REFLECTING ON PEACE PRACTICE PROJECT

Cumulative Impact Case Study

Cambodia's Post-War Struggle for Peace

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACT	Alliance for Conflict Transformation			Relief Committee
ADHOC	Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association		**CSD**	Center For Social Development
			CWS	Church World Service
ADB	Asian Development Bank		**CYK**	Caring For Young Khmer
AFSC	American Friends Service Committee		**DCCAM**	Documentation Centre of Cambodia
ANS/HI	Action Nord Sud		**DK**	Democratic Kampuchea
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations		**ECCC**	Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
BFD	Buddhism For Development		**FHI/IMPACT**	Family Health International / Impact Cambodia
BLDP	Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party		**FUNCINPEC**	National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful & Cooperative Cambodia (Front uni pour un Cambodge indépendant, neutre, pacifique et coopératif)
CAS	Center for Advance Study			
CCASVA	Cambodian Children Against Starvation and Violence Association			
CCCR	Cambodia Centre for Conflict Resolution			
			GAD/C	Gender and Development Cambodia
CCPCR	The Cambodian Center for the Protection of Children's Rights		**HRP**	Human Rights Party
			IMF	International Monetary Fund
CDA	Collaborative Development Action		**JS/JRS**	Jesuit Service-Cambodia
CDRI	Cambodian Development Resource Institute		**KAFDOC**	Khmer Association For Development Of Countryside
			KAP	Krom Aphiwat Phum
CICP	Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace		**KID**	Khmer Institute of Democracy
			KKK	Khmer Kampuchea Krom
CIDA	Canadian International Development Aid		**KLD**	Khmer Kampuchea Krom League For Development
CIDSE	Cooperation Internationale Pour le D'evelopment et la Solidarité		**KR**	Khmer Rouge
			KWVC	Khmer Women's Voice Center
CIHR	Cambodia Institute of Human Rights		**MCC**	Mennonite Central Committee
CPCS	Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies		**MONATH**	Molinaka and Naktaorsou Khmer for Freedom Party
CPD	Center for Peace and Development		**NGO**	Non-Government Organization
			NGO Forum	NGO Forum on Cambodia
CPP	Cambodian People's Party		**NRP**	Norodom Ranariddh Party
CRS	Catholic Relief Service		**Oxfam GB**	Oxfam Great Britain
CRWRC	Christian Reformed World		**PADEK**	Partnership for Development in Cambodia

PADV	Project Against Domestic Violence
PDK	Party of Democratic Kampuchea or 'Khmer Rouge'
PPA	Paris Peace Agreements
RGC	Royal Government of Cambodia
RPP	Reflecting on Peace Practice
SADP	Souteast Asia Development Program
SDR	Social Development in Rural
SRP	Sam Rainsy Party
SSC	Social Services of Cambodia
TPO	Transcultural Psychosocial Organization
UN	United Nations
UNAMIC	United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
WGWR	Working Group for Weapons Reduction
WVI-C	World Vision International Cambodia
YFP	Youth For Peace
YRDP	Youth Resource Development Program

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SECTION 1: BACKGROUND TO CASE STUDY

Since the signing of the Paris Peace Agreements in 1991, there have been significant efforts in peacebuilding and postwar reconstruction as Cambodia has tried to recover from the scars of both modern and traditional conflicts. Although there is general recognition of progress in peace and development as well as optimism about Cambodia's future, many feel that unresolved issues and conflicts must be addressed before Cambodians can experience real peace. The following case study reflects on the cumulative impacts of multiple actors and efforts across times that have shaped Cambodia's progress towards peace.

This case study is part of the wider CDA Reflecting on Peace Practice (RPP) collaborative learning effort to improve the effectiveness of peace practice. Between 1999 and 2003, CDA engaged hundreds of agencies and individuals who work on conflict around the world including international peace and conflict resolution NGOs, as well as local organizations and groups working for peace in their countries. The RPP project conducted 26 case studies, and consulted with over 200 agencies and over 1,000 people to analyze peacebuilding experience. The findings of three years of analysis and consultation are presented in *Confronting War: Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners*[1], which reviews recent peace practice, assesses elements that have been successful (or not) and why, and points to learning on how to improve effectiveness.

Since September 2003, RPP has been working with active peace programs in three regions of the world to test how the lessons of *Confronting War* might be applied in practice. The goals of the Utilization Phase are a) to improve the effectiveness of existing peace programs through application of the RPP learnings; and b) to gather the experiences gained through using the RPP lessons, in order to improve the impacts of subsequent peace practice.

RPP has focused on the effectiveness of programs vis-à-vis Peace Writ Large – the overall conflict situation. Assessing contribution to Peace Writ Large is difficult, as most peacebuilding programs are discrete efforts aimed at affecting one (often small) piece of the puzzle, and no single project can do everything. The evidence gathered by RPP suggests that although many people do, indeed, work at many levels, conducting good programs at each level, these programs do not automatically "add up" to peace. RPP's findings to date have pointed to many factors that have *prevented* programs from "adding up" to have an impact on the overall conflict situation, but yielded less evidence on what contributes to the "adding up" process. Key questions remaining include:

- How do multiple different peace efforts have cumulative impacts on a situation? What elements and/or processes determine whether there is a positive

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[1] Available at http://www.cdainc.com/rpp/publications/confrontingwar/ConfrontingWar.pdf.

cumulative impact of multiple programs, reinforcing what others are doing as well as responding to changes in circumstances?

- How can we link micro ("peace writ little") and macro ("peace writ large") levels in programming decisions in order to improve the impacts of all programs on the broader peace? Many practitioners are uneasy with the emphasis on Peace Writ Large as the standard of effectiveness. They question whether it is possible or fair to hold small, often grassroots initiatives to this standard. Further, they do not want to undervalue the success of "peace writ little" – positive impacts at the community level. But here we are challenged to reconcile the findings of the first phase of RPP about "adding up" with the concerns raised by our field colleagues. It is important to figure out how to link these small, community-level, geographically limited programs to impacts at the macro level.

RPP has been addressing these questions in new case studies reflecting on situations that changed in the direction of peace (even if "peace" was not achieved, and in some cases later was reversed). The cases include: Northern Ireland, Cyprus, Sri Lanka, South Africa, Guatemala, Burundi, Israel/Palestine, Kosovo, Haiti, Aceh (Indonesia), Liberia, Mozambique, Mindanao (Philippines), the Solomon Islands, Tajikistan, and the present case study of Cambodia. In these cases there has been a great deal of peacebuilding activity at multiple levels in all, and there has been a shift in the situation, even if settlements were only achieved in a few.

The case study aims to capture new understanding about how cumulative impacts come about and what constitutes effective linkages for building peace. The aim is also to facilitate reflection and strategy development among peacebuilding actors to improve the collective impact of their activities. By reflecting retrospectively on situations that have changed, such as in Cambodia, it may be possible to identify what and how the various efforts contributed to that change.

SECTION 2: METHODOLOGY

The Case Study Methodology largely follows RPP guidelines for case studies. The case studies are guided by the key questions:

- What efforts and processes had cumulative impacts on peace? How did multiple efforts have positive cumulative impacts?
- What linkages – between levels, within levels, between and within different constituencies, between and within peacebuilders, between and within different sectors, etc. – contribute to cumulative impacts?

A basic interview guide was used to cover these questions which included:

- What are the causes of conflict and obstacles to settlement?
- What were the main positive turning points in the conflict (especially recent ones)?
- What Peacebuilding work has been done? (Mapping of Peacebuilding efforts)?
- Analysis of cumulative impacts: where, when and how did they occur?
- An analysis of the sustainability or reversal of progress towards peace.

Cambodia has experienced continuous periods of conflict in its recent past. In agreeing on a timeframe for this case study there was a decision to allow for the interviewees to locate the period for reflection. In general, people described the period spanning from the signing of the Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict ("Paris Peace Agreements") in 1991 or the 1998 elections through to the present (end of 2008) as the period of developments from conflict towards peace.

Literature Review

An initial literature review of local and international sources was conducted to understand and integrate what has already been researched, compiled and written about peacebuilding efforts in Cambodia. An analysis of the conflict and context was conducted principally by the authors; drawing on international and local literature and experience. This forms the main part of Section 3: Background to Cambodian Conflicts.

Interviewees

A range of people were interviewed across sectors, at different levels of society (elite/decision makers, middle level leaders and local leaders, grassroots). Interviewees included, but were not limited to, representatives of the agencies/groups doing peacebuilding work, donors/agencies supporting peacebuilding, governmental and intergovernmental agency representatives and participants in peacebuilding activities.

People at different levels who have not been directly involved in peacebuilding or the

peace process but who are good observers of the process over time were also consulted for their perspectives. Ministers and politicians from across Cambodia's political groups were interviewed, as well as local and international NGOs from various sectors, media, religious leaders and academics.

Approximately forty one-hour in-person interviews (one international telephone interview) were conducted with both co-authors present, in Khmer or English as preferred by interviewees. Interviews were recorded with consent for note-taking purposes only.

SECTION 3: BACKGROUND TO CAMBODIAN CONFLICTS

Historical Overview

For a long time Cambodia was ruled by the divine right of kings and governed by a deeply embedded traditional class system. The decline of this system, in the form of the Khmer empire, began in the twelfth century with accumulated pressures and tensions that led to its final and complete collapse in 1975. For many Cambodians interviewed, Cambodia's post-1979 experiences of conflict, and its path towards peace, reflect a continuation of these historical approaches to conflict and power.

The past conflicts, which have led to widespread destruction, can be conceived of in three significant stages:[2] The first stage was from the fourteenth to the eighteenth century, when the Khmer empire was continuously in conflict with its neighbors Thailand and Vietnam. [3] In the second stage, from the nineteenth to the twentieth century, Cambodia was under the rule of the French protectorate (1863 to 1953).[4] The third stage followed independence from the French (1954) to the 1970s and 1980s, when Cambodia became a Cold War battlefield.

Cambodia's modern historical conflicts resulted in a period of chronic war starting in the 1960s—which also marked the beginning of the end of social prosperity and development. The Cold War posed an increasing threat to the world, and the communist movement in Southeast Asia was increasing in strength, especially in Vietnam.

King Sihanouk became the leader of the country after independence from France. He tried desperately to protect his new nation from the effects of the Cold War. His decision to secretly allow the North Vietnamese communist forces to operate supply passages through Cambodia, while assuring the United States of his neutrality, led to the 1973 secret U.S. Air Force carpet-bombing of eastern Cambodia. This marked the start of decades of destruction, war, and conflict with the ensuing violence and turmoil.

By 1975, the Cambodian communist movement, the Khmer Rouge, had gained momentum, and on April 17 it marched into Phnom Penh, overthrowing the U.S.-backed Lon Nol government. Democratic Kampuchea (DK) was founded. The population was immediately ordered to evacuate all urban centers and form agricultural collectives. Intellectuals and other "enemies of the revolution," including monks, were summarily

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[2] *See* Soth Plai Ngarm, "Cambodia: Peacebuilding amid Unresolved Issues," in A. Heijmans, N. Simmonds & H. van de Veen (eds.) *Searching for Peace in Asia Pacific: An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2004).

[3] B.K. Gordon, *The Dimensions of Conflict in Southeast Asia* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 45.

[4] *See* http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/cambodia/cambodia_brief.html for a brief overview of the stages of Cambodia's political history.

executed. Between 1975 and 1979 an estimated 1.7 million Cambodians died.

In 1977, the DK, with military aid from China, began a series of internal purges of dissidents. A number of DK dissident commanders fled to Vietnam, where they were groomed for a government-in-exile. While almost the entire international community continued to recognize the genocidal DK regime, Vietnam began an offensive in 1978 to "liberate" the Cambodian people from its control. In 1979, Phnom Penh quickly fell to the Vietnamese forces, and large numbers of Cambodians fled to the Thai border. The Vietnamese-backed People's Republic of Kampuchea, of socialist orientation, was established.

Almost immediately, resistance forces, comprising the Khmer Rouge, the United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC), and the Khmer People's National Liberation Force under the leadership of Prince Sihanouk, joined together along the Thailand-Cambodia border to fight the Vietnamese-backed government. The conflict officially lasted until the signing of the Paris Peace Agreements in 1991 and the arrival of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), although fighting and civil conflict continued into the late 1990s.

With the end of the Cold War, it became possible to undertake diplomatic negotiations to resolve issues among the main Cambodian factions. Through the negotiation process, the various factions and the international community agreed on an arrangement in which Cambodian sovereignty was vested in a Supreme National Council, made up of representatives of the different factions. Cambodia's administration and the first general election were overseen by the United Nations (UN), which was also responsible for the country's security. The Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict were signed in Paris on 23 October 1991, and are known as the Paris Peace Agreements (PPA) [5].

To facilitate the agreement, the UN passed a resolution establishing the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC).[6] It was a precursor to the larger United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), deployed in 1992.[7] UNTAC was established to ensure implementation of the Agreement.

The May 1993 election conducted under the auspices of UNTAC marked a turning point for Cambodia. The election helped to establish a new constitutional monarchy under a coalition government composed of the Cambodian People's Party (CPP) and FUNCINPEC, with Sihanouk as king. The Khmer Rouge, however, did not participate in the election and returned to insurgency activities in its former strongholds, leaving the newly combined security forces to fight an ongoing civil conflict.

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[5] *See* http://www.cambodia.org/facts/Paris_Peace_Agreement_10231991.php for the full text of the Agreements.

[6] UN Security Council Resolution 717, S/Res 717 (1991). *See* http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamicbackgr.html for a more detailed description of the origins and the mandate of UNAMIC.

