

Do No Harm Teaching Case Study: Cité Soleil

Reference for Workshop Participants



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A Teaching Case Study



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Executive Summary

This case study is meant for use by Do No Harm workshop participants. It focuses on Cité Soleil, the largest slum in Haiti, and one of the 7 municipalities that make up the capital city Port au Prince. It is an area that has experienced chronic violence for the past decade, most of which comes from armed groups of young men that are commonly referred to as gangs. The municipality is informally divided into a set of gang territories, whose boundaries shift as the gangs' power and allegiances change. Cité Soleil experiences low rates of education and employment, suffers from a lack of state services, and is vulnerable to flooding and other disasters.

The residents of Cité Soleil, after years of negative experiences, have little trust in the government, the United Nations, and international NGOs. They are extremely suspicious of outsiders, and this adds an extra layer of complexity to any intervention that takes place in the area. At the same time, there is a serious stigma attached to Cité Soleil, and few organizations, businesses, or individuals are willing to even step foot in the municipality.

This case study will explain the background of what is currently happening in Cité Soleil, as well as developments from 2015 that altered key conflict dynamics. It will then walk participants through a series of hypothetical scenarios. Participants will be guided through planning a conflict-sensitive intervention in a place like Cité Soleil that suffers from chronic urban violence.



Map 1 : Haiti from Nations Online Project at www.nationsonline.org.



Map 2 : Port au Prince from Maps.com at www.maps.com.

Background - Haiti

Haiti is a small country in the Caribbean that shares an island with the Dominican Republic. It was a colony of France that gained independence in 1804 through a slave revolt that led to a fourteen-year revolutionary war. Because it was the only example of a successful slave rebellion, Haiti became an international pariah to the colonial and slave-owning powers of the time. Haiti has repeatedly been the site of intervention by foreign powers ever since.

After the revolution, a small group of educated, mixed-race Haitians became the dominant political and economic elite. They exerted their power over the former slaves and their descendants, and this led to an antagonistic power dynamic between the elite and the masses that continues to this day.

Haiti has almost never had a stable government: there have been approximately 55 rulers or presidents of Haiti since independence, and only 9 have successfully completed their terms. Of the others, 33 were executed, and 23 were overthrown in coup d'état. In 1986, the 35-year Duvalier dictatorship was brought to an end by a popular uprising, led by the Lavalas movement and its leader, the priest Jean Bertrand Aristide. Aristide was elected in Haiti's first democratic election in 1990, and was overthrown by members of the Haitian army (FADH) in 1991. Aristide was very popular among the rural and urban poor, so following the coup the Haitian masses were repressed.

Aristide eventually returned from exile and was re-elected in 2000 and disbanded the FADH. But he was overthrown in a second coup in 2004, which was orchestrated by Haiti's ex-military and economic elite¹. Following this coup, the UN authorized a peacekeeping mission known as *Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en Haïti* (MINUSTAH), with a mandate to stabilize the country.

Background - Cité Soleil

Cité Soleil is a municipality on the western edge of Haiti's capital, Port au Prince. It only covers about 21 square kilometers, but has anywhere from 250,000 to 500,000 residents, making it the most densely populated area in the country. It is bordered by the sea and a national highway. Cité Soleil is divided into three sections: one of which is urban, two of which are pre-urban and rural. For the purpose of this case study, 'Cité Soleil' refers to the urban section of the municipality.

During the Duvalier regime, Cité Soleil was an industrial area devoted to sugarcane processing and housing of the factory workers. In the 1980s and 1990s, an economic crisis in rural Haiti

prompted hundreds of thousands of rural migrants to move into Cité Soleil in search for factory jobs. So many people moved to the area that they overwhelmed the available supply of housing and began building informal settlements along the sea. By the early 1990s Cité Soleil was home to hundreds of thousands of people.

The political instability of the 1990s led to the closing of many of the factories. It also led to a backlash against and repression of people in Cité Soleil, who have traditionally been pro-Aristide. The 1990s were a period of increased unemployment among Cité Soleil's youth and a feeling of political and social marginalization, which continued to increase in the period after the second coup d'état in 2004.

