DO NO HARM PROJECT

Do No Harm in Senegal: Missed Opportunities and Future Possibilities

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List of Abbreviations

ADHIS   Action Humaine pour le Developpement Integre au Senegal
ANRAC   Agence National pour la Reconstruction de Casamance
ARD   Association for Rural Development
CBO   Community-Based Organization
CDA   CDA Collaborative Learning Projects
CEP   Corporate Engagement Project
CONGAD   Conseil des Organisations Non Gouvernementales D'Appiu au Development
CRS   Catholic Relief Services
DNH   Do No Harm, previously Local Capacities for Peace
ECOWAS   Economic Community of West African States
GADEC   Groupe d'Action pour le Developpement Communitaire
FPIC   Free, Prior, Informed Consent
IDS   Institute for Development Studies
LP   Listening Project
MFDC   Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance
OA   Oxfam America
OGB   Oxfam Great Britain
PDS   Senegalese Democratic Party
Plan   Plan International
PRA   Participatory Rural Appraisal
RADDHO   Rencontre Africaine des Droites de l'Homme
RBA   Rights Based Approach
WANEP West Africa Network for Peacebuilding
WARO   West African Regional Office, division of Oxfam America
WIPNET   Women in Peacebuilding Network
WPSN   Women's Peace and Security Network, Africa

Introduction

The Do No Harm Project (DNH) began in the mid-1990s. It was originally called the Local Capacities for Peace Project, a name that more completely reflects the ideal of (re)constructing and sustaining peace on foundations that exist locally and can be reinforced by outsiders trying to help. DNH helps those involved in humanitarian and development work better understand their potential and actual impacts so they can avoid causing greater tension and can intervene in ways that complement local mechanisms for mitigating conflict.

In 2006, the Do No Harm Project set out to determine how DNH was being used in the world and whether that use was leading to more effective programming decisions. A series of *Reflective Case Studies* was written in multiple countries to determine how practitioners in those places are learning, thinking about, using and spreading DNH. Some organizations are experienced and effective in applying Do No Harm principles and framework to their work, while others are struggling. This range of experience provides valuable lessons. Whether implementing Do No Harm in their daily work, in their program design and monitoring, or in shaping policies and organizational procedures, the cases look at where in their work people find it easy to use Do No Harm, where they find roadblocks, and how (or if) they overcame them.

In June 2007 DNH contracted with Larry Dixon and David Reyes to revisit Senegal as part of this broader effort to review and improve the project. The trip detailed in this case study took place in early September. Leading up to this trip, DNH staff worked to gather information about the history and spread of DNH in Senegal, but unfortunately, CDA had very limited records of those efforts.

The bulk of the study was conducted in Dakar from September 1 until September 10, 2007. David Reyes remained in Dakar until September 14 for CDA's Listening Project, during which time he was able to pursue answers to a few questions raised during the initial 10-day study period. Both Larry Dixon and David Reyes wrote this report, which attempts to represent the opinions and reflections expressed by individuals and organizations consulted during the trip to Dakar. Any omissions or errors are wholly our (Dixon and Reyes) responsibility. We greatly appreciate the time and insight that everyone gave us in Dakar on such short notice.

Methodology

At the beginning of this case study, we had the following background about Do No Harm in Senegal:
- A CDA consultant had worked with Oxfam America to provide a Local Capacities for Peace / Do No Harm[1] training in 2001;
- It is possible the same consultant had returned to follow up;
- Oxfam America (OA) hosted the training;
- The names of OA's current Regional Director and the names of some its current partner organizations;
- A review of the training and its aftereffects had been written but was not available;
- It was possible Oxfam Great Britain (OGB) and Save the Children had had some DNH exposure.

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[1] Some interviewees remembered the training as a Local Capacities for Peace (LCP) training. LCP went on to be called Do No Harm (DNH) around the time of the Senegalese efforts. For the purpose of this case study we refer to any LCP/DNH efforts simply as DNH, which it is now known as.

We did not know who had attended the training or anything about the current status of DNH in Senegal. This obviously had an impact on the approach we took and on the nature of information we were able to find. Not having any on-the-ground contacts severely limited how we went about this case. If we had started with a list of training participants we likely would have focused on locating and speaking with those individuals and other staff from their organizations. A more targeted study would almost certainly generate a more thorough understanding of how Do No Harm was applied after the training and how it is, or is not, applied today. As it was, only OA had been indirectly notified of our visit to Senegal. Mamadou Biteye, OA Regional Director, received an email about our trip while on vacation and was unaware of our visit until he came back from vacation several days after we had arrived..

When we arrived in Dakar we were still hopeful that we might find or generate a list of former training participants. We tried to contact OA's current partners. Using information provided by CDA, a somewhat dated OCHA list, internet searching and local telephone directories, we managed to contact less than half of these organizations. Apart from one, AHDIS (discussed below), those we spoke with had no recollection of being involved in DNH training.

However, the fact that we did not have information about the training left open the possibility of a more encompassing study. We cast the net more broadly, looking for signs of DNH in current thought and programming; looking for individuals who knew of the Project; and looking for other approaches to conflict sensitivity. In short, our methods were devised ad hoc to learn anything that might inform CDA of DNH uptake in Senegal.

Nevertheless, the kinds of questions we hoped to answer remained the same: we still wanted to find out who had participated and why; we hoped to gather information about the training itself; and, of course, we sought to learn what became of DNH – how it was used or why it was not. Since it looked as though we might not find many people with direct exposure to DNH, it also seemed worthwhile to gather information about what other conflict sensitivity mechanisms organizations find useful.

It proved serendipitous that CDA had combined the DNH case study with a Listening Project (LP) exploratory visit. For lack of an alternative, we began visiting and calling the offices of agencies identified as potential Listening partners to inquire about their conflict sensitivity approaches. These inquiries were extremely useful not only in terms of the LP, but also helping us contact other NGOs and gaining a better understanding of the institutional lay of the land. We listened for indications that their efforts were informed, perhaps unknowingly, by the DNH framework and for ideas and approaches from outside the DNH scope but relevant nonetheless.