[7] UN Security Council Resolution 745, S/Res 745 (1992).

At that time, three factors remained as significant obstacles to Cambodia's national reconciliation and reintegration. First, those who controlled land and resources questioned whether, after the reintegration, they would have to share or give up what they controlled. Second, those involved in politics were unsure they could work together again after being enemies for so long. Third, and most importantly, everyone feared that one party would not have the ability to tolerate the others, when eventually one of them could take an absolute control over all the armed forces.

The widespread fear and insecurity at the individual and group level generated by these three factors resulted in a strong aversion to risk, which made imaginative conflict resolution measures difficult to implement. The experience of the Khmer Rouge regime had taught Cambodians that losing power meant a loss of everything, including life. This is critically important for understanding Cambodian conflict and power politics today.

The presence of UNTAC and the election outcome opened up the country to a rapid flow of financial and technical assistance, enabling a large number of actors, including international organizations and nongovernmental organizations, to play constructive roles in rebuilding the country. Despite this newly laid foundation for peace, many issues remained unresolved, especially the ongoing insurgent activities of the Khmer Rouge. In 1997, after months of escalating political tension and violence, the coalition government ended when the two coalition parties—the CPP and the royalist FUNCINPEC party— openly competed for the support of armed groups, including Khmer Rouge remnants.

At the time of the second national election in 1998, the Khmer Rouge ended its resistance and joined the government. After the elections, the CPP/FUNCINPEC coalition brought five years of relative stability and development to Cambodia. The third national election in July 2003 resulted in the formation of a new CPP/FUNCINPEC coalition government.

The next sub-section describes the subsequent context for Cambodia's more recent conflict issues which shifts focus from larger violent political conflicts to more specific (although related) conflict issues.

Post 1998 until today

Cambodia's current conflicts are more pragmatic than ideological or political, and thus can be characterized as more development-related. Most disputes concern material resources. Pertinent conflicts include labor disputes, resource-based conflicts over land, forests, and waterways, corruption, tension as a result of discrimination and racism, border disputes, and election violence and intimidation. These contemporary conflicts have been exacerbated by a culture of impunity and violence, contradictions between traditional and modern-day hierarchies, and the rise of private enterprise and the business sector. Unresolved issues about how to reconcile past conflicts (like the ongoing trial of the former Khmer Rouge leaders); global issues such as regional and international cooperation to curb terrorism; and other economic and security matters also influence the national political agenda.

Those interviewed felt that there has been progress in terms of policy development and the creation of good laws across several sectors, including development, rule of law, citizenship and immigration. However, there has been little progress in implementation (both by decree and enforcement) of these laws. For instance, the Nationality Law has been arbitrarily enforced across provinces, and there have been discriminatory practices against minority ethnic groups such as the Khmer Kampuchea Krom (KKK)[8] and Vietnamese.

Laws that intended to provide for anti-corruption were drafted ten years ago but have not been passed. Enforcement and implementation were commonly described as barriers to progress across all sectors. Many reasons were given for this, including: lack of political will and politically-motivated self-interest, a strong culture of self-interest that sustains corrupt systems and practices, and strategic political manipulation, such as the specific targeting of Vietnamese and the KKK, who have not been allowed citizenship rights.

However, people did recognize that progress requires time. Now that Hun Sen (leader of the CPP) has consolidated power and reduced his opposition, implementation may progress. For instance, the recent sacking of a top military leader associated with land corruption was interpreted by many as a symbolic message about both Hun Sen's power and his intentions to address corruption.

Economic Development / Poverty
Cambodia's economic infrastructure was devastated by the civil war of the early 1970s and the rule of the KR between 1975 and 1979. Cambodia's diplomatic isolation also stifled growth in the first half of the 1980s.[9] Growth accelerated in the late 1980s with the government's gradual move towards free market economic policies and the "peace dividend" of development with economic growth in the decade following the Paris Peace Agreements.

Yet Cambodia remains one of the world's least developed countries, with an estimated GDP per capita in 2008 of US$711.[10] Cambodia's human development index is estimated at 0.593 as of 2007, which is below Laos and only just above Myanmar.[11] Poverty remains a massive problem with over 30 percent of people living below the official poverty line.[12] The number of people dying from curable and preventable disease is very high, largely because health care is limited and access to appropriate medicine is

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[8] The KKK are ethnic Khmer who have been residents of Vietnam for many generations.

[9] Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Cambodia Country Brief (January 27, 2009), http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/cambodia/cambodia_brief.html (accessed May 10, 2010).

[10] World Development Indicators Online (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2009), available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD. The Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade estimates GDP per capita to be $823 as of 2008, up from $647 in 2007. Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Cambodia Fact Sheet (December, 2009), http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/fs/cmbd.pdf.

[11] UNDP, Cambodia Human Development Report 2009, http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_KHM.html (reporting HDI as of 2007).

[12] World Development Indicators Online, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.NAHC.

inadequate. While the number of Cambodians who are HIV positive has dropped from 2.6 percent in 2007[13] to 0.8 percent. In education, the student dropout rate grows at each successive level. As a result, a quarter of the population is illiterate.[14]

Poverty is exacerbated by poorly developed infrastructure, with harsh roads, minimal electrical supply outside urban areas and limited telephone coverage. The land title system is not yet reliable, contributing to the problem of land grabbing by powerful people. Meanwhile, there is unsustainable pressure upon natural resources, with forests declining due to irresponsible logging, and fishing conflicts growing more common.

Young Population and High Unemployment
The 2008 General Population Census suggests that there are about 13.4 million people, and that about 34% are under 15, and about 56% are under 25, around 65% under 30.[15]

"The bamboo shoot will replace the bamboo" was a Khmer saying mentioned by several interviewees when discussing the potential for change in society resting with the youth population. One interviewee recognized that if the bamboo is affected, the shoot will follow the same as the previous generation. The hope vested in Cambodia's youth coexists with concern for the problems faced by Cambodia's youth.

Unemployment rates are higher for youth than adults. Unemployment rates in Phnom Penh were 6.2 percent for teenagers aged 15–18 years and 7.8 percent for young adults aged 20–24 years during 2004. Youth accounted for 72 percent of total unemployment in the capital city that year.[16] Unemployment of Khmer youth in Cambodia presently increases by approximately 300,000 young people every year. [17]

The economy is unable to create enough jobs to handle this demographic imbalance, and a significant outcome is the high rate of youth unemployment and the exploitation of young members of the community. Young people, both those who lack experience, education and productive skills, and, more importantly, university graduates and those with work experience, are finding it very difficult to find employment in the legitimate labor market. In some cases these people are turning to crime or other illegal activities to create income. The prevalence of child labor, the rapid growth of the commercial sex

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[13] http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.DYN.AIDS.ZS

[14] World Development Indicators Online, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ADT.LITR.ZS (http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTEDSTATS/Resources/3232763-1171296190619/3445877-1172014191219/KHM.pdf)

[15] The 2008 General Population Census: http://celade.cepal.org/khmnis/census/khm2008/

[16] ILO Regional Sub Office for East Asia, *Policy Brief on Youth Employment in Cambodia* (Phnom Penh: International Labour Office, 2007), pp. 2-3.

[17] "Unemployment Of Khmer Youth Presently Increasing," *The Mirror*, Vol. 12, No. 581 (October 11, 2008) (translating article from Khmer Shapana, *Vol.1, #114)*, available at http://cambodiamirror.wordpress.com/2008/10/13/saturday-11102008-unemployment-of-khmer-youth-presently-increasing/.

industry, and the trafficking of women and children reflect the difficulties that poor and vulnerable groups - especially women - face in securing a more sustainable livelihood. High unemployment and a predominately young uneducated populace will remain a serious challenge to Cambodia's development for years to come.

Human Rights and Community Security
The Human rights situation in Cambodia has changed during the last few years. Political violence has been significantly reduced, although it is still very much a concern. The incidents of violence have become more selective and are targeted at high profile political figures rather than political activists at provincial and community levels, as once was the case.

Human rights abuses still occur. For example, figures in a recent report by "End Child Prostitution, Abuse, and Trafficking in Cambodia (ECPAT) published figures of rape, of sex trafficking, and of debauchery based on reports in five local newspapers: *Koh Santepheap, Rasmei Kampuchea, Kampuchea Thmey*, the *Cambodia Daily*, and the *Phnom Penh Post*, where there were 322 cases of rape reported. The number increased by 16.77% compared to 2008, where there had been only 268 cases, and by 6.52% compared to 2007, where there had been 301 cases. The 332 cases victimized 337 persons, among whom 202 were underage girls and 2 were boys. Most of the victims were Khmers".[18] These statistics suggest that the psychological impact from war on the Cambodian people has been severe, and that a culture of violence permeates. The high rate of violent crime perpetrated by young people indicates that the culture of violence has been transferred to the younger generations. Human rights agencies and institutions have tended to seek legal solutions to these problems. While this approach can be effective, it has failed to address the deeper causes arising from deep cultural and structural violence, especially psychosocial aspects.

Freedom of expression has been increasingly limited by the government through arrests, threats and other restrictions. Cambodia's press has also come under pressure with increasing censorship of the media, which is protected by the Constitution.[19]

Nationalism and Inter-Ethnic Tensions
Fear of loss of identity and territory that is rooted in past conflict experiences come to surface from time to time. One specific example is the current border conflict with Thailand regarding the Preah Vihear temple.

Political and nationalist tension between Cambodia and its neighbors remains today. On 29 January 2003, a riot erupted against Thai nationals and businesses in Phnom Penh,

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[18] ECPAT Cambodia Report: http://cambodiamirror.wordpress.com/2010/01/19/ecpat-cambodia-rape-of-women-and-children-increased-in-2009-to-322-cases-monday-18-1-2010/ (accessed June 14, 2010)
[19] A recent report by the Cambodian League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights (LICADHO) highlights the ongoing restrictions to Cambodia's media. LICADHO, "Reading Between the Lines: How Politics, Money & Fear Control Cambodia's Media," (Phnom Penh: LICADHO, 2008). Available at: http://www.licadho-cambodia.org/reports/files/119LICADHOMediaReport2008.pdf.

sparked by unfounded rumors that a Thai actress had said that the Angkor Wat temple should be returned to Thailand. Many Thai establishments, including the embassy, were attacked by a group of young Cambodians. In response, a Thai group attacked the Cambodian Embassy in Bangkok. Bilateral relations with Thailand came under severe strain following the event.[20]

Tensions flared again in July 2008, when UNESCO designated Cambodia's Preah Vihear temple a World Heritage Site, building on the 1962 World Court (ICJ) decision that the temple lies in Cambodian territory, not in Thailand. The case became a volatile political issue in both countries, with domestic politicians in both countries using the dispute to stir up nationalist sentiment. There has been ongoing tension along the border, and soldiers were deployed on both sides.

These international issues are linked to interethnic conflicts amongst Cambodia's communities. Similar tensions also exist between Cambodian and Vietnamese communities, both inside Cambodia and between the two countries, particularly in relation to issues of illegal immigration and border integrity. These events reveal the complicated, deep-rooted historical animosity between Cambodia and its neighbors. Attention to inter–faith issues has also increased in the last few years, due to the global impacts of the "war on terror," as well as the threat to the predominance of Buddhism in Cambodia by transnational religious influences.

Finally, regional and domestic conflict dynamics have been affected by politics regarding economic issues. Regional leaders promote competing visions regarding economic development, resulting in a clash between progressive and conservative ideas. The progressive idea means exploring equal opportunity to cooperate amongst and between neighbours; where the conservative one has been a practice that the stronger and the bigger either economic or military who make demand and the weaker or smaller who need to follow. At the same time, this economic potential has inspired some business-oriented leaders to build alliances, and direct relationship between themselves and become a threat to the traditional elites/leaders. The tension arises also from a broader range of conflict dynamics among the member countries in ASEAN.[21] The wealthier countries (such as Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam) increasingly compete, in response to potential new economic growth due to larger scale accessibility to natural resources, such as oil, minerals, and other beneficial areas such as tourism, services and industrial products.

Democratic Development
On the surface the Cambodian government maintains a democratic system. However, in reality decisions are made by political deals among a handful of political leaders and the

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[20] T. Cheng, "Quiet After the Cambodian Storm." BBC News World Edition, January 31, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2711661.stm (accessed May 11, 2010).

[21] Such as the competing dynamic between Singapore and Malaysia, the feeling of being left out from a new form of regional grouping such as Mekong sub-regional group, especially those countries that the Mekong River does not pass through.

business elite, who put their personal and political parties' best interests ahead of the interests of Cambodian citizens.

This political system has been allowed to continue, due to Cambodia's long political legacy of dictatorships and totalitarian and authoritarian regimes. As a consequence, Cambodian political leaders have been afforded a level of power not usual in other democratic systems of government, and the fledgling democracy is fighting against systemic corruption, nepotism and human rights abuses.

A survey in 2003 by the Asia Foundation[22] raised questions about how to understand democracy in light of fundamental human rights abuses. There was doubt to the outcome of the survey where Asia Foundation seemed to suggest that to be accurate; condition of rights abuse also need to apply in order to determine democracy in Cambodia; not only from responses from the survey. In general the survey shows that a high percentage of Cambodian citizens are satisfied with the current political system, suggesting that democracy in Cambodia has improved. The perceived gains in the areas of economic and development may be more limited as the issues that prevent parties from responding to constituents' needs are still present. People are accustomed with undeliverable promises of political parties where in fact the whole countries still rely on international aid thus far. In this way, it fails to qualify democracy in relation to the situation to good policy and democratic practice, but more about how much a party can control over many fronts. After the 1993 elections, Cambodia wished to ensure future political policies are in the best interest of the whole population, rather than just the handful of elites at the top. There is a need to look at democracy from other perspectives.