Armed Groups in Cité Soleil

The landscape of armed actors in Haiti is complex. After the fall of the Duvalier regime, many neighborhoods armed themselves to protect their residents against the chaos and repression that followed, including Cité Soleil's *Lanmè Wouj* (Red Army.) In the 1990s and early 2000s *Lanmè Wouj* was replaced by other armed groups.

During the rise of Aristide, many of the young people in marginalized communities were organizing themselves into *baz*, or bases, from which they could mobilize their neighborhoods for local or national action. Different political groups began arming these *baz*, including, allegedly, Aristide. Not all *baz* are armed: every neighborhood has a *baz*, and they can serve social functions, (organizing parties, community service, etc.) political functions, (attending protests, mobilizing for elections, etc.) or violent functions (crime and politically-motivated violence.) Some *baz* ended up amassing a lot of power and weapons in the 2004 period, and became what was referred to as 'gangs'.

Complicating this are other armed groups currently operating in Haiti: there are ex-FADH soldiers, (who operate as a national network even though it is illegal) countless private militias, (belonging to the political and economic elite) and criminal networks (who are associated with powerful families.) There is a significant amount of political manipulation of armed groups and youth in general, who are often paid by politicians to create disturbances.

The police and the country's elite also contribute to the violent environment. The police are involved in many criminal activities, and as a whole, the economic elite possess more weapons per person than the rest of the country, even when compared with active gang members.

The Anatomy of the Gangs

There are many different names that are used by locals to identify types of armed groups in the country's ghettos, such as: *Bandi* (bandit), *Mafya* (mafia), *Chime* (people who supported Lavalas),

and *Militant* (militants). While each name marks a unique identity within the context, policy makers have typically referred to all of these armed groups with the blanket term "gang." We believe that noting the different names and what they imply is crucial for real-life interventions in this context. However, for the sake of simplicity and an English-speaking audience, this case study will also be using the term "gang."

The word 'gang' often carries connotations of very structured, hierarchical groups with their own colors, symbols, names, and initiation rituals. While some Cité Soleil gangs have those characteristics, most tend to have a more fluid structure. Cité Soleil gang identity is mainly based on the neighborhood the gang comes from, although a gang's territory can expand over many neighborhoods. Because these gangs have no colors or uniform, it can be impossible to identify who is a gang member unless you are from the neighborhood.

Typically, a gang has one leader, called a *chef*, and a set of core (male) members, referred to as *solda*, or 'soldiers'. There exists some sort of hierarchy between soldiers, but the edges of the gang are hard to define. A soldier has his own gun, that stays with him at all times. But there are many other young men who are given weapons only when needed, some who drive motorcycles for the gangs, and others who run errands or work as lookouts. Many of the soldiers become involved with the gangs as young boys: they start out as lookouts or run errands, and gradually get pulled in as they get older and gain the *chef's* trust.

The gang lifestyle is precarious, mostly dependent on political patronage and robbery, gangs frequently alternate between relative wealth and complete poverty. There is a lot of fighting between gangs, as well as fighting within gangs for power and control. Few live past their 30s. *Chef's* have absolute power within their neighborhoods, but can almost never leave the boundaries of the areas they control without having significant political connections.

Leaving the gangs is incredibly challenging. A person who is in a gang's outer ring, running errands or occasionally holding a weapon, could possibly withdraw and return to 'civilian life.' However, leaving the gangs would be extremely difficult for a soldier, and virtually impossible for a *chef*. The only way they could leave the gangs would be by leaving Cité Soleil, preferably also leaving Port au Prince, or Haiti. The few powerful *chimè* who tried to return to civilian life in Cité Soleil were assassinated, because other gangsters felt threatened by their former power. So for most soldiers and *chef*, there is no exit strategy except for death or prison.

Age and Social Determinants of Gang Membership in Cité Soleil

Youth are an important part of the political and militarized space in Haiti. Young people have been at the forefront of the political movements that led up to the end of the Duvalier regime,

the coup d'états of Aristide, and everything in between. The average age of an armed urban gang member is 22, and the average age of other insurgency group members is 26.

The mechanisms that the community's adults would use to control youth have broken down: urban migration has eroded many of the traditional community mechanisms for social order. In addition, so few parents are able to adequately provide for the basic needs of their households (food, shelter, safety, education) that many have lost their moral authority over their children. Some families even depend on their children's gang-related activities for their livelihood or safety.

