COLLABORATIVE LEARNING PROJECTS

DO NO HARM PROJECT

Do No Harm in Somalia

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COLLABORATIVE LEARNING PROJECTS

This document was developed as part of a collaborative learning project directed by CDA. It is part of a collection of documents that should be considered initial and partial findings of the project. These documents are written to allow for the identification of cross-cutting issues and themes across a range of situations. Each case represents the views and perspectives of a variety of people at the time when it was written.

These documents do not represent a final product of the project. While these documents may be cited, they remain working documents of a collaborative learning effort. Broad generalizations about the project's findings cannot be made from a single case.

CDA would like to acknowledge the generosity of the individuals and agencies involved in donating their time, experience and insights for these reports, and for their willingness to share their experiences.

Not all the documents written for any project have been made public. When people in the area where a report has been done have asked us to protect their anonymity and security, in deference to them and communities involved, we keep those documents private.

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FOREWORD

As this case study was being written, famine again threatened many parts of Somalia.

In May of 2008, *The New York Times* reported, "there has been a collision of trouble in the region: skimpy rainfall, disastrous harvests, soaring food prices, dying livestock, escalating violence, out-of-control inflation and shrinking food aid because of many of these factors…People are left to the mercies of the desert…the winds are harsh, throats are dry.

"Beyond the warlords and clan fighting there is now a budding conflict with Western aid worker…recent American attacks on an Islamist leader…have spawned a wave of revenge threats against Western aid workers." [1]

On 19 August 2008, in an Op-Ed for *The New York Times*, Samantha Power laid out a persuasive argument that both international and local staff working for the UN and NGOs has become targets everywhere, including Somalia. "Al Qaeda," she writes," and other groups, have said that the United Nations is a priority target".[2] She also quotes the UN´s own post-action report after 17 UN staff was killed in Algeria in December 2007: "The UN has no capacity to predict attacks." Meanwhile, the Somali militant Islamic group Shabab blacklisted several NGOs, including CARE, which have programs critical to the survival of an increasingly desperate population.

The UN and private aid organizations have responded by saying it is now too dangerous to expand their life-saving work. "We are in a different contextual environment right now," said Chris Smoot of World Vision, "…anti-Western rough elements…can shut you down, in any shape or form, at any time." To underscore the severity of the situation, the UN Security Council, traveling to the region in May 2008 to discuss Somalia, were sufficiently fearful of the country's security situation to meet in neighboring Djibouti rather than inside Somalia.

This security quagmire brings forth the dilemma: While Do No Harm is more critical than ever, it is also becoming far more difficult to disseminate the old-fashioned way—using local and international staff being brought in to formally teach workshops or other means to spread the word. Instead, people living on the village level, using local language teaching tools must somehow be empowered to develop and nurture the ideology behind DNH. This is certainly the case in Somalia.

INTRODUCTION

In 2006, the Do No Harm Project of CDA Collaborative Learning Projects (CDA) set out to determine how Do No Harm (DNH) was being used in the world and whether that use was leading to more effective programming decisions. A series of *Reflective Case Studies* was written in multiple countries to determine how practitioners in those places are learning, thinking about, using and spreading DNH. Some organizations are experienced and effective in applying Do No Harm principles and framework to their work, while others are struggling. This

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[1] Gettleman, Jeffery, "Famine Looms as Wars Rend Horn of Africa," *The New York Times*, May 17, 2008.
[2] Power, Samantha, "For Terrorists, a War on Aid Groups," *The New York Times*, August 19, 2008.

range of experience provides valuable lessons. Whether implementing Do No Harm in their daily work, in their program design and monitoring, or in shaping policies and organizational procedures, the cases look at where in their work people find it easy to use Do No Harm, where they find roadblocks, and how (or if) they overcame them.

While DNH is widely utilized in some countries, it has not taken hold in others, such as Somalia. Our mission is to understand why. Could it be that Somalia is intrinsically a more complicated place to introduce and disseminate DNH than in other violence-prone areas of the world? Are agencies and local communities in Somalia resistant to DNH in ways that impede its introduction and dissemination?

In our conversations with dozens of people familiar with DNH in both Kenya and in Somalia over a three-week period in March and April of 2008, we concluded that Somalia does face many unique circumstances that require equally unique approaches to the dissemination of DNH.

METHODOLOGY

Traveling in the Gedo[3] and the Bakool regions of South Central Somalia as part of this study, we held conversations with international NGO staff working in Somalia, their implementing partners and members of the local communities.[4] Many with whom we spoke had not heard of DNH or their familiarity with DNH was very spotty. We also made a point of seeking out agencies, including UN agencies, which do not practice DNH—even though they sometimes refer to DNH in their mission statements or in their stated Humanitarian Principles. Finally, we spoke to individuals who make serious efforts to practice DNH in their work in Somalia. These people are employed by some of the biggest humanitarian agencies, many of which are faith-based.

Despite the cost and logistical hurdles of visiting Somalia, we were determined to make field visits there and not limit our inquiries to Nairobi, where many of the agencies operating inside Somalia are headquartered. Traveling to Somalia permitted us to speak with individuals and groups, including implementing partner NGOs, which are deeply involved in the aid processes inside Somalia, yet rarely travel outside the country. Among the groups with whom we especially wanted to speak with were community groups and local authorities. We also spent time in the small Kenyan border town of Mandera,[5] located near the point at which Somalia, Kenya, and Ethiopia meet.

For security reasons, much of Puntland, and areas of South Somalia, including Mogadishu, were off-limits. So were sections of Somaliland, which at the time had recently clashed with neighboring Puntland. Traveling to Somaliland was deemed unnecessary as the international agencies working there also had operations in the parts of Somalia to which we had better access, namely the provinces of Gedo and Bakool. Two agencies, World Vision in Bakool, and the Norwegian Church Aid in Gedo, acted as our hosts and arranged for us to travel widely and

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[3] In December 2008 Al-Shabab mujahidin fighters, chasing away the Somali Transitional Government, took control of Garbahare, Bardera, and Baledhawo, and are now said to turn their focus on Luuq and Doolow.
[4] For a complete list, please go to Appendix 1.
[5] For security considerations, many NGOs have offices in the Mandera area, a strategic location allowing them to move across the border of Somalia as the situation demands.

visit local communities and aid agencies—both NGOs and UN agencies. We are immensely grateful to all those who took time out of their busy schedules to meet with us.

The intent of our visit was to learn the extent of use of DNH in Somalia. What presence does it have there? Are NGOs, UN agency project staff, and the local communities familiar with DNH and its analytical framework? If so, do they *practice* the full, formal weight of the framework, or are certain elements (i.e. Connectors[6] and Dividers[7]) better understood and thus more widely used than other aspects of the framework? What are the challenges or obstacles to its application and subsequent mainstreaming? Is the application of DNH driven by eager individuals or by agencies as a whole? By answering some of these questions, CDA hopes, in part, that DNH over time can become a more nuanced tool—one that can be applied with greater precision, under a variety of circumstances, and by a larger range of agencies and groups possessing different strengths. DNH, now in its second decade, is not a static, one-size-fits-all tool, but a living, evolving, process whose full potential has yet to be unlocked. In fact, this realization is one of the reasons for the reflective case studies series.

We did not use questionnaires, but instead engaged in conversations based on the above issues. In our discussions with Somalis, we relied largely, but not always, on Somali interpreters.

We also contacted several other agencies in Nairobi who have programs in Somalia or in Somaliland. We expected to discuss DNH with staff from these agencies, but discovered in preliminary conversations that few had been trained in DNH, or had any knowledge or opinions of DNH that might have contributed to the case study. Due to time limitations, we decided not to pursue these interviews. While in Mandera and Somalia, however, we made a point of interviewing agency staff from all agencies and local groups, regardless of their familiarity with DNH.

Finally, all of us have been involved with Do No Harm for many years. Millicent Otieno has extensive experience as a DNH workshop facilitator in East Africa, along with Davies Owino, who has worked as a DNH trainer in Somalia as well. With his long exposure to DNH, Sam Engelstad has lived in Somalia as a humanitarian staff member, and occasional consultant, for the UN. Ms.

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[6] Most societies contain moderating influences that prevent disagreements from breaking into violence. Although they may be divided by conflict, people also may remain tied together across sub-group lines. In DNH terminology, these ties are called <u>Connectors</u>. In planning and executing projects, every effort must be made to strengthen these (or, at the very least, not weaken them). Typical Connectors may include shared schools and other social services, religion, sports, intermarriage, and common workplace.

[7] <u>Dividers</u> are sources of tension that divides individuals, groups, and communities. Some may be rooted in deep-seated, historical injustice, while others may be recent, short-lived or manipulated by sub-group leaders. They may arise from many sources, including economic relations, geography, demography, politics or religion. Some may be entirely internal to a society; others may be promoted by outside powers. They may include militias, which may favor one group over another, legal systems that discriminate, police stopping one group but not others at checkpoints, agriculturalists and pastoralists using land differently, religious laws being imposed on people not of that religion, and so on. Understanding what divides people is critical to understanding how aid programs feed into, or lessen, divisions and social tension.