Recently, opposition parties have been weakening, because of internal divisions within the parties and election losses. FUNCINPEC had been the second biggest party, but split into two—FUNCINPEC and the Rannaridh party. Some members also defected to other new parties, such as the Human Rights Party led by Khem Sokha, a former parliamentarian from FUNCINPEC. There was also large defection from the Sam Rainsy Party, the third largest party after FUNCINPEC, into CPP. Thirteen members from the Sam Rainsy party at the top operational level, joined the CPP, and all of them were publicly received by CPP top leaders and awarded roles and positions either in CPP or in the government.

Although the opposition parties have become weak due to internal instability, the CPP is still suspicious that increasingly widespread problems stemming from land conflicts and economic concession policies might have decreased their popularity among the rural population. For the first time in Cambodian history the country is beginning to benefit from its natural wealth, such as off-shore gas and oil in the south and aluminium and other minerals in the north. CPP top leaders are eager to benefit from the potential of economic development and increasing wealth during the next period, both personally and

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[22] C. Charney & S. Hopkins, *Democracy in Cambodia—2003: A Survey of the Cambodian Electorate* (Phnom Penh: Asia Foundation, 2003). Available at: www.asiafoundation.org/pdf/DemocracyinCambodia.pdf

as political parties, and are doing whatever they can to ensure an absolute majority vote, including exploiting historic nationalistic sentiment within the population.

The 2008 elections were the first in which the governing party gained a majority of the votes.[23] This marks a shift in the wider political landscape: the CPP, under Hun Sen's longstanding leadership, is now clearly in control of both military and government. With the CPP's consolidation of power, the influence of the international community and opposition parties has decreased.

Vietnamese and Chinese governance models have influenced Cambodian political and economic policies. These countries have seen capitalism as a tool for creating economic benefits that does not necessarily require remodeling the state from an ideological perspective. For example, the Cambodian leadership has been influenced by Vietnamese policies that welcome the establishment of business enterprises without changing political and social structures. Similarly, Chinese policies have accepted the development of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), but have done so with state control. These NGOs address issues in society but largely in a manner organized by the state.

Due in part to the fact that the top political leaders in the CPP have long-term relationships in Vietnam and China, the Cambodian leadership has been influenced by these state-control models, with regard to both domestic and international issues. Prime Minister Hun Sen has generally been much more frank in his leadership domestically than with the international community. As the CPP consolidates its power ands opposition parties become weaker and no longer pose a threat to it, the NGO and international community in Cambodia may also become targeted.

Despite continuing challenges, Cambodia has experienced change in the direction of peace. The next section explores the key turning points for Cambodia from violent conflict towards peace, as identified by interviewees.

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[23] The fourth National Assembly elections took place on 27 July 2008. The Cambodian People's Party received 90 of the National Assembly's 123 seats, the Sam Rainsy Party 26 seats, the Human Rights Party three seats and the Norodom Ranariddh Party and FUNCINPEC two seats each. Opposition parties received around 42 percent of the vote.

SECTION 4: SIGNIFICANT TURNING POINTS TOWARDS PEACE

Most interviewees identified the 1991 Paris Peace Agreement (PPA), the 1993 general elections and the post-1997 coup event as significant turning points towards peace for Cambodia's recent history. Many recognised that the 1991 PPA enabled the 1993 elections that led to the most significant end of the civil and political conflict in 1998. These three important events are examined more closely to explore factors contributing to these changes, and also to try to understand the roles key actors played to bring about change towards peace writ large.

Cambodia was facing similar questions as other countries in the world that try to emerge from a failed state situation and to launch post war reconstruction and nation building: "What would be the effective starting points and the most appropriate to the context, from peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding perspectives?" Two approaches were possible: a comprehensive peace plan that could lead to concrete peace and development or a framework, with details to be worked out in an ongoing process enabling participation from all key players

From the all views gathered, as far as Cambodia's experience is concerned, a comprehensive plan (Paris Peace Agreements) was seen as correct from the beginning and was broadly appreciated nationally and internationally. Yet problems emerged directly in the implementation of the plan. In this section, we first examine peacebuilding in Cambodia within the framework of Paris Peace Agreements. We then look more deeply into the internal political dynamics, and the approaches each influential political party used to win support, and their effects on peace. Thirdly, we assess the non-political dynamics of the process—the reciprocal interactions amongst internal and external parties and dynamics as these emerge as one of the major factors influencing the direction of Cambodia's peace in general.

The Peace Process under the Framework of the Paris Peace Agreements

There are split views on whether UNTAC did a good job in Cambodia. Whilst some believe that, given the breadth of the mandate, UNTAC was successful in supporting the 1993 elections; many people believe that UNTAC failed practically on its mandate with regards to "Military Functions" stipulated in Annex I, Section Cof the PPA. [24] Some interviewees believed that negligence on the part of UNTAC resulted in the Khmer Rouge's withdrawal from the general elections in 1993, continuing armed tension, and ultimately a bloody coup in 1997.

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[24] Paris Peace Agreements, Annex I (UNTAC Mandate), Section C (Military Functions), available at http://www.cambodia.org/facts/Paris_Peace_Agreement_10231991.php. This section provided that UNTAC would "supervise, monitor and verify" the withdrawal of foreign forces from Cambodia, and would supervise regrouping and relocation of the parties' forces, as well as take steps for their demobilization.

The demobilization of armies from all rival factions was supposed to be a priority prior the election.[25] However, significant amounts of weapons and ammunition were left uncontrolled throughout the country, and armed forces remained politicised in line with their ex-enemy groups. It was also clear that political parties were not complying with the rules of the agreement. The 1993 election overseen by UNTAC resulted in FUNCINPEC obtaining 58 seats in the constituent assembly, the CPP 51 seats, the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP) 10 seats and the Molinaka and Naktaorsou Khmer for Freedom Party (MONATH) 1 seat. [26] This gave FUNCINPEC the right to form the government. The CPP, however, rejected the result, accused the UN of bias towards FUNCINPEC and threatened to form an autonomous zone under its control in the eastern part of Cambodia. The confidence with which they delivered this ultimatum indicated that they still had full access to armed force and weapons. Fearing a coup and knowing it would not be possible to confront the CPP militarily, FUNCINPEC agreed to put the results aside in favour of a 50-50 coalition between FUNCINPEC and CPP.[27]

The international community, including the UN, were wary of triggering a civil war or jeopardising the peace process by their actions. Consequently, UNTAC took a more conciliatory approach to ensure "peace" and accepted the coalition created under threat of violence. Given the complex circumstances following the 1991 Paris Peace Agreement, it is not surprising that the third party would make such a mistake. The UN and international agencies that were part of the third party intervention needed more capacity to implement the agreed plan. It should also be recognized that this point reflects the views of Cambodian scholars we interviewed, who shared the view that Cambodia's peace was partly a secondary effect from the international and regional peace, particularly the end of the Cold War and new relationships in the international arena.

The Paris Peace Agreements themselves were a major achievement, and amongst the Cambodian conflict parties, there was shared satisfaction with the accomplishment. Regrettably, parties let their competition spill outside of the framework of the Peace Plan. Each political party continued to mobilize armed forces loyal to their own group. UNTAC dealt with complaints in an ineffective manner, which contributed to making the peace process more fragile. The most illustrative example concerns the UN's treatment of the KR. Although the KR was an equal party in the peace process and played an important role in the peace agreement, many interviewees reflected that the UN's judgement was influenced by preconceptions that the KR was the "bad guy" and therefore did not deserve to be listened to.

Prior to its withdrawal from the 1993 elections, the KR made a complaint to UNTAC in reference to the PPAt, Section IV (Withdrawal of Foreign Forces and its Verification),

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[25] *See* Paris Peace Agreements, Appendix 1, Annex 2, Article V, para. 4.

[26] Inter-Parliamentary Union, Historical Archive of Parliamentary Election Results, Cambodia, Parliamentary Chamber: Constituent Assembly Elections Held in 1993, http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2051-93.htm (accessed May 11, 2010).

[27] D. Ashley, "Between War and Peace: Cambodia 1991-1998," in D. Hendrickson (ed.), *Safeguarding Peace: Cambodia's Constitutional Challenge*. *ACCORD* Series, Issue 5, 20 (London: Conciliation Resources, 1998), p. 25.

Article 8[28] that secret Vietnamese armed forces remained operational in some areas inside Cambodia. The complaint was ignored, and the KR decided not to allow UNTAC to enter its controlled zone. International media projected that the KR was breaking the peace agreement. UNTAC's lack of neutrality and its failure to give due importance to the KR faction almost destroyed the peace process and threatened a recurrence of war.

What might have been different, if these mistakes had been avoided? People who focus on the errors believe that two unfortunate things could have been avoided. First, there might not be the resumption of armed clashes in northern and western Cambodia, that occurred in July [1993, shortly after the elections (if elements in PPA, Section C and Annex 2 had effectively been executed. Second, the quality of democracy in Cambodia would have been better than is currently the case. Actions by UNTAC undermined the establishment of checks and balances in the political system and facilitated factional domination of state structures; political parties cannot engage in democratic political processes on an equal footing without facing threat and fear by the main ruling party.

From the perspective of an interviewee who is a former senior military official of UNTAC, UNTAC was successful overall in supporting the peace plan, given the enormity of its mandate, the difficulty of engagement with the KR, and the brevity of its resources and time. He claimed that the major achievement was the registration of people on the electoral rolls. The election was the UN's main focus, and the fact was that the Cambodians themselves fully supported the electoral process, as people registered despite threats. From the UN's perspective, they had worked well to be spread out across the countryside[29].

Whilst UNTAC achievements were recognized, so too were the problems UNTAC faced. From the outset, the intelligence was all wrong. In relation to UNTAC's failure to engage the KR, a senior UNTAC official described how engagement was problematic. The KR were taking hostages, so staff were reluctant to engage, especially after a Japanese worker was killed. UNTAC also found it difficult to establish credible interlocutors; it was largely engaging with young KR soldiers as entry points. UNTAC officials would establish relationships with one group of KR and then a new group would appear, subsequently replaced by another group.

What could the UN have done differently? According to a former UNTAC official, UN staff were frightened and panicked. They needed a committed and strong approach, but although such a strategy was advocated by this interviewee, this was not the dominant perspective. He conceded that the Constitution was flawed and that the UN had been weak and equivocating in its writing. People were prepared to make compromises. The

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[28] This Article stipulated that the role of UNTAC was to verify the complete return of foreign forces and other relevant provisions detailed in Annex 2 of the Peace Accord.

[29] Over four million Cambodians (about 90 percent of eligible voters) participated in the May 1993 elections, although the Khmer Rouge or Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK), whose forces were never actually disarmed or demobilized, barred some people from participating in the 10-15 percent of the country (holding six percent of the population) it then controlled.

biggest worry for UNTAC, however, had been the CPP and what would happen if they thought they weren't going to win the 1993 elections. Such concerns hampered the ability of the UN to do its job.

In his view, following the 1998 elections "stability" was chosen over other aspects such as peace and justice. Personally, he says he resisted that view but was accused of not being democratic. Reflecting further that those who compromised are the same as those who jeopardised the [peace] process. "They [political parties in Cambodia] are also not natural democrats. They agreed to an election as demanded by their patron nations, not as an enlightened process…. and this has been proven in how democracy has developed in Cambodia."

Political Dynamics from 1993 to 1997

Power Sharing

The coalition government following the 1993 elections did not result from the election but from power sharing negotiations undertaken at the initiative of King Sihanouk following the contested election results. The power sharing arrangement itself emerged from ongoing political competition without regard to rules and supplanted the Peace Plan. Many saw the arrangement as Cambodians' own decision for their future, even though it was imposed by political elites without regard for democratic principles. The arrangement allowed the reluctant UN to shed its responsibility and declare the elections a success. By early 1994 UNTAC had withdrawn, and the role of the UN remained limited to human rights observation and development work.

The unique power sharing formula calling for co-premiers did buttress the peace process for three years following the election.[30] A consensus was reached without difficulty to draft a new national constitution. The achievement of this common vision should have been cause for hope among Cambodians in general, as they should now be able to focus on peacebuilding and economic development. Unfortunately, this was not to be. The major parties, especially FUNCINPEC and CPP, while working together in the coalition government, were doing whatever necessary to win the next election. There was confusion about their roles in the government and within their own parties.[31] Politicians chose their own party over national peace and development. In order to achieve their longer-term survival, they struggled to control the peace and development process. Interviewees reflected that the political leaders have never understood the democratic value that they are supposed to work for the people.

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[30] The power-sharing agreement between CPP and FUNCINPEC was unusual in that it involved not just the cabinet, but the entire state, and established dual-command structures not only at the premier level, but in virtually every state body. Ashley, "Between War and Peace: Cambodia 1991-1998," p. 24.

[31] As one analyst observed, "power-sharing Cambodian-style created to separate 'Party-States', in effect two parallel structures of authority—one belonging to the CPP, the other to FUNCINPEC. Rather than working with their immediate counterpart from the other party, officials from the highest level down preferred to use their party clients and colleagues to conduct their business." Ibid., p. 25.

The power sharing arrangement was merely a reconfiguration of competing space for achieving party dominance. Hun Sen's action in July 1997 to disarm FUNCINPEC-aligned troop and dismiss Ranariddh, and the fighting the accompanied it[32] (some describe it as a coup committed by CCP against FUNCINPEC) was a key incident shaping what is peace in Cambodia today. While one can appreciate the creativity of resolving a political deadlock by creating positions for two prime ministers, there is strong sentiment that an opportunity was missed by adopting such a power sharing formula at the expense of a real process that could have supported national reconciliation, through which the country might have moved towards healing the past.