The West African Context and Senegal

West Africa Region

The recent decline in acute warfare in West Africa is important to understanding the operating environment for NGOs in the region and thus the application of DNH. Guinea Bissau's civil war ended with a truce in 2000 and, despite a coup in 2003, the results of subsequent elections seem to be holding; Sierra Leone's civil war ended after 10 years in 2002; the Liberia conflict effectively concluded with Charles Taylor stepping down in 2003 and elections in 2005; the war in Côte d'Ivoire ended with the Ouagadougou Accord in March of this year. While none of these (and for that matter most countries in the region) are models of democracy or economic stability, the context is not presently defined by widespread political violence.

As might be expected for a region rich in natural resources, relative stability has brought increased foreign direct investment, especially in extractive sectors. Whereas during periods of warfare resources like timber and diamonds were being exploited without government oversight, West African States today are working to control the exploitation of their resources. They are more involved in negotiating business and trade agreements than before, but improvements in governance have been slow to evolve. The laws against corruption and environmental abuse are often strong but lack the institutional support necessary for enforcement. Thus, poverty reduction and general improvements in living standards are lagging as resource exploitation increases.

Senegal

In contrast to many of its neighbors, "Senegal has been held up as one of Africa's model democracies…. [T]he country has one of the region's more stable economies…. [P]olitical participation and peaceful leadership changes are not new."[2] Among French-speaking countries in West Africa, Côte d'Ivoire historically always outshone Senegal but this changed in 2002 with the outbreak of the Ivorian civil war. NGOs with regional headquarters in Abidjan sought relocation or expansion in another Francophone capital with adequate infrastructure to support their operations. They generally chose Dakar, making it more of a West African regional hub for international NGOs, some of which already had smaller-scale operations there.

Senegal has not been completely stable, though. The key exception is a low intensity separatist conflict in the Casamance region south of The Gambia. Fighting began in 1982 between Government troops and the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC). In simple terms, the war's roots trace to a promise for independence made by the country's first President in 1960. However, perceptions of marginalization of the region's Jola (Diola) people by the Nation's Wolof majority continue to fuel the conflict. Despite peace agreements signed in 2001 and 2005, sporadic violence continues.[3]

Elsewhere, people's main struggle is against poverty, with 54% living below the poverty line and 48% unemployment. The average age of the country's 12.5 million people is less than 19 years and literacy is about 39%. Agriculture is by far the main occupation accounting for 77% of labor but contributing only 18% of GDP. Nevertheless, the economy is considered healthy, averaging over 5% annual growth in GDP since 1995 with inflation in the low single digits.[4]

Relative 'health' might also describe Senegal's democracy. Prior to independence in 1960 there were Senegalese representatives in the French parliament. The country's first President, Leopold Senghor of the Socialist Party, left office voluntarily in 1980 after the election of fellow Socialist, Abdou Diouf. The Socialists lost power in 2000 to Abdoulaye Wade and his Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS). In February 2007 President Wade was reelected from among a field of 15 candidates with 55% of the vote (70.5% turnout) in an election that was declared free and fair by ECOWAS. While the opposition

[2] From BBC Senegal Country Profile: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/1064496.stm. Last accessed on 10/18/07.
[3] Sources: Simmons, Andrew "Senegal to sign Casamance accord," BBC News, December 30, 2004, available from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4133881.stm. Accessed on 10/18/07. "Casamance Conflict," Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Casamance_Conflict. BBC Senegal Country Profile, *supra*.
[4] Source: *The World Factbook: Senegal*, CIA, updated October 4, 2007. Available from: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sg.html. Accessed on 10/18/07.

complained of "serious irregularities," they owe defeat more to divisions amongst themselves.[5] For the most part, people are engaged in politics and secure enough to speak and vote their minds.

This tradition of democracy and general political openness define a modestly progressive environment where NGOs openly engage in community and government level advocacy. Trainings for local NGOs and community-based organizations (CBOs) are commonplace, covering a range of capacities that include human rights awareness, environmental monitoring, government transparency and accountability, and conflict mitigation. The Director of one organization estimated more than 50 such training opportunities per year. Women are also exerting more influence on politics as a significant number run for office in upcoming elections.

However, not all is harmonious. There is tension, for example, among NGOs over a perceived power imbalance. We heard complaints from at least one large Senegalese organization that their international counterparts enjoy unfair advantages such as higher-level access, the equivalent of diplomatic immunity, and privileged tax status. We also heard of growing tensions related to decentralization, increased planning by local government, and corresponding efforts to mobilize communities for more inclusivity of minority parties. This was described by one international agency as an ongoing paradigm shift – power relations are changing and the resulting situation in communities can be very tense.

The broader concern is essentially that, as Senegal moves forward, the poor, including minorities, are increasingly disadvantaged, pushed aside, and marginalized. As changes happen around them, they have a diminished capacity to conceptualize and articulate their place in this new reality. One person explained this as poverty, not just in terms of basic physical needs but also of relations. "People are losing their ability to name their reality... losing their value in the community [and] their self-worth." In this person's view the solution is to ensure that they play an active and effective role in the development and civil society agenda-setting process.

This is the basic context for NGOs based in Senegal. The next section looks at how they are responding to and operating within it.

Story of Do No Harm Training in Senegal

The following reflects an attempt to document the introduction of DNH, subsequent trainings, and the work that followed. It is based on information provided by Ibrahima Thiam, an OA Program Officer at the time of the DNH activities who soon after became Regional Director of OA's West Africa Regional Office (WARO). He is now the current Executive Director of Wetlands International. Information also came from Mamadou Biteye, Thiam's replacement at OA, and from Winifred Fitzgerald, the CDA consultant who led DNH activities in Senegal. Much of this relies on people's memory and ability to recall activities six years earlier. After we completed our data collection in Senegal we received information by email from Fitzgerald (which included attendance sheets). Therefore, we could not check apparent inconsistencies with those we met earlier.