The reasons young people join gangs are complex: one of the primary reasons is that being a part of a gang, and being armed, gives them a feeling of control over a very chaotic existence. Violence in Haiti falls disproportionately on people living in the poorest neighborhoods, and domestic abuse is prevalent. One study showed that every person in Cité Soleil knew someone who was a victim of violence. Joining a gang - or being in the good graces of a gang - provides a sense of security.

Cité Soleil youth also feel socially excluded and marginalized. They are aware that their poor living conditions are not normal, and of how the rest of the country sees them. They see violence as a legitimate way to gain social respect, fight exclusion, and set the score with those in power.

This social exclusion increases youth's chances of unemployment. Social mobility opportunities are very limited in neighborhoods like Cité Soleil, as is access to education. On average, gang members have only 7 years of education, which is not enough to graduate secondary school. Being from Cité Soleil carries such a strong stigma that even those who *are* qualified for jobs may be disqualified on the spot.

Due to the lasting insecurity few private enterprises are willing to invest in Cité Soleil. Many young people feel that if the public and private sectors aren't willing to give them a chance, they will 'take matters into their own hands'. Gang association is one of the few existing income opportunities in Cité Soleil. Gangs gain money through illegal activities, as well use political connections to control access to legitimate jobs and professional development opportunities.

Community-Gang Relations

The gangs have a complex relationship with the communities they are from. Many armed young people, and unarmed residents, see the gangs as a necessary form of protection on many levels. Because of the lack of trust in the police, many communities rely on gangs to protect them from thieves and other gangs. Some communities will even pressure local unarmed *baz* to take up arms, citing their responsibility to protect the neighborhood. Other gang members are more militant and see themselves at war with those in power, including the political and economic

elite, the police, and even MINUSTAH. Many armed youth cite a desire to serve their community as their main reason for joining a gang.

Given this, there is an unwritten social contract between neighborhoods and their local gangs. There are informal "rules" for gang behavior, including who they can target to kill (other gangsters, gangsters' family and girlfriends, politicians, and thieves.) Women are generally considered neutral and not direct targets of gangs (although there are high rates of domestic and sexual violence in Cité Soleil.) If the gangs protect the neighborhood against thieves, and follow the "rules", then the community will allow them to operate and even protect them against arrest by the police or MINUSTAH. But if a gangster gets out of control, the neighborhood may try to cooperate with the police or MINUSTAH for their arrest, recruit a rival gang to run them out, or even kill the gangsters themselves. While this is rare, it does happen when the community is pushed past its breaking point.

However, despite this unspoken arrangement, the gangs regularly abuse their power. They divert many local resources for their own gain, endanger their communities through battles with other gangs or police/MINUSTAH, use their weapons to settle personal grievances over pride or women, and are often hostile to other forms of local leadership. Much of the violence that residents experience is directly related to the gangs.

The younger generation of gangsters is less powerful but more unpredictable; many of them seem to disregard the "rules" of the past and have been known to beat women and children just for looking at them the wrong way. Recently, one opened fire on a crowd of several thousand at a street party - this was unheard of even in the "bad years" of 2004-2006. Locals estimate that between 12 to 27 people were killed.

The State

Underlying all of this is the real and perceived absence of the Haitian state. There is extremely low confidence in the justice system: the police are seen as very corrupt and have been involved in many criminal activities such as kidnapping, rape, and other abuses of power. Most people in Cité Soleil simply do not see it as a viable option to go to the police, which is why they turn to local gangs for justice and protection. When people do go to the police, they are often asked to hand bribes in order for an arrest to be made, and even when this happens, criminals are frequently released. This makes people reluctant to engage with the police for fear of retribution. The rest of the justice system is seen as equally corrupt, with bribes and favors being the primary determinants of rulings.

There is great distrust of the government: a post-earthquake survey showed that only 15% of residents thought that the government was doing a good job, and only 9% thought it was honest

and fair. Basic services such as electricity, trash collection, water, sanitation, road maintenance, and education are unreliable or non-existent, and if they are present, it is often because an NGO or UN group is financing it. Many residents feel that the local government has an incentive to keep Cité Soleil impoverished, because the officials profit from projects designed to fix the municipality's problems. In the absence of the government, gangs function as a substitute state in many neighborhoods.

