more unpredictable peacebuilding dimensions of integrated programmes. OM allows for a type of open-ended inquiry that can tease out unanticipated outcomes (both positive and negative) and alternative explanations. However, although helpful, this does not need to be the dominant approach and it might be applied in an informal way – simply ensuring that unforeseen outcomes are captured.
Finally, in some cases, where ‘manipulation’ is possible and the context is relatively stable, it may be possible to design an impact evaluation process for integrated programmes using experimental or quasi-experimental approaches, such as randomised control trials, for attributing impact. This was done in the Tumutu Agricultural Training Programme in Liberia (see case study, Section 5.1). However, as discussed above, there are significant problems with using these approaches in conflict settings. Moreover, whilst the approach can be successful at measuring impacts on the drivers of conflict at the level of the intervention (e.g. social exclusion or ex-combatants), it may be less valuable for considering the broader relevance of the programme to the overall conflict context (a key criterion in evaluating peacebuilding activities), and, for complex or broader programmes, may not lead to strong conclusions about attribution.

4.3 Fundamental reviews of integrated programmes

Some circumstances may necessitate a ‘fundamental review’ of integrated programmes, for example where there are significant changes to the conflict context (or understanding of that context) and/or evidence emerges of tensions between peacebuilding and development objectives of an integrated programme, as occurred in the Nepal Rural Access Programme (see case study in Section 5.2). A fundamental review serves to inform the appropriate changes to the programme rather than provide an assessment of results. Central to this process is a review, and, if necessary, adjustment, of the theories of change linking peacebuilding and development, and a reflection on the most appropriate balance of objectives. On the basis of the findings, adjustments can be made to the results chain and new indicators identified.

4.4 Methods for gathering data

This guidance does not address the broad array of methods for gathering data that can be used in an evaluation. General guidance on data collection and analysis in general and in peacebuilding can be found in other Guidance Products in the Results Initiative:


*Tools for measurement, monitoring and evaluation: Making conflict, crime and violence data usable* (Small Arms Survey, 2013)

*Tools for measurement, monitoring and evaluation: In-depth focus on surveys* (Small Arms Survey, 2013)


To address questions specific to integrated programming, however, additional data collection methods may be required. Table 4 provides information on the possible sources of data in relation to the key issues in relation to the OECD DAC criteria that need to be considered when evaluating integrated programmes.

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28 The full lines of inquiry, including for development, peacebuilding and integrated programming, can be found in Annex 1.
Table 4: Data gathering in relation to evaluation consideration for integrated programmes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Considerations for integrated programming</th>
<th>Examples of data sources/ collection methods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relevance</strong></td>
<td>How far has the programme been informed by an analysis of the linkages between conflict/peacebuilding and development?</td>
<td>Conflict analysis which includes an assessment of the linkages between conflict and development/sector in question.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To what extent has the balance and trade-off between peacebuilding and development objectives been informed by, and evolved in response to, the context and findings of a conflict analysis that explores the linkages between development and conflict? (Particularly intra-sectoral integration)?</td>
<td>Sector analysis that considers linkage with conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Effectiveness</strong></td>
<td>How far did the development activities contribute to peacebuilding outcomes and affect conflict dynamics? (e.g. improved relationship between competing groups)? (Particularly – but not exclusively - for multi-sectoral integration).</td>
<td>Monitoring data in relation to indicators focused on theory of change linking development and peacebuilding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To what extent did the synergies, linkages and coherence between the peacebuilding and development objectives contribute to effectiveness? (Particularly for intra-sectoral integration).</td>
<td>Perception surveys, Project reports, Case studies, Self-reporting exercises (monitoring forms), Violent incident reporting forms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Impact</strong></td>
<td>How far did the development activities impact on the key drivers of conflict e.g. marginalization of certain groups? (Particularly – but not exclusively - for multi-sectoral integration)</td>
<td>Monitoring data in relation to indicators focus on theory of change linking development and peacebuilding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To what extent did the synergies, linkages and coherence between the peacebuilding and development objectives contribute to enhanced impacts? (Particularly for intra-sectoral integration).</td>
<td>Light touch conflict analysis updates (monitoring).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Changes in context identified through conflict analysis and other data relevant to the development sector (e.g. statistics on educational enrolment for an education programme).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Other evidence relating to the theory of change (research, analysis, reports etc.).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coherence and Coordination</strong></td>
<td>What is the internal coherence and balance between the peacebuilding and development objectives (for multi-sectoral integration)?</td>
<td>Interviews with programme staff and other relevant stakeholders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What are the linkages and coordination undertaken between the development activities/ actors and the peacebuilding actors? (Particularly for meta-integration)</td>
<td>Needs assessments and conflict analysis, Project/programme reports, Meeting reports, including coordination structures, budgets etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.5 Practical considerations