There was an introductory workshop involving the CDA consultant, key Oxfam staff, and a few partners on April 9-10, 2001 to introduce LCP/DNH and plan a larger training. Shortly thereafter the training

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[5] Sources: "Senegal's Election – Economist Intelligence Unit Briefing," Economist Intelligence Unit ViewsWire, March 5, 2007. BBC Senegal Country Profile, *supra*.

called "Managing Conflicts for Peace: What Local Solutions?" took place and was sponsored by OA and held in Dakar May 8-11, 2001. According to Fitzgerald there was a follow-up workshop about nine months later (February 27 through March 10, 2002) in Dakar as part of OA's WARO strategic objective for the Right to Peace and Security.

Rosalie Lo, a program officer for OA's Peace and Security initiative at the time, maintained contact with workshop participants and was involved with DNH mainstreaming efforts. She left OA some years back for another organization, which we followed up with but nobody there seemed to know her. No reports were available to review.

According to Fitzgerald, OA organized a more intensive workshop in Gao, Mali for OGB and several local Oxfam partners that wanted more information on DNH for their peace building programs (partners from Ghana and Mali attended). Fitzgerald went there once and noted they were using DNH. According to her, "One partner used DNH in northern Ghana where inter-ethnic fighting had erupted over the kingship of the Dagbon traditional area. A consortium of NGOs was to provide relief to some displaced persons in Yendi and Tamale and they found DNH, which was introduced to the team, to be useful for their work."

Based on discussions with Thiam and Biteye, there was only one short, introductory training in Senegal (likely the May 8-11, 2001 training mentioned above). At the time, WARO emphasized peace building, geared especially toward preventing conflict in the region. There was a recognized need by OA and its local and regional partners to enhance peace-building capacity, as there was a significant amount of conflict in the region (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Casamance, Northern Mali).

According to Thiam, discussions were held between CDA and OA headquarters in Boston to bring DNH to OA and its partners. OA took the lead in organizing a DNH training for 17 of its local and regional partners. It was a general exposure training, not a training of trainers (TOT), which was corroborated by attendee Samba Barry, who at the time was the Coordinator of Southern Programs for CONGAD (an association of NGOs in Senegal) and is now with OGB. CDA provided Winifred Fitzgerald as the trainer. We were only able to speak with four organizations listed on the attendance sheet—OA, OGB, CONGAD, RADDHO. Only three of which had recollection of their organization's participation in the initiative. We also spoke with a handful of other individuals that said they participated in the training in Dakar, but there is no record of them on the attendance sheet. It is possible that not everyone actually signed the sheet, that they mistook another training for DNH,[6] or that another DNH training was conducted without CDA's involvement.

According to Thiam, OA organized this training with the expectation that there would be a more comprehensive strategy to partner with CDA and outline next steps after partners recognized its usefulness. DNH was promoted as a peace-building approach for use in overt conflicts, as opposed to development scenarios.

Thiam, Biteye, and Barry noted that participants were excited about the content and wanted more of it, seeing its relevancy to their work. Based on discussions and what people remembered of the evaluations, participants felt that the DNH framework was simple enough to use for rural communities where illiteracy is high, but also powerful enough to elicit deep analysis by academics and program officials. Some went on to say that in oral societies, such as those in West Africa, this simple framework

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[6] One person insisted he was at the training and that a tall man led it—certainly not Winifred!

can have profound impact because it is not complicated. Several people expanded on the simplicity and understandability of the concepts, as well as the ease of use by academics and non-academics alike.

After the training there was a lot of momentum; partners wanted to better understand the framework, be part of a TOT, and pass on the learning to their organizations and projects. Wanting to harness this momentum, Thiam remembers that OA approached CDA through their respective Boston offices to discuss next steps.[7] Although OA was interested in pursuing next steps, CDA explained that DNH was no longer a priority and that engaging private companies was its new programmatic priority. OA did not have any DNH staff expertise, and although OA did organize the training, it did so for its partners' benefit. Thiam clarified for us that OA did not utilize the DNH content for its own operations and saw itself only as the "facilitator," connecting its partners to needed capacity training.

Thiam also explained that OA felt there had to be a "bridge between CDA and local partners" so they could acquire the expertise needed to utilize DNH in their programming. Without CDA assistance and expertise, he recalled that OA turned to Winifred Fitzgerald as the next logical choice to strengthen partner understanding of DNH. Funding was very tight, so OA worked with Fitzgerald to try to identify sources of funding while expanding peace-building capacity. By this time it was 6-12 months after the training, and momentum was waning. Unfortunately no other funding was found and OA abandoned its DNH efforts.

"Some good things came from the training, but so much more could have happened with the support of CDA—there was a lost opportunity." (Ibrahima Thiam)

The Do No Harm 'Tree' in Senegal and Beyond

We received information about the original trainings from Fitzgerald. This information included a list of participants, facilitators, and the logistics team involved in the OA Workshop: "Managing Conflicts for Peace: What Local Solutions?" The list indicated that DNH had somehow branched out in Senegal and beyond without a clear link to the CDA training. The following are summary explanations of the DNH linkages that we learned of. It is broken down by individual or organization, depending on which had the clearest ties to DNH. There is some repetition to maintain clarity on who said what. As it turns out, this probably reveals both a side-branch to the main DNH 'tree' planted at the 2001 training as well as a separate tree nurtured by sources other than CDA.

Ibrahima Thiam

Thiam, mentioned above, was a Program Officer with Oxfam America at the time of DNH activities in 2001 and 2002. He later became Regional Director before leaving for graduate studies in the US, and is now the Director of Wetlands International in Dakar. Thiam attended the CDA training and describes the DNH framework as a good, simple, operational framework, well suited to broader peace-building programming agenda for West Africa at the time. According to him, OGB and local partners were invited to the training and that the partners in particular were very excited about it. However, he also says there was an unmet expectation that CDA would be available to support further use of DNH. During our meeting, he stressed that there were (and are) dozens of new frameworks introduced to local and international NGOs every year. Such competing frameworks have a better chance of being used if they are promoted by a donor that requires its use, or if the sponsor can provide the capacity

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[7] According to him, Mary Anderson from CDA met with Mike Delaney at OA. Efforts to contact Mr. Delaney by email went unanswered.

and expertise required for the organization to fully understand and utilize it. Thiam sees OA as having been "just a facilitator" and therefore not as an end-user of DNH. He does not use the framework in his current work at Wetlands International.

