

Envisioning and Pursuing Peace Writ Large

A Response by Diana Chigas & Peter Woodrow

www.berghof-handbook.net

47

1. Introduction

Peace Writ Large, as Simon Fisher and Lada Zimina note, is a term introduced by CDA Collaborative Learning Projects because of the absence of vocabulary to describe this idea of societal-level peace. Five years since the publication of *Confronting War* – the conclusions of the first phase of the Reflecting on Peace Practice (RPP) project, an experience-based collaborative learning effort to understand what is effective and not in peacebuilding, and how we can improve our impacts on Peace Writ Large – the notion is widely discussed. But as Fisher and Zimina also note, the results are still meagre. They issue a needed call to the peacebuilding community to think hard about *why* peacebuilding is not living up to the transformative goals it professes, and to do something about it.

The lead article talks extensively about the need for and potential elements of a less ‘narrow’ and more robust agenda for Peace Writ Large connected to economic justice, environmental and human rights agendas, as well as about agencies joining together to promote it. The question is *how* to develop a vision and conception of Peace Writ Large that will help shape action in ways that improve the impacts. Similarly, how can the reality of very diverse practice, goals and methods combine, or ‘add up’, to generate momentum? In this response article, we would like to share experience on these questions gathered through the RPP project, which has been running since 1999.

2. Promoting a Broader and Integrative Vision of Peacebuilding

The lead authors lament the lack of interconnectedness and integration amongst issues, actors and efforts. RPP's findings mirror Fisher and Zimina's; peacebuilding efforts are indeed not 'adding up', due in part to a lack of linkages and synergies amongst efforts, and a failure on the part of programmers and donors to see how the efforts fit into the 'bigger picture'. Their explanations of *why* and their prescriptions for *what* to do, however, do not go far enough in helping us reflect on *how* to do it.

2.1 Encouraging an Integrative Understanding of Conflict

Fisher and Zimina accuse the peacebuilding field of being too narrowly "focused on war and the drivers of war" (Open Letter, Chapter 1, 6; see Fisher/Zimina 2009) and call for integration of peacebuilding efforts with those addressing other major threats to survival and security.

RPP is finding that peacebuilding work is not having transformative effects on Peace Writ Large, but not because, as the authors suggest, people are too narrowly focused on the drivers of conflict. On the contrary, it is because programme strategies are not sufficiently linked to the key driving factors of conflict.

The interconnectedness of economic justice, environment, human rights, governance and peace has been recognized since the *Agenda for Peace*, and has led to a dramatic expansion of the notion of peacebuilding in the last 15 years. In the context of the influential Development Assistance Committee within the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD-DAC), the most recent articulation of what peacebuilding is refers to "interrelated areas of intervention that are required to promote sustainable peace" (OECD-DAC 2007, 17). That includes poverty reduction, equitable access to services, sustainable and equitable access to natural resources, protection of human rights, participation in governance and justice, among others.

Fisher and Zimina are correct that this broader understanding of peacebuilding has not led to serious rethinking of what is required for sustainable peace and how peacebuilders can affect the bigger picture. Why is this so? Ironically, an unintended consequence of the very broadening of the concept and practice of peacebuilding has been a loss of strategic rigour in practice. People assume that because they are doing work on these issues, they are contributing to peace. For instance, if they are working on poverty, they are building peace. Youth work is building peace, because 'youth are critical to peace'. People assume that, because all these issues are linked, their work contributes *ipso facto* to peace. Consequently, they think that they do not need to do anything differently, or to think rigorously about what Peace Writ Large means in their context. Programmes often therefore miss the mark; they may be good programmes, but they are not automatically good *peacebuilding* programmes.