Otieno and Mr. Engelstad did the actual interviewing and the gathering and organizing of data for this study, which took place in between 26 March and 12 April 2008.

SOMALIA BACKGROUND

Located at the Horn of Africa, Somalia[8], at 637, 657 sq km, has four major regions. In the northwest is the former British protectorate, Somaliland, which unilaterally declared itself independent after the collapse of the Somali Republic in 1991. To the northeast is Puntland, also nominally independent (unrecognized). Finally, there is South-Central Somalia, which includes the fertile agricultural areas of the Lower Juba and Shabelle rivers, and the areas around the capital Mogadishu. The population, more than nine million, is largely Islamic, and, with the exception of farmers in south-central areas, its people are largely nomadic and pastoral. With the longest coastline in Africa, fishing has traditionally been an important economic activity. This knowledge of the seas, however, has in some areas lead to large-scale pirating along the major international shipping lanes in the Gulf of Aden, along Somalia´s east coast, and even far out to sea, in the Indian Ocean.

During the colonial era, Somalia was divided among several powers, including Ethiopia, which controlled areas to the west, and France, which ruled what is now Djibouti, to the northwest. The British held the areas near today's Kenya and (British) Somaliland in the north. South Central (including Mogadishu) and Central Somalia were controlled by Italy.

In 1960, much of Somalia gained its independence when the British and Italian territories became the Republic of Somalia. For the first nine years Somalia was a multiparty democracy, though it was troubled by gridlock and corruption among contending groups. Then, in 1969, General Siad Barre, in a military coup, replaced the government with a socialist regime, and Somalia became a client state of the Soviet Union. With Russian aid, Siad Barre built up a huge national army that he led into a disastrous war against Ethiopia in the 1977-78 Ogaden War, losing more than 200,000 men. These losses spawned many serious internal conflicts and resulted in several failed coups by disaffected clans and their militias. Retaliating against one of the groups, the Isaaq clan in northwest Somalia, Barre's army killed 60,000 people and obliterated Somaliland's largest city Hargeisa, in an air bombardment. In all, some three-quarter of a million people either fled to Ethiopia or became displaced.

The violence brought forth waves of instability, which in turn led to political repression. Barre soon switched his allegiance from the Soviet Union to the United States. As the Cold War waned, and Barre's brutality showed few signs of abating, the United States began to reduce its support of Barre. Then, in 1990, Siad Barre attacked the Hawiye clan, which dominated the Mogadishu area. This led the Hawiye clan to overthrow Barre.

In 1991, Barre fled the capital with his elite militia; wreaking devastation as he fought his way towards the west and south before finding refuge in Kenya, and eventually Nigeria. The cycles of violence that occurred during Barre's regime, and his flight across the country, helped to bring about the great famine in 1991 and 1992, prompting its widespread international humanitarian intervention.

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[8] See map of Somalia, http://www.africa.upenn.edu/CIA_Maps/Somalia_19881.gif

Meanwhile, Barre's two principal Hawiye antagonists in Mogadishu, the businessman Ali Mahdi Muhammad, and General Farrah Aidid, fell into disagreements leading to further cycles of conflict, in which north and south Mogadishu were partitioned and warfare, looting, and general lawlessness, demolished the city. Since that time, a mix of warlords and their militias, and sometimes-Islamic groups, have ruled Mogadishu and many parts of Somalia.

There has been no effective central government in Somalia since Barre's fall, despite many attempts to form one, including the establishment of the clan-based Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2004. Instead, the country, with the exception of Somaliland (which considers itself independent, though it remains unrecognized by the UN and the rest of the international community), has suffered 17 years of anarchy and warfare. Looting and land theft became the norm. According to a 2004 report by the World Bank, in the first decade after Barre's fall, the conflict produced, "powerful interests, which perpetuated lawlessness and blocked reconciliation."[9] It also produced warlords, whose power depended on a chronic state of insecurity and fear, so that their clan constituencies continue to need them for protection. Illiterate gunmen saw war, plunder, and extortion as their only livelihood. Moreover, "war-related criminal activities such as weapons sales, and the diversions of food-aid and drug production, enriched some businessmen...whole clans, finding themselves in possession of valuable urban and riverine real estate won by conquest, which they stood to lose in a peace settlement, continued to have a vested interest in the ongoing violence." [10]

It is estimated that a quarter of a million or more Somalis died in the 1991-92 famine and as a result of the conflicts. Hundreds of thousands fled the country or became displaced.

Stepping into this power vacuum were the Islamist Courts, introducing a new equation into the Somali context. The Courts provided their own brand of social insurance, security, stability and justice. Many people, sick of the ongoing violence, came to admire and support the Courts. But the Courts also provoked dislike and opposition because of their conformist demands, vested interests, and poor treatment of women. The resulting discontent led to a new and violent dimension of the conflict – including the invasion and occupation by Ethiopia. After a disastrous tenure, in which increasingly violent and uncompromisingly militant groups within the Islamic Courts took control of many parts of southern and central Somalia, Ethiopia began to withdraw its forces from Somalia in late 2008. The withdrawal created yet another power-vacuum in which various Islamic groups, including the Shabab, widely considered to be the least moderate group, began to fight amongst themselves for control.

Since 1991, the ongoing humanitarian assistance programs by the international community have been characterized by the intervention of external NGOs, and by the UN, including UNOSOM 2, a large UN operation that withdrew from Somalia in 1995. The operation injected massive amounts of resources into Somalia with little thought of how such external resources would affect the relationships among the competing forces in this conflict-prone country. It played

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[9] The World Bank, "Conflict in Somalia: Drivers and Dynamics," Washington, DC. 2005. This section also draws on reports by the Center of Research and Dialogue (2004), the Development Research Center (2004), the Center for Creative Solutions (2004), and on I.M. Lewis' pioneering work on the Somali clan system, including *A Pastoral Democracy*, London. Oxford University Press, 1961.
[10] Ibid.

into the pattern of clan opportunism, feeding competition among clans. As the flow of external resources into Somalia began to dwindle, the competition for them continued to feed the cycle of conflict—the effects of which are still being felt today.

For almost 18 years, international aid agencies have provided social services, which ordinarily would have been provided by the central government and, in doing so, contributed to a dependency on their programs. External NGOs, many of which have tried to create *sustainable* social service institutions, are effectively being run over by much larger multilateral and bilateral aid agencies. Responding to international public pressure and political agendas, these agencies have often applied generic aid efforts to unique problems. Worse, they have given inadequate consideration to the potential destructive competition their efforts have created among aid recipients—thus exacerbating the ongoing conflicts.

There are some fundamental political reasons which explain in part why Somalia has fallen to instability and manipulation, and why it is such a difficult country in which to carry out humanitarian activities. Many of the legacies of the Barre era relate directly to this process. They include the wars discussed above, which, as the World Bank Report states, continue to, "fuel conflict in contemporary Somalia" [11] and Somalia's client-state relationships during the Cold War. The report continues, "the state was oppressive and exploitative, and how it was used by some political leaders to dominate others, monopolize state resources, and appropriate valuable land and other assets. As a result, reconciliation and power-sharing discussions in Somalia are complicated by high levels of distrust and a 'zero-sum game' mentality about political power and the state."[12] The writers make the point that::

"The leadership skillfully manipulated and politicized clan identity for over two decades of divide-and-rule politics, leaving a legacy of deep clan divisions and grievances". [13]

Therefore, to understand DNH's role in Somalia it is vital to understand Somalia´s clan identity – which permeates all aspects of its life.

CLANS AND CLAN IDENTITY

Nearly all armed conflicts in contemporary Somalia break out along clan lines.[14] Clan identities "are not static and fixed, but are shaped and manipulated according to changing situations. They are not inherently conflictual, but rather clan identities can be manipulated purposefully to acquire control over resources and power. Warlords and divisive leaders emphasize differences among clans and formulate approaches that play on those differences. In a typical us-versus-them scenario to stress distinctive identity, warlords are instrumental in invoking loyalty to raise or lower the level of identity from clan to sub-clan, to sub-sub-clan, and back again, depending on what is most convenient."[15]

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[11] Ibid. p. 10

[12] Ibid. p. 10

[13] Ibid. p. 10

[14] Davies, Jack L. *Reunification of the Somali People*. Institute for Development Research and Development Politics, University of Ruhr, 1996.