Reintegration of the Khmer Rouge

The latent conflict between the parties became apparent during 1995 and 1996, and then surfaced in a brief, bloody armed conflict in July 1997. In 1994, after a fresh coalition was formed, FUNCINPEC and CPP were expressing good relations and decided to work together to get rid of the remaining Khmer Rouge. However, this turned out to be more difficult than they thought. The National Assembly voted to outlaw the KR, and the Government ordered an attack on all KR positions. The fighting was fierce. Soldiers from both sides were injured and killed, but the KR remained intact. The parties then decided to try to win over the KR through political negotiations for their integration into the Government. The KR themselves were divided on whether to rejoin society or continue fighting. The attempt to reintegrate the remaining Khmer Rouge cadres into the society was becoming a prize for FUNCINPEC and CPP in their political contest.

CPP's attitude was consistent: it never trusted the international community, including the UN, let alone other political parties or actors. In the view of the CPP, the international community (or the third party) was biased against them and had never recognized them in the first place, despite their firmly established control ever since the Vietnamese armed invasion in 1979. Their vigilance, in their view, had helped make them strong, because, except for their old friends and neighbours like Vietnam and Laos, they could trust only their former comrades within the political line and those within their controlled structures. Believing they could not rely on anyone else, they kept themselves very close together; looking after each other (both leaders and followers). The CPP also followed closely every move made by FUNCINPEC.

The CPP successfully consolidated its dominance across all areas by using carrot and stick tactics effectively with corrupt opposition political elites and leaders. They made secret deals with individuals or small groups; offered powerful positions, paid money in exchange for information, encouraged politicians to create divisions within their own political parties, and created fear through threats, political intimidation and political assassinations. Most interviewees referred to situations that are widely known and were reported regularly in the media between 1993 and 1997. Most political parties contested the 1993 elections and the 1998 elections more-or-less opposing the CPP. Most parties, in particular FUNCINPEC, relied on the international community, which they believed

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[32] *See* ibid., p. 28 for a description of the events of July 1997.

was on their side. This was an illusion, and, along with the disconnectedness between party leaders and followers, especially at the grassroots level, led to their downfall. FUNCINPEC was playing an idealistic political game while CPP was playing at *realpolitik.* Neither was listening to the needs and interests of the people.

Consolidation of Power

The 2003 election saw drastic changes in results. CPP gained more votes, with fewer votes shared between FUNCINPEC and the Sam Rainsy Party. CPP secured 73 seats, Sam Rainsy 24 seats, and FUNCINPEC 26 seats.[33] In the period from 2003 to the next election in 2008, CPP managed to further consolidate power. The loss in 2008 election was almost the final defeat of the major opposition parties, who have been weakened further by lack of resources and the inability to withstand the pressure created by the ruling party, CPP. Although the CPP lost one seat, from 73 to 72, in the 2008 election, the remaining seats were split further across a greater number of opposition parties.[34]

There are clear trends from the 2003 to 2008 elections. Security has improved, but land conflicts have also intensified, due to more active occupying, buying and selling throughout the country. The media still occasionally reports violence, but violence and crime are seen as a normal social phenomenon, rather than organized or politically-manipulated crime/violence. In general, people feel relief from the constant fear they had been feeling prior to 2003. On the other hand, a negative trend lies in the rapidly widening gap between rich and poor, a form of structural violence. Before the recent economic slow-down due to the global recession, a boom in buying and selling land and real estate reinforced a pattern of abuse of power and influence over community people by collaboration of powerful high ranking and business persons. This produced an anarchical, rather than a well regulated, economy.

In summary, most interviewees identified key turning points that were at the political level, namely during election times. Underlying these political dynamics were regional shifts as well as social conditions that were both changing with these shifts as well as providing the basis for them.

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[33] Inter-Parliamentary Union , Historical Archive of Parliamentary Election Results, http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2051_03.htm (accessed May 11, 2010).

[34] The newly formed political party, Human Rights Party, won 8 seats in its first contest in 2008, while Rannariddh's Party (split from FUNCINPEC) won only 7 seats. Three other new political parties, the League for Democracy Party, Khmer Democratic Party and Hang Dara Democratic Movement Party, each won one seat. The Sam Rainsy Party won more seats than in the previous election: 27, up from 24 seats in 2003. However, a large number of Sam Rainsy Party members defected to CPP right after the election to earn positions in the government formed solely by CPP.

SECTION 5: MAPPING OF PEACEBUILDING EFFORTS

This section looks at other actors in this crucial period, which spans approximately 1993 – 2008, and seeks to map out the range of peacebuilding efforts and how have they contributed to negative and positive peace.

Track 1: Inter-government Efforts

From a multi-track diplomacy perspective, there are two circles in Track 1, a smaller circle and a bigger circle. The smaller circle represents the involvement of countries from Southeast Asia, while the larger circle represents the involvement of countries beyond the immediate region, such as the United States, China, Japan, Australia, some European countries and Taiwan. There are multi-lateral and bilateral dimensions that also contribute to the dynamics that bring about both negative and positive effects on peace in Cambodia. A mixture of interests and values, principles, economic and security politics emerges from an examination of the diplomatic core of both small and outer circles.

The intergovernmental dynamics within the smaller circle exhibit clear interests and agendas, especially from the closest eastern and western neighbors, Thailand and Vietnam. The interviewees pointed out that peace in Cambodia is the product of old regional politics. Although the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was founded in 1967 by Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore based on the core idea that the unified voice of its members would ensure collective confidence in global economic and security politics, in reality, the region is divided into three groups: the original ASEAN members, the Indochinese communists (Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia) and isolated Burma/Myanmar. Leaders believe that these differences need to be worked out before the regional association itself can reach its vision.

During the mid 1980s, before peace negotiations for Cambodia were initiated, the Thai government led by Premier Chatchay Chundawan announced a policy of "turning the battlefield into the market place." As Thailand was a leading member of the original ASEAN, this policy indicated a change in the position of ASEAN itself. It was also the beginning of hope that the dream to unify all Southeast Asian countries, including Burma/Myanmar and Indochina could come true. It is important to note the effects of regional politics on the peace negotiations themselves. Under the PPA, both Thailand and Vietnam were considered as part of the conflicting parties and were not given any direct role during the UN mission in Cambodia. However, both countries were hoping to maintain and develop their influence in Cambodia. A politician interviewed viewed this subtle contest as creating a new form of tension, with impacts on current peace in Cambodia.

At the regional level, ASEAN has been playing a constructive role in making, keeping, and building peace in Cambodia. Significantly, following the armed conflict between CPP and FUNCINPEC in July 1997, the then ASEAN Troika (the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia) and the Friends of Cambodia helped bring the parties back together to

settle their conflict through a political process.[35]

Bilateral relations between Thailand and Cambodia have been both a contributing and spoiling factor in movement towards peace in Cambodia. Despite deep-rooted prejudice and resentment between people from Thailand and Cambodia, diplomatic, economic, and trade cooperation are the only significant measures being taken to normalize Thai-Cambodian relations following the January 2003 anti-Thai riots. ASEAN, the Japanese government, and the United States were among regional and international diplomatic players who helped to bring Cambodia and Thailand back into cooperation. For their mutual benefit, the two governments have decided bilaterally to put the past behind them and to try and rebuild the relationship. In his opening speech at the ASEAN ministerial meeting, Prime Minister Hun Sen stressed that Thailand and Cambodia have a vision of "shared growth and prosperity, founded on the building of a Cambodia-Thailand Economic Corridor."[36] At the same time, despite an expression by United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon of deep concern about the 2008 clash on the Thai-Cambodian border over the Preah Vihear temple, leadership on both sides have resisted outside involvement, seeing this as a domestic issue, not "war" to be resolved by outsiders such as the UN or ASEAN.

Intergovernmental dynamics within the "outer circle," have produced both parallel and contradictory effects from multi- and bilateral approaches. China has been one of the major donors to Cambodia through bilateral agreements directly with the Cambodian government. Yet although China figured prominently in interviewees comments, it not seen as a pivotal actor in the peace process.

The non-engagement policy of a major actor like China has had an impact on Cambodian politics and the peace process. On the positive side, Cambodians had chosen multi-party democracy as the nation's political system; therefore, the non-engagement of China in Cambodian internal politics between 1993 and 1998 helped reduce complications in the democratic development process, as China represents a different political model. However, its later (after 2003) direct bilateral assistance to the Cambodian government without conditions (such as community-oriented principles and values) has contributed to the consolidation of power by the ruling party. It has also contributed to negative developments in aid and assistance policies, such as a decrease in consultation with sectors of society other than government regarding the delivery of aid.

The Consultative Group Meeting, an annual meeting of the Government and its development partners in Cambodia has been an effective multilateral mechanism for pressuring the government for change and redress of discrepancies in the state system and

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[35] The Friends of Cambodia included Australia, Canada, China, Japan, Russia and the United States. For more detail on the response of ASEAN and the Friends of Cambodia to the July 1997 coup, and their role in averting escalation of conflict, *see* S. Peou, "Diplomatic Pragmatism: ASEAN's response to the July 1997 coup," in D. Hendrickson (ed.), "Safeguarding Peace: Cambodia's Constitutional Challenge," p. 30.
[36] Hun Sen, "Cambodia: fully engaged in the ASEAN community," Keynote Address to the Thirty-sixth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Phnom Penh, 16 June 2003, available at www.cnv.org.kh, Document 160603 (Speeches, 2003).

structure. The meeting is used to discuss a range of development issues and challenges in Cambodia and assess financing needs for future development programs, such as development of land issues.

As the population grows and land prices in modern day Cambodia soar, land conflicts are a growing concern in Cambodia, especially as under the Khmer Rouge regime private property ownership was abolished and land titles destroyed. As people resettled during the 1980s and 1990s, land was occupied and various documents were issued by a range of authorities, and land was seized by those with the resources to do so, while poorer citizens settled where they could.[37] Since 1991, through its embassy in Phnom Penh, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) has been dealing with these issues by providing assistance for land management and administration, landmine clearance, peace building, civil society development, election support, and assistance to the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) for the development of democratic institutions.[38] CIDA's strategic objectives focus on two core development sectors: a) promoting of improved governance, particularly by rebuilding public sector capacity and institutions and strengthening democratic processes and practices; and b) support for private sector development through the promotion of rural entrepreneurship, particularly by leveraging Canadian expertise in land management and administration. The Cambodia Canada Legislative Support Project, delivered through the Parliamentary Centre, works at strengthening the analytic and legislative review capacities of parliamentarians, parliamentary committees and the secretariats of Cambodia's National Assembly and Senate.

Substantial financial and technical support has been made in the area of land reform by the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ), the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), among others. They aim to reform the structures for governmental land management by developing a new mechanism to be operated through the Ministry of Land Management with international supervision and assistance. Activities include development of a land law, a land registration and titling system for the whole country, and mediation training to provide capacity for the ministry structure, especially cadastral commissions at district and provincial levels. Finland has also been providing technical support on geomapping.

In addition, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the ADB have been using loans to support reform programs, and the UN Development Program (UNDP) has provided long-term support for areas such as community development, capacity building, and good governance.

As the application of this new land policy is only just beginning, it is too early to determine the effectiveness of the various projects. Nevertheless, some practical

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[37] LICADHO website, www.licadho.org, accessed 9 December 2008/ Cooper, George W. (2002) "Land Policy and Conflict in Cambodia." Unpublished manuscript, available on the North-South Institute website at www.nsi-ins.ca.

[38] Canadian International Development Agency, Cambodia, http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/ACDI-CIDA.nsf/Eng/JUD-129154040-S9M.

problems have arisen, such as the unclear division of roles and responsibilities between cadastral committees and local courts over land disputes. For ordinary people seeking to secure their land titles, this confusion is complicated by the various levels and systems. People continue to be disempowered vis-à-vis the Government, and new mechanisms have not resolved this problem. Until these issues are addressed, land reform policies will not be sufficient alone to resolve Cambodia's land conflicts.

Labor conflicts have also intensified in Cambodia over the last five years. The international Labor Organization (ILO), in addition to its programs to develop employment, construct road-bridges, and conduct vocational skills training,[39] has been attempting to ensure application by the Cambodian government of the ratified ILO conventions.[40] The ILO has also worked to encourage registration of labor unions. Thus far, the ILO has cooperated with the Cambodian Federation of Employers and Business Associations in order to build links with employers. A labor committee has been formed, representing five major worker organizations. The U.S. government can potentially play an effective role on labor issues, since many of the industrial goods produced in Cambodia, especially garments are exported to the United States.[41] Such interventions have already improved working conditions, rates of pay, and worker-employer relations.

Despite a number of foreign government agencies working closely with national authorities to combat drug and human trafficking, the full nature of such trafficking rings has yet to be fully exposed. The UN agencies, international organizations, and NGOs have also raised concerns about this issue. The Cambodian Centre for the Protection of Children's Rights, Gender and Development for Cambodia, and the Ministry of Women's Affairs and Veterans are involved in campaigning against drug and human trafficking."[42]

Cambodia's decision to participate in the U.S. war on terror is the result of internal politics. It has encouraged the building of a preventive mechanism as part of regional and international cooperation to address the issue. Two Thai nationals and one Egyptian person were arrested in Cambodia in May 2003 for alleged links to terrorists.[43]

In addition to the ILO mentioned above, the active UN and associated agencies represented in Cambodia are the Food and Agriculture Organization, the United Nations Joint Program on HIV/AIDS, the UN Cambodian Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the UN Development Program, the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, the UN Population Fund, the UN High Commissioner for

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[39] On the ILO in Cambodia, *see* http://www.ilo.org/asia/countries/lang--en/WCMS_DOC_ASI_CNT_KHM_EN/index.htm.