One of the reasons programmes are missing the mark is that conflict analyses – where they are done at all – are inadequate. Despite the proliferation of conflict analysis frameworks, RPP has found that agencies perform only enough conflict analysis to justify their proposals, to affirm that what they know how to do best is needed. Or they pursue programmes based on their generalized theories of change about how to achieve peace, rather than really analysing the situation. The frameworks for analysis themselves are often elaborate and comprehensive, and integrate, as Fisher and Zimina recommend, analysis of economic, environmental and other factors. But such analyses had not led to more effective peacebuilding strategies. The analyses too often aim to be *too comprehensive* and produce *long lists* of factors, in fairly general terms (such as 'corruption',

‘lack of rule of law’, ‘discrimination’), without showing the *interactions and dynamics* among the various factors, without identifying the *most important* factors in that particular context and without reflecting on the influence of the interventions themselves on the conflict (Woodrow 2006). As a result, every peacebuilding programme assumes equal validity and importance, because it can be justified by an analysis that does not differentiate among the myriad of conflict factors. Programme strategies remain disconnected from analysis and are often ‘off-the-shelf’ approaches, with some variations to adjust to the particular conflict context in which agencies are working.

These findings do not contradict the authors’ argument that a more integrated and broader conception of conflict – beyond war – is needed. However, they do suggest that peace practitioners need to consider how other threats related to security and survival relate to the conflict and how they play out in a particular context. Specifically, peacebuilders need to identify key driving factors of conflict (not just triggers of violence), understand the dynamics amongst the various factors as a conflict system, including the effects of their (and others’) interventions on that system, and identify priorities and points of leverage for shifting it. Analysis must move beyond generalities and provide specifics about what is happening in *this* conflict, at *this* time (and over time) and why.

2.2 Technical vs. Transformative Peacebuilding: Defining the ‘Peace we are working for’

Fisher and Zimina situate most peacebuilding work in the dichotomy between ‘technical’ and ‘transformative’ approaches to peacebuilding. They suggest that “programmes [...] often seem to amount [...] to little more than ‘patching’ – attempts to create the minimal stability that would allow the current world order, driven by market forces and geopolitical power constellations, to step in” (in this volume, 19).

Their constructively provocative contention echoes what CDA’s newest project, the Listening Project, is hearing. This project has been listening to people in countries that have received or are receiving international assistance about their experience, over time, of all kinds of aid (not just concerning peacebuilding). People have noted that aid provision – whether from governmental donors or international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) – has evolved into an ‘industry’, ‘a business, not a commitment’. Agencies are spending less time in communities, listening less to people, and are increasingly described as ‘inflexible’, offering ‘pre-packaged’ aid. This has resulted in an increasing emphasis on improving efficiency, on producing ‘results’ quickly and on measuring those results (Brown 2007). Recipients see no means of holding agencies accountable for badly done or even harmful work.

However, we have some concerns that what Fisher and Zimina suggest to broaden and refocus the vision for peacebuilding will not necessarily fill the gap that they correctly observe. Several questions need further exploration:

Whose Agenda?

The authors suggest that peacebuilders should be responsive to the needs of the least powerful and to ‘the community’. The description of the transformative approach (*Table 1*, in this volume, 21) contains repeated references to the community as the focus and partner in peacebuilding work.

The crucial question is: who is ‘the community’? What does the wellbeing of communities mean, and how is that determined? We all face choices regarding whom we include, whom we choose as partners, to whom we are accountable, whom to involve in setting priorities or programme directions and so forth. In many cases, we are selective about the community we relate to; ‘the community’ is often taken to mean those elements of the society who happen to agree

with our agenda for change and who are comfortable with the methods that we are likely to use. Conservative religious leaders, arguably key elements of civil society, are not necessarily sought as allies for change. Those who employ militant means to effect change – even the same changes we might espouse – are avoided, unless they are engaged as ‘spoilers’ to a peace process. Government agencies of all stripes are viewed with suspicion. These groups and individuals are all part of the host society in the conflict zones in which we work, but somehow we are not accountable to these members of the community; we are only willing to submit to the will of the ‘right’ members of the community – meaning the ‘left’ members.