There are many allegations of local and national politicians directly supporting local gangs with financing, guns, and ammunition, in addition to providing immunity when necessary. This is why even being associated with politics (being an *abolocho*; an intermediary between politicians and gangs or groups of young people) can make someone a 'justifiable' gang target.

International Intervention

Between 2004 and 2006, the gangs had complete control over Cité Soleil and there was virtually no state presence. In 2007, the Preval government made it a priority to regain control over the area, and authorized a MINUSTAH/police intervention. Soleil became a virtual war zone, with tanks in the streets, helicopters in the air, and barricades at the entries to the area. While some reports describe this intervention as sensitive and cautious, many residents remember the time as terrifying and deadly, with many civilian casualties and disproportionate use of force. After many months of fighting, most of the major gang leaders were imprisoned, killed, or exiled, and the state regained some control.

A 'window of opportunity' for creating peace dividends and re-establishing the legitimacy of the state was opened, and largely missed. Despite several 'quick win' projects, local residents' expectations of the return of the state and the private sector to Cité Soleil went unrealized. This not only created great cynicism among local residents, but also meant that the underlying factors that led to the creation of gangs went unresolved. Therefore, the post-2007 reduction in gang activity was temporary. By 2013, the percentage of youth involved in gangs was about the same as it was between 2004 and 2005.

MINUSTAH's post-2007 disarmament programs were also problematic: their incentives were too weak to convince most gang members to transition to a civilian life, but were strong enough to convince some unarmed young people to buy arms just to benefit from their services. After it failed to succeed, the DDR program became the Community Violence Reduction (CVR) program. MINUSTAH soldiers are still present and patrolling in Cité Soleil, and their militarized presence is resented by many residents, who see it as a foreign occupying force and a symbol of foreign intervention in Haiti.

The post-2007 period was also a time when many international NGOs began operating in Cité Soleil. While there were some positive initiatives, as a whole, NGO interventions failed to 'add up' to lasting peace and NGO operations may often have contributed to violence. Many NGOs operated through local gangsters, which reinforced their power. Many residents felt alienated and excluded by the politics of relief and lack of communication. Some jobs related to NGO projects were disruptive because they caused a lot of competition and did not last long; 'cash for work' projects were notoriously corrupt.

Between 2007 and 2010, the international community spent more than \$100 million in Cité Soleil; much more has been spent since the earthquake. Many locals know this and yet see no change, and therefore assume that NGOs are exploiting their poverty for personal gain. This has led to an attitude of "mutual exploitation:" when residents feel that NGOs are taking advantage of them, they take advantage of the NGOs by stealing project resources and sabotaging the project. When there is trust between an NGO and a community, however, residents will actively take risks to protect the project.

Daily Life and Civil Society

Despite all of these dynamics, life goes on in Cité Soleil. Without the factories, most families depend on the informal markets for their livelihoods; very few people have formal jobs. The economic heart of Cité Soleil is the Brooklyn market, followed by the Bwa Nef market, both of which attract people from neighborhoods across the municipality. Because Cité Soleil borders the sea, there is a substantial fishing population in neighborhoods along the water.

Neighborhoods that border National Highway #1 have bigger businesses, like commercial depots and wholesalers. There are still some factories, where people work for very low wages that provide some stable form of employment.

There has recently been some minor economic investment in various parts of the municipality by some progressive members of the elite class and by emerging social enterprises.

Because there is so little economic opportunity in Cité Soleil, there is an intense focus on education as the path to a better life. Families make great sacrifices to send their children to school, and will even send them to neighborhoods that are considered 'rival territories' if necessary. Schools and after-school activities are also seen as important for keeping young people 'off the streets' and make them less vulnerable to involvement with gangs. However, Cité Soleil has only two state-run schools (one primary, one secondary) and both were severely damaged in the earthquake. So most families either have to pay tuition for private schools that, have varying quality of instruction, or give up on schooling entirely.

For the people who succeed at school and find employment, there is intense pressure to leave Cité Soleil. There is a perception that the only people who live in Cité Soleil are those that have no other choice, and residents are suspicious of successful neighbors who remain in the area. This has created a 'brain drain' out of Cité Soleil, and resulted in a significant number of local Diaspora, known as *Soley Deyò*. While many are ashamed of their origins (and many others exploit their connections to Cité Soleil for political gain), there is a growing number of former residents (including famous ones such as the international boxer Evens Paul) who are trying to positively engage the area.