Amadou Daff

Daff attended the CDA training as Representative from GADEC (Groupe d'Action pour le Developpement Communitaire). Ibrahima Thiam mentioned him as an example of how CDA failed to meet the expectation of further support being available post-training. According to Thiam, Daff was involved in a research project with conflict-prone farmers and herders in Northern Senegal. After a series of phone calls, it seems that Daff now works with ASRADIF but we were unable to contact him.

Amadou Cissé

Cissé attended the CDA training and was Program Assistant for OGB in Mali. Ibrahima Thiam mentioned him too as someone disappointed by CDA. He apparently approached OA for more support but was let down because CDA did not provide additional DNH expertise. Possibly contrasting with Thiam's account, Winifred Fitzgerald explained in an email that she and CDA subsequently helped OGB conduct a more intensive DNH workshop in Gao, Mali, and that OGB continued to do more DNH work on their own. Thiam may not have recalled or been aware of this. We were unable to contact Cissé.

Mamadou Bitèye

Bitèye is OA's current Regional Director. He has not attended DNH training but says that NGOs are always aware of their intended and unintended programming impacts, although OA does not apply any particular mechanism for this purpose. At the time of the training, Bitèye says there was a regional need for peace-building programs that is no longer the case. He notes that while there is "still a need for the consolidation of peace," it is less of a program focus. He recognizes that other program areas encompass elements of conflict that may cause or worsen social tensions. Among OA's three program areas – Extractive Industries, Cotton, and Rural Women's Livelihoods – Bitèye chose to highlight extractives as causing "lots of tension." He sees his organization as an agent for change in this area, working through a "very long, slow participatory process" to develop ideas about "appropriate interventions." He sees promoting "free, prior, and informed consent" (FPIC) as instrumental in avoiding conflict since, "only through full disclosure is it possible for a community to decide if it (an extractive activity) is good for them or not." While the approach Bitèye describes does have some overlapping elements with DNH, certain key differences make it unlikely that the CDA version influenced their thinking in this area.[8]

Samba Barry

Barry attended the CDA training while he was Program Coordinator for CONGAD's Programme Sud in the Casamance. Barry left CONGAD to head Afrique Enjeux, another local NGO umbrella organization, and switched to OGB in October 2006, becoming their Conflict Transformation Program Officer. Barry says that in the first few years following the training he used the tools to support context analyses in the field. However, this use declined because, he believes, continuous systematic use of the tools required more support. The training did influence his thinking, though, and he keeps the broader concepts in mind when working with local partners. Barry used an example about assessing the environmental impacts of an irrigation project as a good, not necessarily conflict-related, application of DNH: "when doing anything that can affect someone's interests, there is a need for DNH."

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[8] This was confirmed in a later discussion with Ibrahima Aidara, Oxfam America's Regional Governance Advisor. See the sections below on What NGOs are Doing and Analysis.

At another point in our discussion, Barry was critical of "most agencies" that support peace as something between rebels and the state – not as something between communities. Asked to explain other areas he thought were informed by DNH, Barry highlighted the need to identify and support local mechanisms for resolving conflict, exemplified by OGB's creation of Local Peace Committees, which formalized the traditional use of Griots as mediators. Barry believes that the best way to ensure a DNH approach across OA/OGB lines is by encouraging common partners to apply DNH.

Mohamed Coulibaly

Despite the fact that Coulibaly did not attend the CDA training, he is of interest to DNH because, in his words, "After talking with people who know it, I realize we use it without knowing it." Coulibaly is Oxfam GB's Regional Conflict Reduction Advisor and was present during our discussion with Samba Barry. One example he gave of how OGB applies DNH 'unknowingly' stems from their small arms control program in Northeastern Senegal and adjoining parts of Mauritania and Mali. He explained how, by identifying the factors that contribute to violence, they realized that the perceived need for arms and the arms market were fueled as much by poverty as by security concerns, thus realizing that only through development programs and poverty reduction could they hope to minimize the weapons trade and violence. He was aware of the importance of understanding the underlying causes of conflict, and of the implicit ethical messages of working through the army or police in attempting to resolve it.

RADDHO

Rencontre Africaine des Droits de l'Homme (RADDHO) Executive Secretary Benedict Lambal was present at the CDA training. We met with the current Secretary General, Alioune Tine, in part to discuss the Listening Project and partly to discuss DNH. In the short amount of time focused on DNH it did not seem that RADDHO's activities are directly informed by the trainings or by DNH concepts. Tine was unaware of RADDHO's participation in the training despite having been with the organization at the time. He explained that they are very involved in peace building in the region and that they apply "other methods for doing the same sorts of things…" His examples, though, were about consensus building efforts related to constitutional reform in several West African countries and did not clearly reflect any of the fundamental elements of DNH.

Ameth Diouf

Diouf is the Peace-building/Emergency Team Leader for Catholic Relief Services (CRS) based in Southern Senegal. He says he attended the DNH training but, since he is not listed as having participated in the OA Workshop, he seems to be referring to a different training that we were unaware of. At one point in our discussion he mentioned that Germany supported multi-sectoral peace-building efforts in the Casamance and that this included a DNH training. Unfortunately, we were unable to clarify or follow-up on this. Regardless, Diouf has clearly been influenced by DNH. He says the notion of dividers and connectors is highly relevant and that the framework itself is relevant during conflict and in post-conflict transition. As an example of the latter, he explained their Village Bank Methodology, a micro-finance project focusing on the reconstruction and rehabilitation of social infrastructure in the Casamance. Using DNH to guide their analysis helped them identify the importance of women to establishing and maintaining peace. Diouf gave other examples of how DNH helped inform the creation of what are called 'connective committees' and of how DNH thinking is applied to context analyses generally, from emergency response to "something like an agriculture project" where agencies "have to deal with things like traditional versus legal land tenure."