Many organisations extol the virtues of the grassroots and identify people at that level as those to whom we should be most responsive and accountable. But at the grassroots level, the picture is complex. Entrenched traditional, paternalistic local power structures hold decision-making authority – in the African context this is usually a local chief and a group of male elders. Village members must adhere to norms and rules of behaviour, defer to authority and submit to arbitrary decisions about allocation of resources, such as land. Again, this begs the question who, concretely, are the grassroots? Only those members of the community who are resisting the local micro-power elites? Compared to the rich man in the city, the local chief may be desperately poor and relatively powerless, but in his own sphere he is a minor despot. And to add another layer of complexity: in many West African villages, discrimination/exclusion is often exercised against the richest person in the community – the money lender, who is usually from a different ethnic group that engages in trade throughout the region.

In sum, there are deep divisions at the grassroots, and simply referring to the ‘grassroots’ or ‘community’ as the group whose ‘peace’ we should be working towards and to whom we should be accountable glosses over complex situations that require careful study and differentiation by outsiders seeking to help. We need to acknowledge that none of us enters a conflict zone with a blank slate. We bring values, philosophical views and favourite methodologies. We also look for partners who will ‘fit’ our profile. This is natural. But we should not suffer the illusion that we have entered as empty vessels waiting to be filled with the will of the people (whoever they are!). Fisher and Zimina implicitly recognize this in their suggestion that we *should* adopt an *explicit* agenda for change. This agenda may be more valid and more effective than the ‘liberal peace’ agenda, but again we must not discount local people who may see it as just as alien and externally imposed as liberal democracy, human rights and free market economies. We need to ensure that we remain open to other information and views and the realities on the ground.

How Big an Agenda? An Ethical Stance or a Theory of Change?

Fisher and Zimina exhort us to join peacebuilding with addressing the key, linked global issues of economic injustice, environmental destruction and oppression, i.e. the denial of rights and participation (in this volume, 25), in part because they see a need for rethinking and restating what is meant by positive peace.

We would caution, however, against relying on a broad rethinking of the notion of Peace Writ Large to improve the transformative quality of peacebuilding practice. We do need to rethink the nature of sustainable peace – in order to test, and challenge where appropriate, the liberal democratic paradigm that comprises the default conception. But a general rethinking risks producing a generic definition of peace assumed to be applicable in all places. The determination of what we mean by Peace Writ Large must be done *in context*, with people *in context* and with reference to the drivers and dynamics of conflict *in context*. In fact, in its earlier phase, RPP attempted to identify a more precise general definition, but participants concluded decisively that Peace Writ Large must be generated in context.

This is why we would place greater importance on theories of change than do the authors, who refer to them in passing. The theory of change is the conceptual link between peacebuilders' understanding of the conflict, their activities and Peace Writ Large – and the basis for most practitioners' planning (see also Shapiro 2006). As the authors mention and our project has also found, these theories are most often implicit, unclear or incomplete, and unexamined and untested. Practitioners must become clearer, more explicit and more rigorous about their theories of change and incorporate processes (and joint conversations) for testing those theories. Over time, these steps will lead to increased effectiveness. Greater clarity about theories of change will promote greater honesty, rigour and clarity about overarching goals, as the authors correctly call for, and would help practitioners become more strategic in connecting their work to these goals. Perhaps even more importantly, testing these theories of change can help us learn from our own experience about what works and what does not in promoting the kind of transformations required, in each context, to make peace sustainable.

Organisations' Roles and Relations to Peacebuilding: Unity or Diversity?

Fisher and Zimina correctly urge organisations in the peacebuilding field to reflect on “the obstacles to bringing transformative elements more to the fore” (in this volume, 20). An underlying question is whether we in the field need to or can agree on the parameters of Peace Writ Large, and whether we collectively *should* take a stand on issues, confront government and business and link more explicitly to “emerging alternative(s)” (in this volume, 28). Does a transformative approach require that we do?

