

Reflecting on Peace Practice Program
Understanding Cumulative Impacts of Peacebuilding

Issue Paper:

**STRATEGIES FOR DEALING WITH
THE HARD-TO-REACH**

We are seeking your feedback & reflections!

This Issue Paper is a working DRAFT.

*As part of our collaborative process,
CDA's Reflecting on Peace Practice Program
welcomes your feedback,
based on your own experience and insights.*

*Please e-mail your thoughts or questions regarding this Issue Paper
by or before **October 1, 2012**
to Chloe Berwind-Dart at cberwind@cdainc.com.*

*Thank you in advance
for your observations and suggestions.*

This document was developed as part of a collaborative learning project directed by CDA. It is part of a collection of documents that should be considered initial and partial findings of the project. These documents are written to allow for the identification of cross-cutting issues and themes across a range of situations. Each Issue Paper represents the views and perspectives of a variety of people at the time when it was written.

These documents do not represent a final product of the project. While these documents may be cited, they remain working documents of a collaborative learning effort. Broad generalizations about the project's findings cannot be made from a single case or Issue Paper.

CDA would like to acknowledge the generosity of the individuals and agencies involved in donating their time, experience and insights for these reports, and for their willingness to share their experiences.

For background information on the collaborative learning process and cumulative impacts, please refer to the *Understanding Cumulative Impacts of Peacebuilding* on the CDA website by directing your browser to the following pathway:

http://www.cdainc.com/cdawww/pdf/other/rpp_understandingcumulativeimpactsofpeaceefforts_background_Pdf.pdf

Issue Paper:

STRATEGIES FOR DEALING WITH THE HARD-TO-REACH

The first phase of RPP, summarized in “Confronting War,” found:

- Effective peace practice engages “key people”—people who hold power (formal or informal) and must agree to a peace process or agree to achieve it or sustain it.
- Effective peace initiatives pay attention to “what needs to be stopped and those who will resist it.”
- Most peace initiatives work with the “easy to reach” and focus on “doing good” vs. “stopping bad,” and are therefore less effective than they could be.

In this phase of RPP, the evidence in the cases – as much from its absence as its presence – confirms that dealing with the “hard to reach” is important for the attainment of cumulative impacts. The evidence is strong that, while it is not necessary to *start* with the “hard” issues or the hard to reach, working only with the easy to reach or on easy issues can be either a useful entry point or a sticking point (as clearly occurred in Kosovo).

Who are the “hard to reach?”

Much of the scant literature on this topic has focused on “spoilers.” Stedman (1997) defines spoilers as follows: “Peace processes create spoilers... Spoilers exist only when there is a peace process to undermine, that is, after at least two warring parties have committed themselves publicly to a pact or have signed a comprehensive peace agreement. A negotiated peace often has losers: leaders and factions who do not achieve their war aims. Nor can every war find a compromise solution that addresses the demands of all the warring parties.” Spoilers are “leaders and organizations who decide that the kind of peace in question is not in their interest.”

The hard to reach includes these kinds of “spoilers” but the cases suggest that “spoilers” are not the only kind of “hard to reach” that must be engaged for peacebuilding initiatives to “add up.” The notion of hard to reach exists only in relation to the context: the actions of the other parties in relation to an emerging or ongoing peace process (process to end violence and resolve the causes of conflict without resort to violence) or following an agreement.

The cases suggest that the hard to reach include:

- a. “Spoilers”:
 - i. Groups whose interests seem extreme and who are acting to oppose or undermine a peace process (e.g., Khmer Rouge in Cambodia in the early 1990s, Orthodox Church in Cyprus, TNI (army) in Indonesia prior to agreement in Aceh, AWB in South Africa).
 - ii. Groups whose interests may not be met by a process and who are opposing or may oppose or undermine an ongoing or upcoming process (that is, *potential* “spoilers”, such as ex-combatants in Liberia, Conservative Party and Inkatha Freedom Party in South Africa).

- iii. Groups whose interests lie in war rather than peace, some of whom actually profit from war (such as organized crime groups, arms dealers, etc. ...).
- b. Groups that are hard to access:
- i. Because of where “we” sit in relation to them ideologically, historically, because of networks, etc. (Sinn Fein for John Hume in Northern Ireland, RENAMO for FRELIMO in Mozambique, etc.)
 - ii. Because of their physical location (CNDD-FDD in Burundi, e.g.)

Those Both Inside and Outside the Process: The hard to reach can be inside the process and attack the process from inside. The cases have examples of the leadership of a conflict party remaining hard to reach, such as the Greek Cypriot government during the negotiations of the Annan Plan or the Sri Lankan government after 2005. Often the hard to reach represent a faction within a party or side, such as Hamas in Palestine, right wing parties within Israel, hardliners within the ANC in South Africa, the JVP and JHU (ultra-nationalists) in Sri Lanka, and so forth.