Evaluation of integrated programmes may also require adjustments in practical arrangements regarding the evaluation. A number of such practical issues need to be taken into consideration when commissioning or undertaking the evaluation of integrated programming, including:

**Ensuring that different perspectives are balance and present in the evaluation team.** Managing and carrying out monitoring and evaluation of integrated programmes requires a balance of development and peacebuilding expertise and country specific knowledge, as well as evaluative skills. This mix should be reflected in the Terms of Reference for the evaluation, and more time may be required to source and build a balanced team and to enable the evaluators to engage with a potentially new set of (peacebuilding or development) issues. Similarly, the management of the evaluation from within DFID should include specialists relevant to both the peacebuilding and development dimensions of the intervention.

**Engaging stakeholders across sectors.** An integrated evaluation may need to access and engage a wide range of actors across potentially two or more sectors. For example, for an evaluation looking at support to the education sector, the Ministry of Education may need to be engaged alongside other actors such as NGOs supporting peacebuilding and conflict-sensitivity. An approach to coordinating the different actors with interests in the evaluation may need to be considered when commissioning or implementing the evaluation, such as establishment of an evaluation Reference Group that reflects the breadth of different actors.

**Extracting learning from evaluations.** Evaluations of integrated programming provide an opportunity for learning about the relationship between development interventions and peacebuilding/state building. Where appropriate, the evaluation TOR could include a requirement for a policy note on emerging findings that can contribute to the body of evidence available.

**Resourcing data collection.** Integrated programmes require data collection in relation to both peacebuilding and development objectives (particularly intra-sectoral programmes). These additional requirements should be factored into the time and resources committed to data collection.
5 Case studies

This section provides three case studies of the evaluation of integrated programmes. The case studies have been selected both to inform the guidance and to provide practical examples of the processes, challenges and analysis of evaluations of the three types of integrated programmes identified in Section 1. The case studies include:

- An impact evaluation of the Tumutu Agricultural Training Programme in Liberia, a programme focused on the reintegration of ex-combatants (intra-sectoral integration);
- A review of the Rural Access Programme in Nepal, which was adapted to address peacebuilding needs (multi-sectoral integration); and
- A theory based evaluation of the impact of multi-donor support to Sudan on peacebuilding and conflict prevention (meta- and multi-donor/cumulative evaluation).

The cases provide a brief description of the programme and the evaluation process, and conclude with lessons learned both about evaluating integrated programming and about what makes it effective.

5.1 Tumutu Agricultural Training Programme in Liberia (TATP)

Liberia’s 14-year civil war was disruptive and destructive, displacing the majority of Liberia’s 3 million inhabitants, halting economic activity, deepening poverty, and depriving a generation of basic education. While the security situation has steadily improved since the end of the war in 2003, many rural youth have continued to make their living through unlawful activities, including unlicensed mining, rubber tapping, or logging. Many of them are ex-combatants, and some remain in loose armed group structures.

A national program successfully demobilized tens of thousands of ex-combatants. However, many thousands of young men and women – often the hard core – were poorly served or unserved by the official program. Ex-combatants and other high-risk youth have been considered particularly precarious, as the bulk of Liberians are young, poor, and underemployed. Following the 2011 elections, one of the most pressing challenges for the President, government ministries and international organizations has been boosting youth incomes and employment, especially that of high-risk youth. As the largest source of employment in the country, agriculture was viewed as a key driver of economic recovery in Liberia.