There are different conceptions within the peacebuilding field of the work we do and differences of views about useful roles that organisations can play. Some of these differences are the result of the eclectic and interdisciplinary nature of the field itself. For example, some came to peacebuilding from the ‘peace movement’ or ‘social change movement’ arena, while others entered the field from professional training in negotiation, mediation and other conflict resolution skills.¹ Still others, including the big INGOs (Oxfam, CARE, Catholic Relief Services, Save the Children, etc.), come from a humanitarian or development mandate. Those coming from peace movements have learned the skills of the negotiation and mediation field as well, but harbour leanings towards social transformation. Negotiation and mediation professionals have, in many cases, come to appreciate that deeper resolution of the conflicts we are working with will require structural changes. Development and humanitarian agencies have come to accept that their aid has political impacts, intended or not; they have come to appreciate the need for social transformation, dialogue and cooperative processes and try to incorporate elements of peacebuilding into their programming. Each has come to appreciate, and in some cases practice, the perspective and skills of the other. We are not that far apart, in the end, but our orientation and work often revert to our origins as activists, facilitators and mediators or development/humanitarian workers. For the latter, who now manage much of the funding given for peacebuilding, it is a major stretch to do *any* sort of peacebuilding, even in the form of conflict sensitivity, much less peacebuilding that is explicitly political and explicitly works for fundamental changes in power structures.

Is this a bad thing? Does it undermine the impact of peacebuilding? Perhaps it merely reflects a healthy division of labour. In many situations there is a need for someone to take on the role of intermediary: an impartial, bridging facilitator to bring contending groups together for dialogue and negotiation. Groups that have wholeheartedly plunged into overt advocacy for

¹ The two of us writing this response represent those two backgrounds, in fact. Peter was a nonviolent social change activist who ‘converted’ to work as a mediator and conflict resolution trainer. Diana encountered the negotiation field in law school and joined Conflict Management Group, an NGO founded by Roger Fisher, co-author of the negotiation classic *Getting to Yes* (1981).

fundamental change will be seen by some parties as biased, untrustworthy and unacceptable as a third party. Some groups in the peacebuilding field have deliberately set themselves up as specialists in providing support for Track I or Track II negotiations – as conveners, facilitators or mediators. Such groups carefully and deliberately avoid any (public) contact with their more ideological brethren who are actively promoting change. Fisher and Zimina make an important point in urging resistance to oppressive governments and greater advocacy in relation to INGOs' own governments. These are forms of peacebuilding that need to be practiced more widely and supported more fully. However, we should not so easily dismiss the value of the 'professional' activities of INGOs (in this volume, 22ff.). We would argue that there is a need for the professional impartial – not all of us need to be strong advocates for change.

Diversity of roles, goals and agendas may be as important to Peace Writ Large as commonality of vision and understanding. RPP is finding that cumulative impacts of peacebuilding occur when there is progress in several domains simultaneously, including changes in policies, in structural issues, in the social fabric and with regard to political dynamics. Early evidence also suggests that progress in the different domains needs to remain in relative balance with each other, i.e. one domain should not get far ahead of the others (CDA 2008a). Transformation in each of these domains requires different approaches and different roles for peacebuilding organisations. Similarly, convergence of *different* agendas appears to propel cumulative impacts; the convergence might involve one agency building on what others have done previously. There is thus room – and a need – for role differentiation.

There is also room – and a need – for differentiated relationships with government and corporations. The authors raise an important point about the dangers of a too cooperative (even complicit?) relationship with governments and corporations. But are civil resistance movements always more effective than more cooperative engagement by civil society or non-governmental organisations with these actors? The evidence gathered through our project suggests not; sustainable peace often requires the involvement, not exclusion, of those people who hold power as they are the ones who must either agree to changes required for peace, or support (or not oppose) the systems to sustain peace and justice (Anderson/Olson 2003, 57/58 and 69).