[40] S. Pandita, "The ILO in Cambodia," *Asian Labour Update*, Issue 44 (2002), p. 2. , Available at www.amrc.org.kh/4406. htm.

[41] Ibid., p. 7.

[42] Gender and Development for Cambodia (GADC) published a comprehensive report on this issue. Gender and Development for Cambodia, "Paupers and Princelings: Youth Attitudes Towards Gangs, Violence, Rape, Drugs and Theft" (Phnom Penh: GADC, 2003).

[43] B. Bainbridge & V. Sokheng, "More 'Terrorist' Arrests to Come," *Phnom Penh Post*, June 19, 2003, p. 1.

Refugees, the UN Children's Fund, the UN Volunteers, the World Food Program, and the World Health Organization. They have contributed to monitoring and strengthening social structures, and also to practical interventions on a wide range of issues.[44]

While development and governance programs may contribute indirectly to peacebuilding, only UNESCO's "Culture of Peace" program and UNICEF's "Living Values" primary school education curriculum have directly sought to address peace issues. UNESCO's "Culture of Peace" program was mentioned by some interviewees as effective in introducing both senior and middle level officials to concepts in positive peace for a short period around the time of the first elections. However, a number of foreign governments have been supporting direct peace work in Cambodia, including Japan, Germany, the Netherlands, the European Union, Sweden, and Canada.

Cambodia continues to experience aid dependency since 1993, which is understandable, given its state of devastation. The government has recognized a need to continue to encourage aid but to shift from donor-directed activities to centrally controlled aid in order to change what was perceived to be past practice of providers directing external resources to programs and activities of their choice, outside government purview or scrutiny, and excessive spending on intangible items like technical assistance.[45]

In 1997, the Cambodian Government asked the UN to assist with the establishment of an internationally credible tribunal to try the Khmer Rouge leaders most responsible for the humanitarian and other crimes committed between 1975 and 1979. After tense negotiations, UN Chief Negotiator, Hans Correll and Cambodian Senior Minister, Sok An signed an agreement on the terms of a tribunal in June 2003.

The new hybrid court, called the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), became operational in June 2007[46]. It is expected that only a small number of people will be formally indicted, with five defendants[47] currently detained at the ECCC, and the first trial scheduled to commence in late February 2009. The ECCC uses a retributive (state-centered) justice model, in which justice is balanced with political realities and international human rights standards with national realities. Arguments in support of the ECCC have been that judicial mechanisms can serve to challenge a culture of impunity, individualize guilt, fulfill an obligation to the victims to publicly acknowledge guilt and innocence, and deter or punish crimes.[48]

For all interviewed, justice and reconciliation require deeper intervention than the present

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[44] For more information about the UN in Cambodia see "The United Nations in Cambodia," www.un.org/kh.

[45] Royal Government of Cambodia, National Strategic Development Plan 2006 – 2010(Phnom Penh: Royal Government of Cambodia, 2005), available at http://www.mop.gov.kh/Home/NSDP/tabid/83/Default.aspx

[46] The official website of the ECCC is http://www.eccc.gov.kh/. *See also* Open Forum of Cambodia, Khmer Rouge Trial Web Portal, http://www.krtrial.org (accessed May 12, 2010).

[47] These are Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary, Ieng Thirith, Khieu Samphan and Duch

[48] See http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/

ECCC process (commonly called the 'Khmer Rouge trials'). While the ECCC might satisfy the international community's need to close the chapter on this era of history, a national tribunal does not adequately address issues of justice and reconciliation or acknowledge the other issues of reconciliation in Cambodia which emanate from pre-1975 and post-1979 conflicts. The ECCC process, interviewees noted, has become overly politicized, and the Cambodian people have grown tired of the unremitting political negotiations which favor political self interest over principles and values. Moreover, many Cambodians doubt the ability of a tribunal to bring about justice, when many former members of the Khmer Rouge are in power in Phnom Penh today. (Those Khmer Rouge soldiers that have defected to the government have nothing to fear from the court.) For many, the nature of the tribunal suggests that the leadership is not genuinely interested in the real process of healing the past and educating future generations about the causes of such societal violence in order to explore real reconciliation and healing. Locally, the Documentation Centre of Cambodia has collected and preserved evidence of crimes against humanity committed by the KR, an effort to address issues of truth and justice. [49]

Special People

Within Track 1, King Sihanouk has been recognized as playing a role as a "Special Person" [50] in the cumulative process of "adding up" towards peace. The King holds a special place for many Cambodians. This is connected mostly to the period after World War II and into the early 1950s, when he began demanding that the French leave Cambodia. He went into exile to Thailand in 1952 and returned when Cambodia was granted full independence on November 9, 1953[51]. He was considered the father of the nation ("*Samdach Aov*") because he was known as the hero who saved the nation from French colonial rule, and this legacy makes him a special person.

His positioning in Cambodian politics that followed did little to hold the King special in the lives of many. The King tried during the negotiations to bring the conflicting parties

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[49] DCCAM website: http://www.dccam.org/

[50] From the first set of RPP Case Studies discussed in a Consultation Process in January 2008 several issues emerged that provide "lenses" for exploring subsequent case studies such as Cambodia. One such 'lens' explores the role of specific events and specific people, or leaders, in the process of "adding up" towards peace. See: CDA RPP Issue Paper (January 2009): "Emerging Lenses for Exploring RPP Cumulative Case Studies". RPP Consultation on Understanding Cumulative Impacts, December 15 – 16, 2008.

[51] In March 1955, he abdicated in favor of his father. A few months later he became the prime minister. At the death of his father in 1960, Prince Sihanouk was elected head of state. He held this position until he was overthrown in a coup in March 1970. After the coup, Prince Sihanouk fled to Beijing and organized forces to resist the Lon Nol government in Phnom Penh. When the Khmer Republic fell to the Khmer Rouge in April 1975, Prince Sihanouk became the head of state. Within a year he was forced out of office and went into political retirement. The Vietnamese invaded Cambodia in December 1978 and ousted the Khmer Rouge. Although wary of the Khmer Rouge, Prince Sihanouk eventually joined forces with them in order to provide a united front against the Vietnamese occupiers. In 1982, he became president of the coalition government of Democratic Kampuchea, which consisted of his FUNCINPEC, Son Sann's KPNLF and the Khmer Rouge. The Vietnamese withdrew in 1989 and left behind a pro-Vietnamese government under Prime Minister Hun Sen. Prince Sihanouk returned to Cambodia in Nov 1991 after thirteen years in exile. In 1993, he was reinstated as King of Cambodia.

out of conflict. He mediated the part of the political compromise that resulted in the power sharing agreement between the CPP and FUNCINPEC in 1993 and introduced the formula for two prime ministers. His influence has declined since then, as FUNCINPEC's identity as mainly a Royalist party has undermined confidence in his neutrality. CPP still views the King as a useful figure of influence and play along with him as they see benefits to their own political interests, but the King has less influence with newer generations and with the middle-aged generation today involved in political factions, as they have been exposed to different ideologies and are no longer loyal to the King.[52] Only the elderly and rural people still have strong faith and belief in the King's role in the life of the country.

Track 2: Non-governmental and Civil Society Organization Efforts

Following the 1993 election, the Track 2 approach, which involved non-governmental professional organizations and individuals, was more active than Track 1. International organizations and NGOs were able to acquire resources and funding for grassroots and middle-level programs. During those years, program activities gave more attention to a bottom-up peacebuilding approach. Community-based projects were broadly supported, as they were aiming to rebuild social structures using sustainable strategies.

A Peace Mapping project was conducted in 2001 to audit peacebuilding activities carried out by civil society actors at different social levels (national, middle and community) and their main activities.[53] Amongst the forty-four agencies identified as having peacebuilding activities, twenty-eight (32 percent) of these had peace as their main program objective, 28 percent had indirect peace building objectives, 26 percent had planned activities in the future, and 14 percent were more *ad hoc* in relation to their main activities. More than fifty percent of agencies working on peacebuilding activities work through education and training; public awareness raising, campaigning, information, research and less than half carry out direct interventions that aim more to resolve or to transform ongoing conflicts using facilitation, mediation and dialogue.

More broadly, civil society has been active across sectors. Around the time of the 1998 elections the number of local civil society actors rose to about 400 NGOs operating throughout the country. As one politician noted, Cambodia in the early 90s hardly had any NGOs, as compared to the thousands it has today.

The pervasiveness of corruption was frequently mentioned in interviews, a structural issue that many believe needs strong action. While measures may be as simple, for example, as raising basic wages for teachers above US$20 per month, unfortunately there are very few direct measures to address corruption. During the Consultative Group Meeting on Cambodia in 2001, NGOs lobbied governments to consider corruption as one

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[52] Officially, Norodom Sihanouk abdicated in 2004, and the Throne Council elected his eldest son, Norodom Sihamoni, as King, but he has played a mainly ceremonial role.

[53] Soth Plai Ngarm, "Peace Mapping: A study of Peace Building Initiatives in Cambodia" (Phnom Penh: Working Group for Weapons Reduction, 2001), available at http://www.wgwr.org/text/PeaceMapping.pdf (full text available on request from author).

of the key issues.[54] Among local NGOs working on corruption, the Centre for Social Development has been the most outspoken and active on corruption.[55] As a result of these activities, the Cambodian government committed to implement key state reforms, and pass an Anti Corruption Law.[56] While the enactment of the Anti-Corruption Law, which has not been passed, would be an important step, the development of capacity to enforce the Law rigorously is equally important.[57] This was often cited as an example of where good policies exist in Cambodia but are not implemented.

Until it was disbanded, the primary local actor on weapons reduction was the Working Group for Weapons Reduction (WGWR) in Cambodia.[58] WGWR iwas formed in 1998 as a coalition of local and international organizations dedicated to eradicating small arms and light weapons to solve problems. It has focused on research, public education, campaigns and monitoring of weapons.[59] In 2001, the government began a program to demobilize the military, with a target of 30,000 soldiers over two years. The World Bank was the major donor, with other agencies such as the Japan International Cooperation Agency contributing to the demobilization process as well, however, only 15,000 were demobilized before the program ran into administrative problems; it has presently been suspended.

Actors that have been playing roles to help maintain peace and security in Cambodia include UN agencies, governmental organizations, international organizations, and local NGOs. They have worked in either bilateral or multilateral ways and as donors or as implementers, focusing on the three societal levels: grassroots, middle, and national.[60] Many have aimed to reinforce the formal systems, such as the justice system, law enforcement, and structural reformation. Others focus on strengthening informal systems, including peacebuilding and conflict resolution through practitioners and grassroots

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[54] NGO Statement to the 2001 Consultative Group Meeting on Cambodia
http://www.ngoforum.org.kh/Development/Docs/ngo_statement_2001/government.htm.

[55] The Centre for Social Development is supported by the U.S. Agency for International Development, through the Asia Foundation, by the Swedish International Development Agency, through DIAKONIA, and by the Danish International Development Agency, through DANCHURCH AID, among others. *See* Center for Social Development website, http://www.csdcambodia.org.

[56] Fighting Corruption in Cambodia: http://www.scribd.com/doc/10126390/Anti-Corruption-Law-of-Cambodia (accessed 14 June 2010)

[57] In a recent speech (2008) PM Hun Sen noted that combating corruption takes a toll on economic performance and undermines the efforts to reduce poverty; many other measures in addition to the enactment of the Anti-Corruption Law are needed. Some of these measures, such as streamlining bureaucratic procedures, simplifying and modernizing the tax system, eliminating excessive regulations, and motivating public servants by giving them a decent level of salaries, can help reduce the opportunities for corruption. At the same time, the Royal Government is mindful of the fact that changing peoples' attitudes and behaviour may take some time. Hun Sen, February 2008, Outlook conference. Available on the CDRI website:
http://www.cdri.org.kh/webdata/download/oc08/Samdech%20Techo%20Hun%20Sen's%20Keynote%20Address%20in%20English.pdf (accessed 10 June 2010)

[58] The Working Group for Weapons Reduction is no longer an active NGO, but the WGWR – Document Center can be accessed at: www.wgwr.org.

[59] Ibid.

[60] In Cambodia these levels are represented by the government structures—village, commune, district, provincial, and national levels. The grassroots level pertains to village, district, and commune jurisdictions, while activities in the provinces are middle-level interventions.

communities by revising traditional practices and encouraging application of alternative conflict resolution.

Key actors in the initial rehabilitation and reconstruction work were international NGOs such as the Mennonite Central Committee, the American Friends Service Committee, Oxfam-Great Britain, Catholic Relief Services, Jesuit Service, Cooperation Internationale pour le Dévelopment et la Solidarité, Church World Service, and World Vision. They have been either facilitators of emergency relief and community development projects, advocacy networks, or financial supporters of local organizations.

At the local level, during the 1990s, a large number of Cambodian NGOs worked on community development projects, but only a small number operated peace and conflict resolution programs. The Working Group for Weapons Reduction in Cambodia, the Youth Resource Development Program, Youth for Peace, Khmer Ahimsa, and SILAKA are all implementing peace and conflict resolution programs in Cambodia in the areas of direct action, training, and resource development so far.