Malik Ndome (and CRS)

Although Ndome, the Head of CRS's Health and HIV/AIDS Unit, did not attend the CDA training, he applies DNH principles in his work. In particular, CRS' Care and Support for People Living with HIV/AIDS Program explicitly tries to "find ways of using DNH." This includes engaging with program beneficiaries and caregivers to identify and minimize factors contributing to further marginalization and stigmatization. By working to understand belief systems, change perceptions, and increase equality, conflict is reduced. Ndome attributes the internal push for the application of DNH to Caroline Bishop, CRS Regional Health Technical Advisor. Other CRS local partners are also interested in the approach, including Helen Keller International. He would like to conduct a DNH training for partners in the coming year, and shared documents indicating an approach premised on CDA's.

We contacted Caroline Bishop for further information. She noted that CRS has been using DNH inconsistently, but is "trying to ensure that it is part and parcel of every HIV project that we review and approve." CRS is also drafting a chapter on DNH for a new, internal HIV Guidelines document to help programming staff design, implement, and evaluate programs on the unintended consequences of their work. Ruth Kornfield, Regional HIV and AIDS Advisor for the Central African Region explained that it wants to apply DNH strategies to all Care and Support Projects of orphans and vulnerable children and HIV programs "to identify unintended harm coming to beneficiaries as a result of project interventions. This is to be part of their regular project monitoring system. In addition they will carry out periodic external evaluations, using external neutral consultants to identify negative project effects. In both cases a system of feedback and response to the problems identified should be put in effect so as to cease or modify any interventions that are causing harm and avoid any further harm. A primary aspect of the methodology is the necessity of collecting data directly from the beneficiaries, in this case the children themselves."

Amacodou Diouf

Diouf is the President of AHDIS (Action Humaine pour le Developpement Integré au Senegal) and a Vice President of CONGAD. He says he attended the CDA training but is not on the list of attendees, and also described the facilitator as a tall white man – certainly not Winifred Fitzgerald. So, it may be that like Ameth Diouf of CRS, Amacodou Diouf attended a different DNH training. He described the methodology of the training itself as being quite distinctive for its inclusive approach and explained his understanding of DNH as a highly participatory approach requiring an initial study of the context. Beyond this, however, he said little that reflected the DNH framework.

WANEP/WIPNET/WPSN

Mamadou Bitèye told us that The West Africa Network for Peace building (WANEP) was gaining momentum as the DNH training occurred. He thought someone from WANEP attended the training and that the subsequent creation of WANEP's Women in Peace-building Network (WIPNET), with OA's support, was influenced by DNH. This was later contrasted somewhat by Ibrahima Thiam who explained that WANEP attended the training but that the agenda for WIPNET was previously established. Thiam did not think there was any specific connection between WIPNET and DNH.

Fortunately, we were able to get partial clarification in a meeting with Ecoma Alaga who was the WIPNET project coordinator from 2004 until early 2007. She said someone from WANEP attended the training, that they returned to work and, as was common practice, they replicated the training in-house. According to her, WANEP benefited institutionally from DNH, applying the framework to its mission of sustainable peace built around local capacities. However, no one from WANEP or any of its projects is

listed as having attended. One possible link is Thelma Ekiyor who, according to Alaga, instigated WIPNET and who, according to CRS' Ameth Diouf, attended the same DNH training as he did.

Regardless of how DNH came to WIPNET, it did have an impact. Alaga explained that other available models for conflict analysis were too sophisticated for largely illiterate participants but that "CDA's simplicity worked…the basic language was easily understood." She also said the women represented in WIPNET were "living with the daily realities of conflict" and that the institutions available "left them out." In this context, the use of DNH was "like a sinking man grabbing what was available," so WIPNET adapted what it could from DNH for its own work. WIPNET's general goal was increasing local women's capacities for engaging in peace and security. WIPNET accordingly tailored its presentation of DNH to West African women by infusing their own stories as illustrative case studies and by inserting a breakdown of actors by gender. Alaga explained that in 2004 she, as WIPNET coordinator, sent a proposal to CDA for further support and that CDA confirmed receipt of the proposal but never contacted WIPNET again. It seems the proposal was for financial support, which may help explain why CDA, which does not fund programming, was unresponsive.

A rift between WANEP and WIPNET arose in 2006 when, as part of a 5-year analysis, it became clear WANEP would not respond to WIPNET members' demands for more participation and decision-making capacity within the organization.[9] WIPNET's members chose to seek full legal autonomy from WANEP, its parent organization, which disputed WIPNET's right to break away, ultimately resulting in a court ruling that the name 'WIPNET' belongs to WANEP. In response, the bulk of WIPNET's members have decided to leave WANEP and regroup as the Women's Peace and Security Network-Africa (WPSN), an organization with the same ideology and vision but with broader programming areas, goals, and geographic coverage.[10] Alaga will be its coordinator and says the DNH model will inform the work of the new organization in efforts to assess and re-tool existing capacities with a view toward "changing the realities of the day."

NGO Programming and Conflict

This information is meant to give the reader a better understanding of how the different NGOs we spoke with are addressing conflict within their programming in Senegal and the region. It is impossible to fully understand any organization's approach in just one meeting. Nonetheless, it is based on our discussions with NGO representatives and is not an exhaustive list of all programmatic activities.

Conflict Sensitivity Tools

The NGOs we spoke with are using multiple and different tools and techniques to analyze, understand, and address conflict within their programs as well as in peace building. In some instances it is accurate to say that organizations use hybrid and modified DNH tools, while others use conflict sensitivity tools they learned from other donors or programs, tools developed by their headquarters, or a combination of all three. The current political context in West Africa generally and Senegal more specifically focuses attention on development and governance, meaning deep-seated institutional, social, political, economic, environmental, and cultural change for very traditional societies. The NGOs we spoke with were well aware that to address such issues, adequate mechanisms must be in place to effectively manage conflict and NGO impacts.