The hard to reach can also be outside the peace process—either because they are excluded from the process (such as the MNLF in Mindanao, or Hamas in Palestine) or because they have excluded themselves (such as paramilitaries in Northern Ireland). They can also be constituencies or other “key people” who are not and would not be “at the table” but who have influence on the parties or the capacity to disrupt the process (through violence, failing to implement agreements that might be reached, etc.).

“Reachability” seems to depend on *who* the hard to reach are and why they are hard to reach, *where* they sit in relation to the ongoing peace process, and *when* in the peace process they are hard to reach. Who is hard to reach often changes over time, as a process progresses from violence/war, to pre-negotiation, to negotiation and agreement, to a post-agreement reconstruction and peacebuilding phase.

General approaches for dealing with the “hard to reach”:

The following general approaches come out of the cases, and are consistent with the findings in *Confronting War*, as well as the literature on the subject:

1. *As much as possible, include all viewpoints or parties in the process and address concerns.* When groups have legitimate political interests that are excluded (or they exclude themselves) from an official peace process, agencies can work to ensure that these views are somehow kept on the agenda. In some conflicts the costs for official actors to deal with certain groups can be too high, while civil society groups may have more flexibility to engage excluded groups in informal ways. At the same time, direct inclusion of hard to reach groups can complicate and disrupt a process and prevent agreement. The cases show a number of strategies developed to deal with this dilemma: inclusion of parties at the table, but without a veto (“sufficient consensus” in Northern Ireland and South Africa); establishment of principles and standards of behavior for inclusion (Northern Ireland), permitting parties to self-exclude; inclusion of “proxies” who are able to bring the voice of a particular hard to reach group or party into the political domain (for instance, civil society vis-à-vis political prisoners in Northern Ireland). Other strategies include:

- Leadership gestures and outreach (such as John Hume in Northern Ireland, People's Alliance winning over of LTTE for talks by relaxing embargo on Jaffna, ANC/NP agreement to overlook election irregularities to include IFP in South Africa)
 - Involvement in peace structures and peace committees to deal with violence, and in post-agreement phases, to address ongoing implementation issues (such as National Peace Accord in South Africa, COSA structure in Aceh).
 - Integration of/power sharing in key governance structures, such as the army in Burundi.
 - Preparing the ground for inclusion of the hard to reach. In several cases, civil society actors worked to prepare the public for acceptance of the hard to reach, thus facilitating their inclusion and reintegration (such as Northern Ireland civil society work to prepare for acceptance of Sinn Fein's inclusion; Mozambique churches work to ensure that the population would not engage in acts of revenge)
2. *Reduce the capacity of the hard to reach to disrupt.* This could include:
- Direct coercion, such as military action/defeat (for example, AWB in Bophutatswana), sanctions that change parties' calculus about whether they can pursue their aims (such as sanctions against Charles Taylor in Liberia), or mass mobilization to confront hard to reach (Turkish Cypriot "This Country is Ours" campaign that succeeded in ousting Denktash in Cyprus from his position).
 - Withdrawal of resources or support for hard to reach parties has been pursued both in pre- and post-agreement contexts: withdrawal of significant support for RENAMO from the US and South Africa post-1990; the Anglo-Irish Agreement in Northern Ireland's withdrawing guaranteed support for either side from Britain and Ireland; US granting of a visa to Gerry Adams (supporting engagement with Sinn Fein); or DDR programs withdrawing weapons in post-agreement situations.
 - Prevention and disruption of blocking coalitions. In some situations, hard to reach groups become "key" because they form coalitions—implicit or explicit—with other key groups (for example, Solomon islands militants and police; business and administration in north Cyprus; right wing and security forces in other settings). Here, efforts to break coalitions have been effective in reducing the power of the hard to reach.
 - Direct confrontation and opposition to hard line tactics have been used to reduce the power of the hard to reach (such as Ahtisaari's confronting the Indonesian government about TNI's human rights abuses; Mandela's statement after the Boipatong massacre and walking out of talks).
3. *Transform or socialize.* This approach relies on changing a group's views on where their interests lie. This could be through transforming ideas of what is possible through negotiation, capacity-building to pursue interests through other means, intra-party dialogue, vision building and consensus-building, and material incentives and socio-economic opportunities. Examples include Culture of Peace training with the military in Mindanao, which has changed how the military views and responds to situations. Civil society work with political prisoners, facilitating dialogue in the prisons between prisoners across conflict lines in Northern Ireland helped transform political prisoners and support them to play a constructive role in the political process. As a result, political prisoners were identified as the single most important constituency in contributing to the changed situation. Similarly, the Olaf Palme Institute's assistance to GAM (rebel group in Aceh), first, for consultations with field headquarters and later for transformation to a political party was significant (along with the work of SIRA in laying out an alternative