[15] Please see footnote 4

Thus, “different clan identities are used as a tool to mobilize clan members when in conflict. In this way, clan and sub-clan differences can be a force for division and fragmentation, particularly when manipulated for political purposes. It was during Barre’s post-independent period that manipulations of clan identities for economic and political ends became prominent.”[16]

But clans also “remain a potential source of reconciliation because of their ability to shape relations among warring groups. Instead of focusing on differences, such common bonds as language, religion, tradition and inter-clan marriage, can unite Somalis. Clan elders use traditional laws to settle disputes in non-confrontational ways. In fact, in the absence of state authority…clan elders use customary laws to bring about negotiated settlements and prevent conflict escalation.”[17] In recent years, perhaps in part as a legacy of UNOSOM and external agency presence over 18 years, “clan and sub-clan conflicts increasingly have been countered by efforts of civil society organizations, business, and local initiatives. These have formed across clan-lines and even religious structures, and they work towards development and peace, helping to build trust and overcome suspicion among clans.”[18]

HISTORY OF DO NO HARM IN SOMALIA

Aid organizations found out about Do No Harm (or Local Capacities for Peace, as it was then known) in different ways. One of the international NGOs working in Somalia, Action Africa Help International (AAH-I) learned about the tool through one of its donors, the German Church Service (EED), which for some time had been a part of the DNH process. EED established its Local Capacities for Peace Project in the Horn of Africa to facilitate it among its partner organizations. Its director at the time, Dr. Vivian Erasmus, initially used it in its programs in Kenya, Uganda and the Sudan programs, and he later introduced the concept to the AAH-I Somalia program. He was also instrumental in organizing DNH presentations to the other organizations working on or in Somalia, including the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB), Concern Worldwide, the EC Humanitarian Office (ECHO), and UNICEF. He gave talks and presentations about DNH in different coordination forum, and, citing his own successful experience with the tool during interventions in Sudan, he urged members of the humanitarian agencies working in Somalia to adopt Do No Harm.

In September 2002, Wendy Carson of Concern Worldwide organized the first DNH workshop for humanitarian staff and selected community leaders in Mogadishu. The workshop facilitators, Ambrose Ongwen and Rolf Grafe, endured the limitations caused by tight security to provide the much-needed tool to the workshop participants. When Wendy Carson soon afterwards left Concern Worldwide to join the SACB, an additionally planned workshop was cancelled.

In February 2003, the SACB conducted a DNH workshop for its members in Nairobi. It was Wendy Carson’s idea that the workshop would lead to a series of additional training sessions for humanitarian staff and communities in Somalia. She believed that this would lead to the systematic use and mainstreaming of DNH. Many who attended the workshop expressed the desire to have the additional and in-depth training necessary to practice the tool. However, no

[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.

concrete steps were taken to do so. Once the interested staff members left their organizations, the interest in DNH faded away. Further, it is unclear if DNH was ever put to use, even by those participants who seemed to have appreciated its relevance and usefulness to their work in Somalia.

In late 2003, a number of meetings took place between the DNH Project (Local Capacities for Peace Project) in the Horn of Africa, and the ECHO office, in an attempt to plan a workshop for Echo's own staff working in Somalia. After several meetings, correspondences, and follows-up by Dr. Erasmus, a two-hour DNH presentation to the heads of departments and various coordinators was made in ECHO´s Nairobi office. It was decided to stock the DNH text, *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace—or War*[19], for ECHO´s resource centre, and to request further DNH training. However, this was never prioritized by ECHO, and, before long, the initial enthusiasm evaporated.

Most of the agencies saw the value of DNH in improving their service delivery, and minimizing the negative impact of their assistance, but cited the emergency situation in the field as a barrier to carving out sufficient time for overloaded staff to take part in DNH trainings. While this remained a big challenge, self-imposed and complex bureaucratic barriers and procedures presented additional obstacles, often making it impossible for DNH to be prioritized. Such obstacles were especially frequent within UN bodies.

Many of the organizations that have attempted to systematically use, and apply, DNH in Somalia (and in Somaliland) have tended to be faith-based agencies such as the Norwegian Church Aid Somalia (NCA), World Vision International Somalia, and Action Africa Help International (AAH-I). This does not mean that there is no DNH presence among secular agencies. In tracing the spread of DNH in Somalia, several trainers noted that organizations such as Oxfam have integrated DNH into their participatory and conflict resolution approaches during various training session. In the past, Halima Shuria, a Somali DNH trainer, has introduced DNH to several agencies. She has also focused on using Dividers and Connectors during her trainings among local communities in Somalia. Perhaps as a result, there is a growing interest among community members to receive more training.

WHAT IS USEFUL ABOUT DO NO HARM?

In Somalia, enthusiasm for Do No Harm runs deep, and among both Somalis and international humanitarian staff. What is more, the members of the local village councils and local authorities shared this passion. People we spoke with remembered that workshops on DNH-related issues were usually heavily attended.

Many aspects of life in Somalia illustrate a need for DNH—poverty, militias and the violent scramble for resources. Several people, local and non-Somalis alike, noted DNH's potential in the context of Food For Work, which has a history of being used for financial gain by criminals and ordinary people alike. For instance, we were told that food gained through FFW was

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[19]Anderson, Mary B., *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – Or War*. Boulder. Lynne Reinner Publishers, Inc. 1999

sometimes brought to the town markets and exchanged for bullets. Some noted that DNH could be an ideal tool to help mitigate such misuse of assistance. [20]

DNH is Inclusive

DNH does not exacerbate conflict because it includes all the important actors, international and local. This provides a check on whether or not aid is balanced among groups. Many of those interviewed suggested that inclusiveness is particularly critical in Somalia. In Somalia security issues often create big and costly delays, which make planning unpredictable, and threats and violence often prevent international staff from initiating or otherwise participating in the DNH dissemination process. This makes the role of the Somali community member especially critical.

DNH is Cross-cutting

DNH provides a lens though which we can view all sectors of civil society, including water, health and education. In fact, it can be used in almost any context, conflict-related or not.

DNH Provides a Conceptual Approach
DNH helps the agencies, the communities, and the governments to begin sharing an understanding of the challenges of development and humanitarian aid in the midst of conflict.

DNH Prevents Inadvertent Damage
It prevents violent or other serious conflict as a result of the implementation of aid projects.

DNH Focuses on Causes
DNH enables communities to focus on the causes of the conflict, not just the symptoms. DNH changes how communities look at themselves. It promotes equity, a sense of community, and a "give-and-take" mentality.

DNH Supports a General Philosophy of Peace, Reconciliation, and Conflict Resolution
DNH is not fundamentally designed to be a peace-building instrument, but does force the participants to think about peace and conflict. In this light, DNH doubles as a conflict-sensitivity tool, while also focusing on the long-term goal of peace (though merging DNH into peace analysis can sometimes produce negative side effects, as it has in some cases in Somalia). It is also instrumental in conflict transformation—with some components applicable to humanitarian groups and others to the communities. However, as we will discuss later, this dovetailing with peace-building has its drawbacks.

DNH Forces the Participants to Think About the Context
DNH forces participants to think about the Context in which people in conflict areas live and work: what unites people, and what separates them. Without this knowledge, aid can to do more harm than good. Judging from the number of times Conflict Context was brought up in our

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[20] These findings are not inconsistent with the findings of Williams and Natiq in the 2006 Afghanistan case study. We have chosen to list briefly some of their findings here (in bold) because they mirror a pattern consistent with DNH everywhere.
See case study, "Do No Harm in Afghanistan: A Study in Cycles"
http://www.cdainc.com/cdawww/pdf/casestudy/dnh_afghanistan_reflective_case_Pdf.pdf

conversations, it is clear that this is one of those defining images in people's minds when discussing DNH.

DNH Enables Communities and Agencies to Learn, and to Speak, a Common Language
If members of the community receiving the aid have been trained in the language and logic behind Connectors and Dividers, they are likely to develop a more productive partnership with the external aid community. To take full advantage of this potential, however, DNH must be fully translated into, and shaped by, the local vernacular. Only then can it be embedded in the community and its social, political, and economic, structures.

DNH Promotes Dialogue
The dialogue of DNH is highly focused on ways in which to facilitate aid. When asked, many participants appreciated the distinction between the language of conflict-resolution and peace, and that of DNH, which they view as unambiguous, user-friendly, self-evident, exciting, and easy to communicate.

DNH Supports Careful and Well-Designed Resource Transfers
Resource analysis and the avoidance of negative effects—the reflection on *why* and *how* decisions are made to distribute aid in certain ways—always engender much discussion. It does not matter where in the world, such decisions lie at the heart of humanitarian aid, and everyone who has been an aid provider can recount his or her own stories about when the processes went haywire. Some degree of inter-group competition is inevitable, but its severity depends on the amount and type of resources provided, how they are distributed and who makes the decisions about their allocation. DNH supports intelligent resource transfers by providing information about a context that constitutes *de facto* guidelines that do much to facilitate this process in an orderly, transparent and accountable way.

DNH Is a Great Planning Tool
Beyond the planning stages, DNH encourages ongoing monitoring and corrections of many aspects of a project as it moves through its cycle. The ability of the project staff to monitor the process throughout makes for easier evaluation at the end of the project. In our discussions, we noted how this aspect of DNH appeals to program managers and makes it palatable to those who might otherwise have avoided DNH.