For those that remain behind, geography is identity. The geographic nature of the gang conflicts creates lines that many residents feel uncomfortable crossing. This isolation has led to an intense sense of neighborhood identity and pride. This sense of pride motivates many *baz* to name their neighborhoods after big cities; e.g. Los Angeles, Paris, and Jerusalem are three neighborhoods that border each other. *Baz* are competitive about who has the best area: this can be healthy when it motivates young people to invest their energy and resources into their neighborhoods. However, this competitiveness can also get out of hand and lead to inter-neighborhood conflict.

The dominance of young men is clear in the Cité Soleil culture. A globalized urban culture has taken hold in the area, with hip-hop, break-dancing, graffiti, and street parties being very important. Local DJs are influential figures, because bringing a popular DJ to a street party is a measure of a *baz*'s resources and connections. Sports such as basketball and football (soccer) are extremely popular, although they are played less during times of increased violence. Excelling in one of these areas is one of the few ways to earn some respect in Cité Soleil without being involved with gangs or politics.

Religion also plays a role in the lives of many in Cité Soleil: residents generally practice Voudou, Catholicism, or one of many Protestant denominations. Some religious leaders are respected and active community organizers, others are suspected of corruption or political links. Various churches and temples may draw people of the same faith together from across the municipality, but not across faiths. There are no active inter-religious forums to coordinate between faith leaders in Cité Soleil. However, during certain times of crisis, local activists have managed to mobilize religious leaders to participate in movements such as peace marches and other displays of unity.

Civil society also plays a role in Cité Soleil: there is a countless number of informal local associations and registered organizations. Many of these have been providing services to their communities for years. However, many others are seen as "pocket organizations" (which their leaders will "pull out of their pockets" when NGOs or other funding sources are around, but are otherwise not active in the community.) The latter has seriously delegitimized the former, to the

point where there is suspicion of even legitimate local groups. The use of some local associations as "middlemen" for politicians further undermines civil society's legitimacy.

In general, the media is seen as another force that exploits Cité Soleil's misery for its own financial benefit. Residents are very suspicious of anyone with a camera: it is assumed that foreigners taking pictures will use the images of Cité Soleil's poverty as a way to raise funds for projects that will never benefit Cité Soleil. There is one community radio station in Cité Soleil called Radio Boukman, which is generally appreciated by local residents, although the founder was assassinated by gangs in 2013. Most Soleyans get their local news from *Teledjòl*, the rumors that circulate constantly around Cité Soleil. While they are important for survival, rumors can easily spiral out of control and result in conflict or death.

Post-Earthquake Conflict and Opportunities

The earthquake of January 12, 2010 was a shock to the entire country, but its effects in Cité Soleil were not what was covered in the media. The national prison was destroyed in the earthquake, releasing thousands of prisoners, many of which were gang members that communities helped to arrest, and came back to terrorize their old neighborhoods. New struggles emerged as boundaries of gang territories were disrupted by the disaster and ex-prisoners sought to re-establish their power.

The camp for displaced persons in Cité Soleil's central square, Place Fierte, became a source of insecurity because thieves and unruly gangsters could hide in the tent camp instead of being accountable to their neighborhoods. The situation was so bad that an ad-hoc coalition of *baz* eventually evacuated and burned down the camp in a single night in October 2010.

The government, police, and MINUSTAH had all been badly affected by the earthquake and were already stretched thin with the response. This led to further reduction in state presence and services that created a void that the gangs filled. Many gangs profited from dealing with corrupt NGO and government workers who controlled relief resources.

As a result levels of insecurity and gang membership, which had been declining since 2007, increased sharply in the post-earthquake period.

However, the post-earthquake period also brought together many unarmed civil society groups who felt motivated by the disaster. A social movement was established in 2011 called Konbit Soley Leve, which sought to bring people from different neighborhoods together to address common problems such as flooded canals, trash, blackouts, and at-risk youth. It was an unstructured, unofficial, open movement with no fixed leadership. The movement's structure was designed to make it impossible for it to receive money, cooperate with politicians, or ignite

fighting over control. The movement grew over the next few years until it had participants from across Cité Soleil, and has gone through various cycles of visible activity (such as leading a peace march that ended a conflict between Cité Soleil and the area of Simon-Pele) and more underground activity (during times when social leaders are being targeted.)