Further efforts to raise awareness on the issue of domestic violence have been significant, with far-reaching educational campaigns. Most notable, however, is the draft legislation on domestic violence, which at the time of writing is before the National Assembly. The movement to address Cambodia's high rate of domestic violence has been strongly led by Cambodian NGOs, such as the Project Against Domestic Violence, the Cambodian Women's Crisis Centre, and Gender and Development for Cambodia.[61] The domestic violence law is significant not only because of the seriousness of the issue it seeks to address, but also because of the close cooperation between local organizations and the Ministry of Women's Affairs that has been established through its development.

NGOs focused on election monitoring and conflict prevention during the election campaign, coming together to create COMFREL (the Committee for Free and Fair Elections in Cambodia), an independent election monitoring organization which has worked to ensure free and fair elections using a broad network across the country.[62] and has organized independent monitoring missions during the elections. COMFREL worked closely with the National Electoral Committee and international observers. The organization effectively alerted relevant agencies and political parties on irregularities during election campaigns and the voting period. At the end of elections, COMFREL releases public statements on their election observations.

Conflict Prevention in Cambodian Elections (COPCEL) was established in 2002 as a program of the Cambodian Development Resource Institute to facilitate discussion among political parties prior to the election period in order to prevent violent conflict. COPCEL has credibility with the political parties and has been effectively organizing regular discussions between the main political party representatives.

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[62] *See* COMFREL website, http://www.comfrel.org.

The Arbitration Council was established specifically for dealing with labor conflicts. Since the rise of factories (especially garment factories) is operating in Cambodia, the exploitation of workers and poor working conditions have led to the development of organized unions who from time to time confront the factory owners or industrial heads. The AC was initiated by the government, but the members of the Council itself are recruited from professional civilians such as teachers and lawyers, and functions independently from the government or court system.

Local initiatives have been enhanced by relationships and funds generated through regional networks and alliances. These institutions include the Southeast Asian Conflict Studies Network and Action Asia, among others.

The psychological and psychosocial impacts of conflict on people, such as mental health problems and trauma after such long periods of civil conflict have been approached by developments in the mental health system and Track 2 efforts. For instance, Transcultural Psychosocial Organization (TPO) and Social Services Cambodia (SSC) have been the primary actors on these issues. Whilst the psychosocial effects of conflict were mentioned by many interviewees, there have been limited efforts on these issues in peacebuilding efforts.

Overall, amongst the local peacebuilding efforts three were considered 'key' actors in influencing peace: the Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace, the Cambodian Development Resource Institute, and the Dharma Yietra Centre for Peace. The latter was led by Buddhist patriarch Maha Ghosananda and was active until 1997 leading marches for peace into former conflict areas of Cambodia. These actors are discussed further below as "key people" within Track 2 efforts.

Key People

Interviewees noted the importance of individual actors as influential across sectors. For example, amongst shifting party alliances and organizational representations and changes over time – some individuals were noted as having had specific influence on change. Both the Cambodian Development Resource Institute (CDRI) and the Dharma Yietra Centre for Peace can be identified as key actors that led civil society efforts for peace in Cambodia.

Venerable Maha Ghosananda (1924 – 2007) worked for peace and reconciliation by showing compassion and understanding to all (Khmer Rouge soldiers, the King, the people, etc). During 1979, Maha Ghosananda established temples at the refugee camps that lined the Thai-Cambodian border and ordained new monks against the orders of the Thai military. In particular Ghosananda is recognized for the Dharmayeitra for Peace and Reconciliation walk that came to represent solidarity of the people and the commitment to peace despite the risks for those involved. The Dhammayietra is a "pilgrimage of truth," or a peace walk, lasting for several days or weeks.

In 1992, Ghosananda led the first Dhammayietra for one month through northern Cambodia, just prior to full implementation of UNTAC. Before the first Cambodian

elections in 1993, he led Dhammayietra II through areas where open civil war was still underway, encouraging citizens to overcome fear of political violence and intimidation and to exercise their right to vote. Hundreds of people participated in the 350-kilometer journey across the war-torn provinces of Siem Reap, Kompong Thom, and Kompong Cham down to the central capital city of Phnom Penh. At the time, people were afraid of elections and the walk was able to counter fear and provide new hope. Ninety percent of the Cambodian electorate voted in the 1993 elections. While UNTAC is seen to have helped create the conditions necessary for the holding of the elections, some Cambodians and NGO workers attributed the popular participation to the success of the Dhammayietra[63].

CDRI and a core group of individuals trained by CCCR

In the early 1990s a core group of local people participated in a training program provided by Responding to Conflict, a UK-based NGO, in cooperation with the Cambodian Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCCR). CCCR operated under the auspices of the Cambodian Development Resource Institute (CDRI), an independent policy research institute, and introduced the first conflict resolution training program in Cambodia in 1997. CDRI was a special contributor to the leadership of local actors working directly for peace.

The first core group trained by the CCCR formed themselves into a national networking organization called the Alliance for Conflict Transformation (ACT). Many of the key peacebuilding NGOs have been established and guided by this core groups of individuals. ACT's contributions include capacity and skills development, technical support in the area of peacebuilding to other sectors, and advocacy for policy changes, through workshops, conferences, networking, and research. Significantly, the CCCR, known today as Cambodia Peace and Development, has also provided training courses to commune councils in what are known as the "reconciliation zones," former Khmer Rouge–controlled areas. NGOs who worked with government official considered that the trainings in peace and conflict transformation provided to many officials with the skills and concepts to transform their approaches to conflict and provided opportunities to influence change without violence.

Track 3: Peacebuilding through commerce/business

Despite massive investment in the postwar reconstruction of Cambodia, support for direct peace work in Cambodia, especially in terms of development of institutional and local mechanisms for peace, remains limited. The majority of financial and technical assistance has targeted economic growth. This may be influenced by a narrow view of root causes of conflict or by the dissemination of international concepts of demographic growth and the trickle-down effect of economic development and reinforced by assumptions (theories of change) that negative peace is necessary for economic prosperity, but that economic prosperity will lead to sustained peace.

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[63] Source: http://www.ghosananda.org/bio_book.html

Cambodia's capacity to understand the social, economic, and cultural causes of violence, abuse, illiteracy, and poverty is frequently undermined by the necessity of dealing with the results of conflict on a day-to-day basis. Some interviewees explicitly mentioned people's need to focus on daily survival as a barrier to developments in other areas. This is one of the obstacles to sustainable development and self-reliance. If its level of dependency remains as strong as it is today, Cambodia will not be able to achieve self-management of conflicts and tensions without significant support from outside. Support that only helps Cambodia to address the results of conflict, such as the visible violence and abuses, in fact weakens society's ability adequately to address the root causes of conflict.

The shift in donor strategies toward work undertaken through government structures has been important. However, it has not been complemented by the appropriate parallel contributions toward civil society actors, particularly in the areas of peacebuilding or changes in social norms and relations. This situation has contributed to competition for donor funding and delayed possible dividends in peace and social reconstruction.

The business community has much stake in security and conflict in Cambodia. Businesses must develop close connections with political parties or powerful individuals in order to survive. Some national business tycoons funded armed conflict to win business privileges over their competitors. During the armed clash in 1997, for example, a Cambodian business tycoon, Theng Bunma, was known to support CPP with material and finances to fight against FUNCINPEC. Other businessmen invested in FUNCINPEC, in the hope of obtaining business privileges if the party gained political power; this helped FUNCINPEC to confront CPP. The close connections between businessmen and political parties were exemplified when FUNCINPEC was caught acquiring new weaponry from Taiwan one month before the clash in July 1997. It was clear that the business sector has been playing a very important role in conflict and security in Cambodia's past. Unfortunately, there has been no engagement from the business sector in peacebuilding or social issues. The business community has generally been part of the problem, as a driving force behind political interests influencing the allocation of resources available in the country, with little scrutiny from other sectors.

Track 3 peace contributions from the international investment in the trade and business sectors are also negligible. Since the UN designated Cambodia as a "post-war context," there has been no proper monitoring of activities of international investors and trade. Some well-known international companies that observe corporate social responsibility principles are perceived as not bothering to do so in Cambodia, as operations are well concealed by local corrupt systems. Companies that do not have corporate social responsibility policies have even worse practices and enjoy unrestricted operations under the poor regulatory system in Cambodia.[64] There are very few international pressures in

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[64] In the World Bank report corruption, economic and regulatory uncertainty, legal system and trade regulations are identified among the leading general constraints to the operation and growth of Cambodia. World Bank, "Cambodia: Seizing the Global Opportunity: Investment Climate Assessment and Reform

this area, and those that are brought forward often swiftly dissipate. Interviewees raised the example of Global Witness, who managed to publish critical reports on illegal logging, and were subsequently banned by the Cambodian government from further operating in Cambodia. The last report of Global Witness referred to family members of the Prime Minister receiving millions of dollars from illegal logging and natural resource exploitation:

> *The report details the activities of Cambodia's most powerful illegal logging syndicate - known as the Seng Keang Company - which is controlled by individuals related to Prime Minister Hun Sen, Minister for Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Chan Sarun and Director General of the Forest Administration Ty Sokhun.[65]*

The reaction and denial of the government indicate some of the challenges in confronting pervasive corruption. First, targeting individual persons rather than the system, is ineffective, and, second, random pressure normally does not work in the present Cambodian context. Accused individuals do not feel that they gained as much money as alleged, and much of the accumulated funds is often be absorbed into the greater corrupted system. Moreover, as the system itself is the main problem, targeting individuals who are part of a complex system of relationships prompts strong reactions and little cooperation amongst actors, with the consequence of minimizing the effectiveness of this type of strategy.

The trends of the business sector are largely seen as a 'time bomb' of social issues for the future. In a process of ongoing centralization of land ownership through abuse of power and money, and personal connections, major investments by some create structural exploitation affecting many people at several levels. The current lack of transparency in policies regarding natural resource management—such as mineral extraction, gas and oil—foreshadows the potential for social unrest in the future, if there is no improvement in practice and policies. There is optimism that the business sector can be encouraged to contribute more to long-term peace building and broader peace writ large. There have been recent attempts at the policy making level to improve the status quo in the business sector. Despite ongoing negative trends, there are positive signs of change, such as that publicly indicated by the government in a speech of Mr. Cham Prashidh, Senior Minister and Minister of Commerce at a World Bank-sponsored workshop. The speech indicates recognition by government of discrepancy in business sector and the government is ready for fight it:

> *"One we know the symptoms and the diseases, what is needed now is strong political will to undertake the necessary surgery operations. The remedy and the drug prescription are already identified. It is now time to take action".[66]*

Strategy for Cambodia," Report No. 27925-KH (2004), 7.
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCAMBODIA/Resources/CG-Report-Brief.pdf
[65] Information in relation to human rights and the Cambodia Freedom Fighters is available at the Human Rights Watch website, www.hrw.org/press/2000/12/cambodia1205.htm.
[66] Cham Prasidh, "Converting WTO Accession to Poverty Reduction," Keynote Speech at World Bank-

Track 4: Individual citizen or personal involvement

In general, peacebuilding through personal involvement (Track 4) has been to date almost nonexistent. One interviewee explains that Cambodians, especially people from the older generation, are living in *"bak s'bat"* (a weary mental state). The expression *bak s'bat* describes a feeling of utter exhaustion that comes from generations experiencing internal oppression, fear, war after war, leaders taking advantage of people, and loss of ability to continue. People have been living with severe violent conflict and war continuously from 15th and 16th century onward, fighting with Thai, Vietnamese, French colonization, the Cold War and civil wars. This has generated a psychological state of fatigue that has scarred generations. People are afraid of war or conflict and seen it as very negative. They are afraid to do anything seen as political that may incite conflict or tension. Peace workers who have conducted conflict resolution training have experienced similar rejection, while trying to convince people that there are positive sides of conflict. The situation is aggravated by the long neglect of education, leaving people with cumulative life experiences that reinforce perceptions, misinformation and enmeshed meanings between life and politics they cannot separate.

For many we interviewed, the hope of active involvement of individual citizens seems to lie with younger generations, as now the population has been broadly hypnotized under a process of pacification. The end of civil fighting for many people was needed for basic survival, livelihood and development.

Track 5: Media Contribution

After UNTAC left, the media were divided between those who sided with FUNCINPEC and those aligned with CPP. Both FUNCINPEC have their own television station. Others have fairly equal access to the media. However, after consolidating power, CPP is understood to have gained control of all media.

The Electoral Monitoring Organization often cites the problem of media accessibility. COMFREL, for example, has statistics showing that 70 percent of the airtime for CPP, compared to 20 percent for FUNCINPEC. This largely reflects the financial resources enabling the purchase of radio and TV airtime during election campaign.

There was relatively little international media following both the conflict and peace processes, with an exception of Radio Free Asia, which was an influential alternative for news and reached many in rural areas. Radio is still the main media source for remote areas of Cambodia, but now technology (internet, TV, etc.) are competing.

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sponsored workshop on "Seizing the Global Opportunity: Investment Climate Assessment and Reform Strategy" (August 12, 2004), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCAMBODIA/Resources/Speech-HECham-Prasidh.pdf.

SECTION 6: ANALYSIS OF CUMULATIVE IMPACTS

This section analyzes the cumulative impacts of peace efforts, synthesized from the views given in earlier sections. The analyses are arranged into five parallel domains: 1. Political, 2. Structural, 3. Policy, 4. Social fabric, and 5. Socio-psychological domains.