The Tumutu Agricultural Training Programme ran from 2008 to 2010 and was managed by Action on Armed Violence (AOAV, formerly Landmine Action). It aimed to reduce armed violence and support livelihoods in ‘hot spots’ that presented the most immediate security concerns. The programme integrated economic and psychosocial assistance, offering vocational agricultural training and life skills counselling to young ex-combatants at a government-owned residential training centre. Upon completing the course, each trainee returned to a community of their choice with the tools, seeds and inputs to start their own farms. The theory of change underpinning this programme was: If ex-combatants are provided with the resources, know-how and life skills to achieve a sustainable, legal livelihood within the rural sector, then they will move out of illicit resource extraction, and gain legal employment; and if they have legal, lucrative alternatives to illicit activities, then they will reintegrate into society and will be less likely to be recruited to or engage in violence.

Given that the objective of the programme was primarily to reduce the risk of armed violence, with livelihoods support as a supporting objective and a means for achieving the peacebuilding goal, this programme can be described as intra-sectoral integration.
Methodological approach, findings and challenges

Research to inform a randomised control trial (RCT) impact evaluation of the programme was undertaken during the period of 2009-2011. AOAV identified 1,330 youth, and because the demand exceeded availability of spaces, the researchers randomly assigned these individuals by lottery to either a ‘treatment group’ (receiving the programme) or ‘control group’ (not receiving the programme). By comparing the treatment group to the control group 18 months after the programme, the evaluation team was able to analyse the effects of the intervention on both development and peacebuilding outcomes – and examine the linkages between agricultural livelihoods, shifts from illicit to legal employment, poverty, social integration, aggression, and potential for recruitment into violence.

The evaluation adopted both a qualitative and quantitative approach to data gathering. For the qualitative investigation, some members of the control and treatment groups were interviewed at regular intervals over the two years of the study, before, during and after the intervention. The quantitative investigation comprised a randomised survey of both those in the treatment and control group. Survey data was collected through self-reporting several weeks prior to the programme, 16-20 months later and 12-16 months after the programme was completed. Detailed data was collected and changes were tracked against a number of indicators covering both livelihoods and peace and security related outcomes.

Table 5: Indicators and measurements used to assess change in Tumutu Agricultural Training Programme, Liberia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lines of inquiry</th>
<th>Examples of indicators and measurements used</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Extent of youth\textsuperscript{24} engagement in and attitudes towards agricultural activities</td>
<td>Number of agricultural work hours in the past month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% respondents engaged in agricultural activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interest in farming in the future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shift by youth from illicit to legal livelihoods</td>
<td>Number of respondents engaging in legal activities (agriculture, petty business etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of respondents engaging in illegal activities (illegal mining, rubber tapping)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of hours employed in legal and illegal activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impacts on youth employment levels, income and wealth</td>
<td>Current income (net cash earnings from wages, business and farm profits)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total of common types of short-term expenditures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Savings and debt levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wealth index (housing quality, major assets and land)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extent of citizenship and social integration of youth</td>
<td>Community participation (e.g., group memberships)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Index of family relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Index of social support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of individuals that had changed communities in past 6 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth mental health</td>
<td>Self-reported symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) – PTSD scale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Self-reported symptoms of depression – depression scale including culturally specific manifestations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggression and potential for mobilisation into violence</td>
<td>Criminal and aggressive attitudes and behaviours (e.g., support for violent solutions, hostile behaviour, confrontation with leaders and police)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Proxy indicators for risk of mobilisation into armed rebellion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{24} Blattman, C. & Annan, J. (2011) Reintegrating and Employing High Risk Youth in Liberia: Lessons from a randomized evaluation of a Landmine Action agricultural training program for ex-combatants (Yale University and Innovations for Poverty Action). Evaluators were Christopher Blattman (Yale University) and Jeannie Annan (International Rescue Committee). Their report is available at http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=36796.