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[9] WIPNET had grown to 377 member groups, or more than 80% of the WANEP total of around 460.
[10] WIPNET had requests to join from women in Angola and Rwanda but WANEP refused because of the organization's identity as a *West* African network.

At least two different NGOs mentioned the "deluge of conflict tools" made available to them by donors and partners. A local NGO official said that he and his colleagues are invited to up to 50 workshops and trainings a year, many of which are promoting new tools, techniques, and initiatives, making it difficult to concentrate on their mission. NGOs make very pragmatic decisions on which tool they will use. Based on our discussions, NGOs use the tools they feel comfortable with—those that they have used before and understand well, or those that they can get the support and assistance to use effectively. This support and assistance could be from headquarters or from those that developed them (donor, institute, etc).

Rights-based Approaches (RBA) are very popular with INGOs we met with—OA, OGB, CRS, and Plan International (Plan) all utilize the RBA. Not all RBAs are the same however. Plan's RBA is done through Child-Centered Development, focusing on all facets of development that intersect with a child's life. CRS uses the Integral Human Development Framework and Catholic social teaching as the foundation of its programs. OGB focuses on sustainable livelihoods, peace building, and fair trade through an RBA that encompasses capabilities, powerlessness, and inequity. OA seems to take the most activist RBA through its extractive industries program, building local capacity to leverage human rights against the types of lapses and abuses common to mining and other extractive activities. A fundamental goal of this effort is to pressure companies to acquire not only the legal license to extract resources but also the social license.[11]

Plan, OA, OGB, CRS, WIPNET and local NGOs we spoke with use a combination of stakeholder mapping, participatory facilitative techniques, different forms of Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA), and context and conflict analysis tools as part of their conflict toolkits. Plan also uses the Power Cube, developed by John Gaventa and the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) in the UK, as well as tools used by the director while he worked with ARD on a USAID-funded democratization project in the Casamance. OGB and WIPNET use concepts that are directly from DNH training with both emphasizing the utilization of local and traditional mechanisms to address conflict. CRS uses DNH tools acquired at the headquarters level and those from a DNH training. It is fair to say that nearly all of the organizations we met with use conflict sensitivity tools that are consistent to some degree with the DNH approach. OA is the greatest possible exception with its more activist human rights approach that seemed, after our brief discussions, more prone to confrontation with government and companies over the detrimental effects of extractive activities.

Programming

DNH and other conflict sensitivity tools are being used in more traditional peace-building activities as well as in other development activities. Probably because of the recent history of peace-building activities throughout the region, NGOs are very aware of the implications of their actions on underlying conflicts, even in development activities. It is clear that as Senegal and other parts of West Africa become more developed, traditional societies will experience more gender, political, and social tensions. Below are some of the different program areas that NGOs in Senegal are addressing, which illustrate the continued need for conflict sensitivity tools.

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[11] OA explained its approach, deploying the legal system by informing people and communities of their rights and helping to pay the costs associated with legal action when necessary. Stressing that our discussions were short, we were nonetheless surprised by an approach that appeared to accept a significant level of conflict as inevitable. In DNH terminology, we were left wondering if certain 'connectors' were not being overlooked and certain 'dividers' reinforced.

All of the organizations that we spoke to are involved in governance activities. Senegal has seen a growth in its number of political parties in recent years. Local and international NGOs work to bring national and local politicians and government officials together in various fora with citizens. NGOs are creating opportunities for citizens to engage, question, and hold accountable their elected officials. As women and other formerly marginalized people experience the benefits of development, they have learned that they can run for office. This has helped to create more political parties and changes in office, especially at the local level. Ousmane Seye, Director of Plan Senegal, explained that some women benefiting from its micro-finance program have increased their economic and political power, are likely to stand in local elections, and have a good chance of winning. He went on to explain that such a change will be difficult for some incumbents, who have never had any real opposition before, and never faced women in elections.

Such activities increase the speed at which traditional societies face change and inevitable conflict. One official explained that the poorest are being left behind with NGOs trying to address their basic needs, while others are experiencing the benefits of a country that is developing fairly quickly. This produces a divide within society, as the 'haves' continue to move forward in society and the 'have-nots' are left behind. Senegal is at a point where some fear the 'have-nots' may be completely isolated, forgotten, and left behind in their community. As explained above, these marginalized people need to be part of the NGO and community development agenda-setting processes, not only have their basic needs addressed. This will continue to be a challenge as Senegal continues to develop.

OGB, Plan, and CRS operate microfinance projects with CRS utilizing DNH as part of its programming activities in the Casamance. CRS explained that such activities can act as connectors in the Casamance to consolidate the peace process. A DNH analysis helped them understand the key economic role played by women across ethnic lines in the region, which then led to greater focus on women through microfinance programming. OGB is using its microfinance program as part of its efforts to improve women's participation in village decision-making and overcome gender disparities at the community level. Plan does the same, and in one story explained how a group of male elders who wanted to build a new mosque had to go to the women that ran a successful micro-finance loan program. Typically men control financial matters and are decision-makers, but because it was a women's loan fund they had to go to the women to inquire about getting a loan. It is hoped that over time men will accept women as equals.

CRS is also using DNH concepts in its HIV programming, especially in the project design phase, and has plans to incorporate it into implementation and evaluation. CRS is currently preparing an internal HIV Guidelines document to help programming staff throughout the region better utilize DNH concepts. One project in Senegal is targeting social attitudes and behavior to reduce the stigmatization and marginalization of HIV patients and used DNH in the design to emphasize connecters and the implicit ethical message the public gets from their interactions with HIV patients at medical clinics. The program officer is very excited about DNH, which has spread to CRS's other health and HIV partners who also want to better utilize it, and is planning a DNH training of their own next year. The promotion of DNH use in HIV programming has come from the Regional HIV and Aids Technical Advisor, rather than the trainings in Senegal.