DNH Strengthens Legitimate Local Groups
This connector is mentioned in conversations about DNH everywhere.
Somalia is an extraordinarily difficult country in which to determine the groups that possess legitimate authority. By Somali standards, many groups speak, or claim to speak, with great *authority*. Yet these groups may fail to be truly representative of everyone in the village, district or region. After many years of a percolating toxic brew of inter-clan conflict and manipulation, *authority* in Somalia has often become confused with *powe*r, and vise versa. Authority is often measured by a clan's ability to acquire wealth (including criminal means), and by exploiting weaker clans, displaced populations, farmers not aligned with the traditional clan system (e.g.Bantus) and other minorities. Thus, aid workers may hold discussions with one group without understanding the local context of that group at their project's peril—and at the peril of those they are in Somalia to serve. This is a reality many agencies face when starting up operations in Somalia

However, in the wake of the most brutal periods of the civil war there are areas where civil society in Somalia has had some success in bucking this negative trend. Using DNH, agencies can do much to bolster the creation and legitimization of truly representative groups. NGOs, with their community-based orientation, have an advantage in this regard. Many UN agencies, on the other hand, are oftentimes not in a position to take advantage of these local capacities, regardless of their staff's commitment to such principles. As intergovernmental bodies, UN agencies answer first and foremost to their member states, which often impose inflexible policies and guidelines (including the hiring of local staff and vehicles).

Effective DNH dissemination demands an organizational commitment from top to bottom. DNH must be embedded in an agency's policies and operational agenda. Without being completely and organically embedded, its impact will remain inconsistent.

As previously noted, practicing DNH in Somalia involves unique challenges, including difficult logistics, insecurity, clan-based opportunism, and lack of a national government. Another challenge lies in agencies' tendency to unwittingly marginalize DNH vis-à-vis their general peacemaking activities. These problems must be acknowledged and discussed by agencies' leadership as part of its overall DNH training regime. The leadership also bears a special responsibility to collaborate better with other agency heads to promote and disseminate DNH in Somalia, and to provide training. Yet such collaboration is rare on many issues—including DNH.

DO NO HARM TRAINING

Somalia suffers from many unusual constraints, which govern the way DNH is being trained. Somalia consists of numerous regions divided by their individual histories and mutual distrust of each other, making travel between regions difficult or impossible. Also, roads are often impassible, or dangerous to travel. Many non-Somali staff are required by agency headquarters and national governments to use armed escorts, which often cannot travel through territories of competing clans. In addition, escorts are expensive and, in DNH analysis, promote negative implicit ethical messages. Therefore, to travel between these regions often requires separate trips by air from Nairobi.

Security and logistical problems are sometimes exacerbated by the rules and regulations imposed on NGOs by funding governments. Heightened security measures are often fueled by worry about national media exposure and domestic political fallout. For example, when a European national was recently shot and killed in Mogadishu, the government of that national responded by placing restrictions on all nationals traveling in and out of Somalia. In addition, ECHO and the UN frequently suspend flights to and from Somalia pending the resolution of security issues. Such delays force staff and consultants wait in Nairobi, and postpone all planned activities on the ground in Somalia.

Due to the stringent security measures of bilateral and multilateral agencies, local community-based organizations (CBOs)provide the only certain programming continuity as international staff come and go. They also shape the degree to which DNH is adopted and used, especially in the long-term. Unless local communities themselves are responsible for DNH training, the process may be suddenly interrupted while outside trainers or other critical personnel are stuck outside Somalia.

Over the past years, DNH training has been done in several parts of Somalia with much of the training carried out by consultants or in-house staff belonging to individual NGOs without much cross-consultation. Prominent among these have been World Vision International, the Norwegian Church Aid, and Care (through PACT) – but these agencies have operated without much cross-consultation.

However, other NGOs, which have in the past practiced DNH elsewhere, find it hard to practice DNH in Somalia. They cite many reasons, including the logistical and security constraints discussed above. Some agencies have provided training for communities only, but not for their implementing partners or their own staff.

In 2006, the Norwegian Church Aid held a DNH workshop in Gedo as part of its general peace and conflict resolution efforts. According to NCA´s staff, there were some serious problems associated with this integrated approach, which consisted of three workshops at three different locations. Several hundred staff and community participants attended these workshops. However, no teaching aids in the Somali language were used, and the training was a broad mix of conflict resolution, peace building, gender and DNH. Interviewed two years later, few of the workshop participants were able to distinguish between terminology related to "peace and conflict" from that of DNH. When asked which aspects of DNH they liked, the answers ranged from "awareness" to "justice" to "Resource and Problem" to "community mapping." None of these concepts are integral to the DNH Framework.

Some people who participated in DNH workshops suggested that DNH training should be conducted separately from peace and conflict resolution workshops. They suggested that this procedure might require removing DNH from the peace units of agencies altogether so as not to confuse DNH with conflict resolution and peace work. However, the leader of a peace unit at one large NGO, while agreeing in principle, doubted that such separation would be possible. He noted that peace and conflict resolution activities never attract much funding from the donors. DNH, on the other hand, is high on many donors' lists of priorities. By mixing them into one unit, peace and conflict resolution activities benefit financially from their close association with DNH, but not necessarily vice versa. The implications are clear: DNH mostly becomes a mechanism to fund for the organization's broader peace activities -- not one to further DNH itself.

One consultant familiar with DNH training in Somalia argued that unless top managers of agencies practicing DNH demonstrate a relentless commitment to DNH and fully participate in workshops, a gulf will likely form between agency management and the staff charged with implementing and disseminating DNH. This institutional disconnect negatively affects DNH´s ability to take root within the agency's culture. He added, "Concepts alone, while beautifully expressed by so many agency leaders, do not in themselves enable DNH to take root within an agency." Another NGO staff in Gedo echoed, "Where there is no [DNH] knowledge, policies or practices at headquarters level, *there will be no trickle down effect*."

In our conversations, we were often struck by how many agencies working in Somalia, while themselves familiar with DNH, were oblivious to each other's DNH training activities.

We also found that a few local implementing partner agencies (LIPs), after being exposed to DNH training, came away from the experience with considerable enthusiasm. This enthusiasm was generated by international NGOs, which have sought to infuse DNH into the participatory community process. But, lacking coherent follow-up strategies, the enthusiasm has waned and the notion of DNH has become indistinct. We also found that agency assessments to determine how well staff use DNH in certain projects or locations are rare.

We asked several local community groups if they would be willing to train other local groups in DNH without any compensation. The idea was surprisingly well received—particularly if training were to be accompanied by Somali language teaching aids. Knowing how dependent many Somalis have become on financial incentives provided to them by the international community, this observation was particularly astonishing to us. In fact, most of those who have lived and worked in Somalia have observed how dependent on external agencies and their resources many Somalis have become, and how workshops associated with learning have become a highly prized source of income.

We were therefore surprised to find people willing to promulgate DNH without financial compensation, including per diems and travel allowances. The veteran Deputy Team Leader of a Wajiid-based French implementing partner of both the World Food Programme and World Vision, however, was not at all surprised. He had never heard about DNH, but he quickly grasped its potentially positive implications. DNH, he believed, could become a powerful and very practical tool with which to facilitate aid and mitigate conflict. In order to reduce dependence on external agencies and their resources and to generate a sense of DNH as a tool for local people to make a livelihood, he even suggested that international agencies should begin to offer workshops in exchange for a modest fee. The successful participants would receive a diploma at the workshop's conclusion. The value of a diploma would grow, he predicted, provided that international agencies and their implementing agencies begin to demand the diploma as a prerequisite when candidates responded to job vacancies.

"You Cannot Train Everyone"

We were repeatedly told that, given the costs and other logistical hurdles of sending appropriate numbers of trainers to Somalia, there will never be sufficient numbers of external trainers available. However, if Somalis begin to train each other, using special training modules in Somali designed for members of the local community to adopt an extended Training of Trainers (TOT) regime, it becomes much easier to disseminate DNH lessons. TOT activities have taken place in East Africa outside Somalia using both local consultants and outside consultants from CDA, but we found no examples of efforts to bring DNH TOTs to interested local communities in Somalia, using Somali language training aids.

MAINSTREAMING OF DO NO HARM

Challenges

Mainstreaming is a term favored by many humanitarian actors to indicate when something can evolve by itself to the point where it is widely, almost viscerally, understood.