\textsuperscript{30} Youth in this table refers to both the treatment and control group.
The research found that there had been a large and significant impact on engagement in agriculture. For example, the treatment group was more likely to be engaged in agriculture and to have sold crops. There was, however, little change in current income and expenditures amongst participants, although there was an increase in assets. Participation levels in illicit activities dropped (number of hours engaged), although rates of participation (number of participants engaged) were unchanged. The evidence on measures of social engagement, citizenship, aggression and propensity to violence was equivocal: while there were modest (but not statistically significant) improvements among the treatment groups vis-à-vis the control group regarding social integration, there was no significant reduction in aggressive or criminal behaviour. Evidence about treatment and control groups’ relationships with commanders, hypothetical willingness to fight and interest in mobilization to fight in Cote d’Ivoire was more promising, although not conclusive. The evaluators concluded that “[g]iven the difficulty of shifting such behaviors,” the impacts of the programme were “extremely promising”. This suggested that the theory of change was at least plausible, even if not confirmed.

It was recognised that certain effects of training would be hard to measure with surveys – particularly citizenship and social integration and propensity to violence. Self-reporting in relation to behaviour and attitudes comes with risks to the accuracy of data. For example, those exposed to the project may have been more likely to respond positively even if their behaviour and attitude has not changed. This is known as social desirability bias.

Lessons

The RCT approach was successful in identifying impacts of the programme. Focusing at the level of the individual enabled large enough sample sizes for credible results using an experimental approach. This is harder to achieve when comparing, for example, impacts of programmes on a small number of treatment and control communities.

Risks and ethics of using of an RCT. Those closely involved in the evaluation questioned the conflict-sensitivity of the RCT approach of selecting (and excluding) participants by lottery in a conflict-affected environment. During the course of the research programme, staff had difficult conversations with community leaders who did not feel it was fair to identify and then exclude a group. Given the context where recourse to violence is the norm, the concern that those excluded would kick up trouble was evident. In this instance, there was no violent backlash, but the risks were genuine.

Programming impacts of using an RCT. From a programming point of view, it was important to ensure the legitimacy of those selected for the programme to see if they were indeed ex-combatants. However, this risked the integrity of the research results, since it removed an element of randomisation. This created a tension between the research protocol and programming considerations. It is important that these tensions are anticipated and averted. However, if tensions do arise, it is undoubtedly important that programming considerations are given priority.

Timing. Contrary to common assumptions, the length of time to see positive results on metrics of social integration and propensity to violence was relatively short, and changes were observed. Changes in farming income, however, were not observed during this period. This may have been due to the length of time it takes to see improvements in income from farming employment amongst new farmers in a post-conflict environment.

Inherent tensions between poverty reduction and peacebuilding objectives. The programme adopted a model of intensive training and investment on a relatively small group of ex-fighters, since this was likely to be the most successful in terms of transitioning individuals from fighters to becoming productive members of society. However, a less intensive approach, which also targeted the broader community, might have more spread the benefits and made a greater contribution to broader poverty reduction objectives.

5.2 The Rural Access Programme in Nepal (RAP)

Until the 1960s, Nepal was practically cut off from the rest of the world and lacked a significant road network. Since then, Nepal opened up to development aid. DFID has been involved in road-building for many years and has made a significant contribution to the main highway network. But the interior mountain and hill areas remained neglected until the 1990s, when DFID planned a programme for bringing roads to more remote rural areas through the Rural Access Programme (RAP).

The core aim was to support livelihoods. This would be done not only by connecting producers with markets but also by providing direct support for livelihoods through the process of road building itself. Based on a concept of ‘green roads,’ the use of machinery was kept to a minimum, and the roads were built as far as possible using manual labour. Road Builders Groups (RBGs) were formed and supported by local NGOs, recognising the need to include women, dalits (outcaste Hindus) and other minorities. The RBGs would include savings schemes and would be supported to become self-sustaining, both through work on maintenance and through inputs of credit and training.