1. Political

A recurring theme regarding the dynamics of Cambodia's political conflicts was described as power struggle and power relations. Within the political sphere the nature of conflict has transformed from armed struggle to direct political struggles. It is very important to notice that the 1991 PPA was not an agreement to end the conflict, but an agreement to choose a different path to continue it. Thus, from the first election in 1993 to the second election in 1998, all relevant actors were pursuing victory through a democratic framework. Several interviewees used a saying: "from fighting in the jungle to fighting under one roof." What have been cumulative impacts from the political domain that have helped sustain Cambodia from falling back to a new war or prolonged violent conflict? The change came out of:

> a. The parties' learning/understanding more about the issues and their differences;
> b. A process of shift in political boundaries;
> c. A process of recognizing a combination of common interests.

What did actors do in order to bring this new reality?

The conflict parties learned to manage political challenges within limits, from peaceful negotiations to low intensity violence and armed clashes where it was impossible when armed clash occur; it is difficult to turn back to negotiation table. Diplomats, national and international figures have had access to key political parties and worked with them separately and jointly to develop channels of communication among the key political parties when political tensions escalated.

Time and patience were among the most important pieces of the puzzle. Both national and international actors, whether NGOs or UN, were taking time in order to work with the political parties; they did not push them with "hard power," but helped them slowly understand more clearly their different positions and realities.

The commitment of the international community to help Cambodia through the dangerous crossroads during the late 1990s was very crucial for its survival. International organizations and donors continued to do their work, despite political tension and armed clashes.

Another important, useful aspect was a continuation of dialogue in the political domain.

Many politicians, irrespective of party, remained in direct communication. Civil society actors continued to raise key issues and shared views through different settings, formal and informal.

2. Structural

The primary structural effects have been in the political and socialdomains, although there are cumulative impacts seen in the cultural and traditional domains as well.

Political structure refers to the overarching structure of power. During the post-war peacebuilding period, Cambodia experienced a reconfiguration of an older political culture (a form of dynasty with a new generation of political actors). A shift happened at both national and local levels, through both national and international efforts. The impacts include significant changes in institutional structures (governance structure, law and regulations), but few changes in practical implementation or relationships, as would be indicated by the sustained attitudes and behavior of polticians (values, principles, moral/ethical judgments). Simply put, there have been some changes in terms of political and governing structures, but these are not matched by changes at the level of moral sentiment.

At the national level, we find effects from two interconnected mechanisms related to the delivery and the receiving of assistance for the development of political structures. International community actors, including international organizations and government bilateral and multilateral assistance agencies, have made a large contribution to development of technical capacity, often through technical organizations and expert individual consultants. These actors introduced external models of political structuring into Cambodian context that contributed to some adjustments in the existing political structures. However, the objective achievements are small compared to the predominant political structure in Cambodia. The impacts on the restructuring of the political structure in Cambodia are limited to and largely controlled by the Cambodian political elite. Evidence of the limits of external influences on local structures in politics can be measured by the prevailing mentality of those that interact with the structure – or more simply stated- by the continuation of the political parties workings of the structures to best meet the changing needs of the Cambodian context. The overall impacts made when focus is on structural change from outside, ultimately have lesser impact than it meant for change of political structure.

Government and national institutions are the main recipients in this analysis. These structures are very much stuck in an authoritarian power relationship and patron-client system that is deeply embedded in Cambodian political culture. Though there have been changes in institutional structures, decisions within the system are often still made not according to the formal structures, but rather based on the influence or the relationship between patrons and clients ("I help you, you help me"). As interviewees commonly identified, "Cambodia has good laws, but not good practice and enforcement of the law."

To identify impacts during the time period covered by this case study requires an

understanding of changes in social structures that have been made as a result of all the efforts. Civil society efforts have been very significant in Cambodia. There have never been so many civil society actors in Cambodian history until 1990s. In 2000, there were about 800 local NGOs and hundreds more international NGOs operating in Cambodia. This new phenomenon of social structure has brought in universal languages and technical concepts that help in communication, make complex dynamics in conflict clearer and unearth a number of hidden issues, such as gender, human rights, environment, ethnic diversity and other peace issues. Though all these concepts and knowledge are still limited to some parts of society, they are the beginning the long journey to bring about social awareness and knowledge. This is the main view gathered from the interviews.

Another aspect of social domain is the negative form of social relations that have emerged from the gap between the rich and the poor. They are widening gaps in political and economic privilege and between rich and poor. And while there have been widespread improvements in infrastructure through development programs —such as buildings, roads, schools, community clinics—problems problems of accessibility to the facilities and poor services across sectors remain.

Do efforts at the political and structural levels contribute to peace?

The efforts described above may not directly contribute to peace in a short term, but they are clearly contributing to the ongoing peace developments. Within the political and social domains, there are significant contrasts between the adopted concept and the practice that people is more inclined in relation to their traditional practice At the local level, there are impacts made by direct implementation of national and international NGOs and indirectly by the donor community which obviously is a social structural impact. However, there are often debates about the transferability of capacity development, such as human rights concepts, democratic principles and the rule of law across contexts as many NGO reports claim. For this reason, democratic restructuring is not experienced in many people's daily lives. Instead they seek peace by developing their ability to accommodate power relationships within the traditional patron-client system. Therefore, peace from political and structural area is little by little only growing out of traditional form which is in a low rate if looking from a cost efficient perspective.

Reflecting on this finding, we also ask why this kind of political and social structure seemingly works for Cambodia? While Cambodia has achieved a type of peace, this is not matched by equal accomplishments in justice. Within the frame of existing political structures, people see the peace process in Cambodia as a rather extreme form of pacification of the population. Peace has become equated with accepting power dynamics with little resistance, in a situation in which little resistance is tolerated. People are afforded some peace, but if they exercise too much resistance, they will be crushed. People expect that justice is met only when the needs of political leaders are satisfied.

3. Policy

The influence on public policy and political choice clearly helped to sustain peacebuilding during the political crisis of the late 1990s. First, when the winner of the power struggle between CPP and FUNCINPEC decided to give peace a chance, it made a great deal of difference in the period that followed. After the events of July 1997, CPP decided to continue the good policies developed earlier, even though they had jointly been decided with FUNCINPEC, and they made their former adversaries their partners. In particular, the National Election Committee was composed of broad-based members from different political parties and civil society representatives, and they allowed international third party observers to take part in later democratic processes. They have pursued other constructive policies, such as development programs and peacebuilding activities that began in the early 1990s that have been allowed to go on despite political tension and insecurity. International and national non-political actors maintained pressure for these changes. Their efforts also contributed to a quick easing of tension and subsequent political recovery, which was crucial to the return to normalcy after the 1997 armed clash.

International and national actors also constrained the imposition of extreme agendas by the powerful parties. The powerful and ruling parties were constantly under the watching eyes of independent actors, such as the UN, the international community and NGOs. That reduced their tendency to impose extreme agendas and led them to seek compromises. For example, the CPP party might have pressed ahead, after they had won the armed conflict against rival FUNCINPEC, to form a government on its own or by imposing military rule like that in Burma/Myanmar. Instead they were willing to organize a fresh election to legitimize their power. That would not have been possible if antagonisms had remained as they had been in the early 1980s.These advances can be attributed to the influence of outside interventions, such as by ASEAN leaders and foreign embassies in Phnom Penh, but local leaders are also influenced by knowledge of political alternatives and the experiences accumulated through relationship building through the peace process and implementation of the peace plan, spanning the late 1980s through to early 1990s.

The new forms of public policy and decision-making procedures at the national level do show inherited qualities from international community interventions, particularly in structural reform and good governance. However, the impacts have been more on technical aspects, rather than in democratic practice. There is a growth of technocratic autocracy in public policy practice. Most government public policies have technical ideas embedded in them, but hardly any processes for consultation with the population, and any form of referendum is unthinkable. This often creates more conflicts rather than managing them. Land reform policy and land conflict is a clear example.

In sum, there are observable cumulated impacts in the policy domain, specifically regarding technical and administrative procedures. However, there are few impacts in the policy area in relation to core issues like democratic and justice principles and basic human needs.

4. Social Fabric

There is evidence that recovery in the social fabric has begun. The international community and Cambodian civil society actors have done great work in this area, by committing, continuing to support and giving comfort to Cambodian people during the tough times of transition from a very fragile period during the 1990s until the present. As a result, people are able to look beyond the ongoing political tension and violence. The international community and NGOs helped people to focus on important work needed to achieve basic peace, including de-mining, community development, human rights education, illegal small arms reduction, peaceful conflict resolution training and various peacebuilding activities. From all of these efforts the remaining living tissue of social fabric started reviving itself. It is evident that impacts cumulated at social fabric domain helped to ease the volatile situation and reduce the possible escalation of violent conflict. The peace movement, such as peace walks led by Ven. Maha Ghosananda that began since early 1990s, were small but significantly contributed to a gradual reconnection between people from every corner of the society and has strengthened the social fabric. The process has invited back the soul of the society; despite different political backgrounds and ideological beliefs, everyone can see each other as human beings. In Cambodian culture,   as part of the healing process, the society must find the soul that once has been lost.

5. Social-psychological

This domain describes the conflict located deep in the soul of Cambodian society. It is a deep cultural phenomenon which is difficult to touch significantly through all the efforts described thus far. The effects of this deep culture on political and general social relations have their roots in history. Any attempt to build sustainable peace in Cambodia cannot afford to ignore this important social-psychological domain, although the impacts are less tangible or evident. Cambodians seem to have discovered more alternatives to violence and learned more about their violent culture though experiences in the peace process, conflict resolution and peacebuilding skills training introduced earlier on by peace workers and the concept of a Culture of Peace by UNESCO. There are positive patterns cumulating through dialogue, collaboration and cooperation that strengthen connections amongst people. There have been attempts to rebuild the positive sides of social culture and to emphasize beliefs such as 'peace by peaceful means' through predominant Cambodian Buddhist and other Khmer cultural approaches. These are oriented to majority Khmer culture, but are nonetheless important for social-psychological aspects in Cambodia.

To conclude this section, cumulative impacts occurred differently in different domains at the same time. In general, the efforts made by so many different actors at different levels converged to help Cambodia from falling back into a new civil war. The analysis highlights several important lessons for cumulative impacts of peacebuilding in Cambodia:

- The democratic political system in the case of Cambodia has been characterized by a process of clarifying who is in control, not through popular support but militarily. When power was uncontested, tension was drastically reduced, and peace was able to emerge. From the Cambodian experience, we can see that there is no direct path from war to peace; rather, the path proceeds from armed struggle to political struggle and transition to a temporary peace/negative peace. (Peace came first along with a little justice.)
- Both political and social structures have their own place in the contextual arrangements that were achieved better through transformation from within the context, not via imposing change. So time, patience and long term commitment is very important towards structural change. It is clear from transition between armed violence to negative peace, and gradually to a more positive peace.
- Policy always needs improvement, but the CPP's decision to maintain policies of using democratic rule of game that were already good for helping during crisis was a very good lesson learned. As far as the Cambodian experience is concerned, this was the key to a quick return to normalcy after a brief re-emergence of armed violence in 1997.
- The Peacebuilding process that helped Cambodians to envision and refocus again on the future is very important, starting from building relationships and the ability to see each other as fellow human beings and adopting peace as an alternative to violence.
- Conflict in the deep culture of Cambodia is the social-psychological area that must not be ignored. In the Cambodian case, understanding this dynamic helps further understanding of many other areas.

SECTION 7: ANALYSIS OF SUSTAINABILITY OR REVERSAL OF PROGRESS

Cambodia's progress across various social domains is still decided within the controlled political realm of the current system. Discussion of Cambodia's future direction often focuses on policies, rules and regulations that may be acceptable or workable within the existing system, but do not address social issues that may require reorientation of existing foci. In other words, progress has involved tinkering with the status quo rather than fundamental structural change; power, leadership and governance continue to be based on family ties, connections and "client" relationships, without challenge or questioning from the broader population.

However, the contradictions in the system may be sources of future social unrest or discontent. There are unhealthy signs, as the conditions that led to past social problems—such as structural violence, injustice, and economic deprivation—exist, and similar dynamics to those that existed in the pre-conflict situation are occurring.

The ruling party has sought—thus far, successfully—to win the hearts of the people by bribing and giving handouts, and creating patron-client relationships. This has created a tenuous harmony for the time being because the middle class seems to be satisfied with the leadership provided and benefits they receive. Politicians' connections with business through family ties allow the status quo to continue. The consequences of this approach, however—from the loss of scrutiny in the system to corruption and accumulation of wealth by the families of the powerful leaders—will have longer-term effects creating problems for the government. If the system ceases to meet the interests of business or the middle class, the ruling party will face problems, and their connections and loyalty structures may become dividing factors in the future. Similarly, if benefits diminish as the middle class expands and limited resources are stretched, discontent is likely to emerge. The rural population may begin to raise questions about the disparities in development across the country.

The resort to nationalism has succeeded in mobilizing and unifying people for political purposes. But this process too has created a pattern of popular movements that can easily be redirected to the Government. For example, when Thai-Cambodia tension subsides, anger could be redirected to corruption.

Certainly Cambodia is now relatively peaceful. However, from a peacebuilding perspective, it is clear that there are different qualities of peace in Cambodia that cannot be quantified. For peace in Cambodia must include the qualities of justice and for a more sustainable peace it must also involve both the soul and spirit for transformation. The co-authors' sentiment from this analysis is: "If one believes peacebuilding in Cambodia is a success story, one must also believe there is no direct path from war to peace, but from violent/armed struggle to political struggle and to a negative peace; and peace has to come first".