Activities on the prevention of small arms trafficking and peace building continue in Senegal and the region. CRS, OGB, WANEP, and WIPNET all have such programming. As mentioned above, CRS uses DNH in the Casamance on peace consolidation activities, usually in the form of development projects such as micro-enterprise support. OGB also promotes peace building and prevention of small arms

trafficking activities through its local partners including WANEP and WIPNET.[12] The support and use of local and traditional mechanisms to prevent and resolve conflicts are important to OGB. The use of griots (local praise singers and musicians well-versed in the oral histories of their communities in much of West Africa) as trusted messengers on small arms trafficking has been very effective, as has mediation training and support to help them address small community conflicts.

AHDIS, OGB, and to some extent OA are working together to address and overcome some of the friction between local and international NGOs. There are a number of NGO associations and fora held to improve capacity, coordination, and planning between them. Organizations spoke about the common agenda of governance and democracy education as successful initiatives undertaken together.

Analysis

It is clear that DNH is having some impact in Senegal and West Africa. This is due in part to the OA-sponsored training that was held in 2001, although the impact is difficult to gauge since we spoke with relatively few people who actually attended. It is also due to CRS' in-house efforts to promote DNH from the headquarters level. And, it is due to at least one other DNH training, perhaps supported by Germany and responsible for the separate DNH 'tree' that includes WANEP/WIPNET/WPSN, CRS staff and unknown others.

There is no doubt that some DNH training attendees made use of some of the concepts they learned and applied them throughout their professional lives over the last six years, while others did not. It is also true that some organizations have institutionalized DNH while others have not. What is most striking is that OA, which partnered with CDA for the 2001 training, has not. This raises more questions than we have been able to answer. For example: Did CRS embrace DNH more than OA because it was donor-driven (part of Germany's multi-sectored peacebuilding support in the Casamance)? What were the roles of personality and presentation – Thiam did not see DNH as applicable beyond conflict work or to his organization generally, whereas Thelma Equiyor of WIPNET applied it flexibly with lasting results. What was it the relationship between CDA and OA at the headquarters level that left Thiam believing DNH was no longer a CDA priority?

There were clearly missed opportunities to build a real DNH presence in Senegal and West Africa and improve programming on peace building and peace consolidation activities. Other missed opportunities to use DNH in development activities include health, agriculture, democratization, microfinance, extractive industries, and RBA activities. This next section looks at some of these missed opportunities for DNH, as well as other future opportunities that exist for DNH in West Africa if it decides to pursue them.

Some Missed Opportunities

With Oxfam-America

Reviewing the case study, "Do No Harm in Afghanistan: A Study in Cycles," it is clear that there is a long history of DNH operating in that region, with strong partners that pioneered the approach and took its promotion upon themselves. However in Senegal OA was only at the beginning stages of understanding DNH itself, without anyone on staff that was well versed in it. Based on our discussions, OA expected

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[12] Ref. *Mohamed Coulibaly* in the section above entitled *DNH 'Tree' in Senegal and Beyond.*

CDA to play a larger role in DNH and help build the capacity of its partners. Without that capacity OA felt it could not offer its partners the expertise they needed to utilize DNH.

According to some we spoke with, the training was only a general training intended to help partners see the need for DNH. Partners could only walk away with a general understanding of the DNH concepts, not necessarily the tools to utilize it effectively and efficiently. According to OA other organizations wanted to also use DNH in new and innovative programming and requested more expertise in it because they did not feel ready to use it. In northern Mali where there are tensions between farmers and herders for water, one organization wanted to use DNH but did not receive the training it needed so continued on with the project without it. But in some instances training was enough to give some direction to the challenges that organizations faced, including WANEP and WIPNET which infused the concept and basic approach of DNH into its programming to help guide women already active in peace-building activities across West Africa. However, even former staff from WIPNET expressed a perceived need for further support from CDA to utilize it to its full affect. Both OA and other local partners at the training explained that there are many conflict sensitivity tools available, but the assistance and expertise to use them is not always available. Most organizations will use those tools that provide expertise rather than something they do not entirely understand. Better institutional support from CDA would have rectified this.[13]

OA did a good job responding to the needs of its partners to address peace building and conflict issues by identifying DNH and arranging for the training. However, OA did not see any relevancy of the DNH training for itself as it was only the "facilitator" for what its partners wanted. Not only does this mean that OA is not using DNH, but it also limits their engagement and use of the materials. Had OA arranged the training and then actively participated in it and tried to utilize DNH within its own programming, it could have been internalized. This could have improved OA's understanding of DNH to a point where they could assist partners on how to use it.

By not helping OA to adopt the approach, CDA missed an opportunity to build an influential leader and champion of the approach in West Africa that could assist partners to understand and utilize it. OA explained it operates at least three program areas that deal with conflict and social tension (including its work in the extractive industries). Based on our limited discussions with OA they have taken a more activist approach to these situations, which may fail to identify existing ways of circumventing and transforming conflict. Likewise, the former regional coordinator, who is now the country director of an international environmental NGO, explained that he did not see any relevancy for DNH in his current work even though he described current scenarios of conflict and social tension that the organization now faces. Had OA seen itself as not just a "facilitator" of DNH but also a user, its own staff would have learned the approach and brought it with them to other positions.

Another missed opportunity involves CDA's and OA's interest and involvement in extractive industries. According to OA, it wanted CDA to assist them to expand DNH in Senegal but CDA declined so it could focus efforts on working with the private sector. Ironically, in at least one instance both are working on issues stemming from the same mining operation in the same country but are using somewhat contradictory approaches. OA is more geared toward enabling people to deal with injustice and abuse by pursuing legal remedies. This approach is adversarial, it seems to presume the inevitability of clashes between stakeholders, and it may bypass local potential for conflict mitigation. CDA's Corporate

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[13] While Winifred Fitzgerald did return to the region to help advance the application of DNH principles, OA attributes no credit for this to CDA.

Engagement Project (CEP), on the other hand, evolved from a DNH-style approach to dealing with potentially adversarial parties to help them identify common interests and to navigate constructively through divisive concerns. This is a notable missed opportunity since CDA and OA might complement one another in this area if there was better communication and coordination between them.