In 1996 the Maoist party (Communist Party of Nepal–Maoist) decided to abandon the political process and take up an armed struggle based in the rural areas. The Maoists drew their support mainly from the same marginalised groups who were the focus for DFID’s programme. Initially DFID did not adjust its programmes significantly to the conflict, but in 2001 a Strategic Conflict Assessment indicated that aid was a major contributor to the dynamics of conflict, especially because it neglected the remote rural areas and because the benefits often went to privileged groups. Aid had failed to tackle deep social issues such as discrimination against dalits, bonded labour and the oppression of women. In 2002, DFID conducted a review of its entire programme and adjusted individual programmes to these concerns. By this time, the Maoists were disrupting aid programmes that did not comply with these concerns.

Although RAP had been designed as a development programme, it actually addressed many of the problems that had caused the conflict and operated in a way that was largely acceptable to the Maoist insurgents. DFID’s review showed that RAP already showed good (inter-sectoral) integration of peacebuilding and development objectives. DFID went a step further by focusing the programme on providing immediate labour opportunities for marginalised groups in conflict areas. The long-term development aim of connecting specific locations with each other became secondary to the peacebuilding objective of providing work. The implicit theory of change was that provision of work to marginalised groups would make it less likely that they would join the insurrection. As a result, instead of building roads in a linear fashion (starting at one place and gradually extending the road), pieces of work were taken up at different points along the line of the road.

The programme continued with little interference from the Maoists, but by 2005 DFID managers became concerned that the roads were not being completed when the programme had only one more year to run. Recognising that there was no point in simply assessing results against the original aims, DFID called for a ‘fundamental review’\(^\text{32}\) in order to assess the relationship of the programme to the on-

going conflict and the issue of completing the roads—in other words, to assess the balance between development and peacebuilding objectives.

**Methodological Challenges**

In order to assess this balance the fundamental review used a problem-solving approach rather than the OECD DAC criteria as in a conventional evaluation. It examined the programme’s performance and identified the problems that had led to the current situation. It then identified ‘principles of change’, taking account of DFID’s policies and resource parameters.

The review found that the programme was far behind schedule. With only a year left to run, not a single road had been completed, and the programme was nowhere near reaching its construction targets. Although the review began by assessing the outputs of the programme in terms of roads completed and wages provided, the crucial parts of the analysis came from examining the outcomes, especially the unintended outcomes. Failure to complete roads had led to lack of support for maintenance of the few sections already complete. Potentially this could undermine the effectiveness of the entire programme. Although a small number of workers were glad to have wages, the population as a whole did not see any ‘peace dividend’. Moreover, the review found that the scattered bits of work provided to RBGs were not really enough to make a significant difference to their livelihoods and therefore probably did not affect their choice whether to join the insurrection.

In effect, DFID had rightly tried to adapt the programme to peacebuilding objectives but had become too focused on providing work while not fully recognizing the likelihood that completed roads would encourage a much greater number of people to press for peace in order to capitalise on their new opportunities to improve livelihoods. The changes had been driven by high-level analysis and not sufficiently nuanced to reflect the detail of the context. While rightly recognizing the importance of providing labour, they had lost sight of the fundamental purpose of the programme: to encourage general development by completing roads.

The review called for a more robust strategy to complete the roads. The key principle was to focus on roads that could be completed quickly in order to provide an incentive for the wider population to seek an end to the war and engage them in the critical problem of maintenance.

**Lessons**

**The importance of clarifying theories of change in integrated programming.** This case shows the importance of clarifying the different theories of change that link the development and peacebuilding activities and outcomes, and assessing how adjusting programming may affect the functioning of each theory of change. With a better understanding of the assumptions regarding how the road building process could contribute to peace, the tension between providing work and building support for peace based on completed roads might have surfaced earlier and informed effective programming decisions.