2014 saw the re-emergence of the conflict between 'Upper' and 'Lower' Cité Soleil, which is separated by the Route 9 highway. This conflict has historical, political, and class aspects: Upper Cité Soleil is all housing projects, whereas Lower Cité Soleil is a mixture of housing projects and slums. These zones have also traditionally had differing political allegiances. The battle has recently reignited, and even unarmed civilians have been targeted and killed for being in the wrong territory at the wrong time. The conflict has escalated through tit-for-tat killings, and has gotten to the point where few people will cross Route 9. This poses a new challenge for everyone operating in Cité Soleil.

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Main Scenario

You work for the Port au Prince office of an international NGO based in Europe. Your NGO works to rehabilitate disaster-affected buildings, and its mission is to improve human wellbeing and safety through providing resilient shelter in disaster-affected areas. The NGO came to Haiti in 2010 after the earthquake, and you have successfully rehabilitated dozens of earthquake-damaged buildings across Haiti. The NGO's priority is projects that will have significant impact, and therefore you focus only on community buildings (schools, churches, public buildings, etc.) You are proud that you employ Haitian engineers from the top schools and companies, and have about 20 national staff and 10 international staff. You've so far had challenging but workable relationships with local government, and value the relationships you've built with several relevant Haitian ministries.

You recently won a contract to work in Cité Soleil. You have been provided with an assessment from a contracted engineer about the state of 10 buildings in the municipality. You have \$1,000,000 to spend on this project, and your organization is responsible for selecting the sites and carrying out the work. However, you do not have a lot of experience working in the *katye popilè* (the poorer, marginalized areas of the capital such as Cité Soleil), and you are unsure if any of your staff are from these areas. Your organization's board is excited about the prospect of working in such a high-profile area, but your field staff are seriously concerned for their safety. As this is a new situation, your organization needs new protocols and principles for how to successfully pull off this project. You need to figure out which sites to rehabilitate, how to approach the situation, who you will work with, and how you will protect your staff and materials.

Study Questions


1. What seem to be the main sources of division in Cité Soleil?
2. What seem to be the main sources of connection in Cité Soleil?
3. Who should be involved in the decision-making process about what locations to select?
What criteria can you use to ensure that connectors are strengthened and divisions are not?
4. How do you ensure the safety of your staff without legitimizing armed actors? (gangsters, UN, and police - all of which have rocky relationships with the community)
5. How do you build trust with local communities and ensure that building materials are not stolen? (as they often are in Cité Soleil)
6. What role should the municipal government play in this context?

Map and Building Assessments

Below is a map of Cité Soleil, divided into 10 neighborhoods. Route 9, that divides Upper and Lower Cité Soleil is represented by the dotted line. Everything to the left of the dotted line is lower Cité Soleil, and everything to the right of the dotted line is Upper Cité Soleil.

Waf Jeremi is not pictured on the map but is due South of Belekou. It is not directly involved in the current conflict.


The assessed buildings are represented by square icons, and their descriptions can be found in the damage assessment report on the next page. *While these buildings are based on real places in Cité Soleil, details have been altered for the sake of the case study, including the extent of earthquake damage, consequence of earthquake damage, exact location, pre-earthquake functions, etc.*





Map 3: Cité Soleil from Google Maps at www.google.com/maps adapted by CDA. The six icons which were added to the map, and are also used below, are from Canva at www.canva.com.


Damage Assessment Report


You are asked to choose which earthquake-affected buildings to rebuild. You must choose from a list given to you by an independent contractor who assessed one site per neighborhood. The assessment includes a short description of each building and the cost of rehabilitating it. Sites are ranked from least to most damaged:


Block	Structure	
Projet Drouillard	Recreational Area	
Damage:	Estimated cost:	
MILD	\$100,000	
Description:		
<p><i>This recreational area had basketball courts and a flat area to play soccer. A lot of young people from Projet Drouillard and Cite Lumiere spent their free time there, which local parents say was important to "keep them out of trouble." The blacktop was split by the earthquake, the goal post and basketball post/hoop were destroyed, and young people no longer spend time there.</i></p>		