A good analysis, and good strategic planning, should consider the various paths to transformation, who will resist change and how to deal with them – including, but not limited to, civil resistance. As we have seen in Nepal, Cyprus, Ukraine and elsewhere, pressure, advocacy and civil resistance vis-à-vis governments and corporations can be very effective in achieving significant political change. Citizens' movements have shown repeatedly that they can shut down corporate operations through even the most disorganised of nonviolent actions, and lead them to recognize that they need a 'social license to operate' in the societies where they are exploiting resources. In this sense, Fisher and Zimina's call to INGOs to reflect on their relation to these civil movements is important, lest they overlook possibilities for having real impact (see also Dudouet 2008).

But there are other ways of engaging with government and corporations in furtherance of Peace Writ Large that should not be dismissed out of hand. Where there is overlap between a government or corporate agenda and civil society's, collaboration can enhance impact. Civil society can also identify and strengthen pro-peace elements of governments or corporations.

Box 1: Civil Society Work with Governments and Corporations

In many circumstances, ways of engaging with government or corporations other than civil resistance can enhance civil society's capacity to influence Peace Writ Large. For example, in Sri Lanka a parliamentarian who was committed to vocal and practical engagement in peace issues, even when the political parties were promoting war, became involved with a civil society organisation to raise key issues relating to peace that he could not raise in Parliament (Abeygunawardana/Haniffa 2008, forthcoming). Civil society provided a useful forum for silenced voices within government to be heard.

Civil society can also strengthen pro-peace elements of governments or business by working cooperatively with them. International conflict resolution NGOs provided negotiation training and support for government ministries in apartheid South Africa at the request of pro-negotiation elements of the Ministry of Constitutional Affairs. This enhanced their credibility and helped them overcome the opposition of more reluctant parties within government. A programme in Burundi reviewed existing human rights promotion institutions, provided computers and office equipment for the government's human rights agency, and placed a project officer to work with the governmental and NGO human rights institutions to develop local human rights materials. This provided attention and support that the ministry might not otherwise have received (Wohlgemuth 2001).

Finally, where agendas overlap with business or government, alliances can enhance the influence of civil society on Peace Writ Large. In Northern Cyprus, it was not until public service (including peace) NGOs formed a coalition with the Chamber of Commerce that significant progress was made toward peace. The coalition, allying itself also with the main political party in opposition to government, mobilized society-wide demonstrations in favour of the UN proposal for reunification of Cyprus, ultimately achieving the election of the pro-peace opposition and removing one of the major obstacles to a negotiated settlement (Hadjipavlou/Kanol 2008). In El Salvador, the business community's decision to support the peace process and to pressure government to engage seriously in it was critical to the achievement of an agreement; civil society organisations identified this potential role early on and played their part in quietly working with business people to persuade them to support negotiations actively.

Limiting ourselves to one strategy and one kind of relationship with government and corporations – an adversarial one – can undermine our own effectiveness. The pressure of human rights organisations on corporations has led them to reconsider their roles, responsibilities and impacts in the societies in which they work. The more cooperative work of 'professionals' has helped corporations, and those within corporations who want to be good corporate citizens, to reflect on and implement needed changes. These roles are complementary; if peacebuilders were to be forced into just one mode or another, their cumulative impact would be reduced.

In each particular situation, we therefore need to be able to assess exactly what different governments (or corporations) are about – both those in the countries in conflict, which are mostly in the global South, and those in the North, which get a lot of criticism from Fisher and Zimina, much of it deserved. Not all Northern governments are pushing the same agenda, and within governments one will find quite different attitudes and policy interpretations in the defence ministry,

the ministry of foreign affairs and the development ministry. Governments are not monolithic, as the authors themselves recognize, and the development ministries in particular are full of former NGO staff. The fact that they operate under real constraints of sovereignty does not mean that many in those governments and United Nations agencies do not acknowledge the need for the kinds of basic change that the authors advocate, and cannot engage cooperatively to further a transformative agenda within the limits of their mandates and capacities.