**Evaluation of integrated programmes should focus on the inter-relationship and coherence of peacebuilding and development objectives (in particular coherence).** Development objectives, such as support for livelihoods, remain relatively fixed (even if the context and ways to improve livelihoods does change), whereas peacebuilding objectives are likely to change over time. The task of the evaluator is likely to focus on the way in which these two sets of objectives interrelate. This will remain the case whether the programme was initially planned as an integrated development-peacebuilding approach or, as may be more common, where peacebuilding is integrated during the course of the programme.
Although it would be possible to evaluate this relationship by using conventional evaluation criteria, the process would become complicated, because each criterion would have to be considered against both development and peacebuilding objectives—and in this instance they were incoherent. The ‘fundamental review’ approach allowed the evaluation to focus on the strategic balance between development and peacebuilding.

The ‘fundamental review’ could be regarded as either a midterm or formative evaluation or as an example of the type of on-going monitoring and programme adjustment that would have been advisable all along. In a normal development setting a simple Output to Purpose Review (interim evaluative reviews to measure and report on performance to data and suggest adjustments) might have been adequate, but the dynamic changes of the conflict situation meant that the validity of the original objectives could no longer be taken for granted. This implies that special and more robust monitoring processes may be needed in such cases. These processes must allow not only for consideration of progress towards intended results, but also whether those results (objectives) are still relevant, including examination of the interplay between development and peacebuilding aims.

A theory-based approach is likely to be helpful to explore the relationship between peacebuilding and development. In this case a comparison was made between a theory that direct provision of labour to marginalized groups would reduce conflict and a broader development theory that economic development and livelihoods opportunities (enhanced through improved transportation infrastructure) would reduce the risk of conflict. In assessing these theories it was essential to make use of a conflict analysis, but broader issues of DFID policy also had to be taken into account. The review had to consider fixed parameters, including the original concept and logframe, the rights of contractors in implementing the programme and the budget situation. Fortunately, in this case DFID was able to find new resources, create a new project and eventually fulfil both peacebuilding and development objectives. The situation would have been much more difficult if there was no chance of significant programme adjustment and additional inputs.

Subsequent impact studies highlighted the challenge of attribution in conflict contexts. Less than a year after the ‘fundamental review’, the war came to an end, and the Maoists decided to rejoin the political mainstream. This made it easier for DFID to refocus the programme towards completing the roads. DFID had to commit substantial new resources to the programme, but it had more-or-less completed its construction targets by 2012. At that point, DFID undertook an Impact Assessment comparing the current situation with baseline survey results from earlier stages of the programme (generally 8-9 years earlier).

This study illustrates the difficulty of assessing integrated development and peacebuilding programmes during a period in which a peace agreement takes place. The peace agreement had such a massive effect on all aspects of life that the measurement of achievements attributable to the programme became extraordinarily difficult. DFID’s 2012 study identifies improvement in practically all areas, including a wide range of social indicators, but direct evidence for attribution only exists where a comparison can be made with another area. In this case the national average was used, but this may not always be a fair comparison for remote rural areas. Improvements that exceed the national trend may suggest that the programme is responsible, but it would still be necessary to mask out all other variables

in order to be sure of the result. It may be safer to say that the programme ‘contributed’ to wider changes rather than ‘attribute’ those changes purely to the programme. However, this study represents an important effort to address the problem of measuring impact in the context of conflict.

5.3 South Sudan multi-donor review

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in 2005 brought an end to more than two decades of war between the North and the South of Sudan, but there was a considerable degree of uncertainty whether the peace would last. Prospects of renewed war between North and South (over access to oil and a series of border disputes for example) remained a real possibility. There were also significant episodes of violent conflict within the South, reflecting political competition, tribal clashes, fighting over resources, failed attempts at disarmament and other issues. The CPA also called for a referendum in the South regarding independence in 2009, and the international community provided significant amounts of aid aimed at supporting the peace process in the run up to the referendum.