Williams and Natiq, tracing DNH's uptake in Afghanistan, concluded that DNH had (at one time anyway) come a long way towards becoming mainstreamed. They noted that the need for external contributions by international aid agencies and CDA had been reduced.[21]

But in Somalia this has not happened. We asked numerous international aid groups and local implementing agencies working in Somalia if they practiced DNH, and if not, why not? Most of those we spoke with cited Somalia´s notorious instability and lack of a central government, insecurity, confounding internal logistics, high international staff turnover and the confusion between DNH's identity and general peace building activities. Representatives of UN agencies noted their own institutional constraints in trying to implement DNH—regardless of how strongly individuals working for the UN, in the field, or in regional headquarters, believe in it and wish to institute it. Kristian Belslev-Olson, UNICEF´s Somalia Resident Representative, offers some explanations. Formerly a Secretary-General of Danish Church Aid, he is familiar with DNH as a conflict sensitivity-planning tool. UN agencies, however, "have no organizational capacity to translate it (DNH) into action. UNICEF, for example, subscribes to DNH as one of its fundamental principles, but "it remains on paper". UN agencies are huge and complex, "the bureaucracy and…logistics are often costly and takes time…DNH is looked upon as an add-on". The UN "is behind schedule because it is owned by different governments…each…competing, wanting to protect its mandate as well as …its own interests."[22]

As for NGOs, it is instructive to look closer at how some think about DNH and have met with different degrees of success in their efforts to apply the analytical process we call DNH. For instance:

The Country Director for Mercy Corps' relatively young operations in Somalia (he is Somali, trained in DNH in Sudan) acknowledged the difficulties of introducing and practicing DNH in Somalia. A strong proponent of DNH, he cited a long list of constraints to introducing it in Somalia, including: "In Somalia small things tend to get in the way of the bigger picture", immense "internal logistics constraints," the propensity among his countrymen to reflectively ask, after many years of external aid, "what's in it for me?" and finally, their tendency to avoid anything that smacks of "practical solutions"[23] Regarding his own organization's work in Somalia, he reported, "other priorities" have so far taken precedence over his introduction of DNH (though he plans to train his Somali staff and MC's local implementing partners "later this year."). This individual also noted that to implement DNH successfully in Somalia, the local clans will have to buy into the whole idea. He was unaware of what other NGOs working in Somalia had done with respect to DNH and he was curious about any lessons the Norwegian Church Aid, World Vision and other agencies might be able to share with him. Yet, even while we were having this conversation, he was interrupted by a constant stream of demands concerning MC's operational work. This conversation illustrated the pressures that cause the tendency of many busy agency staff to push aside DNH in order to deal with more pressing matters.

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[21] "Do No Harm in Afghanistan: A Study in Cycles". Sue Williams and Hamidullah Natiq. August 2006. CDA Collaborative Learning Projects

[22] Kristian Belslev-Olson, Nairobi, 18 April 2008.

[23] We took it to mean that among some Somalis there are, as previously noted, too many incentives, financial and otherwise, to permit the conflict to continue. It is in the interest of too many actors to avoid "practical solutions."

During our visit to the border town of Mandera, on the Kenyan border with Gedo, Somalia, we met with two energetic representatives for the Irish aid group Trocaire. Trocaire holds a special place in the history of DNH. During the civil war in Somalia in the early 1990s, a consultant working on what would one day become DNH did a case study on the Trocaire program in one of the worst affected areas of Somalia. The consultant, Stephen Jackson, found that many of the assumptions underpinning Trocaire´s field operations already addressed the very question which the emerging DNH had set out to explore: How can we provide aid in a conflict situation without exacerbating the conflict? Jackson's report of Trocaire´s activities in Somalia[24] thus formed one of the cornerstones of early DNH learning.

These particular Trocaire staff had had no "exposure to, nor training in, DNH." They were simply sent to "work with the community." Yet, they feel their work is consistent with the "philosophy" of DNH. They do not use guards or pay for militias. Instead, they involve elders and existing community structures to deliver aid. Still, they said that they regret not having DNH at their disposal, and they would very much like to learn how to practice it. "It would help us (to) leave functional, long term systems in place for Trocaire staff coming after us." In fact, they said that someone from ACT International had come to visit in September 2007 and promised a series of workshops in "Peace, Reconciliation…and DNH." The same person, offering similar promises, also visited staff at the NCA´s Mandera campus. However, people told us that she never returned to either agency.[25]

To describe the sporadic use of DNH in Somalia, it is instructive to note that we were told about a staff member from the Gedo Health Consortium,[26] a small, well regarded, NGO of which Trocaire is a member who had participated in three separate DNH training workshops in his previous job (in Kenya). Yet, this staff member, who was not available for discussion, had never shared the tool with his new colleagues after arriving in Mandera and Gedo.

In fact, we met with a number of NGO and IP staff who told us that at one time or another they had attended DNH workshops, usually outside of Somalia. But none that we met had thought to put DNH to use in his or her own program activities, or thought to train colleagues

A senior staff member of a Somali implementing agency in Mandera told us that, while DNH could serve a uniquely important role in Somalia, it does indeed face serious obstacles because, in his words, "NGOs are King!"

In his view, obstacles to the uptake and use of DNH are in large part due to the remarkable degree to which Somalia has come to depend on the never-ending presence of aid agencies working there. It is a country, he said, where "…teenagers have grown up without knowing what a government's role is…most Somalis are no longer able to distinguish between government and humanitarian agencies." He felt that, with almost complete absence of transparency and accountability to their Somali constituencies, the humanitarian agencies have

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[24]See Stephen Jackson Trocaire Integrated Rehabilitation Program, Cambridge, 1995

[25] It subsequently appeared that ACT International in February 2008 had indeed conducted a workshop for members of the local community and local implementing agencies.

[26] A collaborative effort among the local district, health boards, district administrations, elders and three NGOs (AMREF, Trocaire and Cordaid). AMREF has since (2008) withdrawn from the consortium.

become an "unstoppable industry." Many agencies, in his view, have implicitly concluded that DNH "impedes humanitarian aid deliveries in Somalia—or, at the very least, that DNH serves to distract agencies from their mission." He felt that USAID and other large food delivery organizations have, over time, reached the point at which they only care that the contracted food is being delivered. To take on more careful analysis that could alter the systems of importations of goods (if DNH analysis showed these to be conflict exacerbating) would, he felt, challenge their ways of operating.

"*Conflict in Somalia has become all about aid…they have their own agenda…aid is completely donor driven, unchecked, and imbalanced*." Food agencies, in particular, are "spoilers," handing out contracts to militias for security and transport. Meanwhile, the agencies are "over-coordinated"—even though those who coordinate remain far away in Nairobi.

In this kind of environment, he suggested, DNH will never achieve traction and is unlikely to make much impact. His wish is that DNH could be vigorously disseminated in Somalia by the big agencies, generously funded, and its tenets be "embedded in humanitarian principles." If they were so embedded, agencies would have to abide by the rules because "everyone will know if they broke them."

When the Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) held three separate workshops in Gedo in 2006, it was for "several hundred staff and community members" only. As far as we learned, no international agencies attended. No teaching aids in Somali were available, and this workshop combined conflict resolution, peace building, gender and DNH. In subsequent interviews, the staff with whom we spoke from NCA, which has always been a serious promoter of DNH everywhere,[27] readily noted that this kind of integrated training was not successful, at least from a DNH perspective. The participants came away from the training with no real understanding of the difference between DNH and the workshop's general conflict sensitivity and peace building tools. Two years later, during our visit, we noted that the buzzword "DNH" was much repeated by community members, but that most of the participants had little knowledge or understanding of DNH. They reported that there had been no follow-up.

Norwegian Church Aid, with its long history of promoting DNH, continues to look for ways to use DNH in its program activities in Somalia. However, it remains wedded to using DNH in conjunction with its conflict resolution activities. In a 2007 report about its program in Gedo, staff wrote, "*specific activities aimed directly at peace building including training of technical staff in do-no-harm principles*,"[28] before recommending that "the NCA consider the possibility of facilitating a meeting with other Nairobi-based agency operative(s) in the different areas of Somalia to share experiences and develop models of good practice on the do no harm principle."[29] When asked when NCA will implement this recommendation, staff replied that

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[27] Norwegian Church Aid, with its longstanding commitment to DNH, was also one of the early progenitors of DNH in India, but it has recently been less involved there. It is, however, rebuilding its team of DNH in-house trainers, and have recently have picked up the pace of DNH training of its own staff.
[28] J. Kirkby, J. Rose, and M. Katui-Katua. Evaluation of Norwegian Church Aid Norwegian Government Supported Programme in Gedo, Somalia. May 2007. P 40
[29] Ibis. Pp 40-42

they intend to do so in collaboration with Oxfam Novib in the "third quarter of this year (2008)."[30] However, whether these efforts materialized remains unclear.

Based on NCA staff's conclusion that general peace building programs tend to swallow DNH and relegate it to a side issue, *and* that NCA´s 2006 integrated workshops in Gedo were not successful in teaching DNH, it would seem that they might consider executing dedicated DNH workshops and TOTs tailored for IPs and members of the community, using Somali training aids.

Like NCA and World Vision, CARE was an early proponent of using DNH in its programs around the world. The CARE website has multiple references to DNH and its uses.[31] Yet CARE's implementation of DNH is sporadic. We found that many of its own field staff in Somalia have only a fleeting familiarity with DNH and few have been trained in its use.

Late in 2007, CARE Somalia held a seven-day workshop in the Gedo region, focusing largely on DNH, for local community representatives and general members of the community. The main facilitators were two consultants from Nairobi-based NGO LEAD Africa, with five CARE Somalia staff attending as translators. No international NGO members appear to have attended. The local Deputy Governor of Luuq opened the workshop. Talking about the "importance of peace," he asked the participants to spread the word among the rest of community—those who did not have the "opportunity to travel to the workshop." A sheikh quoted verses about peace and harmony from the Holy Koran[32]. Some time after the workshop concluded, the consultants sent the workshop report to the local CARE Somalia staff with a request that the report be distributed to all the participants, however, the report and all training material were produced in English only.