3. Promoting Synergies among Activities: ‘Joined-up’ Efforts or Linkages?

How can this diversity of roles, goals and agendas lead to synergistic and transformative efforts? Fisher and Zimina blame the “lack of cooperation, both horizontally and vertically” for preventing the peacebuilding community from achieving its potential (in this volume, 25). The assumption appears to be that more “joined-up work with others” will lead to more transformative impacts, in part through challenging the vision of peace of the world’s power elites (in this volume, 17). These are significant assumptions. Are they supported by evidence?

Based on the evidence gathered by RPP to date, our answer is: “partly”. Lack of coordination and outright competition do often weaken the potential effects from multiple efforts; they spawn useless duplication of efforts and, worse, can increase tensions within communities. But the evidence on the need for coordination for effective peacebuilding is mixed at best, and in practice raises a number of difficult questions. We have seen coordination and coherence – not just within government – lead to negative impacts. Whose coordination and coherence is being assessed? The Listening Project has heard from people in communities around the world that coordination amongst INGOs has at times led to their own disempowerment, as they feel they have no choice regarding who works in their community and what is provided. Division of territory, a common form of ‘coordination’, has limited the types and quantities of assistance available to communities (CDA 2008b). And what if efforts are aligned in the wrong direction?

More importantly, cooperation and coordination may not be required at all for cumulative impact. There is evidence that uncoordinated and unconnected activities can ‘add up’, as they have in Northern Ireland and South Africa, where significant progress toward (although clearly not achievement of) Peace Writ Large has been made (CDA 2008a). There is a need to think more broadly than coordination, cooperation and joint efforts. We recommend thinking in terms of *linkages*, which would include coordination and joint efforts, but also much more, such as:

- Promotion of balanced and synchronous progress in different arenas;
- Identification and linkage (explicit, through coalitions, or not) of convergent agendas;
- Funding mechanisms and processes that broaden participation and offer mechanisms for people to see themselves as ‘actors’ in the peace process (such as a Peace Fund in Northern Ireland offering grants to small projects, the Peace Committees in South Africa, televised proceedings of reconciliation processes, etc.);
- Linkage of efforts promoting individual/personal-level change (attitudes, skills, behaviours) to activities and efforts at the socio-political level (policies, structures, processes, collective action), either within programmes, through cooperation or by building on work done by others;
- Conceptual linkage, promoting greater understanding of the complementarity of roles and activities;

- Linkage of ‘more people’ to ‘key people’. Civil society peacebuilding efforts often work with ‘more people’ – the grassroots, local communities, citizens, civil society. Some also work with ‘key people’ – people or groups who are key to the continuation or transformation of a conflict. These may include government officials or agencies, corporations, militias, religious leaders, youth or others, depending on the context. RPP has found that the failure to link efforts and processes with more and key people, and failure to link Track II and Track I efforts are major contributors to the failure of peacebuilding to ‘add up’. These linkages can take a variety of forms – from parallel efforts at the political and community levels, to ‘peace committees’ such as those in South Africa involving citizens with government and other actors in dealing with violence, to ‘peace funds’ such as those implemented in Northern Ireland, in which European Union money was made available (through government) for peace related activities while the negotiations were taking place and afterwards (Fitzduff/Williams 2007).