Although OA utilizes RBA, a better understanding of DNH might assist them to identify and take advantage of existing connectors, especially in the extractives work it does. It is certainly consistent for RBA projects to utilize the existing legal and judicial resources available to meet the human rights standards everyone deserves. However, a more collaborative engagement with the company or government might provide the same results and be much less confrontational in the long run. Using DNH could provide good community-level analysis to better understand how to engage all actors involved in rights issues productively. Relying only on international and political level analysis of the extractives industry and legal frameworks runs the risk of ignoring the many existing local capacities available to address the problems the industry is involved in.

Others

We have presented here a glimpse of another DNH 'tree' that grew from at least one training conducted independent of CDA and that exists in Senegal and the broader region. WIPNET's and CRS's application of DNH are probably evidence of this 'tree.' If CDA had engaged with Ecoma Alaga of WIPNET following her request for further support, the two organizations might have devised a continuing strategy for the further spread of DNH thinking. Had CDA been aware of the training attended by CRS staff, it might have had access to a new range of actors. We understand that CDA sees the results of its collaborative learning methodology as non-proprietary and hopes they will be applied by any organization that finds them relevant. But we also suggest that more careful tracking of its Projects would help avoid situations where people use other, perhaps less suitable tools simply because CDA seems to have 'abandoned' the effort.

This case study itself constitutes a missed opportunity. While we believe the information contained in this report can contribute to CDA's broader efforts to understand the outcomes of DNH and possibly to further mainstream the Project, the results were handicapped by a lack of institutional memory. We feel that after 10 solid workdays in Dakar we were not as far along with our research and interviews as we would have been if reports and other basic information were available from the beginning. This may be a function, in part, of CDA operating with limited staff and primarily through short-term consulting contracts. However, this could be easily overcome by a more systematic effort to collect and store information from the consultants as part of their deliverables.

Opportunities for the Future

Rights-Based Approaches

PLAN, CRS, OGB, and OA all employ some variation of the RBA. All of them recognize the importance of using conflict sensitivity tools at some level, while the first three use different tools from different organizations. RBAs work to address the root causes of poverty and stress the importance of individual rights and responsibilities. The keys to such an approach are inclusivity, representation, transparency, accountability, and equality to overcome structural poverty, structural violence, and oppression.

Inherently this means changing power dynamics and power relationships at all levels, especially politically and socially. This is usually done through facilitative and constructive engagement first, moving to more legally confrontational mechanisms as they are needed, attaining rights through legal

obligations. DNH is well suited for such work, but may need to be actively assimilated into such a framework to show that it is consistent with it.

CRS is already using the DNH framework in some of its programming, while OGB also uses some of its concepts. Although PLAN does not use DNH, it uses several other tools (mentioned above) that are consistent with it. We feel that the DNH framework could complement OA's programming, especially within its extractives work. In the discussions we had with OA, it sounded like communities might be less susceptible to harm caused by irresponsible companies and governments if the current approach were merged with DNH thinking. While legal avenues can be essential to winning respect for people's basic rights, some of the underlying causes of rights violations might be dealt with in advance through the kind of context analysis and program design proposed by DNH. It is unquestionable that communities should know and demand their rights. But, because they will bear the brunt of any backlash, NGOs deploying the latest 'innovative' approach owe them first to help affect change without provoking unnecessary conflict.

Governance

Every organization we spoke with is involved with actively engaging government and trying to connect it with the communities it works with. It seems Senegal is further along than most countries in the region on this, but others are also becoming more engaged including Ghana and Mali. The time is ripe for multi-party democracy to flourish and take hold—more political parties are forming and challenging the status quo, further opening up society and the political systems. These are areas that DNH could target.

As Senegal and the region continue to build their democracy and more parties develop with different messages and allegiances, more conflict will inevitably ensue as they challenge the status quo. This will likely cause friction in society, with NGOs caught in the middle as they continue working on governance activities. Similarly, such rapid change could be seen as a challenge to a country that adheres to traditions and Islamic beliefs. Many Senegalese look to their religious leaders for guidance on who to vote for. A more organic growth of political parties could challenge such a system and the traditions that strengthened it.

Of all the NGOs we spoke with doing governance activities, PLAN seemed to be the furthest along. PLAN's director noted that their approach of engaging government, empowering communities to hold it accountable, and creating the conditions where women and other traditionally marginalized populations consider standing for government seats is very controversial. It is unclear where it will lead. PLAN explained that conflict sensitivity, context analysis, and conflict resolution skills and techniques are strongly needed in Senegal, not only in governance work, but also in all development activities since they inevitably challenge the status quo. DNH would be useful in such a setting. Government itself could be a target for DNH training as they work more closely with NGOs.

Health

CRS is beginning to use the DNH concept and parts of the framework in HIV and other health programming. In Senegal, DNH was used at the program design phase to reduce stigmatization of persons with HIV by not giving them preferential treatment at clinics (before they would go immediately in to see the doctor, so everyone knew they had HIV) and better protecting their privacy (urging clinicians to carry HIV drugs around in the same satchels they carry other drugs in). Campaigns around the difference between HIV and AIDS are also meant to reduce stigmatization. DNH could assist CRS in its planned DNH training for partners to assist CRS, but also learn how to be more relevant within the health sector.

Development, Microfinance, and Consolidating Peace

The organizations we spoke with are well aware of the potential for conflict in development activities and the need for contextual analysis. Much of the work they are doing in the Casamance region is done with an acute awareness of the need to bring peace-building sensibilities to all development programming in order to "consolidate peace." For some organizations this thinking continues throughout the rest of their Senegal and West Africa programming. Specific examples of activities that consolidate peace include microfinance, agriculture, governance, local mediation, and controlling small arms through poverty alleviation activities. By viewing programs through a peace consolidation lens, organizations understand the roles they play can have unintended consequences on programming, and there is an implied understanding of dividers and connectors, whether they are aware of DNH or not. There seems ample opportunity for DNH to solidify this type of programming in Senegal in a more systematic way. For example, as CRS in the Casamance shifts away from peacebuilding and toward the two-pronged objective of encouraging inter-community dialog and re-launching economic activities, it does so while applying DNH thinking, particularly to their village bank methodology.