The staff also expressed disappointment that CARE Somalia, in its determination to integrate DNH into the local community, had by-passed its own local staff and the staff of its local implementing partners. They knew enough about DNH to be excited about its possibilities, but not enough to practice it in their own program work. "We talk to the stakeholders," they complained, and "we, too, need to know if we do harm or not in our program activities…if we are to use it, we need to know about it…send us trainers, and enable us to help train Somali trainers."

The case study team left Gedo to travel to Bakool, the neighboring region. As the crow flies, this is not a long trip—perhaps a hundred and fifty kilometers. However, the road was very bad, particularly with the rainy season approaching (though no rain was actually falling) and the potential for violence remained significant. Our host, an international aid group, considered it unsafe to travel, even with an armed escort, from Doolow in Gedo, to Wajiid in Bakool. Our only option was to drive from Doolow, back to Mandera (on the Kenyan border). From there we chartered a small plane to fly us to Nairobi. After a two-day layover in Nairobi, waiting for a visa from the Somali embassy,[33] it was unclear if the World Food Program (WFP) aircraft bound for

[30] Correspondence with Wambua Kituku, NCA, May 2008.

[31] S. Sprechmann, and E. Pelton. Advocacy Tools and Guidelines - Promoting Policy Change." CARE, 2001. Atlanta

[32] LEAD Africa, *GEDO Peace Building Program Plan. 2008*. Nairobi

[33] The Transitional Federal Government (TFG), the highly unstable national government, is seated in Baidoa, in South Central Somalia. Recognized by the UN, and largely surviving through the support of the

Wajiid and beyond would actually be able to land in Wajiid. This was due to unrest there between the TFG and the illusive Islamists— which would appear one minute and melt away into the bush in the next. This experience only helped to underscore the need for local trainers.

World Vision has a relatively long history and strong presence in Bakool. In May of 2007, WV conducted a seven-day DNH workshop in Wajiid. The training, which brought together several clans, was largely held in the broader context of peace and conflict resolution, but unlike other similar circumstances we had seen, we were struck by how well the some of the DNH-specific contents had been retained by many of the workshop participants. They discussed with fluency the terms *Connectors* and *Dividers* and even the *Tadjikistan case study* (a commonly used workshop case study). *Resource Transfers* and *Implicit Ethical Messages* meanwhile, did not ring any bells. In a broad discussion, people indicated that they did not remember these terms or what they referred to.

The trainers of the World Vision workshop conducted the workshop in Somali, but again several members of the local community told us that all the training aids were printed in English only. These people requested (from us) additional workshops, using Somali language training tools saying this would permit the villagers themselves to buy into DNH by, "going from village to village and train, independent of external agencies." "We can train in school and in mosques—kids should be able to come home from school and lecture their parents about Connectors and Dividers," one man enthused, while the rest of the group nodded.

Overcoming the Challenges

Members of several community groups told us how useful it would be if agencies would add workshops, tailored for the local communities by focusing on Context Analysis, Dividers, and Connectors to teach how to predict outcomes and consider options. They also sought post-workshop, follow-up support, using actual projects against which the above DNH elements could be applied. They felt that, with this, project participants would be compelled to apply their new skills to a real situation. Eventually, the community might become fluent in DNH and its terminology to the point where it could tell an agency: "while your proposal has many merits, we think the approach might undermine X, one of our community's most valued connectors. Instead we suggest that the project be redesigned. This will enable us to strengthen the connector instead of weakening it." They further speculated that, if both the agencies and the local communities learned to speak the same language the entire project cycle could be planned and implemented with far greater effectiveness with respect to equality, respect and partnership.

In an effort to bring DNH beyond the workshops, World Vision's National Peace-building leadership has taken some practical steps to follow up on the workshops themselves. It did so by integrating DNH into an actual project in Wajiid, and then analyzing its impact and options. The results were published in *World Vision Somalia Food Security Project: Local Capacity for*

Ethiopian military, the TFG maintain an embassy in Nairobi. The visas can take time to procure because the Somali embassy is closed both on the Muslim High Holiday (Fridays), and, for all intents and purposes, on Saturdays and Sundays as well.

Peace Assessment.[34] It concluded that, "Conflict-sensitive assistance is highly recommended in a conflict context such as the one in Somalia. Clannism and manipulation of clan identity (are) key factors that hinder harmonious relationships."[35] It proposed, "Continued exposure of (World Vision) staff to LCP,[36] and the identification of staff to be trained as TOTs who could (in turn) help others to become LCP practitioners."[37] The report suggests that with some initial prompting from external agencies members of the community could begin to take responsibility for their own training.

CONCLUSIONS

For many Somalis, life is a scramble to feed, clothe and shelter their families while trying to stay ahead of illiteracy and disease.[38] Yet their lives, like the lives of almost three billion other poor people in the world, are dynamic and unique, requiring a will to endure and specialized coping strategies.

The tipping point of DNH in Somalia rests with local peoples' own ingenuity and ambition, along with access to technology. External solutions will not lead to the organic evolution of DNH in Somalia, but can potentially further dependency, manipulation, corruption, extremism and the continuing violent competition for resources by a generation who has known little else. It reinforces the idea that, in the words of economist Jonathan Morduch, many of us still fail "to understand the nature of what it means to be disadvantaged."[39]

The aid and poverty dilemma, however, is increasingly understood by many agencies, including some of those we have mentioned in this study. Their approach to creating and sustaining local opportunities and empowering local groups is far more common than in past years. In general, we think that NGOs in Somalia appear to have greater flexibility to invest in local people, whereas multilateral agencies do not. Understanding this, it is understandable why donors more and more seem to favor bilateral aid, which in turn funds NGOs.

The rich countries, meanwhile, must continue to provide technology and resources, but in transparent and accountable partnerships with local groups responsible for planning, executing, and evaluating projects and programs. DNH is one such project, and to reach its tipping point, agencies must begin to focus on increasing local DNH footprints in partnership with local implementing agencies and the communities they serve. This means offering communities training of trainer (TOT) programs in Somali which use illustrated Somali training aids. Because the full analytical DNH framework may be unsuitable for inter-group community training, CDA should offer, in collaboration with its partner agencies across the board, to assist communities

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[34] By V. Kamatsiko and T. Oloo. May 2007. Nairobi

[35] Ibid, Page 25

[36] Local Capacity for Peace and Do No Harm are often used interchangeable among practicioners on the ground. In this case study, we use DNH only.

[37] Please see footnote 26.

[38] Because Somalia effectively has no national Government, most disease and mortality data, and other population figures date back to before the civil war. Recent data published by WHO is largely based on extrapolation of both old data and subsequent surveys by external health agencies using modest sample populations.

[39] Jonathan Morduch and Darryl Collins, _Portfolios for the Poor_, Forthcoming. 2009

in designing relevant and appropriate DNH training modules. However, this process should not be carried out under the umbrella of peace and conflict resolution activities, but be dedicated to DNH alone, which is explicitly and directly about facilitating aid.

CASE AUTHORS' RECOMMENDATIONS

Agencies should continue to actively train their own staff in DNH. Other agencies should also consider investing in DNH as an indispensable tool for creating the right aid environment, as has been done by some other agencies.

The top management of international agencies *must* adopt DNH with enthusiasm and consistency and make sure that it is implemented at every level of the organization. They should organize and participate in training, make sure that DNH is built into as many of the agency's projects as possible and set DNH benchmarks along the way with which to evaluate the progress. We know that a low commitment on the part of project planners and implementers tends to undermine DNH as a tool. Without clear signals from the top, appropriate policy guidance and oversight, mid-level and other critical staff will, in the light of other pressing issues, begin to skip the necessary stages of the appropriate DNH analysis.

Many bilateral donors have been diligent in requiring that projects receiving funds adhere to DNH. Sometimes this strict adherence has led to inflexible rules, which assume that the communities and their local NGOs are already familiar with and comfortable using DNH. In reality, however, many are not trained in DNH and so cannot submit proposals that are compliant with donor guidelines. As emphasized in this report, DNH training in Somalia is highly sporadic and many locals can barely speak English; much less write a grant proposal in English. The donors must appreciate that until the communities themselves are immersed in the process, and understand that DNH language itself, the "organic" aspect of DNH will not flower under these conditions. Donor insistence on full compliance with DNH in the application process does not encourage good DNH practices and may lead to shortcuts or outright cheating.

The donors should be prevailed upon to finance the hiring of dedicated in-house DNH trainers. They could also provide support during project planning, implementation, make follow-up visits in the field and work with the communities to establish their own, self-perpetuating DNH training networks appropriate for any given Somali locality. They should also train local TOTs to help incite local appreciation and open up the workshop participants for more interactive engagement. Training should be conducted in a framework that includes the use of such participatory processes as PICD.[40]

Given the role of clan identity and manipulation in Somalia, it is not easy to conduct DNH training in Somalia on a generic level, which is the way DNH has usually been taught. The trainers must remain alert and sensitive to any mention of local issues and be able to transition

[40] PICD, or Participatory Integrated Community Development, describes a community's active involvement in interaction, dialogue, sharing, consensual decision-making, and actions taken. The foundation of this process is something called participatory communication, and it includes the presence of local people in decision-making, project design, implementation and evaluation. Participants must come through this process with a sense of *being in control*.

from the distant (generic) scenario and sit on the local case until all the underlying issues have been addressed. The discussions only end when the participants have brainstormed and resolved their means to prevent the recurrence of similar hostile situations in the future. The discussions should be guided systematically using the different categories provided by Context, Connectors and Dividers, and Options.