4. Conclusion

It is clear that the consensus that RPP found about what Peace Writ Large is – encompassing both stopping violence and promoting just and sustainable peace through social change – is too broad and vague to drive effectiveness. In this article, we have tried to emphasize the importance of the way practitioners engage with these questions for turning these reflections into action, given the reality that peacebuilding practice is ‘all over the map’ both literally, in terms of places, types of conflict, levels and sectors of action, methodologies and activities, and figuratively, in terms of the motivations and goals of programmes. It is important to engage deeply in reflection and discussion about the peacebuilding agenda. But we also need to be much more specific and much more focused on the context. We need to talk not only about *what* the agenda is, but also *how* the agenda is developed. Have we done an adequate analysis of the conflict and are we working on things that will really make a difference? Have we thought through difficult questions of who the ‘community’ is and who is being served (and not) by the agenda? Have we fully utilised the resources available to peace practitioners? Have we developed synergies between diverse roles of different actors? Have we explored linkages, and thought about where joint action would be appropriate and useful?

These are the types of questions that need to be thought through in practice. There is no one right answer. There is still much to learn – both about what kinds of changes bring about true transformation, and about how the myriad and diverse peace efforts of peacebuilders can ‘add up’ to Peace Writ Large.

5. References

- Anderson, Mary and Lara Olson 2003. *Confronting War. Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners*. Cambridge, MA: CDA Collaborative Learning Projects.
- Abeygunawardana, Kanaka and Farzana Haniffa 2008 (forthcoming). "Cumulative Impact of Peace Work in Sri Lanka: Conceptualizing Peace beyond Parties to the War." RPP Case Study. Cambridge, MA: CDA.
- Anderson, Mary, Diana Chigas and Peter Woodrow 2007. "Encouraging Effective Evaluation of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities: Towards DAC Guidance." Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC). Available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/3/39660852.pdf.
- Brown, Dayna 2007. *L'ecoute, premier gage de qualite de tout projet humanitaire*, in: Newsletter of Le Groupe Urgence - Rehabilitation - Developpement (Groupe URD), April 2007.
- CDA 2008a. "Consultation Report: Understanding Cumulative Impacts." Report of the first Consultation of a Collaborative Learning Effort on Understanding Cumulative Impacts. Cambridge, MA: CDA.
- CDA 2008b. "Relationships in the Aid System." Listening Project Issue Paper. Cambridge, MA: CDA (Unpublished).
- Chigas, Diana 1997. Unofficial Interventions with Official Actors: Parallel Negotiation Training in Violent Intra-state Conflicts, in: *International Negotiation* 2, 409-436.
- Dudouet, Véronique 2008. Nonviolent Resistance and Conflict Transformation in Power Asymmetries, in: *Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation*, Online Version. Berlin: Berghof Research Center. Available at www.berghof-handbook.net/uploads/download/dudouet_handbook.pdf.
- Fisher, Roger and William Ury 1981. *Getting to Yes. Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In*. New York: Penguin Books.
- Fisher, Simon and Lada Zimina 2009. Just Wasting Our Time? Provocative Thoughts for Peacebuilders, in: Beatrix Schmelzle and Martina Fischer (eds.). *Peacebuilding at a Crossroads? Dilemmas and Paths for Another Generation*. (Berghof Handbook Dialogue No. 7.) Berlin: Berghof Research Center, 11-35. Also available at www.berghof-handbook.net/std_page.php?LANG=e&id=5. [A longer version was published in March 2008 as *Just Wasting Our Time? An Open Letter to Peacebuilders*, available online at <http://lettertopeacebuilders.ning.com>.]
- Fitzduff, Niall and Sue Williams 2007. "How Did Northern Ireland Move Toward Peace?" RPP Case Study. Cambridge, MA: CDA.
- Ghali, Boutros Boutros 1995. *An Agenda for Peace*. New York: United Nations Department of Public Information. Available at www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html and www.un.org/Docs/SG/agsupp.html.
- Hadjipavlou, Maria and Bulent Kanol 2008. "The Impacts of Peacebuilding Work on the Cyprus Conflict." RPP Case Study. Nicosia and Cambridge, MA: CDA.
- OECD-DAC 2007. *Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities*. Paris: OECD-DAC. Available at www.oecd.org/secure/pdfDocument/0,2834,en_21571361_34047972_39774574_1_1_1_1,00.pdf.