Background of the Authors

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APPENDIX 1: ANNEX 2 WITHDRAWAL CEASE-FIRE AND RELATED MEASURES

AGREEMENTS ON A COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE CAMBODIA CONFLICT - ANNEX 2

Article I: Cease-fire

1: All Cambodian Parties (hereinafter referred to as " the Parties") agree to observe a comprehensive cease-fire on land and water and in the air. This cease-fire will be implemented in two phases. During the first phase, the cease-fire will be observed with the assistance of the Secretary-General of the United Nations through his good offices. During the second phase, which should commence as soon as possible, the cease-fire will be supervised, monitored and verified by UNTAC. The Commander of the military component of UNTAC, in consultation with the Parties, shall determine the exact time and date at which the second phase will commence. This date will be set at least four weeks in advance of its coming into effect.

2: The Parties undertake that, upon the signing of this Agreement, they will observe a cease-fire and will order their armed force immediately to disengage and refrain from all hostilities and any deployment, movement or action that would extend the territory they control or that might lead to as resumption of fighting, pending the commencement of the second phase. " Forces" are agreed to include all regular, provincial, district, paramilitary and other auxiliary forces. During the first phase, the Secretary-General of the United Nations will provide his good offices to the Parties to assist them in its observance. The Parties undertake to cooperate with the Secretary-General or his representatives in the exercise of his good offices in this regard.

3: The Parties agree that, immediately upon the signing of this Agreement, the following information will be provided to the United Nations:

a) Total strength of their forces, organization, precise number and location of deployments inside and outside Cambodia. The deployment will be depicted on a map marked with locations of all troop positions, occupied or unoccupied, including staging camps, supply bases and supply routes;

b) Comprehensive lists of arms, ammunition and equipment held by their forces, and the exact locations at which those arms, ammunition and equipment are deployed;

c) Detailed record of their minefields, including types and characteristics of mines laid and information of booby traps used by them together with any information available to them about minefields laid or booby traps use by the other Parties;

d) Total strength of their police forces, organization, precise numbers and locations of deployments as well as comprehensive lists of their arms, ammunition and equipment and the exact locations at which those arms, ammunition and equipment are deployed.

4: Immediately upon his arrival in Cambodia, and not later than four weeks before the beginning of the second phase, the Commander of the military component of UNTAC will, in consultation with the Parties, finalize UNTAC's plan for the regroupment and cantonment of the forces of the Parties and for the storage of their arms, ammunition and equipment, in accordance with Article III of this annex. This plan will include the designation of regroupment and cantonment areas, as well as an agreed timetable. The cantonment areas will be established at battalion size or larger.

5: The Parties agree to take steps to inform their forces at least two weeks before the beginning of the second phase, using all possible means of communication, about the agreed date and time of the beginning of the second phase, about the agreed plan for the regroupment and cantonment of their forces and for the storage of their arms, ammunition and equipment and, in particular, about the exact locations of the regroupment areas to which their forces are to report. Such information will continue to be disseminated for a period of four weeks after the beginning of the second phase.

6: The parties shall scrupulously observe the cease-fire and will not resume any hostilities by land, water or air. The commanders of their armed forces will ensure that all troops under their command remain on their respective positions, pending their movement to the designated regroupment areas, and refrain from all hostilities and from any deployment or movement or action which would extend the territory they control or which might lead to a resumption of fighting. Article II: Liaison system and Mixed Military Working Group

A Mixed Military Working Group (MMWG) will be established with a view to resolving any problems that may arise in the observance of the cease-fire. It will be chaired by the most senior United Nations military officer in Cambodia or his representative. Each Party agrees to designate an officer of the rank of brigadier or equivalent to serve on the MMWG. Its composition, method of operation and meeting places will be determined by the most senior United Nations military officer in consultation with the Parties. Similar liaison arrangements will be made at lower military command levels to resolve practical problems on the ground.

Article III: Regroupment and cantonment of the forces of the Parties and storage of their arms, ammunition and equipment

1: In accordance with the operational timetable referred to in paragraph 4 of Article 1 of the present annex, all forces of the Parties that are not already in designated cantonment areas will report to designated regroupment areas, which will be established and operated by the military component of UNTAC. These regroupment areas will be established and operational not later than one week prior to the date of the beginning of the second phase. The Parties agree to arrange for all their forces, with all their arms, ammunition and equipment, to report to regroupment areas within two weeks after the beginning of the second phase. All personnel who have reported to the regroupment areas will thereafter be escorted by personnel of the military component of UNTAC, with their arms,

ammunition and equipment, to designated cantonment areas. All Parties agree to ensure that personnel reporting to the regroupment areas will be able to do so in full safety and without any hindrance.

2: On the basis of the information provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 1 of the present annex, UNTAC will confirm that the regroupment and cantonment processes have been completed in accordance with the plan referred to in paragraph 4 of Article 1 of this annex. UNTAC will endeavour to complete these processes within four weeks from the date of the beginning of the second phase. On the completion of regroupment of all forces and of their movement to cantonment areas, respectively, the Commander of the military component of UNTAC will so inform each of the four Parties.

3: The Parties agree that, as their forces enter the designated cantonment areas; their personnel will be instructed by their commanders to immediately hand over all their arms, ammunition and equipment to UNTAC for storage in the custody of UNTAC.

4: UNTAC will check the arms, ammunition and equipment handed over to it against the lists referred to in paragraph 3. b) of Article 1 of this annex, in order to verify that all the arms, ammunition and equipment in the possession of the Parties have been placed under its custody.

Article IV: Resupply of forces during cantonment

The military component of UNTAC will supervise the resupply of all forces of the Parties during the regroupment and cantonment processes. Such resupply will be confined to items of a non-lethal nature such as food, water, clothing and medical supplies as well as provision of medical care.

Article V: Ultimate disposition of the forces of the Parties and of their arms, ammunition and equipment

1: In order to reinforce the objectives of a comprehensive political settlement, minimize the risks of a return to warfare, stabilize the security situation and build confidence among the Parties to the conflict, all Parties agree to undertake a phased and balanced process of demobilization of at least 70 percent of their military forces. This process shall be undertaken in accordance with a detailed plan to be drawn up by UNTAC on the basis of the information provided under Article 1 of this annex and in consultation with the Parties. It should be completed prior to the end of the process of registration for the elections and on a date to be determined by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

2: The Cambodian Parties hereby commit themselves to demobilize all their remaining forces before or shortly after the elections and, to the extent that full demobilization is unattainable, to respect and abide by whatever decision the newly elected government that emerges in accordance with Article 12 of this Agreement takes with regard to the incorporation of parts or all of those forces into a new national army. Upon completion of the demobilization referred to in paragraph 1, the Cambodian Parties and the Special

Representative of the Secretary-General shall undertake a review regarding the final disposition of the force remaining in the cantonments, with a view to determining which of the following shall apply:

a) If the Parties agree to proceed with the demobilization of all or some of the force remaining in the cantonments, preferably prior to or otherwise shortly after the elections, the Special Representative shall prepare a timetable for so doing, in consultation with them.

b) Should total demobilization of all of the residual forces before or shortly after the elections not be possible, the Parties hereby undertake to make available all of their forces remaining in cantonments to the newly elected government that emerges in accordance with Article 12 of this Agreement, for consideration for incorporation into a new national army. They further agree that any such forces are not incorporated into the new national army will be demobilized forthwith according to a plan to be prepared by the Special Representative. With regard to the ultimate disposition of the remaining forces and all the arms, ammunition and equipment, UNTAC, as it withdraws from Cambodia, shall retain such authority as is necessary to ensure an orderly transfer to the newly elected government of those responsibilities it has exercised during the transitional period.

3: UNTAC will assist, as required, with the reintegration into civilian life of the force demobilized prior to the elections.

4: a) UNTAC will control and guard all the arms, ammunition and equipment of the Parties throughout the transitional period.

b) As the cantonment forces are demobilized in accordance with paragraph 1 above, there will be a parallel reduction by UNTAC of the arms, ammunition and equipment stored on site in the cantonment areas. For the forces remaining in the cantonment areas, access to their arms, ammunition and equipment shall only be on the basis of the explicit authorization of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

c) If there is a further demobilization of the military forces in accordance with paragraph 2. a) Above, there will be a commensurate reduction by UNTAC of the arms, ammunition and equipment stored on site in the cantonment areas.

d) The ultimate disposition of all arms, ammunition and equipment will be determined by the government that emerges through the free and fair elections in accordance with Article 12 of this Agreement.

Article VI: Verification of withdrawal from Cambodia and non-return of all categories of foreign forces

1: UNTAC shall be provided, no later than two weeks before the commencement of the second phase of the cease-fire, with detailed information in writing regarding the withdrawal of foreign forces. This information shall include the following elements:

a) Total strength of these forces and their organization and deployment.
b) Comprehensive lists of arms, ammunition and equipment held by these forces, and their exact locations.
c) Withdrawal plan (already implemented or to be implemented), including withdrawal routes, border crossing points and time of departure from Cambodia.

2: On the basis of the information provided in accordance with paragraph 1 above, UNTAC will undertake an investigation in the manner it deems appropriate. The Party providing the information will be required to make personnel available to accompany UNTAC investigations.

3: Upon confirmation of the presence of any foreign forces, UNTAC will immediately deploy military personnel with the foreign forces and accompany them until they have withdrawn from Cambodia territory. UNTAC will also establish checkpoints on withdrawal routes, border crossing points and airfields to verify the withdrawal and ensure the non-return of all categories of foreign forces.

4: The Mixed Military Working Group (MMWG) provided for in Article II of these annex will assist UNTAC in fulfilling the above-mentioned tasks.

Article VII: Cessation of outside military assistance to all Cambodian Parties

1: All Parties undertake, from the time of the signing of this Agreement, not to obtain or seek any outside military assistance, including weapons, ammunition and military equipment from outside sources.

2: The Signatories whose territory is adjacent to Cambodia, namely, the Governments of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, the Kingdom of Thailand and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, undertake to:

a) Prevent the territories of their respective States, including land territory, territorial sea and air space, from being used for the purpose of providing any form of military assistance to any of the Cambodian Parties. Resupply of such items as food, water, clothing and medical supplies through their territories will be allowed, but shall, without prejudice to the provisions of sub-paragraph c) below, be subject to UNTAC supervision upon arrival in Cambodia.

b) Provide written confirmation to the Commander of the military component of UNTAC, not later than four weeks after the second phase of the cease-fire begins, that no forces, arms, ammunition or military equipment of any of the Cambodian Parties are present on their territories.

c) Receive an UNTAC liaison officer in each of their capitals and designate an officer of the rank of colonel or equivalent, not later than four weeks after the beginning of the second phase of the cease-fire, in order to assist UNTAC in investigating, with due respect for their sovereignty, any complaints that activities are taking place on their territories that are contrary to the provisions of the comprehensive political settlement.

3: To enable UNTAC to monitor the cessation of outside assistance to all Cambodian Parties, the Parties agree that, upon signature of this Agreement, they will provide to UNTAC any information available to them about the routes and means by which military assistance, including weapons, ammunition and military equipment, have been supplied to any of the Parties. Immediately after the second phase of the cease-fire begins, UNTAC will take the following practical measures:

a) Establish checkpoints along the routes and at selected locations along the Cambodian side of the border and at airfields inside Cambodia.
b) Patrol the coastal inland waterways of Cambodia.
c) Maintain mobile teams at strategic locations within Cambodia to patrol and investigate allegations of supply of arms to any of the Parties.

Article VII: Caches of weapons and military supplies

1: In order to stabilize the security situation, build confidence and reduce arms and military supplies throughout Cambodia, each Party agrees to provide to the Commander of the military component of UNTAC, before a date to be determined by him, all information at is disposal, including marked maps, about known or suspected caches of weapons and military supplies throughout Cambodia.
2: On the basis of information received, the military component of UNTAC shall, after the date referred to in paragraph 1, deploy verification teams to investigate each report and destroy each cache found.

Article IX: Unexploded ordnance devices
1: Soon after arrival in Cambodia, the military component of UNTAC shall ensure, as a first step, that all known minefields are clearly marked.
2: The Parties agree that, after completion of the regroupment and cantonment processes in accordance with Article III of the present annex, they will make available mine-clearing teams which, under the supervision and control of UNTAC military personnel, will leave the cantonment areas in order to assist in removing, disarming or deactivating remaining unexploded ordnance devices. Those mines or objects which cannot be removed, disarmed or deactivated will be clearly marked in accordance with a system to be devised by the military component of UNTAC.

3: UNTAC shall: a) Conduct a mass public education programme in the recognition and avoidance of explosive devices.
b) Train Cambodian volunteers to dispose of unexploded ordnance devices.
c) Provide emergency first-aid training to Cambodian volunteers.

Article X: Investigation of violations
1: After the beginning of the second phase, upon receipt of any information or complaint from one of the Parties relating to a possible case of non-compliance with any of the provisions of the present annex or related provisions, UNTAC will undertake an investigation in the manner which it deems appropriate. Where the investigation takes place in response to a complaint by one of the Parties, that Party will be required to make personnel available to accompany the UNTAC investigators. The results of such investigation will be conveyed by UNTAC to the complaining Party and the Party complained against, and if necessary to the SNC.
2: UNTAC will also carry out investigations on its own initiative in other cases when it has reason to believe or suspect that a violation of this annex or related provisions may be taking place.

Article XI: Release of prisoners of war

The military component of UNTAC will provide assistance as required to the International Committee of the Red Cross in the latter's discharge of its functions relating to the release of prisoners of war.

Article XII: Repatriation and resettlement of displaced Cambodians.
The military component of UNTAC will provide assistance as necessary in the repatriation of Cambodian refugees and displaced persons carried out in accordance with Article 19 and 20 of this Agreement, in particular in the clearing of mines from repatriation routes, reception centers and resettlement areas, as well as in the protection of the reception centre.