Because details are essential to the sum of DNH, the trainers must make sure that the analysis of the context is detailed and complete. Since every context is unique, the appropriate participatory tools must be employed in order to elicit information from the grassroots population. The Somalia context is shrouded with many issues that might be easily lost during context analysis. Because illiteracy levels in Somalia are among the highest in the world, it is imperative that this factor be paired with the intention of establishing the depth of seriousness by clan, and how it impacts inter-clan relations. The details might also address how the high levels of illiteracy affect the development of local language as an instrument of communication and other contextual issues.

Trauma is another serious and underrated contextual issue in many parts of Somalia. Unmanaged trauma, a result of Somalia's continuous disasters, can severely weaken the performance of the institutions and structures created to steer the application of DNH in a specific area. Due to the paralyzing and disorienting effects caused by trauma, a community's ability to practice DNH effectively is impacted; a contextual analysis might productively take trauma management into consideration.

The partner communities and organizations on the ground must develop local structures that can take responsibility for day-to-day monitoring of the way in which DNH is implemented. The structures should also facilitate local networks and the sharing of experiences. Communities and local organizations should be able to develop local resource teams of trainers. One agency operating in Puntland has trained and registered a group of DNH trainers comprising local men and women only. The group has a leadership structure and is recognized by the local administration.

The creation of new and exciting local institutions, however, relies on the ability of an individual or a small group of individuals, to sustain them and keep them relevant. Given, among other things, the high turnover among agency staff, we know from experience how difficult it is to remain wedded to any project. However, there are ways in which agencies can work to overcome these hurdles (though agencies must be careful to avoid creating further dependencies or false expectations). They may include:

- An incentive scheme to support their existence;
- Providing for regular meetings;
- Making the existence of the resource teams and their services widely known and available to all interested organizations in the area;
- Making sure that local clans buy into their existence, and that the resource teams can overcome inter-clan differences, stigmas and stereotypes;
- Through refresher courses and training, making sure that the resource teams or DNH practitioners keep abreast of the changing trends inside and outside the community.

Given all these important tasks, we urge NGOs and other agencies working in Somalia to consider establishing in-house DNH training units that are separate from their regular conflict resolution and peacemaking units as we do not believe that the merging of DNH and peacemaking units is beneficial. As we have noted previously, the value of DNH has a tendency to become marginalized under this arrangement.

Finally, agencies must learn to collaborate and coordinate with others in the field. In interviewing many serious humanitarian actors in Somalia and Kenya, it was upsetting to note how fragmented the field is. Many agencies possess significant intuitional and individual skill and experience, and in our conversations we rarely came across anyone who would disagree with our fundamental conclusions. Let the knowledge spring forth by establishing, or tapping into existing, consortia, with a lead agency to promote the above process.

APPENDIX

LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED

NAIROBI
27 March 2008

- Kirsten Engebak, Area Representative, Norwegian Church Aid
- Berhane Woldemichael, Coordinator, Somalia Programme, Norwegian Church Aid
- Davies Owino, Executive Director, Seeds of Africa (and a DNH trainer and a contributor to this paper)

28 March 2008

- Tobias Oloo, National Peace Building Coordinator, World Vision Kenya
- Abdikadir Mohamed, Country Director, Somalia, Mercy Corps

30 March 2008

- Alex Musili, Peace Building Coordinator for Somalia, World Vision

MANDERA, KENYA
31 March 2008

- Wilfred Kimeu, Trocaire
- Nur Muse, Trocaire

1 April 2008

- Abdi “Black” Abshir Elmi, Logistics Office, Gedo Health Consortium
- Adam Adawa, Nomadic Pastoralist Development Aid (No Pada)
- Abdirashid M. Yakub, Chairman, Settlement Development Association (SDA)
- Mohat Mohamed Farah, Settlement Development Association (SDA)
- Abdiwahab Sheik Mohamed, Coordinator, Advancement for Small Enterprise Programme
- Abdullai Mohamed Farah, Program Team Leader and Field Coordinator, Norwegian Church Aid

DOOLOW, GEDO, SOMALIA
3 April 2008
Seven members of Doolow Community Group

- Women’s group (3)
- Elder (1)
- Members of District Commission (2)
- NGO rep from Advancement for Small Enterprise Programme (ACEB) (1)

3 April 2008
Six members of CARE and UN agencies

- Farah Habad Ibrehim, Care International
- Mohamed Omar, Care International
- Abdifatah Osman, Care International
- Abdiwahid Bile Abdullah, Care Somalia

- Osman Hassan Farah, WHO
- Hasan Abdhi, UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS)

GEDWYNE, GEDO, SOMALIA
4 April 2008 (Friday and a High Holy Day)

- Large community group, including representatives from women's group, police, town representatives, elder, a sheik, and several youth.

WAJIID, BAKOOL, SOMALIA
7 April 2008

- Community group
- Elder (2)
- Women's group (4)
- Village Leaders - undefined (2)
- IDP (Internally Displaced Person) Camp Leader (1)

8 April 2008
Wajiid Council members, representing:

- Economic Development
- Social Affairs
- Information
- Vehicle hiring
- Sports
- Peace and Conflict Resolution (2)
- Development
- Vice-Cashier

From World Vision's Wajiid Office, representatives of

- Food Security
- Peace Making
- Gender and Youth Mobilization
- Nutrition
- Ibrahim (?), World Vision

9 April 2008

- Houredin Moallim Yaron, Senior Program Officer, World Food program, Wajiid
- Unni Silkoset, Head of nutrition program, UNICEF, Somalia
- Sheik Hassan, Action Cantre Le Ferm (ACF)

APPENDIX II

INTEGRATION WITH OTHER TOOLS, CONCEPTS, AND APPROACHES

(By Millicent Otieno)

It is clear that many organizations have "packed" the DNH tool into their peace building and conflict resolution activities. There are some obvious reasons for this: the concept of dividers and connectors has an almost visceral appeal to agencies and communities alike, and can therefore be used to promote the understanding of conflict contexts. We heard of instances in which people first heard of DNH in conflict resolution workshops. We also learned that the tool had frequently been used in combination with other participatory tools for community development projects.

Do No Harm and Peace Work

Many of the respondents agreed that DNH is being used mostly for dialogue, peacemaking, and conflict resolution in the Somalia context. The DNH concept was not developed for peace work per se, but has been used in issues of peace-building and conflict transformation, especially using dividers and connectors analysis. The approach has proved to be very helpful in conflict context analysis, which is a basis for all those involved in peace work. However, it has been integrated into other tools, e.g. the force field analysis, the conflict triangle, etc. These tools can easily be complimented by aspects identified in the dividers and connectors analysis of DNH. In addition, the concept has been used for identifying entry points and platforms for reconciliation, mediation and negotiation; in most cases those involved are able to integrate the relevant "Do No Harm" components.

Do No Harm and Conflict Management, Resolution and Transformation

DNH compliments ***Conflict Management*** in designing strategies and programs that better address the causes and consequences of violent conflict. DNH provides humanitarian assistance and transition initiative options for situations of ongoing conflict such as the one in Somalia. It is also paramount in examining how longer-term assistance in these areas can help reduce tensions and prevent tensions from erupting into violent conflicts. It helps promote communication and dialogue thus facilitating the settling of disputes, terminating the violence and building a more sustainable peace.

DNH fosters ***Conflict Resolution*** processes by bringing opposing positions (the claim and its rejection) into a single outcome. This can be done through reconciliation of underlying interests of the parties to the conflict. Conflict resolution is aimed at enhancing freedom and implicitly or explicitly increasing space for justice. Using the context analysis and dividers and connectors components, it encourages taking actions that increase understanding and cooperation among the parties to a conflict, by addressing the conditions leading to the dispute. This results in fostering a change of attitudes and eliminating mistrust, which promotes reconciliation initiatives and enhances the processes through which the concerned parties interact. By doing this, the chances of violence are prevented or minimized.

Any assistance given in a context of conflict is intended to promote positive peace, defined as: *" the building of a better world: the fruit of education for peace, of justice, respect for human* *rights and human dignity, and the quest for development that is humane and ecologically sustainable, a development that is qualitative rather than quantitative."*[41]

Efforts are being made by different agencies in Somalia to achieve this elusive virtue, and despite the gloomy scenario that currently exists; all hope is not lost that this will eventually be achieved.

Conflict transformation is a process in which the parties to a conflict are encouraged to negotiate their different interests, needs and goals so that the outcome of the negotiation is supported jointly by all the parties and is perceived by each as to their advantage. It is the process of ensuring that vicious cycles of conflict are turned into virtuous ones and that conflict generates positive rather than negative outcomes. The DNH tool provides a bridge to achieving a truce by helping to initiate dialogue. Additional efforts have to be made to improve the situation by either engaging the parties in joint development work or continuing efforts of increasing and improving the communication between the parties. This includes coming up with strategies to change attitudes and behaviors of the groups or actors who were previously involved in the conflict by engaging them in rehabilitation and re-establishment of structures jointly: they both end any violence that may still exist, work on sustainability of their peace and development.