path to violence for meeting GAM's interests). In a post-agreement phase, DDR in Liberia has been deemed critical, as unemployment of former combatants is seen as a security risk. The Kosovo Protection Corps was another attempt (not entirely successful) to transform and integrate the KLA veterans in Kosovo by providing a structured and valuable role in the post-war society.

4. *Minimize power to disrupt.* This involves action within the broader community to "inoculate" the process against disruptions. Peacebuilding activities can influence communities to resist provocations and build their ability to defuse negative reactions to provocative acts. For example, the ANC and National Party in South Africa insisted on setting a date for elections, after the AWB attempted to disrupt talks by storming the World Trade Center. Monitoring activities by international or local monitors can be helpful (such as diffusion of violations of peace accords in Mozambique by social integrators, especially in areas controlled by RENAMO but without government control; Aceh Monitoring Mission role in Aceh, rumor control networks and processes).

"Entry" strategies

Making contact with the hard to reach in order to work with them through any of these approaches is a challenge in itself. The cases identify a number of ways the "hard to reach" have been reached.

- Private initiatives by individuals who have connections – in two cases (Aceh, Mozambique) by businesspeople.
- Humanitarian or other assistance unrelated to peacebuilding (training, assistance to families, capacity-building, etc.) has often been an entry point for building trust (for example, civil society actors with political prisoners in Northern Ireland and with parties in Mozambique, provision of negotiation training for paramilitary groups in post-Good Friday Accord Northern Ireland).
- Outside mediators or NGOs who continue contacts with excluded parties (such as Jan van Eck in Burundi, Kenyan mediator Okumu meetings with Buthelezi in South Africa).
- Identification and working with specific individuals within the "hard to reach" groups as change agents for the group.

Additional Areas of Inquiry:

1. Evidence is varied on the relationship between the "easy to reach" and the "hard to reach" strategies. In Northern Ireland, an "inside out" approach of consolidating the moderates and then trying to work out, was less effective and sustainable than the Good Friday Agreement, which worked from the "outside in," that is, from the hard to reach to the easy to reach. In Burundi, by contrast, progress was made on the Arusha Accords by excluding one party in a kind of "departing train" strategy. How can we know when to engage and include the hard to reach?
2. When are strategies of inclusion not useful or effective?
3. How have civil society and other actors effectively gained access and gained trust of hard to reach groups?
4. Several cases speak of important activities (mostly of civil society) that prepare the ground in the public sphere for inclusion of the hard to reach. Is this evidence consistent

with experience? Is there counter-evidence? What are effective strategies for preparing the ground for public acceptance of the hard to reach?

5. There is evidence in the cases of outsiders enabling or empowering “spoiler” behavior by the hard to reach. In Kosovo, for example, issues of the geographic distribution of aid, and the emphasis on multi-ethnic projects generated resentment among veterans, a key hard to reach group, that both undermined the effectiveness of international strategies to promote coexistence and reinforced the attitudes that made the veterans hard to reach. In Cambodia, UNTAC’s fears of what the CPP would do if they did not win the elections in 1993 were said to have led it to avoid engagement with the Khmer Rouge, which contributed to driving the KR back to violence. In Cyprus, the international community focused on the Turkish Cypriot leader, Denktash, as the potential “spoiler,” which led them to ignore the motivations and capacity of the new Papadopoulos government to prevent an agreement in 2004. A continuing question: How do outsiders enable and reinforce “spoiler” behavior?
6. What are the most effective roles and actions for outsiders (governmental or nongovernmental) to engage the hard to reach? How do/should they relate to each other?
7. How do strategies for engaging the “hard to reach” differ at different phases of conflict or peacebuilding? How do they differ in the pre-negotiation, negotiation and post-agreement phases?
8. Strategies based on inclusion or transformation/socialization often involve some form of inter-community or inter-party dialogue, formal or informal. How does one deal with hard to reach that cannot (or will not) be engaged in a cross-communal/party setting (such as the Greek Orthodox church in Kosovo) or that will not engage with other factions within their own “side”?
9. Civil society actors (both insiders and outsiders) have played an important role in engaging “hard to reach” in many contexts. When are outsiders most effective in these roles? Insiders? How can outsiders support insiders in engaging the hard to reach?