Block	Structure	
Norway/Waf Soley	Fisherman's Cooperative Building	
Damage:	Estimated cost:	
MODERATE	\$200,000	
Description:		
<i>The fisherman's cooperative serves neighborhoods that lie along the ocean. They share boats, nets, and other equipment. They have a building that was built to serve as a place to clean the fish and had a 'cold room' for storage. Since this building has been damaged, the fishermen are forced to sell the fish as quickly as they catch them. This has been harmful to the local economy, and even just repairing the cold room would improve local livelihoods.</i>		


Block	Structure	
Bwa Nef	Public Market	
Damage:	Estimated cost:	
MODERATE	\$200,000	
Description:		
<i>This is the second-largest public market in the municipality. It serves people from many of the surrounding neighborhoods, including Bwa Nef, Projet Drouillard, Cite Lumiere, and Ti Ayiti. The structures that protected the market from the sun and rain are damaged, and the number of people who can sell in the market has been seriously limited. This is a hit to the local economy.</i>		


Block	Structure	
Brooklyn	Public Market	
Damage:	Estimated cost:	
MODERATE	\$200,000	
Description:		
<p><i>This is the largest public market in the municipality. It serves people from many of the surrounding neighborhoods, including Belekou, Brooklyn, Norway/Waf Soley, Ti Ayiti, Boston, and Premye Site / Dezyem Site. The earthquake damaged the market structures and the streetlights, so not only is there less space, but people do not feel safe to sell there after dark. Less people can come to the market and they can't stay as late as they could before, which hurts the local economy.</i></p>		


Block	Structure	
Belekou	Adventist Church	
Damage:	Estimated cost:	
MODERATE	\$250,000	
Description:		
<p><i>This is a local Adventist church that serves people from Belekou, Brooklyn, and Norway. The front half of the church collapsed, so congregants now have services under a makeshift roof of tarps and sheets, which are incredibly hot. This has reduced the number of parishioners.</i></p>		

Block	Structure	
Boston	Catholic Church	
Damage:	Estimated cost:	
MODERATE	\$250,000	
Description:		
<i>This is the only Catholic church for the municipality, and it serves neighborhoods across Cité Soleil. The side of the church collapsed, reducing the church's capacity by half. There are now hundreds of people who cannot fit into the church every Sunday, causing significant distress in the Catholic community.</i>		

Block	Structure	
Ti Ayiti	Secondary School	
Damage:	Estimated cost:	
MODERATE / SEVERE	\$300,000	
Description:		
<p><i>This is a very well-respected secondary school that normally can hold 500 students. It normally draws students from across Cité Soleil, but because of the damage, it has had to limit its enrollment to 250 students because there are not enough safe classrooms. This was one of the few affordable high schools in the municipality, so many students who are not accepted to this school will have no other option for secondary school.</i></p>		

Block	Structure	
Cite Lumiere	Primary School	
Damage:	Estimated cost:	
MODERATE / SEVERE	\$300,000	
Description:		
<p><i>This is a well-respected primary school that normally holds 750 students. Its reputation is good enough that it draws students from across Cité Soleil. Because of the damage, they can only hold 400 students in classrooms, and another 100 in make-shift sheet metal classrooms that are so hot that students have been known to pass out from the heat.</i></p>		

Block	Structure	
Premye Site & Dezyem Site	Annex of Police Department	
Damage:	Estimated cost:	
SEVERE	\$500,000	
Description:		
<p><i>This is the smallest of the two police stations in Cité Soleil. It is on the outer edge of the municipality, and is mostly responsible for monitoring Upper Cité Soleil. The damage is so severe that the few police officers based there had to move to the other, previously unoccupied, police station which is located in Norway, and this reduces their ability to patrol Upper Cité Soleil.</i></p>		

Block	Structure	
Waf Jeremi	The New Port	
Damage:	Estimated cost:	
SEVERE	\$500,000	
Description:		
<p>Before the earthquake hit, the government was investing in building an improved port in Waf Jeremie, the often-ignored block to the south of Belekou. It is one of the few significant government investments in the municipality in the recent past. The port was planned as a job creation opportunity for the residents of Waf Jeremi, but the earthquake completely destroyed all of the progress that had been made so far.</p>		



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