Aid agencies responded to the peace agreement with a range of reconstruction and development activity as well as conflict prevention and peacebuilding (CPPB) efforts. In 2010, a multi-donor evaluation of support to CPPB activities in Southern Sudan was commissioned by the OECD, involving the task of distinguishing the CPPB impact of donor aid from its development impacts.

Methodological issues

Very few donors had undertaken conflict analyses or stated an explicit theory of change, and there was no coherent approach among donors. In practice, the evaluation tested the view (arising from a Joint Assessment Mission in 2005 and adopted formally or informally by many of the larger donors) that lack of development was in itself a cause of conflict. As stated in the evaluation report: ‘The theory is that all development contributes to CPPB, encapsulated in the term peace dividend’.

While the donor effort could be described as an integrated development and peacebuilding approach, this was not explicit. It might more accurately be described as a mixture of development and peacebuilding without any overarching logic of integration. Agencies made different assumptions as to whether this was a post-conflict situation or, if a threat of renewed conflict was recognised, whether the risk of conflict came from within South Sudan or from the risk of war with the North. Some agencies, along with the evaluators, took the view that all these scenarios should be taken into account.

A challenge for the evaluators was to identify the activities that were most closely related to CPPB in comparison with those that were more purely related to development or statebuilding. The provisional OECD DAC guidance on the evaluation of CPPB programmes cited four peacebuilding categories:

- Reform of justice and security institutions;
- Promotion of a culture of justice, truth and reconciliation;
- Aspects of good governance related to peacebuilding;
- Aspects of socio-economic development related to peacebuilding.

35 Ibid, p. xv
The evaluators considered that categorising the activities implemented in South Sudan required tailoring these categories to that context, and this required a conflict analysis.

The evaluators recognized that relevance would be the key criterion to test whether aid activity had been aligned with the conflict risks and peacebuilding potential. They felt that it would be important to examine the relevance of the original intentions in 2005 as well as the actual outcomes with the benefit of hindsight in 2010. Therefore, as well as conducting an up-to-date conflict analysis (based on recent reports and a workshop with experts), they also reconstructed a conflict analysis to represent the general understanding of conflict as it was in 2005, when most of the aid programmes and strategies were formed. This was done by drawing on the literature available at that time. The evaluators also conducted a general conflict analysis for Sudan as a whole, as, until South Sudan’s independence in 2011, aid had been channelled through funds in which the Government of Sudan had been a key actor.

Each of the three different analyses could be used to test different aspects of relevance. The 2005 South Sudan analysis could be used to examine whether agencies had incorporated peacebuilding intentions into their programmes. The ‘all Sudan’ analysis could be used to test whether programmes were relevant to the national situation. But, for most purposes, the evaluators found it convenient to use a composite and simplified table. This refined the CPPB categories in the provisional DAC guidance and made it specific to conflict factors in Southern Sudan.

Table 6: Specific conflict factors relating to conflict prevention and peacebuilding categories (summarised)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reform of Justice and Security Institutions</th>
<th>Culture of Justice, truth and Reconciliation</th>
<th>Good Governance</th>
<th>Socio-economic development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reintegration of demobilised soldiers</td>
<td>Uncertainty about the future and false expectations</td>
<td>North/South disparities and intra-South marginalization</td>
<td>Status of the ‘Three Areas’ (borders)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undeveloped police and justice systems</td>
<td>Hardening of ethnic identities</td>
<td>Tensions around centralisation and weak structures at State levels</td>
<td>Migration of armed pastoralists; discontented and underemployed youth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incomplete disarmament</td>
<td>Unresolved issues of access to resources</td>
<td>Lack of representation</td>
<td>Returnees</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Table above (Table 6), further interpreted by reference back to the conflict analysis, was used to define CPPB in relation to other aid objectives, notably reconstruction and development. For example, ‘good governance’ was treated as a general development activity, except where it tackled intra-South marginalization. By using all three conflict analyses, it was possible to assess whether aid programmes had been adjusted over time and to what extent they took account of the wider context of Sudan.