Do No Harm in Peacemaking and Peacebuilding

Peacemaking is concerned with interventions at the decision making level, unmasking the powerful and equalizing unequal relationships. DNH is instrumental in the identification of existing and potential Dividers/Connectors which enhances the peacemaking process. It lays a foundation to bring together leaders of two communities (for instance pastoralists and farmers) locked in disputes, to discusses the issues and make decisions or reach an agreement on the way forward to peacemaking.

Peacebuilding actions identify and support structures, which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. It encompasses all those processes that seek to address the underlying causes of violent conflicts and crises either to prevent them or, if they have occurred, to ensure that they will not recur. Peace building activities build on activities initiated by the peacemaking and conflict resolution processes. It involves the physical, social and structural initiatives that can help provide reconstruction and rehabilitation**.** In the Somalia case, it would be premature to conclusively decide that initiatives are geared towards peace-building as many agencies and communities are constantly involved in "fire fighting" and trying to quell the different sporadic resource-based conflicts that continue to plague almost the entire country. Peacebuilding efforts are geared toward fostering unity in diversity in this context.

Additional help for using DNH in peace work can be obtained by the Reflecting on Peace Practices Project (RPP).[42]

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[41] Swan, B., 1995: p37, Peace search: from the secular to the Christic, in M. Salla et al (eds.)

[42]See RPP on CDA's website, www.cdainc.com

Participatory Integrated Community Development Methodologies
This section provides theoretical information on the participatory tools integrated with the DNH concept in an attempt to make assistance provision conflict sensitive in different geographical areas in Somalia as well as Somaliland. The approaches were used mainly by Norwegian Church Aid and Action Africa Help International. There are other players such as UNICEF that also attempted to train their partners on the same. Though, we were not able to see much of the implementation and practical results of the interventions on the ground during the field visit, it was evident that some groups still remembered what the training was. This prompted us to question whether DNH then becomes a sideshow in the attempt to integrate other approaches. Facts gathered according to the Somalia experience in regards to the integration of DNH into other participatory approaches in this case PICD, which has been used, by NCA, UNICEF as well as AAH-I.

1. **Components of PICD integrated into Do No Harm**

This is a selection of the relevant and necessary tools in the participatory processes that are contextualized and simplified during training on community oriented projects and development. Conflict sensitivity is inculcated in the process using the DNH approach to avoid unintended negative side effects in the process of providing assistance to communities. We learned that Norwegian Church Aid and Action Africa Help International had conducted PICD workshops in Somalia with the aim of having the communities own their development as well as strengthening connectors and undermining existing dividers.
The major components of PICD process are as follows:
In using PICD tools, emphasis is placed on visualizing and practical illustrations on the ground using locally available materials, thus making the process applicable and adaptable to all the community members. The power of the pen with the literate community members is minimized, enabling the illiterate and elderly community members not to feel intimidated or left out. This ensures the tapping of knowledge from both genders, different groups and illiterate members of the community as they can also participate in the visualization of the tool on the ground. The group we meet in Gedo who went through the training said that it is helpful to them. They gave examples of some of the exercises they did.

Whereas the DNH framework is often presented as a seven-step approach that can be used at different stages, it proved paramount to deconstruct the tool and pick relevant components during the training and integration process thus making it blend with the participatory community approaches.
The Do No Harm seven steps are:

(1) Understand the context of conflict
(2) Identify and analyze the Dividers
(3) Identify and analyze the Connectors
(4) Unpack assistance
(5) Check effects of Resource Transfers and Implicit Ethical Messages
(6) Develop Options
(7) Redesign

The steps can be used interchangeably so that relevance to the participants and the context is emphasized. In this case emphasis was put on the context analysis using community mapping tools as well as analysis of dividers and connectors in the context. Traditionally the DNH tool is presented for impact assessment of assistance. In this case it is also used to look at preventive measures in combination with other tools facilitate conflict management and promote efforts for reconciliation and peace-building. This was a prerequisite for sustainable development especially given that most interventions are of relief and humanitarian nature due to the ongoing sporadic violent conflicts.

PICD Process, Phases and Tools

Both in Puntland and Gedo it was important to go through a context analysis exercise with the target groups before the exercise began. This helped all the parties involved and other stakeholders understand the context: who is involved in the conflict (actors); what are the contentious issues (what the conflict was/is about); why are people fighting; the geographical scope (the area/location where conflict is experienced in relation to the where the participants came from); and how the conflict is experienced (what is happening). The issues discussed at this stage were taken into consideration, engaged with and addressed during the community based participatory planning process using DNH as a mirror.

There are five phases in the Participatory process:

Introductory/Initiation Phase

It has been confirmed that without a change of attitude among the development players as well as the humanitarian actors, participatory processes are not a reality. The introductory phase aimed at changing the community members', development workers and collaborating partners' attitudes towards development and relief material provision. This participatory process identifies with and embraces community based and community driven development for sustainability and ownership.

The tools applied in the phase include:

a) The River Code
b) Take a Step
c) The Secret in the Box
d) The Boat is Sinking
e) Conflict Mapping

These tools are important for **understanding the context of conflict**, which is undertaken as the next step of integration with DNH.

Situation Analysis and Visioning Phase

Given the vicious cyclic nature of conflicts in Somalia, there is always a need for all parties to appreciate their role in conflict as well as development. A facilitator worked with community members to analyze their current situation and visualize the future they would like to have (present state versus the desired state). The process reveals the undercurrents within the community, helping to identify and analyze underlying causes of conflict in the setting.

The tools used in this phase are:

a) Community Resource and Social Mapping
b) Venn/Chapati Diagram I - Local Institutions
c) Seasonal Calendar
d) Daily Routine/24 Hours Day Schedule
e) Problems and Resources Bags
f) Visioning Matrix

Using the DNH framework, the analytical step of systematic identification and categorization into **Dividers and Connectors** is then undertaken by all the parties involved to put all findings into perspective. Here it is important to note that not all problems or negative things are obvious Dividers and not all positive things are automatic Connectors.

Planning Phase

Taking into account the findings from the analytical phase, programmatic decisions are jointly made by the agencies and the communities as a vision for future engagement and participation. This enables the delivery of assistance with minimal negative harmful effects. Steps to be taken in achieving the preferred future are identified and developed jointly. The community in Gedo went ahead and planned for the project(s) they will have to undertake to achieve their preferred (envisioned) future. However, the next step of actualizing these was never achieved even though a committee was formed for follow-up of the process and progress.

The tools used in this phase are:

a) Long Term Goals Setting
b) Formation of the Community Planning Committee (CPC)
c) Visioning Matrix Discussions
d) Short Term Goals Setting
e) Future Mapping
f) Community Action Planning (CAP)
g) Wealth Ranking
h) Venn Diagram II – mostly used by External Institutions

Using DNH, **Unpacking assistance** by looking at organizational mandate, headquarter organization policies and fundraising procedures and conditionality are considered at this stage. The planning questions are used to develop implementable and relevant interventions. It has been an uphill task for such a process in the Somalia context; however we heard stories of water projects, which could eventually be maintained and managed by the communities if further capacity building and backstopping was provided.

Implementation Phase

During implementation, aid workers must avoid inadvertently worsening destructive interactions while delivering assistance. In the Somalia case it is difficult to avoid doing harm since the situation is such that the scarce resources are in fact a source of conflict as each clan and sub-clan try to get as much as possible for their own. We cannot also ignore the role of businessmen and gatekeepers as well as militias who sabotage assistance meant for perceived lesser clans or communities.

After completing the Community Action Plans (CAPs) and mobilizing the resources required, the community implements its project(s). Various activities have to be carried out during this phase. These activities have however to be implemented according to the plans laid out in the CAP. A system has to be put in place whereby the community members monitor if the implementation of the plans is going on as planned for the successful completion of their project(s).

The **resource transfer effects** and **implicit ethical messages** are especially useful during the implementation to check how the interventions interact with the conflict dynamics thereby positively or negatively impacting on the relations. This helps aid workers consciously make decisions about how resources are given with a bias toward reducing tensions.

The tools used in this phase are:

a) Participatory Impact Monitoring (PIM)
b) Training of Community Planning Committee (CPC)
c) Resource Transfer Effects (DNH framework)
d) Implicit Ethical Messages (DNH Framework)

Evaluation Phase

A continuous evaluation process is conducted involving all the stakeholders to obtain views for redesign and improvement of the next steps. Here the framework for **considering the impact of assistance** should be used to reflect on the impact of the interventions undertaken. Emphasis given to the **options** and **redesign** steps of the framework is for improved effectiveness and better planning of next steps to be taken. This is not the case in Somalia since the systematic application of the tool has been evasive.

Tools used in this stage are:

a) Anticipatory Process Evaluation (combination of tools)

b) Appreciative Enquiry

c) Options and Redesign (DNH Framework)