- Shapiro, Ilana 2006. Extending the Framework of Inquiry: Theories of Change in Conflict Interventions, in: David Bloomfield, Martina Fischer and Beatrix Schmelzle (eds.). *Social Change and Conflict Transformation*. (Berghof Handbook Dialogue No. 5.) Berlin: Berghof Research Center, 61-68. Available online at www.berghof-handbook.net/uploads/download/dialogue5_sochange_complete.pdf.
- Wohlgemuth, Lennart 2001. "NGO Participation in Conflict Prevention in Burundi." RPP Case Study. Cambridge, MA: CDA.
- Woodrow, Peter 2006. "Advancing Practice in Conflict Analysis and Strategy Development." Cambridge, MA: CDA. Available at www.cdainc.com/cdawww/pdf/article/RPP%20Article%20Conflict%20Analysis%2020060101.pdf.

All CDA material is available at www.cdainc.com.

[All weblinks accessed 8 January 2009.]

The Authors

Diana Chigas is co-director (with Peter Woodrow) of the Reflecting on Peace Practice (RPP) project at CDA Collaborative Learning Projects and professor of the practice of negotiation and conflict resolution at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, USA. At CDA she has been concentrating on RPP's engagement with the Balkans, especially Kosovo, and led an assessment of the impact of peacebuilding policies and activities on the violence that occurred in 2004 in Kosovo. Prior to joining CDA, Diana Chigas worked as a facilitator, trainer and consultant in negotiation, dialogue and conflict resolution, including on preventive diplomacy in the OSCE, on conflict management in Cyprus, on Track II discussions in El Salvador, in South Africa, Ecuador and Peru and in the Georgia/South Ossetia peace process. Contact: DChigas@cdainc.com; more information: www.cdainc.com.

Peter Woodrow is co-director (with Diana Chigas) of the Reflecting on Peace Practice (RPP) project at CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA. In this position, he has been concentrating on engagement with governments and NGOs in the Great Lakes Region of Africa, particularly Burundi, Rwanda and the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. He is an experienced mediator, facilitator, trainer and consultant, skilled in negotiation, collaborative problem-solving and dispute resolution systems design. He has also developed and implemented international programmes in consensus-building, problem-solving, decision-making and inter-ethnic conflict resolution in Asia, Africa and Eastern Europe. Contact: pwoodrow@cdainc.com; more information: www.cdainc.com.

See also...

This article has been published as part of Berghof Handbook Dialogue No. 7, *Peacebuilding at a Crossroads? Dilemmas and Paths for Another Generation* (2009). Hardcopies of the complete version, including the following articles, can be ordered at the Berghof Research Center (order@berghof-center.org):

- Martina Fischer and Beatrix Schmelzle, *Introduction*
- Simon Fisher and Lada Zimina, *Just Wasting Our Time? Provocative Thoughts for Peacebuilders*
- Louis Kriesberg, *Making Good Use of the Time: Contributions and Dilemmas of Non-governmental Actors in Peacebuilding*
- Diana Chigas and Peter Woodrow, *Envisioning and Pursuing Peace Writ Large*
- Martina Weitsch, *Mobilizing Public Opinion for Peace: The Next Challenge for the Peacebuilding Communities*
- Goran Bozicevic, *Reflections on Peacebuilding from Croatia*
- Ulrike Hopp and Barbara Unger, *Time to Learn: Expanding Organisational Capacities in Conflict Settings*
- Martina Fischer, *Participatory Evaluation and Critical Peace Research: A Precondition for Peacebuilding*
- Simon Fisher and Lada Zimina, *Reflections on the Comments: Responses and More Queries.*

Downloads of all articles are available free of charge on our website (www.berghof-handbook.net).

Please note: An online forum for further discussion has been established by Lada Zimina and Simon Fisher at www.lettertopeacebuilders.ning.com.