The table suggested to the evaluators that lack of development was not in itself a significant cause of conflict. This raised questions about the dominant theory of change among aid actors: that the spread of development (especially health and education services) would provide a ‘peace dividend’ which would persuade people not to revert to violence.

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The evaluators tested the validity of this hypothesis by comparing maps of conflict outbreaks since the CPA with maps showing the spread of development services. This showed that there was no positive correlation between the distribution of services and the prevalence of conflict. In some crucial cases where conflict had been a major problem, notably Jonglei State, there had also been an exceptionally high level of services. This provided strong evidence that the conflict in Jonglei did not arise because people in that State considered themselves to be unfairly treated in the distribution of development services. The evaluation concluded that ‘the perception of unequal access to resources and services may contribute to general discontent, but is unlikely to be a reason in itself for violent conflict.’\textsuperscript{38} Much of the violence appeared to arise, as the conflict analysis indicated, from failed disarmament programmes, the political marginalisation of specific tribal groups and lack of a functioning justice sector–issues which had been neglected by aid actors.

The \textit{coherence} criterion provided an opportunity to focus on the degree of political engagement in support of CPPB objectives. This led to an observation that international attention had shifted from Southern Sudan after the CPA and focused on Darfur. Little had been done at the political level to influence the authorities in Southern Sudan towards building an inclusive state. The issue of \textit{coordination and linkages} provided an opportunity to examine the lack of authority given to representatives in Juba and the consequent lack of coordination at that level\textsuperscript{39}. These points could have been addressed through the normal criterion of \textit{effectiveness}, but as separate criteria they provided more scope for analysis and gave them greater prominence in the final report.

\textbf{Lessons Learned}

\textbf{The fundamental challenge for evaluators was to identify and interpret peacebuilding intentions and theories that were only partially stated and in many cases were drawn from global experience or intuitive assumptions.} Aid agencies tended to assume that all types of development would contribute to peacebuilding. By using specific conflict analyses, the evaluators were able to show that these general theories had not worked well in the context of Southern Sudan. Only certain types of development had an appreciable impact on peacebuilding.

\textbf{It may be necessary retroactively to define what constitutes ‘peacebuilding’ in a specific context.} The process of applying conflict analysis was complicated by a desire to test both the intentions of the aid programme and its results. This might not be necessary in all cases. Although the full conflict analysis was used to inform judgments and to drill down into specific issues, in practice the table above provided a ‘good enough’ way of distinguishing peacebuilding from development in this context. The CPPB categories in the provisional DAC Guidance provided a possible starting point for categorizing peacebuilding activities, but in practice a simple division into security, political/governance, economic and social categories would have been just as useful.

\textbf{Datasets mapping development activities and conflict events are valuable.} The collection of data comparing development outputs with what were, in effect, peacebuilding problems proved crucial in testing and refuting the dominant theory of change. Data on the spread of development activity is likely to be available, whereas data on the spread of conflict events may be more difficult to find. In this case it was fortunate that OCHA had mapped out conflict events within Southern Sudan for the relevant period.

\textsuperscript{38}\textit{Ibid} p. 49.

\textsuperscript{39}The revised OECD-DAC Guidance (2012) omits ‘Linkages’ and suggests ‘Coherence and Coordination’ as additional criteria that may be taken separately or together.
**Coherence** is potentially an important criterion for evaluating integrated programming. Coherence brings in political dimensions. *Coordination and linkages* are important in drawing attention to focusing activities in order to achieve impact. In this case, donors could have coordinated more closely in relation to areas that were subject to violence and sectors (notably the justice sector) that might be crucial for peacebuilding. However, these issues could all be addressed within the normal criteria, provided that explicit sub-headings are used.

**Sequencing is an important consideration in evaluating integrated programming.** The evaluation showed that a balance between peacebuilding and development objectives has strong implications for the sequencing of aid. Attention shifted too rapidly and too strongly towards development objectives when greater effort was needed to secure the peace. This reflects a lesson for evaluation also: that sequencing as well as balance should be examined when evaluating integrated programmes.
Annexes